1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423 /// this payment being removed.
425 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426 user_payment_id: u64,
427 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
439 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
447 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448 starting_block_height: u32,
450 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
454 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
457 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
458 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
459 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
460 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
461 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
463 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
466 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
471 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
473 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
477 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
483 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
485 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
489 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
496 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
498 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
505 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
506 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
507 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
508 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
514 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
515 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
518 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
519 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
520 let our_payment_hash;
521 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
526 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
527 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
531 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
535 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
536 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
537 let remove_res = match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
542 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
546 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
547 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
548 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
549 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
550 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
551 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
558 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
559 let insert_res = match self {
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
562 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
568 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
569 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
570 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
571 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
572 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
579 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
581 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
582 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
591 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
596 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
597 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
598 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
600 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
601 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
602 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
603 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
604 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
605 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
606 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
607 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
608 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
610 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
611 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
613 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
614 /// to individual Channels.
616 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
617 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
618 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
619 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
621 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
622 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
623 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
624 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
625 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
626 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
627 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
629 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
630 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
631 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
632 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
635 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
636 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
637 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
638 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
639 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
641 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
642 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
643 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
644 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
645 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
646 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
647 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
649 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
650 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
653 default_configuration: UserConfig,
654 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
660 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
662 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
663 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
665 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
666 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
667 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
668 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
670 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
671 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
672 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
673 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
674 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
675 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
677 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
678 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
679 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
680 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
681 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
682 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
683 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
684 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
686 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
688 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
689 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
691 our_network_key: SecretKey,
692 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
694 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
695 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
696 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
698 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
699 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
700 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
701 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
703 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
704 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
705 /// are currently open with that peer.
706 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
707 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
710 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
711 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
713 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
714 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
715 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
716 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
717 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
718 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
719 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
720 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
721 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
723 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
730 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
732 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
733 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
734 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
735 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
736 pub struct ChainParameters {
737 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
738 pub network: Network,
740 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
742 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
743 pub best_block: BestBlock,
746 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
752 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
753 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
754 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
755 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
756 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
757 /// updates are ready for persistence).
759 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
760 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
761 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
762 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
763 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
765 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
766 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
769 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
770 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
774 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
775 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
777 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
778 persistence_notifier: notifier,
779 should_persist: persist_check,
780 _read_guard: read_guard,
785 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
787 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
788 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
793 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
794 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
796 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
798 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
799 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
800 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
801 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
802 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
804 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
805 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
807 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
809 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
810 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
811 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
812 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
813 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
814 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
815 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
817 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
818 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
820 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
821 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
822 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
823 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
825 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
826 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
827 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
828 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
829 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
830 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
833 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
835 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
836 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
839 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
841 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
842 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
843 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
845 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
846 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
847 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
848 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
849 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
850 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
851 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
852 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
853 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
854 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
855 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
858 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
859 /// to better separate parameters.
860 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
861 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
862 /// The node_id of our counterparty
863 pub node_id: PublicKey,
864 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
865 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
866 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
867 pub features: InitFeatures,
868 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
869 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
870 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
872 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
874 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
875 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
876 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
877 /// payments to us through this channel.
878 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
881 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
882 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
883 pub struct ChannelDetails {
884 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
885 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
886 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
887 /// lifetime of the channel.
888 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
889 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
890 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
891 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
892 /// our counterparty already.
894 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
895 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
896 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
897 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
898 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
899 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
900 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
901 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
902 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
903 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
904 /// this value on chain.
906 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
908 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
910 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
911 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
912 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
913 pub user_channel_id: u64,
914 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
915 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
916 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
918 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
919 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
920 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
921 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
923 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
924 pub balance_msat: u64,
925 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
926 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
927 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
928 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
930 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
932 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
933 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
934 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
935 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
936 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
937 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
938 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
939 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
940 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
942 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
943 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
944 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
945 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
946 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
947 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
948 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
949 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
950 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
952 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
954 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
955 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
956 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
957 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
958 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
959 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
960 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
961 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
962 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
964 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
965 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
966 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
967 pub is_outbound: bool,
968 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
969 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
970 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
971 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
972 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
974 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
975 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
976 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
977 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
979 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
981 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
985 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
986 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
988 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
989 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
990 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
991 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
992 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
993 ParameterError(APIError),
994 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
995 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
996 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
999 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1001 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1002 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1003 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1004 /// paths than the ones selected).
1005 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1006 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1007 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1008 /// in over-/re-payment.
1010 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1011 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1012 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1014 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1015 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1016 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1017 /// with the latest update_id.
1019 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1020 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1021 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1022 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1023 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1024 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1025 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1026 payment_id: PaymentId,
1030 macro_rules! handle_error {
1031 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1034 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1035 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1037 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1038 // entering the macro.
1039 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1040 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1043 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1045 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1046 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1047 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1048 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1052 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1053 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1054 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1055 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1060 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1061 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1063 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1064 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1065 action: err.action.clone()
1069 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1070 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1073 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1080 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1081 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1082 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1084 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1085 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1087 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1089 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1090 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1092 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1093 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1094 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1095 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1097 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1098 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1099 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1101 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1102 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1103 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1104 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1106 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1107 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1108 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1114 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1115 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1119 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1121 $entry.remove_entry();
1129 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1130 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1134 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1136 $entry.remove_entry();
1144 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1145 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1147 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1148 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1149 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1156 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1157 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1158 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1160 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1162 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1163 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1164 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1165 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1167 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1168 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1169 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1170 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1171 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1172 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1173 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1174 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1175 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1176 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1177 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1180 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1181 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1182 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1183 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1184 match $action_type {
1185 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1186 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1188 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1189 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1191 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1192 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1193 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1194 if !$resend_commitment {
1195 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1198 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1200 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1201 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1205 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1206 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1208 $entry.remove_entry();
1212 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1213 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1217 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1218 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1219 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1221 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1222 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1226 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1227 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1228 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1229 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1230 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1233 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1238 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1239 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1240 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1241 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1242 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1243 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1245 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1246 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1248 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1249 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1250 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1251 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1254 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1255 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1256 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1257 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1258 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1259 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1260 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1261 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1262 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1263 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1264 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1265 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1268 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1269 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1270 // before it should be allowed to.
