]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
Move `Persist` trait to chainmonitor as that's the only reference
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37
38 use chain;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
49 use ln::msgs;
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::onion_utils;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
61
62 use io;
63 use prelude::*;
64 use core::{cmp, mem};
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use core::ops::Deref;
73
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 //
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 //
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
84 //
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93         Forward {
94                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
96         },
97         Receive {
98                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100         },
101         ReceiveKeysend {
102                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104         },
105 }
106
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109         routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110         incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112         pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 }
115
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 }
121
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 }
128
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130         AddHTLC {
131                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132
133                 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134                 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135                 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136                 // HTLCs.
137                 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138                 prev_htlc_id: u64,
139                 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140         },
141         FailHTLC {
142                 htlc_id: u64,
143                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144         },
145 }
146
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150         short_channel_id: u64,
151         htlc_id: u64,
152         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153
154         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156         outpoint: OutPoint,
157 }
158
159 enum OnionPayload {
160         /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161         /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162         /// are part of the same payment.
163         Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
166 }
167
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
170         cltv_expiry: u32,
171         value: u64,
172         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
173 }
174
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
178
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
181                 self.0.write(w)
182         }
183 }
184
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
188                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
189         }
190 }
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
195         OutboundRoute {
196                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
197                 session_priv: SecretKey,
198                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
201                 payment_id: PaymentId,
202         },
203 }
204 #[cfg(test)]
205 impl HTLCSource {
206         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
208                         path: Vec::new(),
209                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
212                 }
213         }
214 }
215
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
218         LightningError {
219                 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
220         },
221         Reason {
222                 failure_code: u16,
223                 data: Vec<u8>,
224         }
225 }
226
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
229         PrevHopForceClosed,
230         MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
231         Success(u64),
232         DuplicateClaim,
233 }
234
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
236
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
242
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244         err: msgs::LightningError,
245         chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
246         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
247 }
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
249         #[inline]
250         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
251                 Self {
252                         err: LightningError {
253                                 err: err.clone(),
254                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
256                                                 channel_id,
257                                                 data: err
258                                         },
259                                 },
260                         },
261                         chan_id: None,
262                         shutdown_finish: None,
263                 }
264         }
265         #[inline]
266         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
267                 Self {
268                         err: LightningError {
269                                 err,
270                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
271                         },
272                         chan_id: None,
273                         shutdown_finish: None,
274                 }
275         }
276         #[inline]
277         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
279         }
280         #[inline]
281         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
282                 Self {
283                         err: LightningError {
284                                 err: err.clone(),
285                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287                                                 channel_id,
288                                                 data: err
289                                         },
290                                 },
291                         },
292                         chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
294                 }
295         }
296         #[inline]
297         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
298                 Self {
299                         err: match err {
300                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
301                                         err: msg,
302                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
303                                 },
304                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
305                                         err: msg,
306                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
307                                 },
308                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
309                                         err: msg.clone(),
310                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312                                                         channel_id,
313                                                         data: msg
314                                                 },
315                                         },
316                                 },
317                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
318                                         err: msg.clone(),
319                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321                                                         channel_id,
322                                                         data: msg
323                                                 },
324                                         },
325                                 },
326                         },
327                         chan_id: None,
328                         shutdown_finish: None,
329                 }
330         }
331 }
332
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
338
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
346         CommitmentFirst,
347         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
348         RevokeAndACKFirst,
349 }
350
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353         pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354         pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358         /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359         pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360         /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
363         /// go to read them!
364         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
368 }
369
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375         /// commitment transaction.
376         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
377 }
378
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
381 struct PeerState {
382         latest_features: InitFeatures,
383 }
384
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
387 ///
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
389 /// here.
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394         /// this payment being removed.
395         expiry_time: u64,
396         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397         user_payment_id: u64,
398         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
401 }
402
403 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
404 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
405 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
406         Legacy {
407                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
408         },
409         Retryable {
410                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
411                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
412                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
413                 pending_amt_msat: u64,
414                 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
415                 total_msat: u64,
416                 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
417                 starting_block_height: u32,
418         },
419 }
420
421 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
422         fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
423                 let remove_res = match self {
424                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
425                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
426                                 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
427                         }
428                 };
429                 if remove_res {
430                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
431                                 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat;
432                         }
433                 }
434                 remove_res
435         }
436
437         fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
438                 let insert_res = match self {
439                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
440                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
441                                 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
442                         }
443                 };
444                 if insert_res {
445                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
446                                 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
447                         }
448                 }
449                 insert_res
450         }
451
452         fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
453                 match self {
454                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
455                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
456                                 session_privs.len()
457                         }
458                 }
459         }
460 }
461
462 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
463 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
464 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
465 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
466 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
467 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
468 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
469 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
470
471 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
472 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
473 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
474 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
475 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
476 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
477 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
478 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
479 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
480
481 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
482 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
483 ///
484 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
485 /// to individual Channels.
486 ///
487 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
488 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
489 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
490 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
491 ///
492 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
493 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
494 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
495 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
496 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
497 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
498 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
499 ///
500 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
501 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
502 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
503 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
504 /// object!
505 ///
506 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
507 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
508 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
509 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
510 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
511 ///
512 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
513 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
514 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
515 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
516 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
517 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
518         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
519         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
520         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
521         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
522                                 L::Target: Logger,
523 {
524         default_configuration: UserConfig,
525         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
526         fee_estimator: F,
527         chain_monitor: M,
528         tx_broadcaster: T,
529
530         #[cfg(test)]
531         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
532         #[cfg(not(test))]
533         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
534         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
535
536         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
537         pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
538         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
539         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
540
541         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
542         /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
543         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
544         /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
545         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
546         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
547
548         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
549         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
550         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
551         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
552         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
553         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
554         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
555         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
556         ///
557         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
558         ///
559         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
560         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
561
562         our_network_key: SecretKey,
563         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
564
565         /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
566         /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
567         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
568
569         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
570         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
571         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
572         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
573
574         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
575         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
576         /// are currently open with that peer.
577         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
578         /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
579         /// new channel.
580         ///
581         /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
582         per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
583
584         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
585         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
586         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
587         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
588         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
589         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
590         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
591         /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
592         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
593
594         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
595
596         keys_manager: K,
597
598         logger: L,
599 }
600
601 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
602 ///
603 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
604 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
605 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
606 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
607 pub struct ChainParameters {
608         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
609         pub network: Network,
610
611         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
612         ///
613         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
614         pub best_block: BestBlock,
615 }
616
617 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
618 enum NotifyOption {
619         DoPersist,
620         SkipPersist,
621 }
622
623 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
624 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
625 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
626 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
627 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
628 /// updates are ready for persistence).
629 ///
630 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
631 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
632 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
633 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
634         persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
635         should_persist: F,
636         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
637         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
638 }
639
640 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
641         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
642                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
643         }
644
645         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
646                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
647
648                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
649                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
650                         should_persist: persist_check,
651                         _read_guard: read_guard,
652                 }
653         }
654 }
655
656 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
657         fn drop(&mut self) {
658                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
659                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
660                 }
661         }
662 }
663
664 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
665 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
666 ///
667 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
668 ///
669 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
670 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
671 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
672 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
673 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
674
675 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
676 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
677 ///
678 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
679 ///
680 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
681 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
682 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
683 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
684 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
685 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
686 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
687
688 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
689 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
690 /// this value.
691 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
692 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
693 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
694 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
695
696 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
697 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
698 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
699 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
700 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
701 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
702 #[deny(const_err)]
703 #[allow(dead_code)]
704 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
705
706 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
707 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
708 #[deny(const_err)]
709 #[allow(dead_code)]
710 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
711
712 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
713 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
714 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
715         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
716         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
717         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
718         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
719         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
720         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
721         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
722         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
723 }
724
725 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
726 /// to better separate parameters.
727 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
728 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
729         /// The node_id of our counterparty
730         pub node_id: PublicKey,
731         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
732         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
733         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
734         pub features: InitFeatures,
735         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
736         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
737         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
738         ///
739         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
740         ///
741         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
742         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
743         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
744         /// payments to us through this channel.
745         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
746 }
747
748 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
749 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
750 pub struct ChannelDetails {
751         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
752         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
753         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
754         /// lifetime of the channel.
755         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
756         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
757         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
758         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
759         /// our counterparty already.
760         ///
761         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
762         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
763         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
764         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
765         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
766         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
767         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
768         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
769         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
770         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
771         /// this value on chain.
772         ///
773         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
774         ///
775         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
776         ///
777         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
778         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
779         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
780         pub user_id: u64,
781         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
782         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
783         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
784         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
785         ///
786         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
787         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
788         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
789         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
790         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
791         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
792         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
793         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
794         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
795         ///
796         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
797         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
798         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
799         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
800         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
801         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
802         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
803         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
804         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
805         ///
806         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
807         ///
808         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
809         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
810         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
811         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
812         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
813         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
814         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
815         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
816         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
817         ///
818         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
819         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
820         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
821         pub is_outbound: bool,
822         /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
823         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
824         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
825         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
826         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
827         ///
828         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
829         pub is_funding_locked: bool,
830         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
831         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
832         ///
833         /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
834         pub is_usable: bool,
835         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
836         pub is_public: bool,
837 }
838
839 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
840 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
841 /// states for more.
842 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
843 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
844         /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
845         /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
846         /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
847         ParameterError(APIError),
848         /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
849         /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
850         /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
851         /// payment in full.
852         ///
853         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
854         /// send_payment.
855         PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
856         /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
857         /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
858         /// paths than the ones selected).
859         AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
860         /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
861         /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
862         /// in over-/re-payment.
863         ///
864         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
865         /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
866         /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
867         ///
868         /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
869         /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
870         /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
871         /// with the latest update_id.
872         PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
873 }
874
875 macro_rules! handle_error {
876         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
877                 match $internal {
878                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
879                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
880                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
881                                 {
882                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
883                                         // entering the macro.
884                                         assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
885                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
886                                 }
887
888                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
889
890                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
891                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
892                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
893                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
894                                                         msg: update
895                                                 });
896                                         }
897                                         if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
898                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id,  reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
899                                         }
900                                 }
901
902                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
903                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
904                                 } else {
905                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
906                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
907                                                 action: err.action.clone()
908                                         });
909                                 }
910
911                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
912                                         $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
913                                 }
914
915                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
916                                 Err(err)
917                         },
918                 }
919         }
920 }
921
922 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
923 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
924         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
925                 match $err {
926                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
927                                 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
928                                 //peer here.
