1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// A forwarded HTLC.
117 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
118 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
119 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
120 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
121 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
122 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
123 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
125 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
126 /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
127 /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
129 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
130 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
132 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
133 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
134 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
135 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
136 /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
137 /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
138 /// settled by this node.
139 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
140 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
141 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
143 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
145 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
148 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
149 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
151 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
156 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
160 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
162 pub struct BlindedForward {
163 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
164 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
165 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
166 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
167 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
170 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
171 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
172 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
173 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
174 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
175 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
182 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
183 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
184 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
185 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
186 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
187 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
188 /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
189 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
190 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
191 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
192 /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
193 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
194 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
195 /// may overshoot this in either case)
196 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
197 /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
198 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
199 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
200 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
201 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
204 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
205 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
206 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
207 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
210 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
211 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
212 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
213 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
214 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
217 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
218 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
220 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
221 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
222 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
225 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
226 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
228 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
229 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
233 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
236 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
240 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
241 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
242 enum BlindedFailure {
243 FromIntroductionNode,
244 // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
247 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
248 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
249 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
250 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
251 short_channel_id: u64,
252 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
254 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
255 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
256 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
258 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
259 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
264 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
266 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
267 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
268 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
270 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
271 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
274 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
275 struct ClaimableHTLC {
276 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
278 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
280 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
281 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
282 sender_intended_value: u64,
283 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
285 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
286 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
287 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
288 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
290 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
291 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
294 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
295 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
296 events::ClaimedHTLC {
297 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
298 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
299 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
300 value_msat: val.value,
301 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
306 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
307 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
309 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
310 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
311 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
314 /// Number of bytes in the id.
315 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
318 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
319 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
324 impl Readable for PaymentId {
325 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
326 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
331 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
332 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
333 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
337 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
339 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
340 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
341 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
343 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
344 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
349 impl Readable for InterceptId {
350 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
351 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
356 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
357 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
358 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
359 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
360 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
363 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
365 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
366 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
367 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
369 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
370 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
375 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
376 (0, short_channel_id, required),
377 (2, htlc_id, required),
379 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
380 (0, session_priv, required),
385 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
386 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
387 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
388 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
389 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
392 session_priv: SecretKey,
393 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
394 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
395 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
396 payment_id: PaymentId,
399 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
400 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
401 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
403 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
405 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
407 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
410 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
411 payment_id.hash(hasher);
412 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
418 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
420 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
421 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
422 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
423 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
424 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
425 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
429 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
430 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
431 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
432 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
433 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
434 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
436 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
442 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
443 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
445 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
446 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
447 pub enum FailureCode {
448 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
449 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
450 TemporaryNodeFailure,
451 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
452 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
453 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
454 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
455 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
456 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
457 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
458 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
459 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
460 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
462 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
463 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
464 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
467 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
468 fn into(self) -> u16 {
470 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
471 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
472 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
473 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
478 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
479 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
480 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
481 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
482 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
484 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
485 err: msgs::LightningError,
486 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
487 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
488 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
490 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
492 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
494 err: LightningError {
496 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
497 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
510 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
513 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
514 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
515 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
516 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
517 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
518 // commitment upon reconnecting.
519 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
521 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
524 err: LightningError { err, action },
525 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
526 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
527 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
531 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
534 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
536 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
537 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
541 log_level: Level::Warn,
544 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
546 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
548 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
550 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
551 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
559 shutdown_finish: None,
560 channel_capacity: None,
564 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
565 self.chan_id.is_some()
569 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
570 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
571 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
572 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
573 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
575 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
576 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
577 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
578 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
579 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
580 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
581 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
583 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
587 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
588 struct ClaimingPayment {
590 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
591 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
592 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
593 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
596 (0, amount_msat, required),
597 (2, payment_purpose, required),
598 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
599 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
600 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
603 struct ClaimablePayment {
604 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
605 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
606 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
609 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
610 struct ClaimablePayments {
611 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
612 /// failed/claimed by the user.
614 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
615 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
617 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
618 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
619 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
621 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
622 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
623 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
624 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
627 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
628 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
629 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
630 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
632 enum BackgroundEvent {
633 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
634 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
635 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
636 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
638 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
639 /// are regenerated on startup.