1271 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1272 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1273 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1276 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1277 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1278 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1279 msg: announcement_sigs,
1282 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1285 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1286 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1287 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1288 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1289 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1290 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1291 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1292 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1293 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1294 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1295 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1296 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1297 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1298 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1299 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1300 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1301 let mut order = $order;
1303 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1305 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1309 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1310 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1311 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1312 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1317 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1318 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1319 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1320 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1321 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1326 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1330 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1335 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1336 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1337 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1342 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1343 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1344 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1345 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1346 assert!(res.is_ok());
1349 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1353 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1354 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1355 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1357 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1359 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1360 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1365 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1366 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1368 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1369 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1372 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1374 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1375 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1377 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1379 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1381 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1382 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1383 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1384 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1385 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1386 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1389 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1390 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1391 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1395 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1397 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1398 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1399 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1400 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1401 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1402 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1404 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1405 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1407 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1408 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1411 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1412 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1414 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1416 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1417 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1418 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1419 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1427 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1428 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1429 &self.default_configuration
1432 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1434 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1435 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1436 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1437 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1438 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1441 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1442 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1444 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1445 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1446 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1448 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1449 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1450 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1451 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1452 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1453 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1455 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1456 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1457 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1458 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1459 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1465 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1466 Some(peer_state) => {
1467 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1468 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1469 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1470 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1471 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1473 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1476 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1479 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1480 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1482 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1483 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1484 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1486 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1487 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1489 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1494 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1495 node_id: their_network_key,
1498 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1501 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1502 let mut res = Vec::new();
1504 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1505 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1506 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1507 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1508 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1509 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1510 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1511 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1512 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1513 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1514 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1515 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1516 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1517 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1519 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1520 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1521 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1522 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1524 inbound_capacity_msat,
1525 outbound_capacity_msat,
1526 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1527 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1528 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1529 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1530 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1531 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1532 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1537 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1538 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1539 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1545 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1546 /// more information.
1547 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1548 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1551 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1552 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1554 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1555 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1557 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1558 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1559 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1560 // really wanted anyway.
1561 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1564 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1565 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1566 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1567 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1568 Some(transaction) => {
1569 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1573 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1574 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1575 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1576 reason: closure_reason
1580 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1583 let counterparty_node_id;
1584 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1585 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1586 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1590 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1592 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1593 Some(peer_state) => {
1594 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1595 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1596 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1598 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1600 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1602 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1603 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1604 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1605 let (result, is_permanent) =
1606 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1608 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1615 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1619 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1620 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1621 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1626 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1630 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1634 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1638 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1642 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1643 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1644 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1646 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1647 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1649 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1650 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1651 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1652 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1654 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1656 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1657 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1658 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1659 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1660 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1663 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1664 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1665 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1667 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1668 /// the channel being closed or not:
1669 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1670 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1671 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1672 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1673 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1674 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1675 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1677 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1679 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1680 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1681 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1682 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1683 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1687 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1688 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1689 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1690 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1691 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1693 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1694 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1695 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1696 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1697 // ignore the result here.
1698 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1702 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1703 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1704 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1706 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1707 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1708 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1709 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1710 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1711 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1714 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1715 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1717 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1718 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1719 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1722 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1724 chan.remove_entry().1
1726 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1729 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1730 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1731 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1732 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1733 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1738 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1741 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1742 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1743 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1745 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1746 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1747 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1748 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1749 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1750 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1751 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1761 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1762 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1763 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1764 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1765 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1769 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1770 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1771 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1773 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1774 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1775 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1776 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1777 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1778 failure_code: $err_code,
1779 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1784 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1785 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1788 let shared_secret = {
1789 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1790 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1793 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1795 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1796 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1797 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1798 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1799 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1800 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1801 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1802 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1805 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1806 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1807 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1808 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1809 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1812 let mut channel_state = None;
1813 macro_rules! return_err {
1814 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1816 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1817 if channel_state.is_none() {
1818 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1820 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1821 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1822 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1823 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1824 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1829 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1830 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1831 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1832 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1834 let error_code = match err {
1835 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1836 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1837 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1838 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1839 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1841 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1844 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1845 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1846 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1853 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1856 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1857 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1858 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1859 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1860 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1861 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1862 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1863 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1864 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1865 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1866 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1867 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1871 // final_expiry_too_soon
1872 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1873 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1874 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1875 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1876 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1877 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1878 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1880 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1881 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1882 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1884 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1885 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1886 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1889 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1890 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1891 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1892 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1893 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1894 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1895 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1896 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1898 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1900 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1901 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1902 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1903 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1904 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1905 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1906 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1907 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1908 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1911 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1913 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1916 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1921 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1922 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1923 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1924 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1926 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1928 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1929 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1930 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1931 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1934 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1935 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1936 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1938 // Check two things:
1939 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1940 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1941 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1943 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1945 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1946 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1947 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1949 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1951 let blinding_factor = {