929                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
930                         },
931                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
932                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
933                         },
934                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
935                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
936                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
937                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
938                                 }
939                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
940                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
941                         },
942                         ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
943                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
944                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
945                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
946                                 }
947                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
948                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
949                         }
950                 }
951         }
952 }
953
954 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
955         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
956                 match $res {
957                         Ok(res) => res,
958                         Err(e) => {
959                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
960                                 if drop {
961                                         $entry.remove_entry();
962                                 }
963                                 break Err(res);
964                         }
965                 }
966         }
967 }
968
969 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
970         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
971                 match $res {
972                         Ok(res) => res,
973                         Err(e) => {
974                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
975                                 if drop {
976                                         $entry.remove_entry();
977                                 }
978                                 return Err(res);
979                         }
980                 }
981         }
982 }
983
984 macro_rules! remove_channel {
985         ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
986                 {
987                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
988                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
989                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
990                         }
991                         channel
992                 }
993         }
994 }
995
996 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
997         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
998                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
999         };
1000         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1001                 match $err {
1002                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1003                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1004                                 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1005                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1006                                 }
1007                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1008                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1009                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1010                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1011                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1012                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1013                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1014                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1015                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1016                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
1017                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1018                                 (res, true)
1019                         },
1020                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1021                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
1022                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1023                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1024                                                                 match $action_type {
1025                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1026                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1027                                                                 }
1028                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1029                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1030                                                         else { "nothing" },
1031                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1032                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
1033                                 if !$resend_commitment {
1034                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1035                                 }
1036                                 if !$resend_raa {
1037                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1038                                 }
1039                                 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1040                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1041                         },
1042                 }
1043         };
1044         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
1045                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
1046                 if drop {
1047                         $entry.remove_entry();
1048                 }
1049                 res
1050         } };
1051 }
1052
1053 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1054         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1055                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1056         };
1057         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1058                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1059         }
1060 }
1061
1062 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1063 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1064         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1065                 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1066                         (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1067                                 break e;
1068                         },
1069                         (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1070                 }
1071         }
1072 }
1073
1074 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1075         ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1076          $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1077          $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1078                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1079                 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1080
1081                 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1082                 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1083                 let res = loop {
1084                         let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1085                         if !forwards.is_empty() {
1086                                 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1087                                         $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1088                         }
1089
1090                         if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1091                                 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1092                                 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1093                                 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1094                                 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1095                                 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1096                                 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1097                                 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1098                                 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1099                                 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1100                                 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1101                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1102                         }
1103
1104                         if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1105                                 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1106                                 // before it should be allowed to.
1107                                 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1108                                 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1109                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1110                                         msg,
1111                                 });
1112                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1113                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1114                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1115                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
1116                                         });
1117                                 }
1118                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1119                         }
1120
1121                         let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1122                         if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1123                                 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1124                                 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1125                                 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1126                                 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1127                                 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1128                                 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1129                                 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1130                                 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1131                                 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1132                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1133                                 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1134                                         // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1135                                         // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1136                                         // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1137                                         let mut order = $order;
1138                                         if $raa.is_none() {
1139                                                 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1140                                         }
1141                                         break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1142                                 }
1143                         }
1144
1145                         macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1146                                 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1147                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1148                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1149                                                 updates: update,
1150                                         });
1151                                 }
1152                         } }
1153                         macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1154                                 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1155                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1156                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1157                                                 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1158                                         });
1159                                 }
1160                         } }
1161                         match $order {
1162                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1163                                         handle_cs!();
1164                                         handle_raa!();
1165                                 },
1166                                 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1167                                         handle_raa!();
1168                                         handle_cs!();
1169                                 },
1170                         }
1171                         if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1172                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1173                                 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1174                         }
1175                         break Ok(());
1176                 };
1177
1178                 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1179                         // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1180                         // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1181                         // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1182                         assert!(res.is_ok());
1183                 }
1184
1185                 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1186         } }
1187 }
1188
1189 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1190         ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1191                 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1192
1193                 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1194
1195                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1196                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1197                 }
1198         } }
1199 }
1200
1201 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1202         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1203         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1204         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1205         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1206         L::Target: Logger,
1207 {
1208         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1209         ///
1210         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1211         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1212         ///
1213         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1214         ///
1215         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1216         ///
1217         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1218         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1219         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1220         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1221                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1222                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1223
1224                 ChannelManager {
1225                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1226                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1227                         fee_estimator: fee_est,
1228                         chain_monitor,
1229                         tx_broadcaster,
1230
1231                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1232
1233                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1234                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1235                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1236                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1237                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1238                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1239                         }),
1240                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1241                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1242
1243                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1244                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1245                         secp_ctx,
1246
1247                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1248                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1249
1250                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1251
1252                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1253                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1254                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1255                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1256
1257                         keys_manager,
1258
1259                         logger,
1260                 }
1261         }
1262
1263         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
1264         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1265                 &self.default_configuration
1266         }
1267
1268         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1269         ///
1270         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1271         /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1272         /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1273         /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1274         /// otherwise ignored.
1275         ///
1276         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1277         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1278         ///
1279         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1280         /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1281         ///
1282         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1283         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1284         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1285         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1286                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1287                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1288                 }
1289
1290                 let channel = {
1291                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1292                         match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1293                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1294                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1295                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1296                                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1297                                         Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1298                                 },
1299                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1300                         }
1301                 };
1302                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1303
1304                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1305                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1306                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1307
1308                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1309                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1310                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1311                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1312                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1313                                 } else {
1314                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1315                                 }
1316                         },
1317                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1318                 }
1319                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1320                         node_id: their_network_key,
1321                         msg: res,
1322                 });
1323                 Ok(())
1324         }
1325
1326         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1327                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1328                 {
1329                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1330                         res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1331                         for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1332                                 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1333                                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1334                                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1335                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1336                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1337                                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1338                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1339                                                 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1340                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1341                                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1342                                         },
1343                                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1344                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1345                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1346                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1347                                         inbound_capacity_msat,
1348                                         outbound_capacity_msat,
1349                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1350                                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1351                                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1352                                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1353                                         is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1354                                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1355                                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1356                                 });
1357                         }
1358                 }
1359                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1360                 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1361                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1362                                 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1363                         }
1364                 }
1365                 res
1366         }
1367
1368         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1369         /// more information.
1370         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1371                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1372         }
1373
1374         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1375         /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1376         ///
1377         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1378         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1379         /// are.
1380         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1381                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1382                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1383                 // really wanted anyway.
1384                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1385         }
1386
1387         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1388         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1389                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1390                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1391                         Some(transaction) => {
1392                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1393                         },
1394                         None => {},
1395                 }
1396                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), reason: closure_reason });
1397         }
1398
1399         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1400                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1401
1402                 let counterparty_node_id;
1403                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1404                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1405                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1406                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1407                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1408                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1409                                         counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1410                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1411                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1412                                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1413                                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1414                                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1415                                                         chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1416                                                 },
1417                                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1418                                         };
1419                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1420
1421                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1422                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1423                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1424                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
1425                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1426                                                         if is_permanent {
1427                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1428                                                                 break result;
1429                                                         }
1430                                                 }
1431                                         }
1432
1433                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1434                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1435                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1436                                         });
1437
1438                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1439                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1440                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1441                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1442                                                                 msg: channel_update
1443                                                         });
1444                                                 }
1445                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1446                                         }
1447                                         break Ok(());
1448                                 },
1449                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1450                         }
1451                 };
1452
1453                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1454                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1455                 }
1456
1457                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1458                 Ok(())
1459         }
1460
1461         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1462         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1463         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1464         ///
1465         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1466         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1467         ///    estimate.
1468         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1469         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1470         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1471         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1472         ///
1473         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1474         ///
1475         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1476         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1477         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1478         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1479                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1480         }
1481
1482         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1483         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1484         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1485         ///
1486         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1487         /// the channel being closed or not:
1488         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1489         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1490         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1491         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1492         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1493         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1494         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1495         ///
1496         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1497         ///
1498         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1499         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1500         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1501         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1502                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1503         }
1504
1505         #[inline]
1506         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1507                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1508                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1509                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1510                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1511                 }
1512                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1513                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1514                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1515                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1516                         // ignore the result here.
1517                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1518                 }
1519         }
1520
1521         /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1522         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1523         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1524                 let mut chan = {
1525                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1527                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1528                                 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1529                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1530                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1531                                         }
1532                                 }
1533                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1534                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1535                                 }
1536                                 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1537                                         if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1538                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1539                                         }
1540                                 } else {
1541                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1542                                 }
1543                                 chan.remove_entry().1
1544                         } else {
1545                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1546                         }
1547                 };
1548                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1549                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1550                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1551                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1552                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1553                                 msg: update
1554                         });
1555                 }
1556
1557                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1558         }
1559
1560         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1561         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1562         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1563                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1564                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1565                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1566                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1567                                         events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1568                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1569                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1570                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1571                                                 },
1572                                         }
1573                                 );
1574                                 Ok(())
1575                         },
1576                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1577                 }
1578         }
1579
1580         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1581         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1582         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1583                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1584                         let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1585                 }
1586         }
1587
1588         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1589                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1590                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1591                                 {
1592                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1593                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1594                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1595                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1596                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1597                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
1598                                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1599                                 }
1600                         }
1601                 }
1602
1603                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1604                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1605                 }
1606
1607                 let shared_secret = {
1608                         let mut arr = [0; 32];
1609                         arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1610                         arr
1611                 };
1612                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1613
1614                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1615                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1616                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1617                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1618                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1619                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1620                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1621                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1622                 }
1623
1624                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1625                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1626                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1627                 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1628                         return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1629                 }
1630
1631                 let mut channel_state = None;
1632                 macro_rules! return_err {
1633                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1634                                 {
1635                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1636                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
1637                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1638                                         }
1639                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1640                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1641                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1642                                                 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1643                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
1644                                 }
1645                         }
1646                 }
1647
1648                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1649                 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1650                 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1651                         match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1652                                 Err(err) => {
1653                                         let error_code = match err {
1654                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1655                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1656                                                 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1657                                                 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1658                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1659                                         };
1660                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1661                                 },
1662                                 Ok(msg) => {
1663                                         let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1664                                         if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1665                                                 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1666                                         }
1667                                         (msg, hmac)
1668                                 },
1669                         }
1670                 };
1671
1672                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1673                         #[cfg(test)]
1674                         {
1675                                 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1676                                 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1677                                 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1678                                 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1679                                 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1680                                 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1681                                 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1682                                 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1683                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1684                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1685                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1686                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1687                         }
1688
1689                         // OUR PAYMENT!
