1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
501 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
502 /// quite some time lag.
503 enum BackgroundEvent {
504 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate
506 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
507 /// are regenerated on startup.
508 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
512 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
513 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
514 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
515 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
516 /// event can be generated.
517 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
518 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
519 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
522 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
523 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
524 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
527 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
528 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
529 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
530 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
531 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
534 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
535 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
536 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
537 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
541 /// State we hold per-peer.
542 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
543 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
545 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
546 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
548 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
549 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
550 latest_features: InitFeatures,
551 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
552 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
553 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
554 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
557 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
558 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
559 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
560 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
562 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
563 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
564 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
565 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
566 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
567 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
568 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
569 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
570 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
571 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
575 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
576 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
577 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
578 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
579 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
580 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
583 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
587 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
588 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
590 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
593 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
594 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
595 struct PendingInboundPayment {
596 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
597 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
598 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
599 /// this payment being removed.
601 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
602 user_payment_id: u64,
603 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
604 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
605 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
608 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
609 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
610 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
611 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
612 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
613 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
614 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
615 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
617 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
618 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
626 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
628 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
629 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
630 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
635 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
636 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
637 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
638 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
639 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
640 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
641 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
642 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
643 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
645 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
646 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
648 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
649 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
650 pub trait AChannelManager {
651 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
652 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
653 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
654 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
655 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
656 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
657 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
658 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
659 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
660 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
661 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
662 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
663 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
665 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
667 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
668 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
670 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
671 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
672 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
674 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
675 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
676 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
677 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
678 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
679 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
680 R::Target: Router + Sized,
681 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
683 type Watch = M::Target;
685 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
687 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
689 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
691 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
692 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
694 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
696 type Router = R::Target;
698 type Logger = L::Target;
700 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
703 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
704 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
706 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
707 /// to individual Channels.
709 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
710 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
711 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
712 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
714 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
715 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
716 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
717 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
718 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
719 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
720 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
722 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
723 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
724 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
726 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
727 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
728 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
729 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
730 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
732 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
733 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
734 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
735 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
737 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
738 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
739 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
741 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
742 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
743 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
744 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
745 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
747 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
748 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
749 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
750 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
751 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
752 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
753 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
754 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
757 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
758 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
759 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
760 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
761 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
765 // `total_consistency_lock`
767 // |__`forward_htlcs`
769 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
771 // |__`per_peer_state`
773 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
775 // | |__`claimable_payments`
777 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
783 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
785 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
789 // | |__`pending_events`
791 // | |__`pending_background_events`
793 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
795 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
796 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
797 ES::Target: EntropySource,
798 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
799 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
804 default_configuration: UserConfig,
805 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
806 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
812 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
814 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
816 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
817 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
819 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
820 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
821 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
822 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
824 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
825 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
827 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
828 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
829 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
830 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
831 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
832 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
833 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
834 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
836 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
839 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
841 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
843 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
844 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
845 /// and via the classic SCID.
847 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
848 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
850 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
854 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
855 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
856 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
858 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
859 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
861 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
862 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
864 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
865 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
867 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
868 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
869 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
870 /// active channel list on load.
872 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
873 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
875 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
877 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
878 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
879 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
881 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
882 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
883 /// the handling of the events.
885 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
886 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
889 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
890 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
891 /// would break backwards compatability.
892 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
893 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
894 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
896 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
897 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
899 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
901 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
902 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
903 /// confirmation depth.
905 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
906 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
907 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
909 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
911 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
913 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
915 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
917 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
919 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
920 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
921 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
923 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
924 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
926 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
927 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
928 /// keeping additional state.
929 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
931 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
932 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
933 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
934 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
936 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
937 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
939 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
940 /// are currently open with that peer.
942 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
943 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
946 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
948 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
949 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
950 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
951 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
952 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
954 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
955 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
956 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
957 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
958 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
960 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
961 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
965 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
966 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
967 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
968 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
969 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
970 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
971 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
972 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
973 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
974 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
975 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
977 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
986 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
988 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
989 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
990 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
991 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
992 pub struct ChainParameters {
993 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
994 pub network: Network,
996 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
998 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
999 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1002 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1008 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1009 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1010 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1011 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1012 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1013 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1015 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1016 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1017 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1018 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1019 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1021 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1022 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1025 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1026 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1027 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1030 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1031 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1033 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1034 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1035 should_persist: persist_check,
1036 _read_guard: read_guard,
1041 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1042 fn drop(&mut self) {
1043 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1044 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1049 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1050 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1052 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1054 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1055 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1056 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1057 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1058 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1060 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1061 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1063 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1065 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1066 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1067 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1068 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1069 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1070 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1071 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1072 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1073 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1074 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1075 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1076 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1077 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1079 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1080 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1082 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1083 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1084 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1085 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1087 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1088 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1089 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1090 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1091 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1092 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1095 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1097 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1098 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1101 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1103 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1104 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1106 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1107 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1108 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1109 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1111 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1112 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1113 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1115 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1116 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1117 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1119 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1120 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1121 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1122 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1124 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1125 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1126 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1128 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1129 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1130 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1132 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1133 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1134 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1135 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1136 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1137 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1138 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1139 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1140 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1141 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1142 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1145 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1146 /// to better separate parameters.
1147 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1148 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1149 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1150 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1151 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1152 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1153 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1154 pub features: InitFeatures,
1155 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1156 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1157 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1159 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1161 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1162 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1163 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1164 /// payments to us through this channel.
1165 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1166 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1167 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1168 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1169 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1170 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1171 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1174 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1175 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1176 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1177 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1178 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1179 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1180 /// lifetime of the channel.
1181 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1182 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1183 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1184 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1185 /// our counterparty already.
1187 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1188 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1189 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1190 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1192 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1193 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1194 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1195 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1197 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1198 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1200 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1201 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1203 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1204 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1205 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1206 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1207 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1208 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1209 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1210 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1211 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1214 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1216 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1217 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1218 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1219 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1220 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1221 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1222 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1224 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1225 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1227 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1228 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1229 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1230 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1231 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1232 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1233 /// this value on chain.
1235 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1237 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1239 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1240 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1241 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1242 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1244 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1245 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1246 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1248 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1249 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1250 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1251 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1252 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1254 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1255 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1256 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1257 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1259 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1260 pub balance_msat: u64,
1261 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1262 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1263 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1264 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1266 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1268 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1269 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1270 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1271 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1272 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1273 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1274 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1275 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1277 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1278 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1279 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1280 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1281 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1282 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1283 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1285 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1286 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1287 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1288 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1289 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1290 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1291 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1292 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1293 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1295 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1297 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1298 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1299 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1300 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1301 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1303 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1304 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1305 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1306 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1307 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1308 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1309 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1311 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1312 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1313 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1314 pub is_outbound: bool,
1315 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1316 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1317 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1318 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1319 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1321 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1322 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1323 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1324 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1326 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1327 pub is_usable: bool,
1328 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1329 pub is_public: bool,
1330 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1331 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1332 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1333 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1334 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1335 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1337 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1338 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1341 impl ChannelDetails {
1342 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1343 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1344 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1346 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1347 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1348 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1349 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1352 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1353 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1354 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1356 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1357 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1358 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1359 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1362 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1363 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1365 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1366 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1367 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1369 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1370 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1371 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1372 features: latest_features,
1373 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1374 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1375 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1376 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1377 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1378 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1379 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1380 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1381 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1382 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1384 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1385 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1386 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1387 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1388 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1389 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1390 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1391 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1392 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1393 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1394 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1395 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1396 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1397 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1398 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1399 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1400 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1401 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1402 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1403 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1404 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1405 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1406 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1407 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1408 config: Some(channel.config()),
1413 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1414 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1415 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1416 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1417 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1419 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1421 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1422 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1423 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1426 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1427 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1428 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1430 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1431 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1432 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1434 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1435 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1436 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1438 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1443 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1445 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1447 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1448 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1449 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1450 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1452 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1453 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1454 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1457 macro_rules! handle_error {
1458 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1459 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1460 // entering the macro.