1952 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1953 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1954 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1955 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1958 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1960 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1962 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1965 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1966 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1969 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1970 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1971 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1972 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1973 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1977 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1978 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1979 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1982 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1983 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1984 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1985 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1989 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1990 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1991 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1992 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1993 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1994 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1995 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1996 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1997 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1998 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1999 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2001 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2004 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2006 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2007 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2008 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2009 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2010 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2013 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2014 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2015 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2016 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2017 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2018 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2019 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2021 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2022 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2024 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2025 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2026 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2027 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2028 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2030 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2031 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2033 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2034 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2035 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2036 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2037 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2038 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2040 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2041 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2043 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2044 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2045 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2046 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2047 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2048 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2049 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2050 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2051 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2052 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2058 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2059 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2060 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2061 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2063 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2064 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2066 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2067 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2068 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2070 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2072 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2077 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2080 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2081 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2082 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2084 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2085 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2086 if !chan.should_announce() {
2087 return Err(LightningError {
2088 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2089 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2093 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2096 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2097 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2098 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2099 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2100 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2101 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2103 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2104 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2108 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2110 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2111 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2113 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2114 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2115 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2116 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2117 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2118 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2119 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2120 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2123 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2124 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2126 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2132 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2133 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2135 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2136 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2137 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2139 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2140 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2141 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2142 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2143 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2145 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2149 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2150 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2152 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2153 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2154 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2155 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2156 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2157 err: "Payment already completed"
2162 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2163 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2164 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2167 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2169 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2170 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2171 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2172 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2173 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2174 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2175 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2176 total_msat: total_value,
2178 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2182 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2183 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2185 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2186 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2188 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2189 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2191 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2192 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2194 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2195 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2197 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2198 payee: payee.clone(),
2199 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2200 channel_state, chan)
2202 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2203 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2204 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2205 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2206 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2207 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2208 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2209 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2210 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2211 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2213 insert_outbound_payment!();
2215 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2217 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2218 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2219 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2220 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2221 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2222 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2228 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2230 } else { unreachable!(); }
2234 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2235 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2237 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2242 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2244 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2245 /// fields for more info.
2247 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2248 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2249 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2250 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2251 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2252 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2254 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2256 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2257 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2258 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2260 /// In general, a path may raise:
2261 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2262 /// node public key) is specified.
2263 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2264 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2266 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2267 /// relevant updates.
2269 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2270 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2271 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2273 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2274 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2275 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2276 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2278 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2279 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2280 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2281 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2282 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2285 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2286 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2287 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2289 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2290 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2291 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2292 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2293 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2295 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2296 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2298 let mut total_value = 0;
2299 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2300 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2301 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2302 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2303 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2304 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2305 continue 'path_check;
2307 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2308 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2309 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2310 continue 'path_check;
2313 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2314 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2316 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2317 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2319 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2320 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2321 total_value = amt_msat;
2324 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2325 let mut results = Vec::new();
2326 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2327 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2329 let mut has_ok = false;
2330 let mut has_err = false;
2331 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2332 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2333 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2334 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2335 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2336 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2337 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2341 } else if res.is_err() {
2342 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2343 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2346 if has_err && has_ok {
2347 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2350 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2351 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2352 Some(RouteParameters {
2353 payee: payee.clone(),
2354 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2355 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2361 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2362 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2363 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2364 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2370 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2372 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2373 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2374 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2375 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2376 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2378 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2379 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2380 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2381 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2382 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2383 if path.len() == 0 {
2384 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2385 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2390 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2391 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2392 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2394 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2395 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2397 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2398 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2399 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2400 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2403 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2405 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2406 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2407 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2410 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2411 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2412 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2415 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2416 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2417 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2422 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2423 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2427 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2430 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2432 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2433 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2434 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2435 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2437 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2438 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2439 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2441 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2442 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2443 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2444 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2447 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2448 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2449 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2450 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2451 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2453 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2461 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2462 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2463 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2464 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2465 /// never reach the recipient.
2467 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2469 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2470 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2472 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2474 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2475 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2476 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2478 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2480 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2481 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2482 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2487 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2488 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2489 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2490 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2492 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2494 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2496 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2497 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2498 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2499 } else { unreachable!(); })
2502 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2504 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2505 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2508 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2509 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2514 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2516 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2519 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2521 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2531 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2532 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2533 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2537 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2539 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2540 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2542 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2543 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2545 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2546 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2547 /// keys per-channel).
2549 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2550 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2551 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2553 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2554 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2555 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2557 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2558 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2559 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2562 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2563 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2565 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2569 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2570 let mut output_index = None;
2571 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2572 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2573 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2574 if output_index.is_some() {
2575 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2576 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2579 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2580 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2581 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2584 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2587 if output_index.is_none() {
2588 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2589 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2592 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2596 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2597 if !chan.should_announce() {
2598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2602 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2604 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2606 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2607 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2609 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2610 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2611 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2612 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2613 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2618 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2619 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2620 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2622 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2625 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2626 // smaller than 500:
2627 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2629 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2630 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2631 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2632 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2633 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2634 /// our network addresses.
2636 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2637 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2639 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2640 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2641 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2642 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2644 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2646 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2647 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2650 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2651 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2654 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2655 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2656 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2658 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2659 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2660 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2661 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2662 rgb, alias, addresses,
2663 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2664 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2666 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2667 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2669 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2670 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2672 let mut announced_chans = false;
2673 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2674 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2677 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2682 announced_chans = true;
2684 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2685 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2686 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2690 if announced_chans {
2691 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2692 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2693 signature: node_announce_sig,
2694 contents: announcement
2700 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2702 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2703 /// Will likely generate further events.
2704 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2707 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2708 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2709 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2714 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2715 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2716 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2717 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2719 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2720 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2721 match forward_info {
2722 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2723 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2724 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2725 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2726 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2727 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2728 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2730 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2731 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2734 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2735 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2736 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2737 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2738 // problem, not ours.