1690                         // final_expiry_too_soon
1691                         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1692                         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1693                         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1694                         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1695                         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1696                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1697                                 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1698                         }
1699                         // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1700                         if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1701                                 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1702                         }
1703                         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1704                         if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1705                                 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1706                         }
1707
1708                         let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1709                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1710                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1711                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1712                                         if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1713                                                 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1714                                         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1715                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1716                                                         payment_data: data,
1717                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1718                                                 }
1719                                         } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1720                                                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1721                                                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1722                                                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1723                                                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1724                                                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1725                                                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1726                                                 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1727                                                         return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1728                                                 }
1729
1730                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1731                                                         payment_preimage,
1732                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1733                                                 }
1734                                         } else {
1735                                                 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1736                                         }
1737                                 },
1738                         };
1739
1740                         // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1741                         // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1742                         // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1743                         // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1744
1745                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1746                                 routing,
1747                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1748                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1749                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1750                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1751                         })
1752                 } else {
1753                         let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1754                         let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1755                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1756                         {
1757                                 // Check two things:
1758                                 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1759                                 //    read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1760                                 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1761                                 let mut t = [0; 1];
1762                                 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1763                         }
1764                         // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1765                         // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1766                         chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1767
1768                         let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1769
1770                         let blinding_factor = {
1771                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1772                                 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1773                                 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1774                                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1775                         };
1776
1777                         let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1778                                 Err(e)
1779                         } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1780
1781                         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1782                                 version: 0,
1783                                 public_key,
1784                                 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1785                                 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1786                         };
1787
1788                         let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1789                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1790                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1791                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1792                                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1793                                 },
1794                         };
1795
1796                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1797                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1798                                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1799                                         short_channel_id,
1800                                 },
1801                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1802                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1803                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1804                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1805                         })
1806                 };
1807
1808                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1809                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1810                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1811                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1812                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1813                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1814                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1815                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1816                                         let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1817                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1818                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1819                                                 },
1820                                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1821                                         };
1822
1823                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1824
1825                                         if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1826                                                 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1827                                                 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1828                                                 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1829                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1830                                         }
1831
1832                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1833                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1834                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1835                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1836                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1837                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1838                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1839                                         }
1840                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1841                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1842                                         }
1843                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1844                                                 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1845                                                 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1846                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1847                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1848                                         }
1849                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1850                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1851                                         }
1852                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1853                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1854                                         // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1855                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1856                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1857                                         }
1858                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1859                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1860                                         }
1861                                         // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1862                                         // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1863                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1864                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1865                                         }
1866
1867                                         break None;
1868                                 }
1869                                 {
1870                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1871                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1872                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1873                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1874                                                 }
1875                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1876                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1877                                                 }
1878                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1879                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1880                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1881                                                 }
1882                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1883                                         }
1884                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1885                                 }
1886                         }
1887                 }
1888
1889                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1890         }
1891
1892         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1893         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1894         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1895         ///
1896         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1897         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1898                 if !chan.should_announce() {
1899                         return Err(LightningError {
1900                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1901                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1902                         });
1903                 }
1904                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1905                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1906         }
1907
1908         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1909         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1910         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1911         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1912         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1913         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1914                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1915                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1916                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1917                         Some(id) => id,
1918                 };
1919
1920                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1921
1922                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1923                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1924                         short_channel_id,
1925                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1926                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1927                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1928                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1929                         htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1930                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1931                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1932                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1933                 };
1934
1935                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1936                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1937
1938                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1939                         signature: sig,
1940                         contents: unsigned
1941                 })
1942         }
1943
1944         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1945         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1946                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1947                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1948                 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1949                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1950
1951                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1952                         .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1953                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1954                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1955                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1956                 }
1957                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1958
1959                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1960
1961                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1962                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1963                         let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1964                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1965                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1966                         };
1967
1968                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1969                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1970                                 match {
1971                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1972                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1973                                         }
1974                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
1975                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1976                                         }
1977                                         let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
1978                                                 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1979                                                         path: path.clone(),
1980                                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1981                                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1982                                                         payment_id,
1983                                                 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
1984                                         channel_state, chan);
1985
1986                                         let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1987                                         let payment = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id).or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
1988                                                 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
1989                                                 pending_amt_msat: 0,
1990                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1991                                                 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
1992                                                 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
1993                                                 total_msat: total_value,
1994                                         });
1995                                         assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
1996
1997                                         send_res
1998                                 } {
1999                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2000                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2001                                                         maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2002                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2003                                                         // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2004                                                         // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2005                                                         // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2006                                                         // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2007                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2008                                                 }
2009
2010                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2011                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2012                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2013                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2014                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2015                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2016                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2017                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2018                                                                 update_fee: None,
2019                                                                 commitment_signed,
2020                                                         },
2021                                                 });
2022                                         },
2023                                         None => {},
2024                                 }
2025                         } else { unreachable!(); }
2026                         return Ok(());
2027                 };
2028
2029                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2030                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2031                         Err(e) => {
2032                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2033                         },
2034                 }
2035         }
2036
2037         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2038         ///
2039         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2040         /// fields for more info.
2041         ///
2042         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2043         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2044         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2045         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2046         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2047         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2048         ///
2049         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2050         ///
2051         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2052         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2053         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2054         ///
2055         /// In general, a path may raise:
2056         ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2057         ///    node public key) is specified.
2058         ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2059         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2060         ///    failure).
2061         ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2062         ///    relevant updates.
2063         ///
2064         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2065         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2066         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2067         ///
2068         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2069         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2070         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2071         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2072         /// payment_secret.
2073         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2074         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2075         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2076         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2077                 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2078         }
2079
2080         fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2081                 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2082                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2083                 }
2084                 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2085                         // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2086                         // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2087                         // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2088                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2089                 }
2090                 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2091                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2092                 }
2093                 let mut total_value = 0;
2094                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2095                 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2096                 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2097                 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2098                         if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2099                                 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2100                                 continue 'path_check;
2101                         }
2102                         for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2103                                 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2104                                         path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2105                                         continue 'path_check;
2106                                 }
2107                         }
2108                         total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2109                         path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2110                 }
2111                 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2112                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2113                 }
2114                 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2115                         debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2116                         total_value = amt_msat;
2117                 }
2118
2119                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2120                 let mut results = Vec::new();
2121                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2122                         results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2123                 }
2124                 let mut has_ok = false;
2125                 let mut has_err = false;
2126                 for res in results.iter() {
2127                         if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2128                         if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2129                         if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2130                                 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2131                                 // PartialFailure.
2132                                 has_err = true;
2133                                 has_ok = true;
2134                                 break;
2135                         }
2136                 }
2137                 if has_err && has_ok {
2138                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2139                 } else if has_err {
2140                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2141                 } else {
2142                         Ok(payment_id)
2143                 }
2144         }
2145
2146         /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2147         ///
2148         /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2149         /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2150         /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2151         /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2152         ///
2153         /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2154         pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2155                 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2156                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2157                         if path.len() == 0 {
2158                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2159                                         err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2160                                 }))
2161                         }
2162                 }
2163
2164                 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2165                         let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2166                         if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2167                                 match payment {
2168                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2169                                                 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2170                                         } => {
2171                                                 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2172                                                 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2173                                                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2174                                                                 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2175                                                         }))
2176                                                 }
2177                                                 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2178                                         },
2179                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2180                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2181                                                         err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2182                                                 }))
2183                                         }
2184                                 }
2185                         } else {
2186                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2187                                         err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2188                                 }))
2189                         }
2190                 };
2191                 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2192         }
2193
2194         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2195         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2196         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2197         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2198         /// never reach the recipient.
2199         ///
2200         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2201         ///
2202         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2203         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2204         ///
2205         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2206         ///
2207         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2208         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2209                 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2210                         Some(p) => p,
2211                         None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2212                 };
2213                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2214                 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2215                         Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2216                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2217                 }
2218         }
2219
2220         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2221         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2222         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2223                         (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2224                 let (chan, msg) = {
2225                         let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2226                                 Some(mut chan) => {
2227                                         let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2228
2229                                         (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2230                                                 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2231                                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2232                                                 } else { unreachable!(); })
2233                                         , chan)
2234                                 },
2235                                 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2236                         };
2237                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2238                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2239                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2240                                 },
2241                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2242                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2243                                 }) },
2244                         }
2245                 };
2246
2247                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2248                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2249                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2250                         msg,
2251                 });
2252                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2253                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2254                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2255                         },
2256                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2257                                 e.insert(chan);
2258                         }
2259                 }
2260                 Ok(())
2261         }
2262
2263         #[cfg(test)]
2264         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2265                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2266                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2267                 })
2268         }
2269
2270         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2271         ///
2272         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2273         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2274         ///
2275         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2276         ///
2277         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2278         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2279         /// keys per-channel).
2280         ///
2281         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2282         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2283         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2284         ///
2285         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2286         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2287         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2288         ///
2289         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2290         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2291                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2292
2293                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2294                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2295                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2296                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2297                                 });
2298                         }
2299                 }
2300                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2301                         let mut output_index = None;
2302                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2303                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2304                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2305                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2306                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2307                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2308                                                 });
2309                                         }
2310                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2311                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2312                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2313                                                 });
2314                                         }
2315                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2316                                 }
2317                         }
2318                         if output_index.is_none() {
2319                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2320                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2321                                 });
2322                         }
2323                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2324                 })
2325         }
2326
2327         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2328                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2329                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2330                         return None
2331                 }
2332
2333                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2334                         Ok(res) => res,
2335                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2336                 };
2337                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2338                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2339
2340                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2341                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2342                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2343                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
2344                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2345                 })
2346         }
2347
2348         #[allow(dead_code)]
2349         // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2350         // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2351         // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2352         // message...
2353         const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2354         #[deny(const_err)]
2355         #[allow(dead_code)]
2356         // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2357         // smaller than 500:
2358         const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2359
2360         /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2361         /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2362         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2363         /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2364         /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2365         /// our network addresses.
2366         ///
2367         /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2368         /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2369         ///
2370         /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2371         /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2372         /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2373         /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2374         ///
2375         /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2376         ///
2377         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2378         pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2379                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2380
2381                 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2382                         panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2383                 }
2384
2385                 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2386                 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2387                 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2388
2389                 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2390                         features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2391                         timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2392                         node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2393                         rgb, alias, addresses,
2394                         excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2395                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2396                 };
2397                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2398                 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2399
2400                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2401                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2402
2403                 let mut announced_chans = false;
2404                 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2405                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2406                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2407                                         msg,
2408                                         update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2409                                                 Ok(msg) => msg,
2410                                                 Err(_) => continue,
2411                                         },
2412                                 });
2413                                 announced_chans = true;
2414                         } else {
2415                                 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2416                                 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2417                                 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2418                         }
2419                 }
2420
2421                 if announced_chans {
2422                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2423                                 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2424                                         signature: node_announce_sig,
2425                                         contents: announcement
2426                                 },
2427                         });
2428                 }
2429         }
2430
2431         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2432         ///
2433         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2434         /// Will likely generate further events.
2435         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2436                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2437
2438                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2439                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2440                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2441                 {
2442                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2443                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2444
2445                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2446                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2447                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2448                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2449                                                 None => {
2450                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2451                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2452                                                                 match forward_info {
2453                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2454                                                                                                    prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2455                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2456                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2457                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2458                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2459                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2460                                                                                 });
2461                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2462                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2463                                                                                 ));
2464                                                                         },
2465                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2466                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2467                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2468                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2469                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
2470                                                                         }
2471                                                                 }
2472                                                         }
2473                                                         continue;
2474                                                 }
2475                                         };
2476                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2477                                                 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2478                                                 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2479                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2480                                                         match forward_info {
2481                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2482                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2483                                                                                         onion_packet, ..