640 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
641 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
642 /// channel to continue normal operation.
644 /// In general this should be used rather than
645 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
646 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
647 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
649 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
650 /// are regenerated on startup.
651 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
652 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
653 funding_txo: OutPoint,
654 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
656 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
657 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
659 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
660 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
661 channel_id: ChannelId,
666 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
667 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
668 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
669 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
670 /// event can be generated.
671 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
672 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
673 /// operation of another channel.
675 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
676 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
677 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
678 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
680 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
681 event: events::Event,
682 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
684 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
685 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
686 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
688 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
689 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
690 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
691 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
692 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
694 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
695 /// stored for later processing.
696 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
697 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
698 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
699 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
703 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
704 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
705 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
706 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
707 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
708 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
709 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
710 (4, blocking_action, required),
712 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
713 (0, event, upgradable_required),
714 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
715 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
716 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
717 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
718 // downgrades to prior versions.
719 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
723 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
724 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
725 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
726 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
727 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
730 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
731 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
732 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
733 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
737 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
738 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
739 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
740 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
741 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
742 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
744 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
745 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
752 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
753 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
754 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
755 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
756 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
762 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
766 /// State we hold per-peer.
767 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
768 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
770 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
771 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
772 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
774 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
775 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
776 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
777 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
778 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
779 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
780 latest_features: InitFeatures,
781 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
782 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
783 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
784 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
785 /// user but which have not yet completed.
787 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
788 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
789 /// for a missing channel.
790 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
791 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
792 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
794 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
795 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
796 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
797 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
799 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
800 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
801 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
802 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
803 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
804 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
805 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
806 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
807 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
808 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
809 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
810 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
811 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
812 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
813 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
817 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
818 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
819 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
820 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
821 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
822 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
825 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
826 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
827 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
830 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
831 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
832 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
835 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
836 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
837 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
838 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
842 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
843 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
844 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
845 /// The original OpenChannel message.
846 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
847 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
848 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
851 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
852 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
853 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
855 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
856 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
858 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
861 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
862 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
863 struct PendingInboundPayment {
864 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
865 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
866 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
867 /// this payment being removed.
869 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
870 user_payment_id: u64,
871 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
872 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
873 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
876 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
877 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
878 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
879 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
880 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
881 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
882 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
883 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
885 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
886 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
887 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
895 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
897 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
898 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
899 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
904 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
905 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
906 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
907 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
908 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
909 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
910 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
911 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
912 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
914 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
915 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
916 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
925 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
927 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
928 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
929 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
934 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
938 pub trait AChannelManager {
939 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
940 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
941 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
942 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
943 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
944 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
945 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
946 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
947 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
948 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
949 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
950 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
951 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
952 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
953 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
954 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
955 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
956 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
957 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
958 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
959 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
960 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
961 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
962 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
963 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
964 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
965 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
966 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
967 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
968 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
969 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
970 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
971 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
972 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
973 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
974 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
977 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
978 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
980 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
982 ES::Target: EntropySource,
983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
984 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
989 type Watch = M::Target;
991 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
993 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
995 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
997 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
998 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1000 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1002 type Router = R::Target;
1004 type Logger = L::Target;
1006 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1009 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1010 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1012 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1013 /// to individual Channels.
1015 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1016 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1017 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1018 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1020 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1021 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1022 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1023 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1024 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1025 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1026 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1027 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1028 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1030 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1031 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1032 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1034 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1035 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1036 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1037 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1038 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1040 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1041 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1042 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1043 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1045 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1046 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1047 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1049 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1050 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1051 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1052 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1053 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1055 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1056 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1057 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1058 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1059 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1060 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1061 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1062 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1065 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1066 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1067 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1068 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1069 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1073 // `pending_offers_messages`
1075 // `total_consistency_lock`
1077 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1079 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1081 // |__`per_peer_state`
1083 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1085 // |__`claimable_payments`
1087 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1093 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1095 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1099 // |__`pending_events`
1101 // |__`pending_background_events`
1103 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1114 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1115 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1116 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1122 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1126 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1127 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1129 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1130 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1131 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1132 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1134 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1135 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1137 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1138 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1139 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1140 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1141 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1142 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1143 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1144 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1146 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1148 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1149 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1151 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1153 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1154 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1155 /// and via the classic SCID.