2745 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2746 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2747 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2748 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2749 match forward_info {
2750 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2751 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2753 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2754 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2755 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2756 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2757 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2758 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2759 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2762 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2764 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2767 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2769 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2770 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2771 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2777 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2779 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2780 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2781 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2782 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2783 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2784 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2785 // this channel currently :/.
2791 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2792 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2794 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2796 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2798 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2801 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2803 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2804 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2805 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2808 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2810 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2811 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2812 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2813 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2814 // messages when we can.
2815 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2816 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2817 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2824 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2825 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2828 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2829 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2830 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2831 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2832 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2833 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2835 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2837 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2838 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2839 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2841 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2842 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2844 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2846 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2850 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2851 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2854 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2855 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2857 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2858 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2859 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2860 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2861 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2862 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2864 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2872 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2873 match forward_info {
2874 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2875 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2876 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2877 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2878 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2879 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2880 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2881 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2883 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2886 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2887 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2888 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2889 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2890 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2891 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2893 value: amt_to_forward,
2898 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2900 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2901 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2902 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2904 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2905 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2906 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2907 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2908 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2910 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2915 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2916 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2917 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2918 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2919 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2920 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2921 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2922 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2924 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2925 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2927 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2929 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2930 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2932 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2933 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2935 amt: amt_to_forward,
2936 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2940 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2941 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2949 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2953 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2956 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2957 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2958 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2959 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2960 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2961 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2962 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2964 let mut total_value = 0;
2965 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2966 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2967 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2968 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2970 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2974 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2975 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2976 total_value += htlc.value;
2977 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2978 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2979 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2981 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2982 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2984 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2986 _ => unreachable!(),
2989 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2990 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2991 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2992 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2995 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2996 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2998 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2999 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
3000 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3004 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
3005 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
3007 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3009 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3010 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3017 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3018 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3026 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3027 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3030 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3031 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3034 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3035 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3036 events.append(&mut new_events);
3039 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3041 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3042 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3044 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3045 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3046 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3047 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3048 if background_events.is_empty() {
3052 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3054 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3055 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3056 // monitor updating completing.
3057 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3064 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3065 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3066 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3067 self.process_background_events();
3070 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3071 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3072 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3073 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3075 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3076 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3078 if !chan.is_live() {
3079 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3080 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3081 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3084 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3086 let mut retain_channel = true;
3087 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3090 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3091 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3095 let ret_err = match res {
3096 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3097 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3098 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3099 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3102 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3103 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3104 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3105 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3106 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3107 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3108 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3109 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3119 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3123 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3124 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3125 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3126 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3127 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3128 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3129 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3131 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3133 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3135 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3137 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3138 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3139 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3140 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3141 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3143 handle_errors.push(err);
3153 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3155 /// This currently includes:
3156 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3157 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3158 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3161 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3162 /// estimate fetches.
3163 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3164 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3165 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3166 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3168 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3170 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3172 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3174 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3175 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3176 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3177 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3178 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3179 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3181 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3183 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3185 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3186 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3187 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3188 if needs_close { return false; }
3191 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3192 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3193 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3194 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3195 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3196 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3197 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3198 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3202 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3203 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3205 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3206 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3211 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3212 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3221 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3222 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3228 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3229 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3230 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3231 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3232 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3233 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3234 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3236 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3237 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3238 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3239 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3240 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3241 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3242 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3243 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3244 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3245 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3246 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3252 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3253 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3254 // be surfaced to the user.
3255 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3256 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3258 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3259 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3260 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3262 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3263 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3265 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3270 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3271 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3272 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3274 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3275 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3276 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3277 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3278 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3279 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3280 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3281 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3282 Some(RouteParameters {
3284 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3285 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3289 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3290 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3292 rejected_by_dest: false,
3293 network_update: None,
3294 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3296 short_channel_id: None,
3303 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3304 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3306 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3319 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3320 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3321 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3322 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3323 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3324 /// still-available channels.
3325 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3326 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3327 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3328 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3331 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3332 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3333 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3335 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3336 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3337 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3338 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3339 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3340 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3341 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3342 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3346 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3350 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3351 all_paths_failed = true;
3352 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3353 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3355 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3364 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3365 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3366 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3367 Some(RouteParameters {
3368 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3369 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3370 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3375 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3376 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3378 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3380 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3381 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3382 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3383 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3384 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3385 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3386 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3387 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3394 error_code: onion_error_code,
3396 error_data: onion_error_data
3399 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3405 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3406 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3407 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3408 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3410 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3411 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3412 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3413 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3414 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3415 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3416 network_update: None,
3419 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3422 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3424 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3428 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3429 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3430 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3432 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3433 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3434 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3436 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3437 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3439 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3441 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3445 let mut forward_event = None;
3446 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3447 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3449 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3451 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3454 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3457 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3458 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3459 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3460 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3461 time_forwardable: time
3468 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3469 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3471 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3472 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3473 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3474 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3476 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3477 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3479 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3480 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3481 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3482 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3483 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3484 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3488 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3489 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3490 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3491 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3493 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3494 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3495 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3496 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3498 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3499 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3500 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3501 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3502 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3504 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3505 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3506 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3512 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3513 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3514 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3516 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3517 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3518 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3519 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3520 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3521 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3522 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3524 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3525 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3526 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3527 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3528 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3529 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3530 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3531 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3533 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3534 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3535 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3536 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3537 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3538 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3540 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3545 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3546 // which were generated.