2484                                                                                 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2485                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2486                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2487                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2488                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2489                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2490                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2491                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2492                                                                         });
2493                                                                         match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2494                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2495                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2496                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2497                                                                                         } else {
2498                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2499                                                                                         }
2500                                                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2501                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2502                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2503                                                                                         ));
2504                                                                                         continue;
2505                                                                                 },
2506                                                                                 Ok(update_add) => {
2507                                                                                         match update_add {
2508                                                                                                 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2509                                                                                                 None => {
2510                                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2511                                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2512                                                                                                         // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2513                                                                                                         // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2514                                                                                                         // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2515                                                                                                         // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2516                                                                                                         // this channel currently :/.
2517                                                                                                 }
2518                                                                                         }
2519                                                                                 }
2520                                                                         }
2521                                                                 },
2522                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2523                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2524                                                                 },
2525                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2526                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2527                                                                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2528                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2529                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2530                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2531                                                                                         } else {
2532                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2533                                                                                         }
2534                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2535                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2536                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2537                                                                                         continue;
2538                                                                                 },
2539                                                                                 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2540                                                                                 Ok(None) => {
2541                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2542                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2543                                                                                         // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2544                                                                                         // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2545                                                                                         // messages when we can.
2546                                                                                         // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2547                                                                                         // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2548                                                                                         // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2549                                                                                 }
2550                                                                         }
2551                                                                 },
2552                                                         }
2553                                                 }
2554
2555                                                 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2556                                                         let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2557                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
2558                                                                 Err(e) => {
2559                                                                         // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2560                                                                         // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2561                                                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2562                                                                         let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
2563                                                                                 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2564                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2565                                                                                 }
2566                                                                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2567                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2568                                                                                         let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2569                                                                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2570                                                                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2571                                                                                         }
2572                                                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2573                                                                                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2574                                                                                 },
2575                                                                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2576                                                                         };
2577                                                                         handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2578                                                                         continue;
2579                                                                 }
2580                                                         };
2581                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2582                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2583                                                                 continue;
2584                                                         }
2585                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2586                                                                 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2587                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2588                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2589                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2590                                                                         update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2591                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2592                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2593                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2594                                                                         update_fee: None,
2595                                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2596                                                                 },
2597                                                         });
2598                                                 }
2599                                         } else {
2600                                                 unreachable!();
2601                                         }
2602                                 } else {
2603                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2604                                                 match forward_info {
2605                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2606                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2607                                                                         prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2608                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2609                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2610                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2611                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2612                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2613                                                                         _ => {
2614                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2615                                                                         }
2616                                                                 };
2617                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2618                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2619                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2620                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2621                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2622                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2623                                                                         },
2624                                                                         value: amt_to_forward,
2625                                                                         cltv_expiry,
2626                                                                         onion_payload,
2627                                                                 };
2628
2629                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2630                                                                         ($htlc: expr) => {
2631                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2632                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2633                                                                                         &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2634                                                                                 );
2635                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2636                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2637                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2638                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2639                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2640                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
2641                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2642                                                                                 ));
2643                                                                         }
2644                                                                 }
2645
2646                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2647                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2648                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2649                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2650                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2651                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2652                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2653                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2654                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2655                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2656                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2657                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2658                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2659                                                                                         },
2660                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2661                                                                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2662                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2663                                                                                                                 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2664                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2665                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2666                                                                                                                         amt: amt_to_forward,
2667                                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2668                                                                                                                 });
2669                                                                                                         },
2670                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2671                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2672                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2673                                                                                                         }
2674                                                                                                 }
2675                                                                                         }
2676                                                                                 }
2677                                                                         },
2678                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2679                                                                                 let payment_data =
2680                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2681                                                                                                 data.clone()
2682                                                                                         } else {
2683                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2684                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2685                                                                                                 continue
2686                                                                                         };
2687                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2688                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2689                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2690                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2691                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2692                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2693                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2694                                                                                 } else {
2695                                                                                         let mut total_value = 0;
2696                                                                                         let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2697                                                                                                 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2698                                                                                         if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2699                                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2700                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2701                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2702                                                                                                         continue
2703                                                                                                 }
2704                                                                                         }
2705                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2706                                                                                         for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2707                                                                                                 total_value += htlc.value;
2708                                                                                                 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2709                                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2710                                                                                                                 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2711                                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2712                                                                                                                                                                  log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2713                                                                                                                         total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2714                                                                                                                 }
2715                                                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2716                                                                                                         },
2717                                                                                                         _ => unreachable!(),
2718                                                                                                 }
2719                                                                                         }
2720                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2721                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2722                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2723                                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2724                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(htlc);
2725                                                                                                 }
2726                                                                                         } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2727                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2728                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2729                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2730                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2731                                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2732                                                                                                                 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2733                                                                                                         },
2734                                                                                                         amt: total_value,
2735                                                                                                 });
2736                                                                                                 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2737                                                                                                 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2738                                                                                                 // claimed.
2739                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2740                                                                                         } else {
2741                                                                                                 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2742                                                                                                 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2743                                                                                                 // MPP parts.
2744                                                                                         }
2745                                                                                 }
2746                                                                         },
2747                                                                 };
2748                                                         },
2749                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2750                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2751                                                         }
2752                                                 }
2753                                         }
2754                                 }
2755                         }
2756                 }
2757
2758                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2759                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2760                 }
2761
2762                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2763                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2764                 }
2765
2766                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2767                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2768                 events.append(&mut new_events);
2769         }
2770
2771         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2772         ///
2773         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2774         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2775         ///
2776         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2777         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2778                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2779                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2780                 if background_events.is_empty() {
2781                         return false;
2782                 }
2783
2784                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2785                         match event {
2786                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2787                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2788                                         // monitor updating completing.
2789                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2790                                 },
2791                         }
2792                 }
2793                 true
2794         }
2795
2796         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2797         /// Process background events, for functional testing
2798         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2799                 self.process_background_events();
2800         }
2801
2802         fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2803                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2804                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2805                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2806                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2807                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2808                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2809                 }
2810                 if !chan.is_live() {
2811                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2812                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2813                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2814                 }
2815                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2816                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2817
2818                 let mut retain_channel = true;
2819                 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2820                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
2821                         Err(e) => {
2822                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2823                                 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2824                                 Err(res)
2825                         }
2826                 };
2827                 let ret_err = match res {
2828                         Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2829                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2830                                         let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2831                                         if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2832                                         res
2833                                 } else {
2834                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2835                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2836                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2837                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2838                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2839                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2840                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2841                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2842                                                         commitment_signed,
2843                                                 },
2844                                         });
2845                                         Ok(())
2846                                 }
2847                         },
2848                         Ok(None) => Ok(()),
2849                         Err(e) => Err(e),
2850                 };
2851                 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2852         }
2853
2854         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
2855         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2856         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2857         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2858         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2859         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2860                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2861                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2862
2863                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2864
2865                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2866                         {
2867                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2868                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2869                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2870                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2871                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2872                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2873                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2874                                         if err.is_err() {
2875                                                 handle_errors.push(err);
2876                                         }
2877                                         retain_channel
2878                                 });
2879                         }
2880
2881                         should_persist
2882                 });
2883         }
2884
2885         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2886         ///
2887         /// This currently includes:
2888         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2889         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2890         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2891         ///    the channel.
2892         ///
2893         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2894         /// estimate fetches.
2895         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2896                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2897                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2898                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2899
2900                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2901
2902                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2903                         {
2904                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2905                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2906                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2907                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2908                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2909                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2910                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2911                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2912                                         if err.is_err() {
2913                                                 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2914                                         }
2915                                         if !retain_channel { return false; }
2916
2917                                         if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2918                                                 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2919                                                 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2920                                                 if needs_close { return false; }
2921                                         }
2922
2923                                         match chan.channel_update_status() {
2924                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2925                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2926                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2927                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2928                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2929                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2930                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2931                                                                         msg: update
2932                                                                 });
2933                                                         }
2934                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2935                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2936                                                 },
2937                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2938                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2939                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2940                                                                         msg: update
2941                                                                 });
2942                                                         }
2943                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2944                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2945                                                 },
2946                                                 _ => {},
2947                                         }
2948
2949                                         true
2950                                 });
2951                         }
2952
2953                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2954                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2955                         }
2956                         should_persist
2957                 });
2958         }
2959
2960         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2961         /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2962         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2963         /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2964         /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2965         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2966                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2967
2968                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2969                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2970                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2971                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2972                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2973                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2974                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2975                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2976                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2977                                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2978                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2979                         }
2980                         true
2981                 } else { false }
2982         }
2983
2984         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2985         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2986         // be surfaced to the user.
2987         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2988                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2989                         match htlc_src {
2990                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2991                                         let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2992                                                 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2993                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2994                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2995                                                                         (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2996                                                                 } else {
2997                                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2998                                                                 }
2999                                                         },
3000                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3001                                                 };
3002                                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3003                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3004                                                 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3005                                 },
3006                                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3007                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3008                                         session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3009                                         let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3010                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3011                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
3012                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3013                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3014                                                                         payment_hash,
3015                                                                         rejected_by_dest: false,
3016                                                                         network_update: None,
3017                                                                         all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3018                                                                         path: path.clone(),
3019                                                                         short_channel_id: None,
3020                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3021                                                                         error_code: None,
3022                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3023                                                                         error_data: None,
3024                                                                 }
3025                                                         );
3026                                                 }
3027                                         } else {
3028                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3029                                         }
3030                                 },
3031                         };
3032                 }
3033         }
3034
3035         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3036         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3037         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3038         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3039         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3040         /// still-available channels.
3041         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3042                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3043                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3044                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3045                 //timer handling.
3046
3047                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3048                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3049                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3050                 match source {
3051                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3052                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3053                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3054                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3055                                 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3056                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3057                                         if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
3058                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3059                                                 return;
3060                                         }
3061                                         if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3062                                                 all_paths_failed = true;
3063                                         }
3064                                 } else {
3065                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3066                                         return;
3067                                 }
3068                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3069                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3070                                 match &onion_error {
3071                                         &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3072 #[cfg(test)]
3073                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3074 #[cfg(not(test))]
3075                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3076                                                 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3077                                                 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3078                                                 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3079                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3080                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3081                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3082                                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3083                                                                 network_update,
3084                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3085                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3086                                                                 short_channel_id,
3087 #[cfg(test)]
3088                                                                 error_code: onion_error_code,
3089 #[cfg(test)]
3090                                                                 error_data: onion_error_data
3091                                                         }
3092                                                 );
3093                                         },
3094                                         &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3095 #[cfg(test)]
3096                                                         ref failure_code,
3097 #[cfg(test)]
3098                                                         ref data,
3099                                                         .. } => {
3100                                                 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3101                                                 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3102                                                 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3103                                                 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3104                                                 // ChannelDetails.