1461 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1462 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1466 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1467 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1469 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1470 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1471 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1472 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1476 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1477 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1478 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1479 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1484 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1485 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1487 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1488 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1489 action: err.action.clone()
1493 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1494 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1495 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1496 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1497 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1501 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1508 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1509 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1510 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1511 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1512 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1513 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1515 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1516 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1517 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1518 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1519 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1521 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1522 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1524 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1528 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1529 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1530 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1532 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1533 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1535 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1536 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1538 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1539 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1540 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1541 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1542 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1543 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1549 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1550 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1554 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1556 $entry.remove_entry();
1564 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1565 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1569 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1571 $entry.remove_entry();
1579 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1580 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1582 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1583 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1589 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1590 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1591 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1592 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1593 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1595 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1596 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1597 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1598 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1599 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1600 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1601 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1602 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1603 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1604 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1609 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1610 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1611 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1612 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1613 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1614 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1615 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1616 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1617 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1619 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1624 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1625 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1626 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1627 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1628 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1629 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1630 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1631 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1632 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1634 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1639 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1640 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1641 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1642 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1643 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1644 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1645 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1646 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1647 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1648 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1649 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1651 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1652 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1653 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1659 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1660 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1662 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1663 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1664 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1665 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1666 updates.announcement_sigs);
1667 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1668 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1671 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1672 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1673 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1675 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1677 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1678 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1680 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1681 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1682 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1683 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1688 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1689 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1690 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1691 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1692 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1694 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1695 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1696 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1699 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1700 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1701 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1702 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1703 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1704 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1705 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1706 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1710 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1711 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1712 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1713 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1719 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1720 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1724 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1725 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1726 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1727 while !processed_all_events {
1728 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1732 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1735 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1736 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1737 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1739 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1740 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1741 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1742 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1746 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1747 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1748 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1749 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1752 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1754 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1755 $event_to_handle = event;
1757 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1758 post_event_actions.push(action);
1763 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1764 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1765 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1766 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1769 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1770 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1771 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1772 processed_all_events = false;
1775 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1776 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1782 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1784 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1785 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1786 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1788 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1789 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1793 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1795 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1796 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1798 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1800 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1801 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1802 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1805 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1806 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1807 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1808 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1809 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1810 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1811 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1812 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1814 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1815 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1816 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1821 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1823 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1824 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1825 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1826 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1827 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1828 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1829 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1830 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1832 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1835 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1836 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1838 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1840 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1842 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1844 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1845 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1846 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1847 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1848 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1858 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1859 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1860 &self.default_configuration
1863 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1864 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1865 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1868 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1869 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1871 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1873 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1877 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1882 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1884 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1885 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1886 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1887 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1888 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1890 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1891 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1893 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1894 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1895 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1897 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1898 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1899 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1901 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1902 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1903 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1904 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1905 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1906 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1908 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1909 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1910 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1911 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1912 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1913 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1917 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1918 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1922 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1923 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1925 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1927 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1928 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1929 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1930 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1931 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1932 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1936 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1941 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1943 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1944 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1947 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1949 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1955 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1956 node_id: their_network_key,
1959 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1962 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1963 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1964 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1965 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1966 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1967 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1968 // the same channel.
1969 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1971 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1973 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1976 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1977 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1978 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1986 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1987 /// more information.
1988 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1989 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1992 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1993 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1995 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1996 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1998 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1999 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2000 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2001 // really wanted anyway.
2002 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2005 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2006 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2007 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2008 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2010 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2013 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2014 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2017 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2023 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2024 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2026 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2027 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2028 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2030 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2031 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2032 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2033 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2034 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2035 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2036 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2037 total_msat: *total_msat,
2040 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2041 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2043 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2044 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2046 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2051 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2052 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2053 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2054 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2055 Some(transaction) => {
2056 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2057 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2062 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2063 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2064 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2065 reason: closure_reason
2069 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2072 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2073 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2076 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2077 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2081 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2083 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2084 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2085 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2086 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2087 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2089 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2090 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2091 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2092 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2093 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2097 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2098 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2099 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2100 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2101 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2104 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2105 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2106 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2111 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2119 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2120 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2121 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2122 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2125 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2129 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2130 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2131 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2133 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2134 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2136 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2137 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2138 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2139 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2141 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2143 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2144 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2145 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2148 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2149 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2150 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2151 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2152 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2153 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2156 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2157 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2158 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2160 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2161 /// the channel being closed or not:
2162 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2163 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2164 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2165 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2166 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2167 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2168 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2170 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2171 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2172 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2173 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2175 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2177 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2178 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2179 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2182 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2183 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2184 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2185 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2186 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2187 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2191 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2192 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2193 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2194 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2195 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2196 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2197 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2198 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2200 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2201 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2202 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2203 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2204 // ignore the result here.
2205 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2209 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2210 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2211 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2212 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2213 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2214 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2215 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2219 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2220 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2221 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2223 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2225 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2227 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2230 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2231 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2232 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2233 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2234 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2239 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2242 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2244 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2245 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2246 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2247 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2248 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2249 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2250 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2251 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2252 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2253 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2264 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2265 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2266 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2268 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2269 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2270 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2273 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2274 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2275 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2277 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2278 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2279 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2280 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2281 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2284 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2285 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2286 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2287 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2288 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2292 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2293 /// local transaction(s).
2294 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2295 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2296 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2300 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2301 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2303 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2304 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2305 return Err(ReceiveError {
2306 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2308 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2311 // final_expiry_too_soon
2312 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2313 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2315 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2316 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2317 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2318 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2319 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2320 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2321 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2322 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2323 return Err(ReceiveError {
2324 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2325 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2328 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2329 return Err(ReceiveError {
2331 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2332 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2336 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2337 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2338 return Err(ReceiveError {
2339 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2340 err_data: Vec::new(),
2341 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2344 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2345 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2346 return Err(ReceiveError {
2347 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2348 err_data: Vec::new(),
2349 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2351 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2352 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2355 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2356 phantom_shared_secret,
2358 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2359 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2360 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2361 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2362 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2363 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2364 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2365 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2366 return Err(ReceiveError {
2367 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2368 err_data: Vec::new(),
2369 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2373 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2376 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2379 return Err(ReceiveError {
2380 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2381 err_data: Vec::new(),
2382 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2387 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2390 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2391 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2392 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2393 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2397 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2398 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2399 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2401 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2402 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2403 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2404 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2405 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2406 failure_code: $err_code,
2412 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2413 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2416 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2417 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2418 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2420 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2421 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2422 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2423 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2424 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2425 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2426 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2427 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2429 macro_rules! return_err {
2430 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2432 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2433 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2434 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2435 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2436 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2437 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2443 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2445 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2446 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2448 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2449 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2453 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2454 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2456 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2458 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2459 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2460 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2461 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2462 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2464 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2467 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2468 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2469 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2471 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2472 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2473 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2476 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2477 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2478 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2479 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2483 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2484 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2485 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2488 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2489 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2490 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2491 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2492 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2497 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2498 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2499 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2500 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2501 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2502 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2503 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2504 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2505 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2506 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2507 // phantom or an intercept.
2508 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2509 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2510 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2514 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2517 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2519 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2521 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2522 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2523 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2527 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2529 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2530 // have no consistency guarantees.
2531 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2535 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2536 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2537 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2538 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2539 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2541 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2542 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2543 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2544 // we don't have the channel here.