3547 channel_state.take();
3549 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3550 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3551 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3558 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3559 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3560 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3561 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3562 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3564 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3568 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3569 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3570 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3571 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3572 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3573 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3574 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3575 payment_preimage, e);
3576 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3577 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3578 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3579 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3582 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3583 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3584 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3585 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3586 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3587 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3588 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3589 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3590 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3591 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3597 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3599 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3602 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3603 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3604 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3605 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3606 payment_preimage, e);
3608 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3609 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3611 chan.remove_entry();
3613 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3616 } else { unreachable!(); }
3619 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3620 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3621 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3622 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3623 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3624 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3625 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3626 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3627 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3628 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3629 pending_events.push(
3630 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3632 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3637 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3645 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3647 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3648 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3649 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3650 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3651 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3652 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3653 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3654 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3655 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3656 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3657 pending_events.push(
3658 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3659 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3665 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3669 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3670 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3671 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3673 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3674 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3675 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3676 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3677 pending_events.push(
3678 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3686 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3694 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3695 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3696 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3697 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3698 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3699 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3700 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3703 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3704 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3705 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3706 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3707 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3710 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3711 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3712 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3713 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3714 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3715 payment_preimage, e);
3717 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3718 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3719 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3720 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3723 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3724 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3725 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3726 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3730 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3731 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3732 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3735 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3736 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3738 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3746 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3747 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3748 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3751 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3752 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3754 let chan_restoration_res;
3755 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3756 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3757 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3758 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3762 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3766 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3767 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3768 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3769 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3770 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3771 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3772 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3773 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3774 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3777 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3778 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3779 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3781 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3783 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3784 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3785 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3790 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3791 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3792 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3795 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3796 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3799 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3800 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
3801 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3803 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3804 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3808 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3809 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3811 entry.insert(channel);
3817 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3818 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3819 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3821 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3823 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3824 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3826 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3827 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3832 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3833 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3834 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3835 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3837 user_channel_id: user_id,
3842 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3843 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3844 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3845 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3847 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3849 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3852 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3857 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3858 // lock before watch_channel
3859 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3861 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3862 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3863 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3864 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3865 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3866 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3867 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3868 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3869 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3870 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3871 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3873 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3874 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3875 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3876 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3877 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3878 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3882 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3883 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3884 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3889 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3890 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3899 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3901 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3902 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3903 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3904 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3906 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3907 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3909 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3910 Ok(update) => update,
3911 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3913 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3914 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3915 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3916 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3917 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3918 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3919 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3920 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3930 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3931 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3935 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3936 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3937 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3938 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3940 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3943 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3944 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3946 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3947 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3948 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3949 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3950 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3951 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3952 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3953 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3954 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3956 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3957 msg: announcement_sigs,
3959 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3960 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3961 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3962 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3971 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3972 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3973 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3974 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3975 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3977 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3979 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3983 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3984 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3985 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3986 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3989 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3990 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3992 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3993 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3994 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3995 let (result, is_permanent) =
3996 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3998 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4004 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4005 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4006 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4016 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4020 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4024 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4025 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4026 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4027 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4028 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4030 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4031 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4033 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4034 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4035 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4036 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4041 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4042 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4043 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4044 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4045 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4046 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4047 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4049 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4050 } else { (tx, None) }
4052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4055 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4056 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4057 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4059 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4060 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4061 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4066 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4071 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4072 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4073 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4074 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4076 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4077 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4078 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4079 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4081 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4082 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4084 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4086 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4090 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4091 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4092 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4093 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4094 match pending_forward_info {
4095 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4096 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4097 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4098 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4099 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4100 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4101 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4102 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4106 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4107 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4108 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4109 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4110 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4111 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4112 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4113 // no problem just calling this
4114 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4115 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4118 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4120 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4121 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4122 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4125 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4127 _ => pending_forward_info
4130 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4137 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4138 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4139 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4140 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4141 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4143 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4144 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4146 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4148 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4151 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4155 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4156 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4158 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4160 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4163 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4170 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4171 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4172 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4175 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4178 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4179 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4180 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4182 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4189 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4190 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4191 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4192 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4194 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4197 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4198 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4199 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4200 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4201 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4202 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4203 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4208 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4209 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4212 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4213 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4215 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4217 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4218 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4219 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4220 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4221 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4222 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4224 commitment_signed: msg,
4230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4235 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4236 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4237 let mut forward_event = None;
4238 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4239 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4240 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4241 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4243 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4244 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4245 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4246 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4247 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4249 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4250 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4251 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4254 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4255 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4260 match forward_event {
4262 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4263 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4264 time_forwardable: time
4272 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4273 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4275 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4276 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4277 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4279 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4280 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4282 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4283 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4284 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4285 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4286 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4287 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4288 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4289 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4290 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4291 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4292 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4294 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4295 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4296 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4297 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4298 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4300 } else { unreachable!(); }
4303 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4305 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4309 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4310 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4311 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4312 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4313 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4318 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4320 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4321 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4323 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4324 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4326 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4327 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4334 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4335 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4339 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4340 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4342 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4349 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4350 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4351 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4355 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4358 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4363 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4364 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4365 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4366 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4374 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4375 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4376 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4378 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4379 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4381 // It's not a local channel
4382 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4385 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4387 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4388 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4389 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4390 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4391 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4392 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4394 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4396 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4397 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4398 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4399 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4401 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4406 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4409 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4410 let chan_restoration_res;
4411 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4412 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4415 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4417 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4418 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4420 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4421 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4422 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4423 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4424 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4425 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4426 let mut channel_update = None;
4427 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4428 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4429 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4432 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4433 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4434 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4435 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4436 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4437 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4438 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4441 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4442 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4443 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4446 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4451 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4452 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4454 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4455 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4460 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4461 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4462 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4463 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4464 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4465 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4466 match monitor_event {
4467 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4468 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4470 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4473 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4476 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4477 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4478 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4479 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4480 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4481 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4482 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4483 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4484 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4485 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4487 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4488 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4493 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4494 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4496 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4498 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4499 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4500 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4501 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4502 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4507 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4508 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4513 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4514 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4517 has_pending_monitor_events
4520 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4521 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4522 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4523 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4524 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4525 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4528 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4529 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4530 /// update was applied.