1157 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1158 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1160 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1164 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1165 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1166 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1168 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1171 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1172 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1174 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1177 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1178 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1179 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1180 /// active channel list on load.
1182 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1183 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1185 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1187 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1188 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1189 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1191 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1192 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1193 /// the handling of the events.
1195 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1196 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1199 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1200 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1201 /// would break backwards compatability.
1202 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1203 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1204 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1206 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1207 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1209 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1211 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1212 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1213 /// confirmation depth.
1215 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1216 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1217 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1223 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1225 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1227 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1229 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1230 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1231 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1233 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1234 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1236 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1237 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1238 /// keeping additional state.
1239 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1241 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1242 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1243 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1244 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1246 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1247 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1249 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1250 /// are currently open with that peer.
1252 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1253 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1256 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1258 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1259 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1260 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1261 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1262 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1264 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1265 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1266 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1267 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1268 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1270 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1271 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1275 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1276 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1277 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1279 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1280 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1282 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1283 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1284 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1285 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1286 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1288 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1290 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1293 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1294 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1295 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1296 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1297 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1298 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1299 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1300 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1301 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1302 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1304 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1305 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1306 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1308 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1310 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1311 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1313 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1317 signer_provider: SP,
1322 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1324 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1325 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1326 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1328 pub struct ChainParameters {
1329 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1330 pub network: Network,
1332 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1334 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1335 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1338 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1342 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1343 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1346 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1347 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1348 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1349 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1350 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1351 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1353 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1354 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1355 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1356 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1357 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1358 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1360 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1361 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1364 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1365 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1366 /// events to handle.
1368 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1369 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1371 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1372 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1375 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1376 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1377 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1378 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1380 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1381 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1382 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1383 should_persist: move || {
1384 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1385 // processing and return that.
1386 let notify = persist_check();
1387 match (notify, force_notify) {
1388 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1389 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1390 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1391 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1392 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1395 _read_guard: read_guard,
1399 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1400 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1401 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1402 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1403 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1404 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1406 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1407 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1408 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1409 should_persist: persist_check,
1410 _read_guard: read_guard,
1415 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1416 fn drop(&mut self) {
1417 match (self.should_persist)() {
1418 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1419 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1420 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1422 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1423 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1424 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1429 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1430 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1432 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1435 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1436 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1437 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1438 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1440 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1441 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1443 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1445 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1446 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1447 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1448 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1449 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1450 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1451 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1452 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1453 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1454 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1455 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1456 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1457 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1459 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1460 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1462 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1463 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1464 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1465 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1467 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1468 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1469 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1470 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1471 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1472 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1475 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1477 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1478 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1481 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1483 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1484 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1486 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1487 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1488 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1490 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1491 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1492 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1494 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1495 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1496 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1497 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1499 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1500 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1501 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1503 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1504 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1505 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1507 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1508 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1509 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1510 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1511 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1512 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1513 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1514 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1515 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1516 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1517 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1520 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1521 /// to better separate parameters.
1522 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1523 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1524 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1525 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1526 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1527 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1528 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1529 pub features: InitFeatures,
1530 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1531 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1532 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1534 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1536 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1537 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1538 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1539 /// payments to us through this channel.
1540 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1541 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1542 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1543 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1544 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1545 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1546 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1549 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1550 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1551 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1552 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1553 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1554 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1555 /// lifetime of the channel.
1556 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1557 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1558 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1559 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1560 /// our counterparty already.
1562 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1563 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1564 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1565 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1567 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1568 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1569 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1570 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1572 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1573 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1575 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1576 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1578 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1579 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1580 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1581 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1582 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1583 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1584 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1585 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1586 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1589 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1591 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1592 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1593 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1594 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1595 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1596 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1597 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1599 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1600 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1602 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1603 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1604 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1605 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1606 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1607 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1608 /// this value on chain.