2545 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2547 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2549 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2550 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2551 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2552 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2553 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2554 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2555 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2556 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2557 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2558 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2559 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2561 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2564 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2565 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2567 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2568 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2572 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2573 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2574 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2575 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2577 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2584 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2585 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2586 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2587 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2588 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2589 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2591 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2592 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2594 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2595 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2596 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2597 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2598 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2599 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2600 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2601 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2602 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2603 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2609 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2610 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2611 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2612 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2614 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2615 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2617 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2618 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2619 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2621 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2622 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2623 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2624 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2625 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2626 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2627 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2631 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2636 pending_forward_info
2639 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2640 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2641 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2643 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2644 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2645 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2647 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2648 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2649 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2650 if !chan.should_announce() {
2651 return Err(LightningError {
2652 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2653 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2656 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2657 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2660 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2663 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2664 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2665 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2666 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2668 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2669 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2670 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2672 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2673 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2674 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2676 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2677 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2681 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2683 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2685 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2687 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2688 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2689 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2690 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2691 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2694 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2695 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2697 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2698 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2699 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2700 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2701 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2702 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2703 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2704 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2706 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2707 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2708 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2710 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2712 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2719 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2720 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2721 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2724 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2725 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2726 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2729 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2730 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2732 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2733 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2734 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2735 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2736 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2738 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2740 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2741 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2742 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2743 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2747 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2748 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2751 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2752 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2753 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2755 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2756 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2757 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2759 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2760 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2762 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2763 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2764 Some(monitor_update) => {
2765 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2766 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2767 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2770 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2771 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2772 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2773 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2774 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2775 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2776 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2777 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2783 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2784 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2785 // `channel_by_id` map.
2786 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2792 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2793 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2795 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2800 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2802 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2803 /// fields for more info.
2805 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2806 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2808 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2810 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2811 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2812 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2813 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2814 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2816 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2817 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2818 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2819 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2820 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2822 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2823 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2824 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2825 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2827 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2829 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2830 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2831 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2833 /// In general, a path may raise:
2834 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2835 /// node public key) is specified.
2836 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2837 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2839 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2840 /// relevant updates.
2842 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2843 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2844 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2846 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2847 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2848 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2849 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2850 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2851 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2852 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2854 self.pending_outbound_payments
2855 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2856 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2857 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2860 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2861 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2862 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2863 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2865 self.pending_outbound_payments
2866 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2867 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2868 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2869 &self.pending_events,
2870 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2871 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2875 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2876 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2878 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2879 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2880 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2884 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2885 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2886 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2890 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2891 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2895 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2896 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2897 /// retries are exhausted.
2899 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2900 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2902 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2903 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2904 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2906 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2907 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2909 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2910 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2911 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2913 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2916 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2917 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2918 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2919 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2920 /// never reach the recipient.
2922 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2923 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2925 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2926 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2928 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2930 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2931 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2932 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2934 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2935 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2936 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2937 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2938 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2941 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2942 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2944 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2947 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2948 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2949 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2951 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2952 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2953 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2954 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2955 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2956 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2959 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2960 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2961 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2962 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2963 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2965 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2966 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2967 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2970 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2973 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2974 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2977 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2978 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2979 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2980 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2981 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2984 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2986 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2988 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2990 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2992 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2993 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2994 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2995 } else { unreachable!(); });
2997 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2999 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3000 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3002 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3003 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3004 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3012 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3013 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3019 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3024 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3027 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3028 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3029 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3038 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3039 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3040 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3044 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3046 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3047 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3049 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3050 /// across the p2p network.
3052 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3053 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3055 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3056 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3057 /// keys per-channel).
3059 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3060 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3061 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3063 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3064 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3065 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3067 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3068 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3069 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3070 /// for more details.
3072 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3073 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3074 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3077 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3078 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3079 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3080 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3085 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3086 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3087 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3088 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3089 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3090 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3091 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3092 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3096 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3097 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3098 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3099 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3103 let mut output_index = None;
3104 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3105 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3106 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3107 if output_index.is_some() {
3108 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3109 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3112 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3115 if output_index.is_none() {
3116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3117 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3120 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3124 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3126 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3127 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3128 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3129 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3131 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3132 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3134 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3135 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3137 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3139 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3140 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3141 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3142 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3143 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3144 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3145 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3146 pub fn update_channel_config(
3147 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3148 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3149 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3150 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3151 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3156 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3160 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3163 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3164 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3165 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3166 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3170 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3171 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3172 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3175 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3177 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3178 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3179 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3187 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3188 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3190 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3191 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3193 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3194 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3195 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3196 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3197 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3199 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3200 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3202 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3205 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3206 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3207 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3208 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3209 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3212 let next_hop_scid = {
3213 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3214 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3215 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3216 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3217 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3218 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3220 if !chan.is_usable() {
3221 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3222 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3225 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3227 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3228 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3233 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3234 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3235 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3238 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3239 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3240 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3242 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3244 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3245 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3248 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3249 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3250 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3251 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3252 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3254 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3258 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3259 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3261 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3264 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3265 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3268 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3269 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3270 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3273 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3274 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3275 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3276 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3277 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3278 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3279 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3282 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3283 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3285 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3290 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3292 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3293 /// Will likely generate further events.
3294 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3297 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3298 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3299 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3301 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3302 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3304 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3305 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3306 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3308 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3309 match forward_info {
3310 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3311 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3312 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3313 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3314 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3317 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3318 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3319 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3321 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3322 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3323 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3324 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3325 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3326 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3329 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3330 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3332 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3335 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3336 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3342 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3343 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3345 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3349 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3350 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3352 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3356 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3357 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3358 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3359 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3360 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3362 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3363 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3364 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3365 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3366 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3368 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3370 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3371 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3375 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3376 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3377 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3378 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3384 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3387 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3390 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3391 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3392 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3393 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3394 // problem, not ours.
3400 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3401 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3403 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3407 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3408 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3409 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3410 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3413 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3415 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3417 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3421 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3422 match forward_info {
3423 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3424 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3425 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3426 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3427 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3431 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3432 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3433 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3434 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3435 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3436 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3437 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3439 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3440 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3441 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3443 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3446 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3448 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3449 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3450 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3451 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3456 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3457 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3459 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3461 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3462 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3464 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3467 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3469 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3470 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3471 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3480 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3481 match forward_info {
3482 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3483 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3484 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3485 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3488 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3489 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3490 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3492 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3493 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3494 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3496 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3497 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3498 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3499 None, None, onion_fields)
3502 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3505 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3506 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3507 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3508 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3509 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3510 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3511 phantom_shared_secret,
3513 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3514 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3515 // if routing nodes overpay
3516 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3517 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3519 total_value_received: None,
3520 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3525 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3527 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3528 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3529 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3530 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3531 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3532 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3534 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3535 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3536 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3537 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3538 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3539 phantom_shared_secret,
3541 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3542 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3544 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3547 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3548 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3549 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3550 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3551 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3554 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3555 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3556 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3558 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3559 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3560 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3563 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3564 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3565 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3567 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3568 .entry(payment_hash)
3569 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3570 .or_insert_with(|| {
3571 committed_to_claimable = true;
3573 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3576 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3577 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3578 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3581 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3583 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3584 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3585 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3586 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3587 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3590 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3591 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3592 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3593 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3594 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3595 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3596 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3597 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3599 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3600 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3602 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3604 _ => unreachable!(),
3607 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3608 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3609 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3610 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3611 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3612 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3613 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3614 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3615 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3616 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3617 committed_to_claimable = true;
3619 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3620 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3621 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3622 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3623 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3624 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3628 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3629 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3630 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3631 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3633 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3635 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3636 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3638 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3639 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3640 committed_to_claimable = true;
3643 payment_claimable_generated
3647 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3648 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3649 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3650 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3651 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3652 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3653 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3654 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3656 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3657 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3658 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3659 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3660 Ok(result) => result,
3662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3663 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3666 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3667 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3668 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3670 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3671 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3674 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3676 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3677 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3678 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3679 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3681 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3683 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3684 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3685 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3686 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3687 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3688 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3689 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3690 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3692 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3693 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3694 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3698 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3699 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3701 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3705 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3706 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3713 if payment_data.is_none() {
3714 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3715 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3717 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3718 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3719 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3720 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3721 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3723 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3724 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3726 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3727 if payment_claimable_generated {
3728 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3734 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3735 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3743 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3744 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3745 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3746 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3747 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3748 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3750 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3751 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3753 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3755 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3756 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3757 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3759 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3761 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3762 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3763 events.append(&mut new_events);
3766 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3768 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3769 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3771 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3772 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3773 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3774 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3775 if background_events.is_empty() {
3779 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3781 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3782 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3783 // monitor updating completing.