3105                                                 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3106                                                 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3107                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3108                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3109                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3110                                                                 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3111                                                                 network_update: None,
3112                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3113                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3114                                                                 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3115 #[cfg(test)]
3116                                                                 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3117 #[cfg(test)]
3118                                                                 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3119                                                         }
3120                                                 );
3121                                         }
3122                                 }
3123                         },
3124                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3125                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3126                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3127                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3128                                                 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3129                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3130                                         },
3131                                         HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3132                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3133                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3134                                         }
3135                                 };
3136
3137                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3138                                 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3139                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3140                                 }
3141                                 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3142                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3143                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3144                                         },
3145                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3146                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3147                                         }
3148                                 }
3149                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3150                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3151                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3152                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3153                                                 time_forwardable: time
3154                                         });
3155                                 }
3156                         },
3157                 }
3158         }
3159
3160         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3161         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3162         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3163         ///
3164         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3165         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3166         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3167         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3168         ///
3169         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3170         ///
3171         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3172         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3173         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3174                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3175
3176                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3177
3178                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3179                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3180                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3181                         assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3182
3183                         // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3184                         // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3185                         // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3186                         // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3187                         //
3188                         // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3189                         // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3190                         // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3191                         // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3192                         // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3193                         // it.
3194                         let mut valid_mpp = true;
3195                         for htlc in sources.iter() {
3196                                 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3197                                         valid_mpp = false;
3198                                         break;
3199                                 }
3200                         }
3201
3202                         let mut errs = Vec::new();
3203                         let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3204                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3205                                 if !valid_mpp {
3206                                         if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3207                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3208                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3209                                                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3210                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3211                                                                          HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3212                                                                          HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3213                                 } else {
3214                                         match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3215                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3216                                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3217                                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3218                                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3219                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3220                                                                 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3221                                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3222                                                 },
3223                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3224                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3225                                                         // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3226                                                         // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3227                                                         // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3228                                                         // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3229                                                 },
3230                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3231                                         }
3232                                 }
3233                         }
3234
3235                         // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3236                         // which were generated.
3237                         channel_state.take();
3238
3239                         for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3240                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3241                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3242                         }
3243
3244                         claimed_any_htlcs
3245                 } else { false }
3246         }
3247
3248         fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3249                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3250                 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3251                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3252                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3253                         None => {
3254                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3255                         }
3256                 };
3257
3258                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3259                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3260                                 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3261                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3262                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3263                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3264                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3265                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
3266                                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3267                                                                 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3268                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3269                                                                 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3270                                                         );
3271                                                 }
3272                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3273                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3274                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3275                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3276                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3277                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3278                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3279                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3280                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3281                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3282                                                                         update_fee: None,
3283                                                                         commitment_signed,
3284                                                                 }
3285                                                         });
3286                                                 }
3287                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3288                                         } else {
3289                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3290                                         }
3291                                 },
3292                                 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3293                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3294                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3295                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3296                                                         payment_preimage, e);
3297                                         }
3298                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3299                                         let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3300                                         if drop {
3301                                                 chan.remove_entry();
3302                                         }
3303                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3304                                 },
3305                         }
3306                 } else { unreachable!(); }
3307         }
3308
3309         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3310                 match source {
3311                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3312                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3313                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3314                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3315                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3316                                 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&payment_id) {
3317                                         sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)
3318                                 } else { false };
3319                                 if found_payment {
3320                                         let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3321                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3322                                                 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3323                                                         payment_preimage,
3324                                                         payment_hash: payment_hash
3325                                                 }
3326                                         );
3327                                 } else {
3328                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3329                                 }
3330                         },
3331                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3332                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3333                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3334                                 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3335                                 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3336                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3337                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3338                                         _ => None,
3339                                 };
3340                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3341                                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3342                                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3343                                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3344                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3345                                                 }],
3346                                         };
3347                                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3348                                         // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3349                                         // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3350                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3351                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3352                                                                                          payment_preimage, e);
3353                                         }
3354                                         // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3355                                         // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3356                                         // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3357                                         // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3358                                         // can happen.
3359                                 }
3360                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3361                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3362                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3363                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3364                                 }
3365
3366                                 if claimed_htlc {
3367                                         if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3368                                                 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3369                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3370                                                 } else { None };
3371
3372                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3373                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3374                                                         fee_earned_msat,
3375                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3376                                                 });
3377                                         }
3378                                 }
3379                         },
3380                 }
3381         }
3382
3383         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3384         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3385                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3386         }
3387
3388         /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3389         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3390         /// operation.
3391         ///
3392         /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3393         /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3394         ///
3395         /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3396         /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3397         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3398         /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3399         ///
3400         /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3401         ///  1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3402         ///  2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3403         ///     said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3404         ///     any time it cannot do so instantly,
3405         ///  3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3406         ///  4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3407         ///     completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3408         pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3409                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3410
3411                 let chan_restoration_res;
3412                 let mut pending_failures = {
3413                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3414                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3415                         let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3416                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3417                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3418                         };
3419                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3420                                 return;
3421                         }
3422
3423                         let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3424                         let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3425                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3426                                 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3427                                 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3428                                 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3429                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3430                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3431                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3432                                 })
3433                         } else { None };
3434                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3435                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3436                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3437                         }
3438                         pending_failures
3439                 };
3440                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3441                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3442                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3443                 }
3444         }
3445
3446         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3447                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3448                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3449                 }
3450
3451                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3452                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3453                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3454                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3455                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3456                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3457                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3458                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3459                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3460                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3461                                 });
3462                                 entry.insert(channel);
3463                         }
3464                 }
3465                 Ok(())
3466         }
3467
3468         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3469                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3470                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3471                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3472                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3473                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3474                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3475                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3476                                         }
3477                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3478                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3479                                 },
3480                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3481                         }
3482                 };
3483                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3484                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3485                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3486                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
3487                         output_script,
3488                         user_channel_id: user_id,
3489                 });
3490                 Ok(())
3491         }
3492
3493         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3494                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3495                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3496                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3497                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3498                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3499                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3500                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3501                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3502                                         }
3503                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3504                                 },
3505                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3506                         }
3507                 };
3508                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3509                 // lock before watch_channel
3510                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3511                         match e {
3512                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3513                                         // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3514                                         // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3515                                         // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3516                                         // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3517                                         // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3518                                         // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3519                                         // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3520                                         let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3521                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3522                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3523                                 },
3524                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3525                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3526                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3527                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3528                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
3529                                         chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3530                                 },
3531                         }
3532                 }
3533                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3534                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3535                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3536                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3537                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3538                         },
3539                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3540                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3541                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3542                                         msg: funding_msg,
3543                                 });
3544                                 e.insert(chan);
3545                         }
3546                 }
3547                 Ok(())
3548         }
3549
3550         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3551                 let funding_tx = {
3552                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3553                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3555                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3556                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3557                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3558                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3559                                         }
3560                                         let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3561                                                 Ok(update) => update,
3562                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3563                                         };
3564                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3565                                                 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3566                                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3567                                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3568                                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3569                                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3570                                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3571                                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3572                                                         }
3573                                                 }
3574                                                 return res
3575                                         }
3576                                         funding_tx
3577                                 },
3578                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3579                         }
3580                 };
3581                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3582                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3583                 Ok(())
3584         }
3585
3586         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3587                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3588                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3589                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3590                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3591                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3592                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3593                                 }
3594                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3595                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3596                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3597                                         // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3598                                         // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3599                                         // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3600                                         // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3601                                         // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3602                                         // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3603                                         // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3604                                         // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3605                                         // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3606                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3607                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3608                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
3609                                         });
3610                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3611                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3612                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3613                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3614                                         });
3615                                 }
3616                                 Ok(())
3617                         },
3618                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3619                 }
3620         }
3621
3622         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3623                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3624                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3625                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3626                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3627
3628                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3629                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3630                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3631                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3632                                         }
3633
3634                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3635                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3636                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3637                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3638                                         }
3639
3640                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3641                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3642
3643                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3644                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3645                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3646                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
3647                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3648                                                         if is_permanent {
3649                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3650                                                                 break result;
3651                                                         }
3652                                                 }
3653                                         }
3654
3655                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3656                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3657                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3658                                                         msg,
3659                                                 });
3660                                         }
3661
3662                                         break Ok(());
3663                                 },
3664                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3665                         }
3666                 };
3667                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3668                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3669                 }
3670
3671                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3672                 Ok(())
3673         }
3674
3675         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3676                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3677                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3678                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3679                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3680                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3681                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3682                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3683                                         }
3684                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3685                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3686                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3687                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3688                                                         msg,
3689                                                 });
3690                                         }
3691                                         if tx.is_some() {
3692                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3693                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3694                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3695                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3696                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3697                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3698                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3699                                                 }
3700                                                 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3701                                         } else { (tx, None) }
3702                                 },
3703                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3704                         }
3705                 };
3706                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3707                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3708                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3709                 }
3710                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3711                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3712                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3713                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3714                                         msg: update
3715                                 });
3716                         }
3717                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3718                 }
3719                 Ok(())
3720         }
3721
3722         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3723                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3724                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3725                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3726                 //
3727                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3728                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3729                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3730                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3731
3732                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3733                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3734
3735                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3736                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3737                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3738                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3739                                 }
3740
3741                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3742                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3743                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3744                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3745                                         match pending_forward_info {
3746                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3747                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3748                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3749                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3750                                                                                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3751                                                                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3752                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3753                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3754                                                                                 res
3755                                                                         }[..])