1610 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1612 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1614 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1615 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1616 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1617 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1618 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1619 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1620 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1622 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1623 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1624 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1625 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1626 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1627 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1629 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1630 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1631 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1632 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1633 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1635 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1636 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1637 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1638 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1640 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1641 pub balance_msat: u64,
1642 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1643 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1644 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1645 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1647 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1649 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1650 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1651 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1652 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1653 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1654 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1655 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1656 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1658 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1659 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1660 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1661 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1662 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1663 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1664 /// route which is valid.
1665 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1666 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1667 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1668 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1669 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1670 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1672 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1673 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1674 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1675 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1676 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1677 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1678 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1679 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1680 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1682 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1684 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1685 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1686 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1687 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1688 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1690 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1691 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1692 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1693 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1694 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1695 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1696 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1698 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1699 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1700 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1701 pub is_outbound: bool,
1702 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1703 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1704 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1705 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1706 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1708 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1709 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1710 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1711 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1712 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1713 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1714 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1716 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1717 pub is_usable: bool,
1718 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1719 pub is_public: bool,
1720 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1721 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1722 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1723 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1724 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1725 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1727 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1728 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1731 impl ChannelDetails {
1732 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1733 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1734 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1736 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1737 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1738 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1739 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1742 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1743 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1744 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1746 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1747 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1748 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1749 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1752 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1753 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1754 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1757 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1758 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1760 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1761 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1762 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1764 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1765 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1766 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1767 features: latest_features,
1768 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1769 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1770 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1771 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1772 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1773 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1774 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1775 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1776 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1777 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1779 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1780 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1781 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1782 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1783 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1784 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1785 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1786 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1787 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1788 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1789 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1790 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1791 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1792 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1793 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1794 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1795 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1796 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1797 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1798 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1799 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1800 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1801 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1802 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1803 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1804 config: Some(context.config()),
1805 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1810 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1811 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1812 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1813 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1814 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1815 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1816 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1817 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1818 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1820 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1822 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1823 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1825 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1826 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1827 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1828 /// to drop the channel.
1832 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1833 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1834 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1835 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1836 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1838 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1839 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1840 payment_id: PaymentId,
1842 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1844 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1845 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1846 payment_id: PaymentId,
1847 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1849 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1850 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1851 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1854 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1855 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1856 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1858 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1859 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1860 payment_id: PaymentId,
1861 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1862 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1863 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1865 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1866 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1867 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1869 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1870 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1871 payment_id: PaymentId,
1872 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1873 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1877 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1879 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1881 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1882 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1883 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1884 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1886 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1887 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1888 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1891 macro_rules! handle_error {
1892 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1893 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1894 // entering the macro.
1895 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1896 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1900 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1901 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1903 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1904 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1905 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1906 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1910 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1911 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1912 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1913 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1914 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1915 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1920 let logger = WithContext::from(
1921 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1923 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1924 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1926 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1927 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1928 action: err.action.clone()
1932 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1933 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1934 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1935 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1936 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1940 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1945 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1948 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1949 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1950 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1956 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1957 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1958 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1959 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1960 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1961 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1963 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1964 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1965 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1966 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1967 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1969 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1970 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1972 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1976 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1977 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1978 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1980 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1981 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1983 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1984 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1986 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1987 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
1988 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1989 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1990 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1991 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1992 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1994 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1995 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1999 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2000 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2002 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2003 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2005 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2006 match $channel_phase {
2007 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2008 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2010 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2011 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2013 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2014 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2020 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2021 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2025 let key = *$entry.key();
2026 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2028 $entry.remove_entry();
2036 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2037 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2041 let key = *$entry.key();
2042 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2044 $entry.remove_entry();
2052 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2053 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2055 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2056 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2062 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2063 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2064 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2065 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2066 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2068 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2069 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2070 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2071 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2072 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2073 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2074 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2075 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2076 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2077 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2082 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2083 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2084 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2085 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2086 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2087 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2088 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2089 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2090 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2092 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2097 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2098 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2099 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2100 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2101 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2102 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2103 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2104 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2105 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2107 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2112 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2113 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2114 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2115 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2116 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2117 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2118 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2119 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2120 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2121 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2122 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2123 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2125 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2126 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2127 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2133 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2134 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2136 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2137 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2138 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2139 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2140 updates.announcement_sigs);
2141 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2142 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2145 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2146 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2147 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2148 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2150 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2151 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2152 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2153 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2154 let mut batch_completed = false;
2155 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2156 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2157 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2158 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2160 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2161 channel_state.2 = true;
2163 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2165 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2167 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2170 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2171 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2172 if batch_completed {
2173 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2174 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2175 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2176 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2177 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2178 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2179 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2180 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2181 chan.set_batch_ready();
2182 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2183 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2187 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2188 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2189 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2194 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2196 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2197 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2199 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2200 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2201 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2202 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2207 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2208 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2209 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2210 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2212 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2213 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2214 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2215 panic!("{}", err_str);
2217 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2218 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2219 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2222 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2228 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2229 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2230 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2232 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2233 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2234 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2235 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2236 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2237 // filter for uniqueness here.