3784 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3791 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3792 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3793 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3794 self.process_background_events();
3797 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3798 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3799 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3800 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3802 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3803 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3805 if !chan.is_live() {
3806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3807 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3808 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3811 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3813 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3814 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3818 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3819 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3820 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3821 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3822 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3823 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3824 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3826 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3829 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3832 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3833 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3834 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3842 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3844 /// This currently includes:
3845 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3846 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3847 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3849 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3850 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3851 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3853 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3854 /// estimate fetches.
3856 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3857 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3858 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3859 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3860 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3861 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3863 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3865 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3866 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3867 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3870 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3871 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3872 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3873 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3874 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3875 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3876 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3877 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3879 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3880 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3881 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3882 if needs_close { return false; }
3885 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3886 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3887 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3888 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3889 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3890 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3891 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3892 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3894 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3895 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3896 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3897 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3901 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3903 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3906 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3908 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3909 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3910 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3915 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3917 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3923 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3927 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3928 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3933 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3934 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3935 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3936 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3937 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3938 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3939 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3940 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3941 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3942 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3943 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3945 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3946 // have no channels to the peer.
3947 let remove_entry = {
3948 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3949 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3952 entry.remove_entry();
3955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3960 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3961 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3962 // This should be unreachable
3963 debug_assert!(false);
3966 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3967 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3968 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3969 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3970 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3971 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3972 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3975 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3976 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3977 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3979 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3980 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3987 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3988 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3989 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3990 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3991 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3994 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3995 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3998 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4000 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4001 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4002 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4003 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4004 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4011 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4012 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4013 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4015 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4016 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4017 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4018 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4020 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4021 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4022 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4023 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4024 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4025 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4028 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4029 /// reason for the failure.
4031 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4032 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4035 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4036 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4037 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4038 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4039 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4040 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4041 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4046 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4047 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4048 match failure_code {
4049 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4050 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4051 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4052 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4053 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4054 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4059 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4060 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4062 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4064 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4065 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4066 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4067 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4068 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4069 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4070 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4072 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4074 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4075 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4077 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4082 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4083 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4084 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4085 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4086 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4087 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4088 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4089 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4090 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4091 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4093 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4094 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4095 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4096 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4098 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4099 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4100 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4101 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4102 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4106 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4107 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4108 // be surfaced to the user.
4109 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4110 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4111 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4113 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4115 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4116 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4117 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4118 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4119 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4120 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4124 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4127 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4128 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4129 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4130 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4134 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4135 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4136 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4137 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4138 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4139 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4140 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4141 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4142 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4145 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4146 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4147 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4150 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4151 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4152 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4154 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4155 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4156 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4157 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4158 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4160 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4162 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4164 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4165 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4166 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4167 push_forward_ev = true;
4169 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4171 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4174 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4177 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4178 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4179 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4180 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4181 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4182 failed_next_destination: destination,
4188 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4189 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4191 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4192 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4193 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4194 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4196 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4197 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4198 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4199 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4201 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4202 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4203 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4204 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4205 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4206 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4207 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4208 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4213 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4214 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4215 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4216 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4217 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4218 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4219 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4220 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4225 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4226 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4227 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4229 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4230 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4231 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4232 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4237 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4239 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4240 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4241 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4242 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4243 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4244 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4245 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4246 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4247 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4248 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4249 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4250 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4251 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4252 debug_assert!(false);
4256 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4258 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4259 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4260 debug_assert!(false);
4264 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4266 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4267 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4268 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4269 if sources.len() != 1 {
4270 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4271 debug_assert!(false);
4277 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4279 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4280 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4281 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4282 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4285 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4286 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4287 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4288 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4292 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4293 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4294 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4295 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4297 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4298 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4299 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4300 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4301 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4306 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4307 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4308 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4309 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4310 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4311 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4312 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4314 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4317 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4318 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4319 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4320 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4324 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4325 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4326 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4327 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4331 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4332 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4333 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4337 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4338 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4339 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4342 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4345 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4346 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4347 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4349 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4350 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4352 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4353 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4355 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4356 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4357 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4358 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4359 if let Err(e) = res {
4360 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4361 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4362 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4363 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4364 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4371 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4372 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4373 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4377 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4378 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4379 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4380 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4381 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4382 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4383 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4384 // again on restart.
4385 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4386 payment_preimage, update_res);
4388 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4389 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4390 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4391 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4392 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4393 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4397 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4398 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4401 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4403 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4404 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4406 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4407 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4408 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4409 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4410 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4411 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4412 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4415 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4416 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4418 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4420 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4423 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4427 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4428 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4429 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4435 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4436 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4437 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4440 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4441 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4443 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4444 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4445 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4446 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4447 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4451 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4452 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4458 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4459 /// update completion.
4460 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4461 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4462 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4463 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4464 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4465 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4467 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4468 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4469 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4470 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4471 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4472 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4474 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4476 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4477 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4478 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4479 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4482 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4483 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4485 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4487 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4492 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4493 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4495 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4500 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4501 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4503 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4504 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4509 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4513 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4519 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4520 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4521 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4525 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4526 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4527 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4533 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4534 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4536 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4537 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4539 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4540 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4541 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4542 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4543 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4549 let mut peer_state_lock;
4550 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4551 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4552 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4553 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4555 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4560 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4561 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4562 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4565 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4568 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4570 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4571 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4574 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4575 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4576 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4578 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4579 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4580 /// used to accept such channels.
4582 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4583 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4584 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4585 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4588 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4589 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4591 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4592 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4593 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4595 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4596 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4598 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4599 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4601 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4602 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4604 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4605 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4606 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4607 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4610 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4613 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4614 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4615 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4616 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4619 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4620 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4622 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4623 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4626 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4627 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4628 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4629 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4631 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4635 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4636 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4638 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4639 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4640 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4641 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4642 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4643 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4644 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4645 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4648 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4649 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4650 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4654 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4655 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4656 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4660 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4666 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4667 /// or 0-conf channels.
4669 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4670 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4671 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4672 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4673 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4674 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4676 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4677 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4678 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4679 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4680 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4681 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4682 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4686 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4689 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4690 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4692 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4693 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4694 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4695 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4697 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4700 num_unfunded_channels
4703 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4704 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4705 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4708 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4712 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4713 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4714 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4715 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4717 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4718 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4719 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4720 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4723 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4725 debug_assert!(false);
4726 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4731 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4732 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4733 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4734 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4735 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4736 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4739 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4740 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4743 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4744 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4745 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4746 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4747 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4750 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4751 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4752 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4755 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4760 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4762 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4765 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4766 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4767 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4768 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4770 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4771 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4772 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4775 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4776 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4777 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4778 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4779 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4780 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4781 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4785 entry.insert(channel);
4791 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4792 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4793 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4796 debug_assert!(false);
4797 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4799 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4803 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4804 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4809 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4810 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4811 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4812 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4813 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4815 user_channel_id: user_id,
4820 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4821 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4824 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4826 debug_assert!(false);
4827 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4832 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4833 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4835 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4840 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4842 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4845 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4847 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4848 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4849 funding_msg.channel_id))
4851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4852 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4856 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4857 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4858 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4859 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4860 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4861 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4862 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4866 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4868 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4869 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4870 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4872 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4873 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4874 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4875 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4876 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4877 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4878 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4879 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4887 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4888 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4890 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4892 debug_assert!(false);
4893 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4898 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4900 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4901 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4902 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4903 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4904 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4905 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4906 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4907 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4908 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4909 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4918 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4920 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4922 debug_assert!(false);
4923 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4927 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4929 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4930 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4931 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4932 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4933 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4934 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4935 msg: announcement_sigs,
4937 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4938 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4939 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4940 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4941 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4942 // announcement_signatures.