3756                                                                 } else {
3757                                                                         // The only case where we'd be unable to
3758                                                                         // successfully get a channel update is if the
3759                                                                         // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3760                                                                         // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3761                                                                         // payments over the channel back to themselves
3762                                                                         // (because no one else should know the short_id
3763                                                                         // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3764                                                                         // no problem just calling this
3765                                                                         // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3766                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3767                                                                 }
3768                                                         } else {
3769                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3770                                                         };
3771                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3772                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3773                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3774                                                                 reason
3775                                                         };
3776                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3777                                                 },
3778                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
3779                                         }
3780                                 };
3781                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3782                         },
3783                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3784                 }
3785                 Ok(())
3786         }
3787
3788         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3789                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3790                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3791                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3792                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3793                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3794                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3795                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3796                                         }
3797                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3798                                 },
3799                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3800                         }
3801                 };
3802                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3803                 Ok(())
3804         }
3805
3806         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3807                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3808                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3809                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3810                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3811                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3812                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3813                                 }
3814                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3815                         },
3816                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3817                 }
3818                 Ok(())
3819         }
3820
3821         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3822                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3823                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3824                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3825                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3826                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3827                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3828                                 }
3829                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3830                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3831                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3832                                 }
3833                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3834                                 Ok(())
3835                         },
3836                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3837                 }
3838         }
3839
3840         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3841                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3842                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3843                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3844                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3845                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3846                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3847                                 }
3848                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3849                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3850                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3851                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3852                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3853                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3854                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3855                                                         unreachable!();
3856                                                 },
3857                                                 Ok(res) => res
3858                                         };
3859                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3860                                         return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3861                                 }
3862                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3863                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3864                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
3865                                 });
3866                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3867                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3868                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3869                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3870                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3871                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3872                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3873                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3874                                                         update_fee: None,
3875                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
3876                                                 },
3877                                         });
3878                                 }
3879                                 Ok(())
3880                         },
3881                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3882                 }
3883         }
3884
3885         #[inline]
3886         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3887                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3888                         let mut forward_event = None;
3889                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3890                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3891                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3892                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3893                                 }
3894                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3895                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3896                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3897                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3898                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3899                                         }) {
3900                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3901                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3902                                                                                                         prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3903                                                 },
3904                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3905                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3906                                                                                                      prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3907                                                 }
3908                                         }
3909                                 }
3910                         }
3911                         match forward_event {
3912                                 Some(time) => {
3913                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3914                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3915                                                 time_forwardable: time
3916                                         });
3917                                 }
3918                                 None => {},
3919                         }
3920                 }
3921         }
3922
3923         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3924                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3925                 let res = loop {
3926                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3927                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3928                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3929                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3930                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3931                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3932                                         }
3933                                         let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3934                                         let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3935                                                 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3936                                         htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3937                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3938                                                 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3939                                                         assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3940                                                         break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3941                                                 } else {
3942                                                         if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3943                                                                 break Err(e);
3944                                                         } else { unreachable!(); }
3945                                                 }
3946                                         }
3947                                         if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3948                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3949                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3950                                                         updates,
3951                                                 });
3952                                         }
3953                                         break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3954                                 },
3955                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3956                         }
3957                 };
3958                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3959                 match res {
3960                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3961                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3962                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3963                                 }
3964                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3965                                 Ok(())
3966                         },
3967                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3968                 }
3969         }
3970
3971         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3972                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3973                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3974                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3975                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3976                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3977                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3978                                 }
3979                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3980                         },
3981                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3982                 }
3983                 Ok(())
3984         }
3985
3986         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3987                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3988                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3989
3990                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3991                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3992                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3993                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3994                                 }
3995                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3996                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3997                                 }
3998
3999                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4000                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4001                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4002                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4003                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4004                                 });
4005                         },
4006                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4007                 }
4008                 Ok(())
4009         }
4010
4011         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4012         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4013                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4014                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4015                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4016                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4017                         None => {
4018                                 // It's not a local channel
4019                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4020                         }
4021                 };
4022                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4023                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4024                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4025                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
4026                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4027                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4028                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4029                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4030                                         }
4031                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4032                                 }
4033                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4034                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4035                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4036                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4037                                 } else {
4038                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4039                                 }
4040                         },
4041                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4042                 }
4043                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4044         }
4045
4046         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4047                 let chan_restoration_res;
4048                 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4049                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4050                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4051
4052                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4053                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4054                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4055                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4056                                         }
4057                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4058                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4059                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4060                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4061                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4062                                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4063                                         let mut channel_update = None;
4064                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4065                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4066                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4067                                                         msg,
4068                                                 });
4069                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4070                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4071                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4072                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4073                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4074                                                         node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4075                                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4076                                                 });
4077                                         }
4078                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4079                                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4080                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4081                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4082                                         }
4083                                         (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4084                                 },
4085                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4086                         }
4087                 };
4088                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4089                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4090
4091                 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4092                         self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4093                 }
4094                 Ok(())
4095         }
4096
4097         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4098         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4099                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4100                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4101                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4102                 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4103                         match monitor_event {
4104                                 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4105                                         if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4106                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4107                                                 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4108                                         } else {
4109                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4110                                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4111                                         }
4112                                 },
4113                                 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) => {
4114                                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4115                                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4116                                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4117                                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4118                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4119                                         if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4120                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4121                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4122                                                 }
4123                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4124                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4125                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4126                                                                 msg: update
4127                                                         });
4128                                                 }
4129                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4130                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4131                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4132                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4133                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4134                                                         },
4135                                                 });
4136                                         }
4137                                 },
4138                         }
4139                 }
4140
4141                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4142                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4143                 }
4144
4145                 has_pending_monitor_events
4146         }
4147
4148         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4149         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4150         /// update was applied.
4151         ///
4152         /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4153         /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4154         /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4155         /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4156         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4157                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4158                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4159                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4160                 {
4161                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4162                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4163                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4164                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4165                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4166
4167                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4168                                 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4169                                         Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4170                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4171                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4172                                                 }
4173                                                 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4174                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4175                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
4176                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4177                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4178                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
4179                                                         } else {
4180                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4181                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4182                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
4183                                                                 });
4184                                                         }
4185                                                 }
4186                                                 true
4187                                         },
4188                                         Err(e) => {
4189                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4190                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4191                                                 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4192                                                 !close_channel
4193                                         }
4194                                 }
4195                         });
4196                 }
4197
4198                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4199                 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4200                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4201                 }
4202
4203                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4204                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4205                 }
4206
4207                 has_update
4208         }
4209
4210         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4211         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4212         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4213         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4214                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4215                 let mut has_update = false;
4216                 {
4217                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4218                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4219                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4220                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4221                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4222
4223                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4224                                 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4225                                         Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4226                                                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4227                                                         has_update = true;
4228                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4229                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4230                                                         });
4231                                                 }
4232                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4233                                                         // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4234                                                         // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4235                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4236                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4237                                                         }
4238
4239                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4240                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4241                                                                         msg: update
4242                                                                 });
4243                                                         }
4244
4245                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4246
4247                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4248                                                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4249                                                         false
4250                                                 } else { true }
4251                                         },
4252                                         Err(e) => {
4253                                                 has_update = true;
4254                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4255                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4256                                                 !close_channel
4257                                         }
4258                                 }
4259                         });
4260                 }
4261
4262                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4263                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4264                 }
4265
4266                 has_update
4267         }
4268
4269         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4270         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4271         /// Channel object.
4272         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4273                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4274                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4275                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4276                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
4277                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4278                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4279                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4280                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4281                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4282                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4283                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4284                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
4285                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4286                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4287                         }
4288                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4289                 }
4290         }
4291
4292         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4293                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4294
4295                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4296
4297                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4298                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4299                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4300                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4301                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4302                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4303                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4304                                         // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4305                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4306                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4307                                         // never fail a payment too early.
4308                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4309                                         // timestamps.
4310                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4311                                 });
4312                         },
4313                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4314                 }
4315                 Ok(payment_secret)
4316         }
4317
4318         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4319         /// to pay us.
4320         ///
4321         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4322         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4323         ///
4324         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4325         /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4326         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4327         ///
4328         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4329         ///
4330         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4331         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4332         /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4333         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4334         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4335                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4336                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4337
4338                 (payment_hash,
4339                         self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4340                                 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4341         }
4342
4343         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4344         /// stored external to LDK.
4345         ///
4346         /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4347         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4348         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4349         ///
4350         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4351         /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4352         ///
4353         /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4354         /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4355         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4356         /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4357         /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4358         ///
4359         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4360         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4361         /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4362         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4363         ///
4364         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4365         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4366         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4367         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4368         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4369         ///
4370         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4371         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4372         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4373         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4374         /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4375         ///
4376         /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4377         /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4378         /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4379         ///
4380         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4381         ///
4382         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4383         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4384         ///
4385         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4386         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4387         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4388         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4389                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4390         }
4391
4392         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4393         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4394                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4395                 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4396                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4397                 events.into_inner()
4398         }
4399
4400         #[cfg(test)]
4401         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4402                 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4403         }
4404 }
4405
4406 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4407         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4408         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4409         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4410         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4411                                 L::Target: Logger,
4412 {
4413         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4414                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4415                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4416                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4417
4418                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4419                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4420                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4421                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4422                         }
4423
4424                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4425                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4426                         }
4427                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4428                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4429                         }
4430
4431                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4432                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4433                         mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4434
4435                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4436                                 events.replace(pending_events);
4437                         }
4438
4439                         result
4440                 });
4441                 events.into_inner()
4442         }
4443 }
4444
4445 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4446 where
4447         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4448         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4449         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4450         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4451         L::Target: Logger,
4452 {
4453         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4454         ///
4455         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4456         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4457         ///
4458         /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4459         /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4460         /// restarting from an old state.
4461         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4462                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4463                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4464
4465                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4466                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4467                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4468                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4469                         }
4470
4471                         let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4472                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4473                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4474                         }
4475
4476                         for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4477                                 handler.handle_event(&event);
4478                         }
4479
4480                         result
4481                 });
4482         }
4483 }
4484
4485 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4486 where
4487         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4488         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4489         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4490         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4491         L::Target: Logger,
4492 {
4493         fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4494                 {
4495                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4496                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4497                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4498                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4499                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4500                 }
4501
4502                 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4503                 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4504                 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4505         }
4506
4507         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4508                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4509                 let new_height = height - 1;
4510                 {
4511                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4512                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4513                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4514                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4515                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4516                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4517                 }
4518
4519                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4520         }
4521 }
4522
4523 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4524 where
4525         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4526         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4527         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4528         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4529         L::Target: Logger,
4530 {
4531         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4532                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4533                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4534                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4535
4536                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4537                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4538
4539                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4540                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4541         }
4542
4543         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4544                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4545                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4546                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4547
4548                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4549                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4550
4551                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4552
4553                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4554
4555                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4556
4557                 macro_rules! max_time {
4558                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
4559                                 loop {
4560                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4561                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4562                                         // having an explicit local time source.
4563                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4564                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4565                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4566                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4567                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4568                                                 break;
4569                                         }
4570                                 }
4571                         }
4572                 }
4573                 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4574                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4575                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4576                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4577                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4578                 });
4579
4580                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4581                 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4582                         const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4583                         if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4584                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4585                                 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4586                         }
4587                         true
4588                 });
4589         }
4590
4591         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4592                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4593                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4594                 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4595                         if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4596                                 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4597                         }
4598                 }
4599                 res
4600         }
4601
4602         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4603                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4604                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4605                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4606                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4607                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4608                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4609                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4610                 });
4611         }
4612 }
4613
4614 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4615 where
4616         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4617         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4618         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4619         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4620         L::Target: Logger,
4621 {
4622         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4623         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4624         /// the function.
4625         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4626                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4627                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4628                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4629                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4630
4631                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4632                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4633                 {
4634                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4635                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4636                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4637                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4638                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4639                                 let res = f(channel);
4640                                 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4641                                         for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4642                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4643                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash,  HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4644                                                         failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4645                                                         data: chan_update,
4646                                                 }));
4647                                         }
4648                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4649                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4650                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4651                                                         msg: funding_locked,
4652                                                 });
4653                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4654                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4655                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4656                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4657                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4658                                                         });
4659                                                 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4660                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4661                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4662                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4663                                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4664                                                         });
4665                                                 } else {
4666                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4667                                                 }
4668                                                 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4669                                         }
4670                                 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4671                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4672                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4673                                         }
4674                                         // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4675                                         // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4676                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4677                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4678                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4679                                                         msg: update
4680                                                 });
4681                                         }
4682                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4683                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4684                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4685                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4686                                         });
4687                                         return false;
4688                                 }
4689                                 true
4690                         });
4691
4692                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4693                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4694                                         htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4695                                                 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4696                                                 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4697                                                 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4698                                                 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4699                                                 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4700                                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4701                                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4702                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4703                                                                 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4704                                                                 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4705                                                         }));
4706                                                         false
4707                                                 } else { true }
4708                                         });
4709                                         !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4710                                 });
4711                         }
4712                 }
4713
4714                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4715
4716                 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4717                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4718                 }
4719         }
4720
4721         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4722         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4723         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4724         /// up.