4532 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4533 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4534 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4535 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4536 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4537 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4538 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4539 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4541 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4542 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4543 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4544 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4545 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4547 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4548 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4549 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4550 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4551 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4553 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4554 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4555 has_monitor_update = true;
4556 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4557 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4558 if close_channel { return false; }
4560 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4561 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4562 updates: commitment_update,
4569 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4570 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4571 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4578 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4579 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4580 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4583 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4584 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4590 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4591 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4592 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4593 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4594 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4595 let mut has_update = false;
4597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4599 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4600 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4601 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4603 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4604 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4605 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4606 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4608 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4609 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4612 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4613 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4614 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4615 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4616 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4619 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4620 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4625 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4627 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4628 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4634 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4635 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4642 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4643 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4649 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4650 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4652 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4653 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4654 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4655 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4656 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4657 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4658 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4659 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4660 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4661 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4662 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4663 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4664 assert!(should_broadcast);
4665 } else { unreachable!(); }
4666 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4668 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4672 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4673 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4675 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4678 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4679 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4681 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4682 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4683 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4684 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4685 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4686 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4687 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4688 // never fail a payment too early.
4689 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4691 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4699 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4702 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4703 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4705 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4706 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4707 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4709 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4711 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4712 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4713 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4714 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4715 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4716 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4717 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4720 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4721 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4724 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4725 /// stored external to LDK.
4727 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4728 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4729 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4731 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4732 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4734 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4735 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4736 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4737 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4739 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4740 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4741 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4742 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4743 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4745 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4746 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4747 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4748 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4749 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4751 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4752 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4753 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4755 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4757 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4758 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4760 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4761 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4762 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4763 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4766 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4767 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4768 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4769 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4770 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4775 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4776 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4780 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4781 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4785 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4786 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4787 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4788 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4789 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4792 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4793 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4794 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4795 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4797 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4798 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4799 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4800 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4803 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4804 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4806 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4807 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4810 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4811 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4812 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4814 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4815 events.replace(pending_events);
4824 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4826 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4827 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4828 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4832 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4834 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4835 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4837 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4838 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4839 /// restarting from an old state.
4840 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4841 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4842 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4844 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4845 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4846 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4847 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4850 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4851 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4852 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4855 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4856 handler.handle_event(&event);
4864 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4866 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4867 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4868 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4872 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4874 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4875 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4876 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4877 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4878 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4881 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4882 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4883 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4886 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4888 let new_height = height - 1;
4890 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4891 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4892 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4893 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4894 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4895 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4898 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4902 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4904 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4905 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4906 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4910 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4911 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4912 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4913 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4915 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4916 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4919 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4922 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4923 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4924 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4925 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4927 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4928 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4932 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4934 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4936 macro_rules! max_time {
4937 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4939 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4940 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4941 // having an explicit local time source.
4942 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4943 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4944 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4945 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4946 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4952 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4953 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4954 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4955 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4956 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4959 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4960 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4961 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
4962 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4963 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
4964 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
4965 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4966 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4967 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
4975 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4976 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4977 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4978 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4979 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4980 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4986 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4988 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4989 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4990 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4991 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4992 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4993 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4998 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5000 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5001 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5002 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5003 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5006 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5007 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5009 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5010 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5011 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5012 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5013 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5015 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5016 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5018 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5019 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5020 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5021 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5022 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5023 let res = f(channel);
5024 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5025 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5026 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5027 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5028 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5032 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5034 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5035 msg: funding_locked,
5037 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5038 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5039 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5040 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5041 msg: announcement_sigs,
5043 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5044 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5045 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5046 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5047 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5050 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5052 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5054 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5055 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5056 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5058 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5059 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5060 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5061 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5062 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5066 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5067 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5068 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5069 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5070 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5071 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5072 data: reason_message,
5080 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5081 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5082 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5083 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5084 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5085 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5086 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5087 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5088 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5089 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5090 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5091 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5092 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5097 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5102 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5104 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5105 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5109 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5110 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5111 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5113 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
5114 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5115 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5116 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5119 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5120 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5122 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5123 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5126 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5127 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5128 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5129 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5130 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5134 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5135 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5136 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5137 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5141 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5142 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5143 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5145 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5149 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5151 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5154 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5156 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5159 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5161 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5164 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5169 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5171 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5174 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5176 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5179 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5181 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5184 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5186 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5189 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5191 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5194 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5196 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5199 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5201 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5204 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5206 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5209 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5211 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5214 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5219 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5224 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5225 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5226 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5229 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5234 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5239 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5241 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5242 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5244 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5245 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5246 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5247 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5248 if no_connection_possible {
5249 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5250 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5251 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5252 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5253 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5255 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5256 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5261 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5268 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5269 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5270 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5271 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5272 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5273 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5274 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5276 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5279 no_channels_remain = false;
5285 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5293 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5298 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5299 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5300 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5302 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5309 if no_channels_remain {
5310 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5313 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5314 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5318 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5319 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5324 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5325 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5327 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5328 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5332 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5338 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5339 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5340 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5341 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5342 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5343 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5344 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5345 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5349 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5350 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5351 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5357 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5360 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5363 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5364 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5365 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5366 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5367 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5371 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5372 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5377 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5378 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5379 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5380 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5381 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5382 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5385 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5388 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5394 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5395 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5400 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5401 let result = *guard;
5409 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5410 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5411 let current_time = Instant::now();
5413 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5414 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5419 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5420 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5421 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5422 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5423 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5425 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5426 let result = *guard;
5427 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5431 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5432 None => return result,
5438 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5440 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5441 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5442 *persistence_lock = true;
5443 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5448 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5449 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5451 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5453 (0, onion_packet, required),
5454 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5457 (0, payment_data, required),
5458 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5460 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5461 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5462 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5466 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5467 (0, routing, required),
5468 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5469 (4, payment_hash, required),
5470 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5471 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5475 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5476 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5478 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5480 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5481 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5482 reason.write(writer)?;
5484 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5485 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5488 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5489 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5490 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5491 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5498 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5499 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5500 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5503 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5504 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5505 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5506 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5510 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5511 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5512 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5513 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5514 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5517 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5518 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5519 // messages contained in the variants.