4943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4944 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4945 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4946 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4954 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4963 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4964 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4965 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4967 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4969 debug_assert!(false);
4970 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4972 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4973 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4974 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4977 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4978 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4979 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4980 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4983 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4984 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4985 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4986 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4988 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4989 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4990 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4991 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4992 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4993 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4998 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4999 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5000 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5001 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5002 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5009 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5011 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5012 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5018 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5020 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5022 debug_assert!(false);
5023 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5025 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5028 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5030 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5031 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5032 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5033 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5038 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5039 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5040 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5041 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5042 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5043 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5044 } else { (tx, None) }
5046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5049 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5050 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5051 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5053 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5054 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5055 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5056 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5057 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5061 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5066 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5067 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5068 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5069 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5071 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5072 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5073 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5074 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5076 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5080 debug_assert!(false);
5081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5085 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5088 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5089 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5090 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5091 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5092 match pending_forward_info {
5093 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5094 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5095 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5096 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5098 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5099 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5100 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5101 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5102 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5105 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5107 _ => pending_forward_info
5110 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5117 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5118 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5120 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5122 debug_assert!(false);
5123 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5125 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5126 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5127 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5129 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5134 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5138 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5140 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5142 debug_assert!(false);
5143 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5147 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5149 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5156 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5158 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5160 debug_assert!(false);
5161 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5165 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5167 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5168 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5169 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5171 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5178 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5179 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5182 debug_assert!(false);
5183 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5187 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5189 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5190 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5191 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5192 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5193 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5194 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5195 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5203 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5204 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5205 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5206 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5207 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5208 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5209 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5210 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5211 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5212 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5213 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5215 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5216 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5218 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5219 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5220 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5222 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5223 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5226 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5227 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5229 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5230 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5231 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5233 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5234 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5235 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5236 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5237 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5240 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5241 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5244 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5245 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5246 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5247 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5248 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5249 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5250 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5253 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5254 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5255 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5260 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5261 // payments are being processed.
5262 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5263 push_forward_event = true;
5265 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5266 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5273 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5274 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5277 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5278 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5279 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5281 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5285 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5286 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5287 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5288 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5289 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5291 if !forward_ev_exists {
5292 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5294 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5299 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5300 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5302 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5304 debug_assert!(false);
5305 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5306 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5307 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5308 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5310 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5311 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5312 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5313 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5314 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5315 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5316 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5318 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5323 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5327 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5329 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5331 debug_assert!(false);
5332 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5336 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5338 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5345 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5347 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5349 debug_assert!(false);
5350 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5354 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5356 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5357 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5361 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5362 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5363 msg, &self.default_configuration
5365 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5366 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5367 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5375 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5376 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5377 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5378 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5380 // It's not a local channel
5381 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5385 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5386 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5387 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5391 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5393 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5394 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5395 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5396 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5397 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5398 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5402 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5403 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5404 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5405 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5407 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5408 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5413 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5416 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5418 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5419 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5421 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5423 debug_assert!(false);
5424 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5426 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5427 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5428 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5430 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5431 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5432 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5433 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5434 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5435 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5436 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5437 let mut channel_update = None;
5438 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5439 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5440 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5443 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5444 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5445 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5446 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5447 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5448 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5449 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5454 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5455 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5456 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5457 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5458 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5459 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5467 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5468 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5471 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5472 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5477 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5478 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5479 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5481 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5482 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5483 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5484 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5485 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5486 match monitor_event {
5487 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5488 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5489 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5490 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5493 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5494 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5495 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5498 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5499 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5500 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5501 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5503 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5504 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5505 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5506 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5509 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5511 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5514 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5515 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5516 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5517 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5518 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5519 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5523 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5524 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5526 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5528 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5530 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5531 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5532 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5539 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5540 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5546 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5547 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5550 has_pending_monitor_events
5553 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5554 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5555 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5557 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5558 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5559 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5560 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5562 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5567 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5568 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5569 /// update was applied.
5570 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5571 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5572 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5573 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5575 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5576 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5577 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5578 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5581 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5584 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5585 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5586 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5587 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5588 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5589 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5590 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5591 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5593 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5594 has_monitor_update = true;
5596 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5597 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5598 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5599 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5600 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5601 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5602 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5604 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5606 continue 'peer_loop;
5615 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5616 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5617 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5620 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5621 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5627 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5628 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5629 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5630 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5631 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5632 let mut has_update = false;
5634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5636 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5639 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5640 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5641 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5642 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5643 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5646 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5649 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5650 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5651 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5652 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5653 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5658 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5660 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5661 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5662 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5668 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5669 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5677 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5678 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5684 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5685 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5687 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5688 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5689 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5690 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5691 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5692 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5693 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5694 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5695 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5696 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5697 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5698 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5699 assert!(should_broadcast);
5700 } else { unreachable!(); }
5701 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)));
5703 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5707 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5708 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5710 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5714 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5717 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5718 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5720 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5721 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5722 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5723 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5724 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5725 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5726 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5727 // never fail a payment too early.
5728 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5730 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5738 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5741 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5742 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5744 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5745 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5746 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5747 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5749 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5751 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5752 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5756 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5757 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5759 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5761 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5762 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5764 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5765 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5766 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5767 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5768 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5769 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5770 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5771 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5772 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5773 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5774 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5777 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5778 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5780 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5783 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5785 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5787 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5788 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5789 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5790 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5791 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5794 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5795 /// stored external to LDK.
5797 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5798 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5799 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5801 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5802 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5805 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5806 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5807 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5808 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5810 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5811 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5812 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5813 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5814 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5816 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5817 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5818 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5819 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5820 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5822 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5823 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5825 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5826 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5830 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5831 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5833 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5835 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5836 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5838 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5839 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5840 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5841 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5842 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5843 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5844 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5847 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5848 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5850 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5853 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5855 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5857 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5858 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5861 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5862 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5864 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5865 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5866 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5869 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5870 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5872 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5873 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5874 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5875 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5877 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5878 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5879 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5880 Some(_) => continue,
5881 None => return scid_candidate
5886 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5888 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5889 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5891 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5892 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5893 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5897 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5898 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5899 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5901 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5902 /// times to get a unique scid.
5903 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5904 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5905 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5907 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5908 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5909 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5910 return scid_candidate
5914 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5915 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5916 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5917 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5920 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5923 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5924 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5925 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5926 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5935 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5936 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5937 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5938 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5939 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5943 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5944 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5945 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5946 events.push_back((event, None));
5950 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5951 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5952 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5956 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5957 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5961 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5962 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5965 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5966 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5969 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5970 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5972 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5973 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5974 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5977 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5978 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5979 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5981 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5984 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5985 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5986 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5987 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5988 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5989 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5990 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5991 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5992 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5994 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
5996 if further_update_exists {
5997 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6003 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6007 log_debug!(self.logger,
6008 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6009 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6013 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6014 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6015 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6019 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6020 for action in actions {
6022 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6023 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6025 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6031 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6032 /// using the given event handler.
6034 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6035 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6039 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6043 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6045 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6046 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6047 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6048 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6049 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6050 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6054 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6055 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6056 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6057 /// is always placed next to each other.
6059 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6060 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6061 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6062 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6064 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6065 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6066 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6067 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6068 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6069 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6070 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6072 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6073 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6074 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6075 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6078 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6079 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6081 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6082 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6085 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6087 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6088 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6090 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6091 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6095 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6096 events.replace(pending_events);
6105 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6107 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6108 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6109 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6110 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6111 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6112 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6116 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6118 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6119 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6120 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6122 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6126 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6128 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6129 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6130 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6131 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6132 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6133 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6137 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6139 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6140 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6141 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6142 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6143 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6146 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6147 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6150 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6152 let new_height = height - 1;
6154 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6155 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6156 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6157 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6158 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6159 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6162 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6166 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6168 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6169 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6170 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6171 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6172 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6173 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6177 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6178 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6179 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6180 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6182 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6183 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6186 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6187 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6189 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6190 if height < last_best_block_height {
6191 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6192 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6196 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6197 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6198 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6199 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6201 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6202 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6206 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6208 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6210 macro_rules! max_time {
6211 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6213 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6214 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6215 // having an explicit local time source.