4725         /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4726         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4727         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4728                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4729         }
4730
4731         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4732         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4733         /// up.
4734         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4735                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4736         }
4737
4738         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4739         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4740                 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4741                 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4742                 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4743                 *guard
4744         }
4745
4746         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4747         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4748         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4749                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4750         }
4751 }
4752
4753 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4754         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4755         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4756         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4757         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4758         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4759         L::Target: Logger,
4760 {
4761         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4762                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4763                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4764         }
4765
4766         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4767                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4768                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4769         }
4770
4771         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4772                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4773                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4774         }
4775
4776         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4777                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4778                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4779         }
4780
4781         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4782                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4783                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4784         }
4785
4786         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4787                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4788                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4789         }
4790
4791         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4792                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4793                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4794         }
4795
4796         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4797                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4798                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4799         }
4800
4801         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4802                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4803                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4804         }
4805
4806         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4807                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4808                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4809         }
4810
4811         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4812                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4813                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4814         }
4815
4816         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4817                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4818                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4819         }
4820
4821         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4822                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4823                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4824         }
4825
4826         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4827                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4828                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4829         }
4830
4831         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4832                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4833                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4834         }
4835
4836         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4837                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4838                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4839                                 persist
4840                         } else {
4841                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4842                         }
4843                 });
4844         }
4845
4846         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4847                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4848                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4849         }
4850
4851         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4852                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4853                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4854                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4855                 {
4856                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4857                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4858                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4859                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4860                         if no_connection_possible {
4861                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4862                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4863                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4864                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4865                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4866                                                 }
4867                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4868                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4869                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4870                                                                 msg: update
4871                                                         });
4872                                                 }
4873                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
4874                                                 false
4875                                         } else {
4876                                                 true
4877                                         }
4878                                 });
4879                         } else {
4880                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4881                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4882                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4883                                                 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4884                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4885                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4886                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4887                                                         }
4888                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
4889                                                         return false;
4890                                                 } else {
4891                                                         no_channels_remain = false;
4892                                                 }
4893                                         }
4894                                         true
4895                                 })
4896                         }
4897                         pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4898                                 match msg {
4899                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4900                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4901                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4902                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4903                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4904                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4905                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4906                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4907                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4908                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4909                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4910                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4911                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4912                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4913                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4914                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4915                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4916                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4917                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4918                                 }
4919                         });
4920                 }
4921                 if no_channels_remain {
4922                         self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4923                 }
4924
4925                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4926                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4927                 }
4928         }
4929
4930         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4931                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4932
4933                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4934
4935                 {
4936                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4937                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4938                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4939                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4940                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4941                                         }));
4942                                 },
4943                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4944                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4945                                 },
4946                         }
4947                 }
4948
4949                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4950                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4951                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4952                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4953                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4954                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4955                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4956                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4957                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4958                                         // drop it.
4959                                         false
4960                                 } else {
4961                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4962                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4963                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4964                                         });
4965                                         true
4966                                 }
4967                         } else { true }
4968                 });
4969                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4970         }
4971
4972         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4973                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4974
4975                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4976                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
4977                                 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4978                                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4979                                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4980                                 }
4981                         }
4982                 } else {
4983                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4984                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4985                 }
4986         }
4987 }
4988
4989 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4990 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4991 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4992         /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4993         /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4994         persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4995 }
4996
4997 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4998         fn new() -> Self {
4999                 Self {
5000                         persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5001                 }
5002         }
5003
5004         fn wait(&self) {
5005                 loop {
5006                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5007                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5008                         if *guard {
5009                                 *guard = false;
5010                                 return;
5011                         }
5012                         guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5013                         let result = *guard;
5014                         if result {
5015                                 *guard = false;
5016                                 return
5017                         }
5018                 }
5019         }
5020
5021         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5022         fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5023                 let current_time = Instant::now();
5024                 loop {
5025                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5026                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5027                         if *guard {
5028                                 *guard = false;
5029                                 return true;
5030                         }
5031                         guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5032                         // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5033                         // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5034                         // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5035                         // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5036                         // 1.42.0.
5037                         let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5038                         let result = *guard;
5039                         if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5040                                 *guard = false;
5041                                 return result;
5042                         }
5043                         match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5044                                 None => return result,
5045                                 Some(_) => continue
5046                         }
5047                 }
5048         }
5049
5050         // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5051         fn notify(&self) {
5052                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5053                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5054                 *persistence_lock = true;
5055                 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5056                 cnd.notify_all();
5057         }
5058 }
5059
5060 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5061 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5062
5063 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5064         (0, Forward) => {
5065                 (0, onion_packet, required),
5066                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5067         },
5068         (1, Receive) => {
5069                 (0, payment_data, required),
5070                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5071         },
5072         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5073                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5074                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5075         },
5076 ;);
5077
5078 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5079         (0, routing, required),
5080         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5081         (4, payment_hash, required),
5082         (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5083         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5084 });
5085
5086
5087 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5088         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5089                 match self {
5090                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5091                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5092                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5093                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5094                                 reason.write(writer)?;
5095                         },
5096                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5097                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5098                         }) => {
5099                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5100                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5101                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5102                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5103                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5104                         },
5105                 }
5106                 Ok(())
5107         }
5108 }
5109
5110 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5111         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5112                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5113                 match id {
5114                         0 => {
5115                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5116                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5117                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5118                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5119                                 }))
5120                         },
5121                         1 => {
5122                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5123                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5124                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5125                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5126                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5127                                 }))
5128                         },
5129                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5130                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5131                         // messages contained in the variants.
5132                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5133                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5134                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5135                         2 => {
5136                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5137                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5138                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5139                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5140                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5141                         },
5142                         3 => {
5143                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5144                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5145                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5146                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5147                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5148                         },
5149                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5150                 }
5151         }
5152 }
5153
5154 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5155         (0, Forward),
5156         (1, Fail),
5157 );
5158
5159 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5160         (0, short_channel_id, required),
5161         (2, outpoint, required),
5162         (4, htlc_id, required),
5163         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5164 });
5165
5166 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5167         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5168                 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5169                         OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5170                         _ => None,
5171                 };
5172                 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5173                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5174                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5175                 };
5176                 write_tlv_fields!
5177                 (writer,
5178                  {
5179                    (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5180                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5181                          (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5182                  });
5183                 Ok(())
5184         }
5185 }
5186
5187 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5188         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5189                 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5190                 let mut value = 0;
5191                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5192                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5193                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5194                 read_tlv_fields!
5195                 (reader,
5196                  {
5197                    (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5198                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5199                          (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5200                  });
5201                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5202                         Some(p) => {
5203                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
5204                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5205                                 }
5206                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5207                         },
5208                         None => {
5209                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
5210                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5211                                 }
5212                                 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5213                         },
5214                 };
5215                 Ok(Self {
5216                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5217                         value,
5218                         onion_payload,
5219                         cltv_expiry,
5220                 })
5221         }
5222 }
5223
5224 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5225         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5226                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5227                 match id {
5228                         0 => {
5229                                 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5230                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5231                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5232                                 let mut payment_id = None;
5233                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5234                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5235                                         (1, payment_id, option),
5236                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5237                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5238                                 });
5239                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
5240                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5241                                         // instead.
5242                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5243                                 }
5244                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5245                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5246                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5247                                         path: path.unwrap(),
5248                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5249                                 })
5250                         }
5251                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5252                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5253                 }
5254         }
5255 }
5256
5257 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5258         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5259                 match self {
5260                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
5261                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5262                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5263                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5264                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5265                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5266                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5267                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5268                                  });
5269                         }
5270                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5271                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5272                                 field.write(writer)?;
5273                         }
5274                 }
5275                 Ok(())
5276         }
5277 }
5278
5279 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5280         (0, LightningError) => {
5281                 (0, err, required),
5282         },
5283         (1, Reason) => {
5284                 (0, failure_code, required),
5285                 (2, data, vec_type),
5286         },
5287 ;);
5288
5289 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5290         (0, AddHTLC) => {
5291                 (0, forward_info, required),
5292                 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5293                 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5294                 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5295         },
5296         (1, FailHTLC) => {
5297                 (0, htlc_id, required),
5298                 (2, err_packet, required),
5299         },
5300 ;);
5301
5302 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5303         (0, payment_secret, required),
5304         (2, expiry_time, required),
5305         (4, user_payment_id, required),
5306         (6, payment_preimage, required),
5307         (8, min_value_msat, required),
5308 });
5309
5310 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5311         (0, Legacy) => {
5312                 (0, session_privs, required),
5313         },
5314         (2, Retryable) => {
5315                 (0, session_privs, required),
5316                 (2, payment_hash, required),
5317                 (4, payment_secret, option),
5318                 (6, total_msat, required),
5319                 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5320                 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5321         },
5322 ;);
5323
5324 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5325         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5326         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5327         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5328         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5329         L::Target: Logger,
5330 {
5331         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5332                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5333
5334                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5335
5336                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5337                 {
5338                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5339                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5340                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5341                 }
5342
5343                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5344                 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5345                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5346                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5347                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
5348                         }
5349                 }
5350                 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5351                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5352                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5353                                 channel.write(writer)?;
5354                         }
5355                 }
5356
5357                 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5358                 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5359                         short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5360                         (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5361                         for forward in pending_forwards {
5362                                 forward.write(writer)?;
5363                         }
5364                 }
5365
5366                 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5367                 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5368                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5369                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5370                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5371                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
5372                         }
5373                 }
5374
5375                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5376                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5377                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5378                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5379                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5380                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5381                 }
5382
5383                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5384                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5385                 for event in events.iter() {
5386                         event.write(writer)?;
5387                 }
5388
5389                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5390                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5391                 for event in background_events.iter() {
5392                         match event {
5393                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5394                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5395                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5396                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5397                                 },
5398                         }
5399                 }
5400
5401                 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5402                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5403
5404                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5405                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5406                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5407                         hash.write(writer)?;
5408                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5409                 }
5410
5411                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5412                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5413                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5414                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5415                         num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5416                 }
5417                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5418                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5419                         match outbound {
5420                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5421                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5422                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5423                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5424                                         }
5425                                 }
5426                         }
5427                 }
5428
5429                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5430                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5431                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5432                         match outbound {
5433                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5434                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5435                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5436                                 }
5437                         }
5438                 }
5439                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5440                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5441                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5442                 });
5443
5444                 Ok(())
5445         }
5446 }
5447
5448 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5449 ///
5450 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5451 /// is:
5452 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5453 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5454 ///    <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5455 ///    This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5456 ///    ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5457 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5458 ///    way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5459 ///    ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5460 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5461 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5462 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5463 ///
5464 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5465 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5466 ///
5467 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5468 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5469 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5470 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5471 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5472 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5473 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5474         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5475         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5476         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5477         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5478         L::Target: Logger,
5479 {
5480         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5481         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5482         /// signing data.