2238 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2239 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2240 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2241 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2243 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2244 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2246 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2247 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2248 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2254 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2255 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2256 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2257 while !processed_all_events {
2258 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2265 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2266 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2267 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2269 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2270 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2271 result = $self.process_background_events();
2273 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2274 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2275 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2276 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2280 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2281 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2282 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2283 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2286 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2288 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2289 $event_to_handle = event;
2291 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2292 post_event_actions.push(action);
2297 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2298 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2299 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2300 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2301 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2302 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2305 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2306 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2307 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2308 processed_all_events = false;
2312 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2313 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2314 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2316 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2317 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2318 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2324 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2326 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2328 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2329 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2330 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2331 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2335 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2337 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2339 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2340 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2342 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2344 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2345 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2346 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2349 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2350 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2351 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2353 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2354 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2355 current_timestamp: u32,
2357 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2358 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2359 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2360 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2362 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2363 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2364 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2369 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2371 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2372 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2373 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2374 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2375 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2376 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2377 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2378 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2380 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2383 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2384 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2386 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2388 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2390 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2392 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2393 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2394 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2395 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2396 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2397 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2398 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2399 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2401 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2411 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2412 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2413 &self.default_configuration
2416 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2417 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2418 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2421 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2422 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2424 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2426 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2430 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2435 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2437 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2438 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2439 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2440 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2441 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2443 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2444 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2446 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2447 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2448 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2450 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2451 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2452 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2454 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2455 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2457 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2458 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2459 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2460 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2461 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2462 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2464 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2465 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2466 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2467 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2468 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2469 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2473 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2474 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2478 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2479 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2481 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2483 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2484 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2485 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2490 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2491 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2492 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2493 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2494 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2495 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2499 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2504 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2506 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2507 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2510 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2512 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2518 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2519 node_id: their_network_key,
2522 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2525 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2526 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2527 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2528 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2529 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2530 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2531 // the same channel.
2532 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2534 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2536 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2539 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2540 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2541 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2542 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2546 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2547 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2548 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2556 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2557 /// more information.
2558 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2559 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2560 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2561 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2562 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2563 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2564 // the same channel.
2565 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2567 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2569 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2572 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2573 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2574 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2582 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2583 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2585 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2586 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2588 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2589 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2590 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2591 // really wanted anyway.
2592 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2595 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2596 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2597 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2600 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2603 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2604 let context_to_details = |context| {
2605 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2607 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2609 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2610 .map(context_to_details)
2616 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2617 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2619 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2620 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2621 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2623 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2624 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2625 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2626 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2627 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2628 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2630 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2631 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2632 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2634 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2635 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2636 payment_id: *payment_id,
2637 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2638 total_msat: *total_msat,
2641 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2642 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2644 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2645 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2647 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2652 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2653 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2654 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2655 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2656 Some(transaction) => {
2657 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2658 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2663 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2664 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2665 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2666 reason: closure_reason,
2667 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2668 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2672 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2675 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2676 let shutdown_result;
2678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2680 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2681 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2683 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2684 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2686 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2688 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2689 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2690 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2691 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2692 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2693 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2694 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2695 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2697 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2698 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2699 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2700 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2701 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2705 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2706 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2708 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2709 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2710 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2711 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2715 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2716 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2717 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2718 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2722 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2729 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2730 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2732 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2733 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2734 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2735 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2740 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2741 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2742 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2746 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2747 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2753 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2754 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2755 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2757 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2758 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2760 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2761 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2762 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2763 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2765 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2767 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2768 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2769 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2772 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2773 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2774 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2775 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2776 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2777 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2780 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2781 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2782 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2784 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2785 /// the channel being closed or not:
2786 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2787 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2788 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2789 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2790 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2791 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2792 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2794 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2795 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2796 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2797 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2799 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2801 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2802 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2803 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2806 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2807 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2808 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2809 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2810 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2813 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2814 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2815 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2816 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2817 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2820 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2821 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2822 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2823 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2824 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2825 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2827 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2828 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2829 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2830 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2831 // ignore the result here.