6216 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6217 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6218 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6219 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6220 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6226 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6227 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6228 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6229 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6233 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6234 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6235 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6236 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6237 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6238 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6239 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6240 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6247 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6249 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6250 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6251 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6252 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6253 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6254 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6259 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6261 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6263 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6264 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6265 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6270 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6271 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6273 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6274 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6275 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6276 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6277 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6279 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6280 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6282 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6283 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6284 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6285 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6286 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6287 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6288 let res = f(channel);
6289 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6290 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6291 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6292 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6293 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6295 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6296 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6297 if channel.is_usable() {
6298 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6299 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6300 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6301 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6306 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6311 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6312 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6315 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6318 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6319 msg: announcement_sigs,
6321 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6322 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6325 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6326 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6327 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6332 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6333 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6334 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6335 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6336 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6337 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6338 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6339 // is always consistent.
6340 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6341 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6342 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6343 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6344 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6347 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6348 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6349 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6350 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6351 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6352 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6357 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6358 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6360 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6362 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6363 data: reason_message,
6373 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6374 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6375 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6376 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6377 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6378 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6379 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6380 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6381 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6382 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6384 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6385 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6386 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6390 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6393 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6394 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6395 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6396 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6397 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6398 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6399 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6400 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6401 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6404 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6405 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6406 _ => unreachable!(),
6408 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6409 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6410 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6417 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6419 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6420 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6424 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6426 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6427 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6429 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6430 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6434 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6435 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6438 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6439 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6440 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6441 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6444 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6445 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6446 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6447 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6450 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6451 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6453 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6454 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6455 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6456 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6457 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6460 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6461 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6462 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6463 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6466 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6467 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6468 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6469 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6472 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6474 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6475 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6479 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6480 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6482 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6483 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6484 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6485 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6486 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6491 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6492 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6493 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6496 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6497 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6498 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6499 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6502 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6504 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6507 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6508 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6509 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6510 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6513 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6515 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6518 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6520 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6523 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6525 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6528 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6530 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6533 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6535 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6538 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6540 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6543 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6545 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6548 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6550 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6553 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6555 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6558 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6560 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6563 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6565 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6568 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6573 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6578 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6579 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6580 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6583 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6588 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6590 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6593 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6595 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6596 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6598 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6599 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6600 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6603 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6604 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6605 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6606 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6607 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6608 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6613 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6615 // V1 Channel Establishment
6616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6620 // V2 Channel Establishment
6621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6623 // Common Channel Establishment
6624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6626 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6629 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6636 // Channel Operations
6637 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6642 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6645 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6646 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6647 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6648 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6655 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6656 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6657 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6658 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6661 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6663 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6665 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6666 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6670 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6671 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6672 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6678 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6679 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6680 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6681 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6682 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6683 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6686 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6687 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6689 if inbound_peer_limited {
6692 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6693 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6694 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6695 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6696 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6701 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6702 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6704 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6705 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6706 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6707 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6712 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6713 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6718 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6721 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6724 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6725 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6726 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6727 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6728 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6729 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6730 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6734 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6735 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6736 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6741 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6742 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6743 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6744 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6745 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6754 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6758 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6761 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6762 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6764 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6765 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6768 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6770 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6771 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6772 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6776 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6778 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6779 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6782 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6783 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6785 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6793 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6794 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6798 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6799 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6802 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6803 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6806 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6807 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6808 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6809 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6812 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6813 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6814 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6815 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6818 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6819 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6820 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6821 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6824 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6825 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6826 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6827 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6830 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6831 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6832 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6833 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6836 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6837 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6838 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6839 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6842 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6843 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6844 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6845 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6848 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6849 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6850 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6851 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6854 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6855 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6856 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6857 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6861 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6862 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6863 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6864 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6867 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6868 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6870 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6871 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6872 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6873 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6874 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6877 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6878 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6879 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6880 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6883 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6884 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6885 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6886 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6889 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6890 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6891 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6892 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6893 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6894 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6895 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6896 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6897 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6898 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6899 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6900 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6901 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6902 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6903 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6904 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6905 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6906 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6908 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6909 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6910 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6916 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6917 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6919 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6920 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6921 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6922 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6925 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6926 (2, node_id, required),
6927 (4, features, required),
6928 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6929 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6930 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6931 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6934 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6936 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6937 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6938 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6939 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6940 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6941 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6942 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6943 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6944 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6945 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6946 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6947 (7, self.config, option),
6948 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6949 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6950 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6951 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6952 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6953 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6954 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6955 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6956 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6957 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6958 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6959 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6960 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6961 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6962 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6963 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6964 (32, self.is_public, required),
6965 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6966 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6967 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6968 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6974 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6975 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6976 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6977 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6978 (2, channel_id, required),
6979 (3, channel_type, option),
6980 (4, counterparty, required),
6981 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6982 (6, funding_txo, option),
6983 (7, config, option),
6984 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6985 (9, confirmations, option),
6986 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6987 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6988 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6989 (16, balance_msat, required),
6990 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6991 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6992 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6993 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6994 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6995 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6996 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6997 (26, is_outbound, required),
6998 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6999 (30, is_usable, required),
7000 (32, is_public, required),
7001 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7002 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7003 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7004 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7007 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7008 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7009 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7010 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7011 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7015 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7017 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7018 outbound_scid_alias,
7022 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7023 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7025 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7026 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7027 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7028 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7029 confirmations_required,
7031 force_close_spend_delay,
7032 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7033 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7034 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7035 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7036 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7037 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7038 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7043 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7044 (2, channels, vec_type),
7045 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7046 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7049 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7051 (0, onion_packet, required),
7052 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7055 (0, payment_data, required),
7056 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7057 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7058 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7060 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7061 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7062 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7063 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7067 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7068 (0, routing, required),
7069 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7070 (4, payment_hash, required),
7071 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7072 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7073 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7077 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7078 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7080 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7082 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7083 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7084 reason.write(writer)?;
7086 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7087 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7090 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7091 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7092 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7093 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7100 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7101 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7102 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7105 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7106 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7107 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7108 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7112 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7113 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7114 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7115 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7116 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7120 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7121 // messages contained in the variants.
7122 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7123 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7124 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7126 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7128 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7129 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7130 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7133 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7134 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7135 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7136 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7137 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7139 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7144 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7149 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7150 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7151 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7152 (2, outpoint, required),
7153 (4, htlc_id, required),
7154 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7157 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7158 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7159 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7160 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7161 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7163 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7164 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7165 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7166 (2, self.value, required),
7167 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7168 (4, payment_data, option),
7169 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7170 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7171 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7177 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7178 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7179 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7181 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7182 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7183 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7184 let mut total_value_received = None;
7185 let mut total_msat = None;
7186 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7187 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7188 (0, prev_hop, required),
7189 (1, total_msat, option),
7190 (2, value, required),
7191 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7192 (4, payment_data, option),
7193 (5, total_value_received, option),
7194 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7195 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7197 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7199 if payment_data.is_some() {
7200 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7202 if total_msat.is_none() {
7203 total_msat = Some(value);
7205 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7208 if total_msat.is_none() {
7209 if payment_data.is_none() {
7210 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7212 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7214 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7218 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7221 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7222 total_value_received,
7223 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7230 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7231 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7232 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7235 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7236 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7237 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7238 let mut payment_id = None;
7239 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7240 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7241 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7242 (0, session_priv, required),
7243 (1, payment_id, option),
7244 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7245 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7246 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7247 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7249 if payment_id.is_none() {
7250 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7252 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7254 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7255 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7256 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7258 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7259 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7260 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7261 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7265 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7266 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7267 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7269 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7272 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7273 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7278 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7279 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7283 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7284 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7285 (0, session_priv, required),
7286 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7287 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7288 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7289 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7290 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7291 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7296 field.write(writer)?;
7303 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7304 (0, forward_info, required),
7305 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7306 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7307 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7308 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7311 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7313 (0, htlc_id, required),
7314 (2, err_packet, required),
7319 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7320 (0, payment_secret, required),
7321 (2, expiry_time, required),
7322 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7323 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7324 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7327 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7329 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7330 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7331 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7332 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7333 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7334 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7338 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7339 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7341 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7343 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7345 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7346 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7347 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7350 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7353 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7354 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7355 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7358 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7359 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7361 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7362 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7363 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7364 unfunded_channels += 1;
7369 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7371 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7374 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7375 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7376 channel.write(writer)?;
7383 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7384 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7385 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7386 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7387 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7388 for forward in pending_forwards {
7389 forward.write(writer)?;
7394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7396 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7397 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7398 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7400 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7401 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7402 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7403 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7404 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7405 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7406 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7407 htlc.write(writer)?;
7409 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7410 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7413 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7414 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7415 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7416 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7417 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7418 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7419 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7422 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7423 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7424 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7425 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7426 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7428 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7429 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7430 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7431 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7432 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7433 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7434 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7439 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7440 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7441 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7442 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7443 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7444 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7445 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7446 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7447 0u64.write(writer)?;
7449 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7450 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7451 event.write(writer)?;
7455 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7456 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7457 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7458 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7459 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7460 0u64.write(writer)?;
7462 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7463 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7464 // likely to be identical.