5483         pub keys_manager: K,
5484
5485         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5486         ///
5487         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5488         pub fee_estimator: F,
5489         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5490         ///
5491         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5492         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5493         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5494         pub chain_monitor: M,
5495
5496         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5497         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5498         /// force-closed during deserialization.
5499         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5500         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5501         /// deserialization.
5502         pub logger: L,
5503         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5504         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5505         pub default_config: UserConfig,
5506
5507         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5508         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5509         ///
5510         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5511         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5512         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5513         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5514         ///
5515         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5516         /// this struct.
5517         ///
5518         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5519         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5520 }
5521
5522 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5523                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5524         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5525                 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5526                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5527                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5528                 L::Target: Logger,
5529         {
5530         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5531         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5532         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5533         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5534                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5535                 Self {
5536                         keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5537                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5538                 }
5539         }
5540 }
5541
5542 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5543 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5544 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5545         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5546         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5547         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5548         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5549         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5550         L::Target: Logger,
5551 {
5552         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5553                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5554                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5555         }
5556 }
5557
5558 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5559         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5560         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5561         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5562         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5563         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5564         L::Target: Logger,
5565 {
5566         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5567                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5568
5569                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5570                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5571                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5572
5573                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5574
5575                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5576                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5577                 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5578                 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5579                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5580                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5581                         let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5582                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5583                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5584                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5585                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5586                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5587                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5588                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5589                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5590                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5591                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5592                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5593                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5594                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5595                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5596                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5597                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5598                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5599                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5600                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5601                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5602                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5603                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5604                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5605                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5606                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5607                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5608                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5609                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5610                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5611                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5612                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5613                                         });
5614                                 } else {
5615                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5616                                                 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5617                                         }
5618                                         by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5619                                 }
5620                         } else {
5621                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5622                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5623                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5624                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5625                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5626                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5627                         }
5628                 }
5629
5630                 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5631                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5632                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5633                         }
5634                 }
5635
5636                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5637                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5638                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5639                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5640                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5641                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5642                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5643                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5644                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5645                         }
5646                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5647                 }
5648
5649                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5650                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5651                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5652                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5653                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5654                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5655                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5656                                 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5657                         }
5658                         claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5659                 }
5660
5661                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5662                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5663                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5664                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5665                         let peer_state = PeerState {
5666                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5667                         };
5668                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5669                 }
5670
5671                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5672                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5673                 for _ in 0..event_count {
5674                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5675                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5676                                 None => continue,
5677                         }
5678                 }
5679                 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5680                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5681                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5682                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5683                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5684                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5685                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5686                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5687                         });
5688                 }
5689
5690                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5691                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5692                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5693                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5694                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5695                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5696                         }
5697                 }
5698
5699                 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5700                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5701
5702                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5703                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5704                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5705                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5706                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5707                         }
5708                 }
5709
5710                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5711                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5712                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5713                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5714                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5715                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5716                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5717                         };
5718                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5719                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5720                         };
5721                 }
5722
5723                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5724                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5725                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5726                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5727                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5728                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5729                 });
5730                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5731                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5732                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5733                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5734                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5735                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5736                         }
5737                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5738                 }
5739
5740                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5741                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5742
5743                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5744                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5745                 }
5746
5747                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5748                         genesis_hash,
5749                         fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5750                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5751                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5752
5753                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5754
5755                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5756                                 by_id,
5757                                 short_to_id,
5758                                 forward_htlcs,
5759                                 claimable_htlcs,
5760                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5761                         }),
5762                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5763                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5764
5765                         our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5766                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5767                         secp_ctx,
5768
5769                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5770                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5771
5772                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5773
5774                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5775                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5776                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5777                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5778
5779                         keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5780                         logger: args.logger,
5781                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
5782                 };
5783
5784                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5785                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5786                 }
5787
5788                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5789                 //connection or two.
5790
5791                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5792         }
5793 }
5794
5795 #[cfg(test)]
5796 mod tests {
5797         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5798         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5799         use core::time::Duration;
5800         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5801         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
5802         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5803         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5804         use ln::msgs;
5805         use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5806         use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5807         use util::errors::APIError;
5808         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5809         use util::test_utils;
5810
5811         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5812         #[test]
5813         fn test_wait_timeout() {
5814                 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5815                 use sync::Arc;
5816                 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5817                 use std::thread;
5818
5819                 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5820                 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5821
5822                 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5823                 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5824                 thread::spawn(move || {
5825                         loop {
5826                                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5827                                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5828                                 *persistence_lock = true;
5829                                 cnd.notify_all();
5830
5831                                 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5832                                         break
5833                                 }
5834                         }
5835                 });
5836
5837                 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5838                 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5839
5840                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5841                 // available.
5842                 loop {
5843                         if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5844                                 break
5845                         }
5846                 }
5847
5848                 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5849
5850                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5851                 // are available.
5852                 loop {
5853                         if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5854                                 break
5855                         }
5856                 }
5857         }
5858
5859         #[test]
5860         fn test_notify_limits() {
5861                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5862                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5863                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5864                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5865                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5866                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5867
5868                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5869                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5870                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5871                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5872                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5873
5874                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5875
5876                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5877                 // to connect messages with new values
5878                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5879                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5880                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5881                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5882
5883                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5884                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5885                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5886                 // ... but the last node should not.
5887                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5888                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5889                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5890                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5891
5892                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5893                 // about the channel.
5894                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5895                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5896                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5897
5898                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5899                 // parties.
5900                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5901                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5902                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5903                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5904                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5905                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5906
5907                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5908                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5909                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5910
5911                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5912                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5913                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5914                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5915                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5916                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5917
5918                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5919                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5920                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5921                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5922                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5923                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5924                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5925                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5926
5927                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5928                 // the channel info has updated.
5929                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5930                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5931                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5932                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5933                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5934                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5935         }
5936
5937         #[test]
5938         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5939                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5940                 // expected.
5941                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5942                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5943                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5944                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5945                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5946
5947                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5948                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
5949                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
5950                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5951                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5952                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5953                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
5954                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5955                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5956                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5957                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5958
5959                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5960                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5961                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5962                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5963                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5964                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5965                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5966                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5967                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5968                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5969                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5970                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5971                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5972                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5973                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5974                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5975                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5976                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5977                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5978                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5979                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5980                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5981
5982                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5983                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
5984                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5985                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5986                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5987                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5988
5989                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5990                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5991                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5992                 // lightning messages manually.
5993                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5994                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5995                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5996                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5997                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5998                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5999                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6000                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6001                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6002                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6003                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6004                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6005                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6006                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6007                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6008                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6009                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6010                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6011                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6012                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6013                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6014                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6015                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6016                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6017                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6018                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6020
6021                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6022                 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6023                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6024                 match events[0] {
6025                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6026                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6027                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6028                         },
6029                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6030                 }
6031         }
6032
6033         #[test]
6034         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6035                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6036                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6037                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6038                 //      fails as expected.
6039                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6040                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6041                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6042                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6043                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6044                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6045
6046                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6047                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6048                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6049
6050                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6051                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6052                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6053                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6054                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6055                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6056                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6057                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6058                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6059                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6060                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6061                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6062                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6063                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6064                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6065                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6066                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6067                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6068                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6069                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6070                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6071                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6072                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6073
6074                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6075                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6076
6077                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6078                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6079                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6080                 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6081                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6082                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6083                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6084                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6085                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6086                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6087
6088                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6089                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6090                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6092                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6093                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6094                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6095                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6096                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6097                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6098                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6099                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6100                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6101                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6102                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6103                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6104                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6105                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6106                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6107                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6108                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6109                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6110                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6111
6112                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6113                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6114         }
6115
6116         #[test]
6117         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6118                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6119                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6120                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6121                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6122                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6123                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6124
6125                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6126                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6127                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6128                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6129
6130                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6131                 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6132                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6133                 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6134                                   Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6135                                   nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
6136
6137                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6138                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6139                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6140                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6141
6142                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6143                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6144                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6145                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6146                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6147                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6148                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6149
6150                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6151         }
6152
6153         #[test]
6154         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6155                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6156                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6157                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6158                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6159                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6160
6161                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6162                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6163                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6164                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6165
6166                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6167                 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6168                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6169                 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6170                                   Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6171                                   nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
6172
6173                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6174                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6175                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6176                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6177                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6178
6179                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6180                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6181                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6182                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6183                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6184                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6185                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6186
6187                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6188         }
6189
6190         #[test]
6191         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6192                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6193                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6194                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6195                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6196
6197                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6198                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6199                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6200                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6201
6202                 // Marshall an MPP route.
6203                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6204                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6205                 route.paths.push(path);
6206                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6207                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6208                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6209                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6210                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6211                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6212
6213                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6214                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6215                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
6216                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6217                 }
6218         }
6219 }
6220
6221 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6222 pub mod bench {
6223         use chain::Listen;
6224         use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6225         use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6226         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6227         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6228         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6229         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6230         use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6231         use routing::router::get_route;
6232         use util::test_utils;
6233         use util::config::UserConfig;
6234         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6235
6236         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6237         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6238         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6239
6240         use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6241
6242         use test::Bencher;
6243
6244         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6245                 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6246                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6247                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6248                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6249                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6250                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6251         }
6252
6253         #[cfg(test)]
6254         #[bench]
6255         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6256                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6257         }
6258
6259         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6260                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6261                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6262                 // calls per node.
6263                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6264                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6265
6266                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6267                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6268
6269                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6270                 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6271
6272                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6273                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6274                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6275                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6276                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6277                         network,
6278                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6279                 });
6280                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6281
6282                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6283                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6284                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6285                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6286                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6287                         network,
6288                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6289                 });
6290                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6291
6292                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6293                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6294                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6295                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6296                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6297
6298                 let tx;
6299                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6300                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6301                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6302                         }]};
6303                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6304                 } else { panic!(); }
6305
6306                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6307                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6308
6309                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6310
6311                 let block = Block {
6312                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6313                         txdata: vec![tx],
6314                 };
6315                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6316                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6317
6318                 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6319                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6320                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6321                 match msg_events[0] {
6322                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6323                                 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6324                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6325                         },
6326                         _ => panic!(),
6327                 }
6328                 match msg_events[1] {
6329                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6330                         _ => panic!(),
6331                 }
6332
6333                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6334
6335                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6336                 macro_rules! send_payment {
6337                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6338                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6339                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6340                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6341
6342                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6343                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6344                                 payment_count += 1;
6345                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6346                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6347
6348                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6349                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6350                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6351                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6352                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6353                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6354                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6355                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6356
6357                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6358                                 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6359                                 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6360
6361                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6362                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6363                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6364                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6365                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6366                                         },
6367                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6368                                 }
6369
6370                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6371                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6372                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6373                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6374
6375                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6376                         }
6377                 }
6378
6379                 bench.iter(|| {
6380                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6381                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
6382                 });
6383         }
6384 }