5520 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5521 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5522 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5524 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5525 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5526 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5527 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5528 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5531 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5532 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5533 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5534 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5535 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5537 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5542 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5548 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5549 (2, outpoint, required),
5550 (4, htlc_id, required),
5551 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5554 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5556 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5557 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5560 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5561 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5562 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5567 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5568 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5569 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5575 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5576 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5577 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5579 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5580 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5581 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5585 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5586 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5587 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5589 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5591 if payment_data.is_some() {
5592 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5594 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5597 if payment_data.is_none() {
5598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5600 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5604 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5612 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5613 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5614 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5617 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5618 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5619 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5620 let mut payment_id = None;
5621 let mut payment_secret = None;
5622 let mut payee = None;
5623 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5624 (0, session_priv, required),
5625 (1, payment_id, option),
5626 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5627 (3, payment_secret, option),
5628 (4, path, vec_type),
5631 if payment_id.is_none() {
5632 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5634 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5636 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5637 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5638 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5639 path: path.unwrap(),
5640 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5645 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5646 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5651 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5652 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5654 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5656 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5657 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5658 (0, session_priv, required),
5659 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5660 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5661 (3, payment_secret, option),
5662 (4, path, vec_type),
5666 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5668 field.write(writer)?;
5675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5676 (0, LightningError) => {
5680 (0, failure_code, required),
5681 (2, data, vec_type),
5685 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5687 (0, forward_info, required),
5688 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5689 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5690 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5693 (0, htlc_id, required),
5694 (2, err_packet, required),
5698 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5699 (0, payment_secret, required),
5700 (2, expiry_time, required),
5701 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5702 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5703 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5708 (0, session_privs, required),
5711 (0, session_privs, required),
5712 (1, payment_hash, option),
5715 (0, session_privs, required),
5716 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5717 (2, payment_hash, required),
5718 (4, payment_secret, option),
5719 (6, total_msat, required),
5720 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5721 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5724 (0, session_privs, required),
5725 (2, payment_hash, required),
5729 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5730 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5732 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5733 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5736 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5737 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5739 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5741 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5743 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5744 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5745 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5748 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5749 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5750 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5751 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5752 unfunded_channels += 1;
5755 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5756 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5757 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5758 channel.write(writer)?;
5762 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5763 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5764 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5765 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5766 for forward in pending_forwards {
5767 forward.write(writer)?;
5771 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5772 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5773 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5774 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5775 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5776 htlc.write(writer)?;
5780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5781 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5782 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5783 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5784 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5785 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5788 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5789 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5790 for event in events.iter() {
5791 event.write(writer)?;
5794 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5795 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5796 for event in background_events.iter() {
5798 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5800 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5801 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5806 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5807 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5809 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5810 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5811 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5812 hash.write(writer)?;
5813 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5816 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5817 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5818 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5819 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5820 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
5821 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5824 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5825 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5827 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5828 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5829 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5830 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5833 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5834 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
5838 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5839 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5840 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5842 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5843 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5844 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5849 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5850 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5851 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5858 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5860 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5862 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5863 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5864 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5865 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5866 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5867 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5868 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5869 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5870 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5871 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5872 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5873 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5874 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5876 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5877 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5879 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5880 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5882 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5883 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5884 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5885 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5886 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5887 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5889 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5890 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5891 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5892 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5893 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5897 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5898 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5900 pub keys_manager: K,
5902 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5904 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5905 pub fee_estimator: F,
5906 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5908 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5909 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5910 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5911 pub chain_monitor: M,
5913 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5914 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5915 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5916 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5917 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5918 /// deserialization.
5920 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5921 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5922 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5924 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5925 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5927 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5928 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5929 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5930 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5932 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5935 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5936 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5939 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5940 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5941 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5943 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5944 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5947 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5948 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5949 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5950 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5951 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5953 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5954 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5959 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5960 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5961 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5962 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5963 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5964 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5965 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5966 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5969 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5970 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5971 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5975 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5976 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5977 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5978 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5979 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5980 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5983 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5984 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5986 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5987 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5988 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5990 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5992 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5993 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5994 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5995 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5996 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5997 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5998 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5999 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6000 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6001 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6002 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6003 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6004 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6005 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6006 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6007 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6008 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6009 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6010 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6011 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6012 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6013 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6015 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6016 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6017 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6018 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6019 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6020 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6021 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6022 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6023 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6024 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6025 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6026 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6027 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6028 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6029 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6030 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6033 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6034 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6035 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6037 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6040 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6041 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6042 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6043 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6044 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6045 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6049 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6050 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6051 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6052 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6056 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6057 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6058 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6059 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6060 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6061 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6062 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6063 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6064 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6066 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6069 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6070 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6071 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6072 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6073 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6074 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6075 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6076 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6078 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6081 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6082 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6083 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6084 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6085 let peer_state = PeerState {
6086 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6088 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6091 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6092 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6093 for _ in 0..event_count {
6094 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6095 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6099 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6100 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6101 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6102 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6103 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6104 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6105 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6106 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6110 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6111 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6112 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6113 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6114 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6115 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6119 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6120 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6122 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6123 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6124 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6125 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6130 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6131 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6132 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6133 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6134 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6135 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6136 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6138 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6139 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6143 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6144 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6145 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6146 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6147 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6148 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6150 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6151 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6152 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6153 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6154 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6155 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6157 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6159 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6160 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6161 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6162 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6163 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6164 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6165 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6167 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6168 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6169 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6170 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6171 if path.is_empty() {
6172 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6173 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6175 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6176 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6177 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6178 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6179 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6180 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6181 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6182 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6185 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6186 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6187 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6188 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6190 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6191 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6192 total_msat: path_amt,
6193 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6195 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6196 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6205 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6206 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6208 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6209 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6212 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6214 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6215 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6216 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6218 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6220 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6225 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6227 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6228 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6230 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6231 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6234 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6235 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6237 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6239 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6240 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6241 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6242 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6244 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6245 logger: args.logger,
6246 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6249 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6250 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6253 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6254 //connection or two.