7465 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7466 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7468 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7469 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7470 hash.write(writer)?;
7471 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7474 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7475 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7476 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7477 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7478 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7481 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7482 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7484 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7485 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7486 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7487 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7490 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7491 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7495 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7496 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7497 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7499 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7500 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7501 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7507 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7508 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7509 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7510 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7513 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7514 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7515 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7516 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7517 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7520 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7521 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7522 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7523 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7524 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7525 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7526 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7527 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7528 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7529 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7530 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7531 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7538 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7539 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7540 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7541 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7544 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7545 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7546 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7547 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7548 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7549 // check that the event is sane here.
7550 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7551 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7552 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7553 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7559 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7560 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7561 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7562 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7563 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7564 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7567 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7568 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7569 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7570 events.push_back((ev, action));
7571 } else if action.is_some() {
7572 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7579 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7581 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7583 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7584 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7585 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7586 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7587 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7588 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7589 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7590 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7591 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7592 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7593 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7594 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7595 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7597 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7598 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7600 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7601 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7603 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7604 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7605 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7606 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7607 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7608 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7610 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7611 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7613 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7614 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7615 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7616 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7617 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7622 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7623 pub entropy_source: ES,
7625 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7626 pub node_signer: NS,
7628 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7629 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7631 pub signer_provider: SP,
7633 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7635 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7636 pub fee_estimator: F,
7637 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7639 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7640 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7641 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7642 pub chain_monitor: M,
7644 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7645 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7646 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7647 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7648 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7649 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7651 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7653 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7654 /// deserialization.
7656 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7657 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7658 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7660 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7661 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7663 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7664 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7665 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7666 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7668 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7671 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7672 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7675 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7676 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7678 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7679 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7680 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7681 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7682 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7683 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7687 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7688 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7689 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7690 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7691 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7693 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7694 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7699 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7700 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7701 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7702 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7704 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7705 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7706 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7707 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7708 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7709 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7713 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7714 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7715 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7719 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7720 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7722 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7723 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7724 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7725 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7726 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7727 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7731 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7732 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7734 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7735 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7736 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7738 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7740 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7741 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7742 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7743 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7744 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7745 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7746 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7747 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7748 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7749 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7751 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7752 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7753 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7754 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7755 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7756 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7757 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7758 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7759 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7760 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7761 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7762 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7763 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7764 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7765 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7766 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7767 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7768 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7769 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7770 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7771 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7772 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7773 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7774 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7775 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(monitor_update));
7777 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7778 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7779 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7780 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7781 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7783 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7784 let mut found_htlc = false;
7785 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7786 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7789 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7790 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7791 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7792 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7793 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7794 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7795 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7796 log_info!(args.logger,
7797 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7798 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7799 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7803 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7804 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7805 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7807 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7808 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7810 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7811 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7812 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7813 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7816 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7817 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7818 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7822 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7823 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7824 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7825 // safely discard the channel.
7826 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7827 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7828 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7829 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7830 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7833 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7834 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7835 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7836 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7837 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7838 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7842 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7843 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7844 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7845 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7846 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7847 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7848 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7850 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7854 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7855 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7856 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7857 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7858 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7859 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7860 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7861 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7862 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7864 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7867 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7868 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7869 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7870 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7872 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7873 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7874 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7876 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7879 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7880 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7881 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7882 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7883 let peer_state = PeerState {
7884 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7885 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7886 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7887 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7888 is_connected: false,
7890 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7893 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7894 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7895 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7896 for _ in 0..event_count {
7897 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7898 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7903 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7904 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7905 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7907 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7908 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7909 // on-startup monitor updates.
7910 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7911 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7913 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7917 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7918 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7920 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7921 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7922 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7923 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7924 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7928 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7929 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7930 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7931 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7932 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7933 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7934 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7936 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7937 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7941 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7942 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7943 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7944 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7945 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7946 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7947 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7948 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7949 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7950 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7951 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7952 let mut events_override = None;
7953 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7954 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7955 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7956 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7957 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7958 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7959 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7960 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7961 (8, events_override, option),
7962 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7963 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7964 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7966 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7967 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7970 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7971 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7974 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7975 pending_events_read = events;
7978 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7979 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7982 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7983 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7984 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7985 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7986 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7987 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7989 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7991 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7992 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7993 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7997 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7998 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7999 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8000 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8001 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8002 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8003 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8005 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8006 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8007 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8008 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8009 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8010 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8014 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8015 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8016 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8017 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8019 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8020 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8021 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8023 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8024 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8025 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8026 retry_strategy: None,
8027 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8028 payment_params: None,
8029 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8030 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8031 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8032 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8033 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8034 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8035 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8036 total_msat: path_amt,
8037 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8039 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8040 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8045 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8047 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8048 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8049 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8050 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8052 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8053 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8054 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8055 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8056 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8057 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8058 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8059 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8060 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8061 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8062 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8067 !forwards.is_empty()
8069 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8070 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8071 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8072 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8073 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8074 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8075 intercepted_id != ev_id
8082 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8083 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8084 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8085 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8086 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8087 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8088 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8089 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8090 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8091 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8092 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8093 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8094 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8103 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8104 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8105 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8106 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8107 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8108 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8109 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8110 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8114 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8115 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8117 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8118 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8119 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8120 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8122 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8123 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8126 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8127 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8129 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8130 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8132 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8135 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8136 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8137 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8139 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8143 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8144 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8145 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8146 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8147 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8149 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8150 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8151 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8152 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8153 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8154 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8155 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8156 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8158 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8159 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8163 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8165 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8167 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8168 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8170 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8171 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8176 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8177 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8179 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8181 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8183 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8184 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8185 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8186 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8190 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8191 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8194 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8195 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8196 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8198 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8199 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8200 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8202 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8203 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8204 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8205 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8206 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8207 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8209 if chan.is_usable() {
8210 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8211 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8212 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8213 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8220 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8222 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8223 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8224 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8225 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8226 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8227 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8228 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8229 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8230 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8231 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8232 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8234 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8235 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8237 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8238 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8239 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8240 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8242 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8243 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8244 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8245 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8247 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8248 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8249 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8250 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8252 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8253 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8254 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8257 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8258 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8261 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8262 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8265 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8268 purpose: payment.purpose,
8269 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8275 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8276 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8277 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8279 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8284 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8286 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8287 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8288 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8289 router: args.router,
8291 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8293 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8294 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8295 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8296 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8298 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8299 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8301 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8302 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8303 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8305 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8310 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8312 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8314 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8315 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8316 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8317 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8318 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8320 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8321 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8322 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8324 logger: args.logger,
8325 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8328 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8329 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8330 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8331 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8332 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8335 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8336 //connection or two.
8338 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8344 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8345 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8346 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8347 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8348 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8349 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8350 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8351 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8352 use crate::ln::msgs;
8353 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8354 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8355 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8356 use crate::util::test_utils;
8357 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8358 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8361 fn test_notify_limits() {
8362 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8363 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8367 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8369 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8370 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8371 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8372 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8373 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8375 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8377 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8378 // to connect messages with new values
8379 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8380 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8381 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8382 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8383 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8384 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8386 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8387 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8388 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8389 // ... but the last node should not.
8390 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8391 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8392 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8393 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8395 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8396 // about the channel.
8397 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8398 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8399 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8401 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8403 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8404 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8405 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8406 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8407 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8408 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8410 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8412 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8414 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8415 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8416 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8417 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8418 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8419 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8421 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8422 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8423 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8424 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8425 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8426 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8427 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8428 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8430 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8431 // the channel info has updated.
8432 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8433 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8434 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8435 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8436 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8437 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8441 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8442 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8448 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8450 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8451 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8452 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8453 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8455 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8456 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8457 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8458 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8459 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8460 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8461 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8462 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8464 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8465 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8466 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8468 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8469 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8470 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8472 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8474 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8475 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8476 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8478 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8479 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8482 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8483 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8484 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8485 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8486 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8487 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8488 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8489 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8490 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8492 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8493 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8494 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8496 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8498 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8500 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8501 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8502 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8503 // lightning messages manually.
8504 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8505 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8508 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8509 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8510 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8512 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8513 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8515 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8516 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8518 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8519 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8520 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8522 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8523 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8524 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8526 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8528 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8530 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8534 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8535 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8536 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8539 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8540 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8541 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8542 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8544 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8547 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8548 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8549 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8550 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8555 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8556 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8557 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8558 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8565 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8566 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8567 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8568 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8569 // fails as expected.
8570 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8571 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8572 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8573 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8574 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8575 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8576 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8578 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8579 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8580 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8582 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8583 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8584 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8585 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8587 let route = find_route(
8588 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8589 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8591 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8592 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8596 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8597 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8598 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8600 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8601 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8602 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8603 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8606 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8607 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8608 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8609 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8610 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8611 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8612 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8613 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8614 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8616 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8617 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8619 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8620 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8621 let route = find_route(
8622 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8623 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8625 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8626 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8628 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8630 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8631 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8632 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8634 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8635 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8636 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8637 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8639 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8640 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8641 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8642 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8646 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8649 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8650 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8651 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8652 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8653 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8654 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8655 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8656 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8657 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8659 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8660 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8664 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8665 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8666 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8672 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8673 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8675 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8676 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8677 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8678 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8680 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8681 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8682 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8683 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8684 let route = find_route(
8685 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8686 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8689 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8690 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8691 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8692 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8693 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8694 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8697 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8698 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8699 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8700 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8701 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8702 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8703 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8705 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8709 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8710 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8714 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8716 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8717 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8719 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8720 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8721 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8722 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8724 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8725 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8726 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8727 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8728 let route = find_route(
8729 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8730 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8733 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8734 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8735 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8736 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8737 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8738 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8739 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8740 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8743 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8744 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8745 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8746 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8747 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8748 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8749 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8755 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8757 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8759 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8761 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8762 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8763 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8764 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8766 // Marshall an MPP route.
8767 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8768 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8769 route.paths.push(path);
8770 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8771 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8772 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8773 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8774 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8775 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8777 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8778 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8780 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8781 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8783 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8788 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8789 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8790 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8791 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8792 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8794 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8796 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8797 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8799 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8800 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8802 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8805 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8806 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8807 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8808 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8809 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8810 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8813 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8816 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8822 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8823 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8829 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8830 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8832 total_msat: 100_000,
8835 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8836 // payment verification fails as expected.
8837 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8838 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8839 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8840 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8842 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8846 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8847 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8851 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8852 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8853 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8854 // the channel is successfully closed.
8855 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8856 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8857 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8858 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8860 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8861 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8862 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8863 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8864 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8866 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8867 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8869 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8870 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8871 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8872 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8875 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8877 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8878 // as it has the funding transaction.
8879 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8880 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8881 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8884 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8886 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8888 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8890 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8891 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8892 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8894 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8897 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8898 // as it has the funding transaction.
8899 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8900 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8901 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8904 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8905 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8907 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8908 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8909 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8910 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8912 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8914 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8915 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8917 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8918 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8920 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8921 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8922 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8923 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8924 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8925 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8926 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8930 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8931 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8932 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8933 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8934 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8935 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8936 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8939 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8941 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8942 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8943 // closing transaction).
8944 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8945 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8948 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8949 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8950 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8951 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8952 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8955 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8957 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8959 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8960 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8961 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8963 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8965 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8966 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8969 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8970 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8971 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8974 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8975 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8976 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8979 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8981 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8982 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8984 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8985 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8987 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8988 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8993 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8994 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8995 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8996 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8997 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8998 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8999 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9003 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9004 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9005 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9007 // Test the API functions.
9008 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9010 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9012 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9014 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9016 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9018 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9020 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9024 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9025 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9029 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9031 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9033 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9034 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9036 let mut funding_tx = None;
9037 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9038 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9039 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9042 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9043 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9044 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9045 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9046 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9048 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9050 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9052 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9054 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9056 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9058 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9061 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9062 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9063 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9064 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9065 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9067 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9068 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9070 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9071 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9072 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9073 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9074 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9075 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9076 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9078 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9079 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9080 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9081 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9083 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9084 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9085 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9086 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9087 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9088 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9089 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9091 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9092 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9093 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9094 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9096 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9097 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9098 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9099 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9101 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9102 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9104 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9105 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9106 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9107 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9108 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9110 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9111 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9112 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9114 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9115 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9116 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9118 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9119 // "protected" and can connect again.
9120 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9121 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9122 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9123 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9125 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9127 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9128 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9132 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9133 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9139 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9141 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9142 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9144 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9145 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9146 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9147 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9150 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9153 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9154 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9156 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9157 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9158 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9160 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9162 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9163 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9167 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9168 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9169 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9172 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9173 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9175 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9177 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9179 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9180 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9182 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9183 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9184 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9185 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9186 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9187 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9189 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9190 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9192 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9193 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9197 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9198 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9201 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9202 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9203 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9204 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9205 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9206 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9207 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9209 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9210 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9211 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9212 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9218 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9219 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9221 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9222 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9223 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9225 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9226 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9230 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9235 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9236 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9237 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9238 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9241 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9242 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9243 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9245 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9247 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9248 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9249 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9251 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9252 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9254 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9255 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9260 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9261 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9263 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9264 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9266 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9270 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9272 use crate::chain::Listen;
9273 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9274 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9275 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9276 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9277 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9278 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9279 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9280 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9281 use crate::util::test_utils;
9282 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9284 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9285 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9286 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9288 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9292 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9293 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9294 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9295 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9296 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9297 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9298 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9300 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9301 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9303 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9304 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9306 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9308 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9313 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9314 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9317 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9318 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9319 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9321 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9323 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9324 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9325 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9326 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9327 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9329 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9330 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9332 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9333 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9334 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9335 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9337 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9339 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9341 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9342 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9343 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9344 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9345 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9347 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9349 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9351 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9352 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9353 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9354 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9355 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9358 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9359 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9360 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9362 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9363 } else { panic!(); }
9365 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9366 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9367 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9369 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9370 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9375 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9376 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9377 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9379 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9380 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9385 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9388 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9391 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9392 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9394 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9395 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9396 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9397 match msg_events[0] {
9398 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9399 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9400 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9404 match msg_events[1] {
9405 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9409 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9410 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9412 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9413 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9418 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9419 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9421 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9422 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9424 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9427 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9428 macro_rules! send_payment {
9429 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9430 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9431 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9432 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9433 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9435 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9436 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9438 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9439 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9440 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9441 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9442 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9443 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9444 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9445 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9446 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9447 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9448 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9450 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9451 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9452 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9453 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9455 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9456 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9457 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9458 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9459 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9461 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9464 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9465 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9466 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9467 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9469 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9474 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9475 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);