6256 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6262 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6263 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6264 use core::time::Duration;
6265 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6266 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6267 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6268 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6270 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6271 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6272 use util::errors::APIError;
6273 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6274 use util::test_utils;
6276 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6278 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6279 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6281 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6284 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6285 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6287 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6288 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6289 thread::spawn(move || {
6291 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6292 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6293 *persistence_lock = true;
6296 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6302 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6303 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6305 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6308 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6313 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6315 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6318 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6325 fn test_notify_limits() {
6326 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6327 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6331 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6333 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6334 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6335 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6336 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6337 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6339 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6341 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6342 // to connect messages with new values
6343 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6344 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6345 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6346 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6348 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6349 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6350 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6351 // ... but the last node should not.
6352 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6353 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6354 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6355 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6357 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6358 // about the channel.
6359 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6360 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6361 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6363 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6365 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6366 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6367 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6368 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6369 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6370 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6372 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6373 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6374 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6376 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6377 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6378 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6379 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6380 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6381 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6383 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6384 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6385 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6386 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6387 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6388 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6389 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6390 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6392 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6393 // the channel info has updated.
6394 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6395 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6396 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6397 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6398 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6399 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6403 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6404 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6409 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6410 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6412 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6413 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6414 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6415 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6416 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6417 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6418 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6420 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6421 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6422 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6424 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6425 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6429 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6430 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6431 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6437 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6438 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6439 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6440 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6441 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6442 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6443 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6445 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6447 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6448 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6450 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6451 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6452 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6454 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6455 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6456 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6457 // lightning messages manually.
6458 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6460 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6461 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6462 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6467 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6468 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6470 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6471 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6472 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6474 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6475 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6476 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6478 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6480 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6482 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6486 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6487 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6488 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6491 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6492 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6493 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6494 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6496 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6499 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6500 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6501 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6502 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6507 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6508 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6509 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6510 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6517 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6518 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6519 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6520 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6521 // fails as expected.
6522 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6523 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6524 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6525 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6526 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6527 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6529 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6530 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6531 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6533 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6534 let params = RouteParameters {
6535 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6536 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6537 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6539 let route = find_route(
6540 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6541 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6543 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6545 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6546 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6547 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6548 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6549 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6551 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6552 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6553 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6555 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6556 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6557 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6558 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6559 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6560 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6561 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6562 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6563 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6565 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6566 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6568 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6569 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6570 let route = find_route(
6571 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6572 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6574 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6576 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6578 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6579 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6580 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6582 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6583 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6584 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6586 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6587 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6588 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6589 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6590 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6592 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6594 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6596 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6597 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6598 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6599 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6600 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6601 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6602 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6604 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6606 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6607 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6611 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6612 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6613 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6617 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6619 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6620 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6621 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6622 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6624 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6625 let params = RouteParameters {
6626 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6627 final_value_msat: 10000,
6628 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6630 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6631 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6632 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6633 let route = find_route(
6634 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6635 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6638 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6639 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6640 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6643 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6644 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6645 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6646 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6647 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6648 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6649 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6651 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6655 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6656 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6660 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6662 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6663 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6664 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6665 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6667 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6668 let params = RouteParameters {
6669 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6670 final_value_msat: 10000,
6671 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6673 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6674 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6675 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6676 let route = find_route(
6677 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6678 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6681 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6682 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6683 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6684 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6688 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6689 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6690 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6691 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6692 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6695 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6699 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6703 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6705 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6706 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6707 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6708 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6710 // Marshall an MPP route.
6711 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6712 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6713 route.paths.push(path);
6714 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6715 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6716 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6717 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6718 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6719 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6721 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6722 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6723 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6724 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6729 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6732 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6733 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6734 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6735 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6736 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6737 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6738 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6739 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6740 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6741 use util::test_utils;
6742 use util::config::UserConfig;
6743 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6745 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6746 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6747 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6749 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6753 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6754 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6755 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6756 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6757 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6758 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6759 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6764 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6765 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6768 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6769 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6770 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6772 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6773 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6775 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6776 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6778 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6779 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6781 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6782 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6783 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6784 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6785 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6787 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6789 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6791 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6792 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6793 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6794 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6795 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6797 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6799 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6801 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6802 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6803 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6804 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6805 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6808 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6809 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6810 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6812 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6813 } else { panic!(); }
6815 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6816 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6818 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6821 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6824 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6825 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6827 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6828 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6829 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6830 match msg_events[0] {
6831 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6832 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6833 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6837 match msg_events[1] {
6838 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6842 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6844 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6845 macro_rules! send_payment {
6846 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6847 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6848 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6849 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6850 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6851 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6852 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6854 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6855 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6857 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6858 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6860 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6861 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6862 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6863 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6864 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6865 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6866 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6867 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6869 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6870 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6871 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6873 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6874 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6875 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6876 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6877 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6879 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6882 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6883 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6884 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6885 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6887 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6892 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6893 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);