2832 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2834 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2835 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2836 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2837 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2839 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2840 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2841 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2842 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2843 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2844 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2845 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2846 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2849 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2852 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2853 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2856 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2857 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2861 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2862 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2863 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2864 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2867 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2868 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2869 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2870 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2871 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2873 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2875 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2876 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2877 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2878 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2879 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2880 mem::drop(peer_state);
2881 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2883 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2884 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2885 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2887 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2888 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2889 // Unfunded channel has no update
2890 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2893 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2894 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2895 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2896 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2898 (None, *peer_node_id)
2900 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2903 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2904 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2905 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2907 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2908 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2909 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2910 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2911 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2917 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2920 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2922 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2923 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2925 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2926 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2927 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2928 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2929 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2930 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2931 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2942 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2943 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2944 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2946 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2947 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2948 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2951 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2952 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2953 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2955 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2956 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2957 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2958 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2959 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2962 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2963 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2964 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2965 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2966 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2970 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2971 /// local transaction(s).
2972 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2973 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2974 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2978 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2979 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2981 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2983 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2984 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2987 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
2988 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2989 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
2991 _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
2994 macro_rules! return_err {
2995 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2998 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(msg.channel_id)),
2999 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3001 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
3002 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3003 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3004 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3005 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3006 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3007 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3008 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3014 let NextPacketDetails {
3015 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3016 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3017 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3018 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3019 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3022 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3023 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3024 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3025 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3026 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3027 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3028 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3029 // phantom or an intercept.
3030 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3031 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3032 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3036 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3039 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3041 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3043 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3044 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3045 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3049 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3050 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3053 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3054 // have no consistency guarantees.
3055 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3059 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3060 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3061 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3062 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3063 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3065 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3066 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3067 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3068 // we don't have the channel here.
3069 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3071 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3073 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3074 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3075 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3076 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3077 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3078 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3079 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3080 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3081 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3082 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3083 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3085 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3088 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3089 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3091 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3092 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3099 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3101 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3102 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3104 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3105 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3106 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3107 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3108 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3110 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3111 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3117 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3118 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3119 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3120 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3122 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3123 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3125 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3126 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3127 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3129 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3130 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3131 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3132 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3133 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3134 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3135 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3139 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3141 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3144 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3145 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3146 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3147 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3148 macro_rules! return_err {
3149 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3151 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(msg.channel_id)), "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3152 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3153 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3154 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3155 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3156 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3162 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3164 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3165 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3166 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3167 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3170 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3171 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3172 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3173 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3174 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3176 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3179 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3180 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3181 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3182 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3183 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3189 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3190 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3191 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3193 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3194 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3195 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3197 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3198 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3199 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3200 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3201 return Err(LightningError {
3202 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3203 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3206 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3207 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3209 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3210 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3211 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3214 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3215 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3216 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3217 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3219 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3220 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3221 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3223 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3224 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3225 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3226 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3227 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3228 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3229 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3233 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3236 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3237 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3238 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3239 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3241 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3242 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3243 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3244 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3245 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3248 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3249 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3251 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3252 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3253 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3254 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3255 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3256 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3257 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3258 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3260 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3261 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3262 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3264 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3266 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3273 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3274 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3275 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3276 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3281 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3282 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3283 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3286 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3287 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3288 log_trace!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None),
3289 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3290 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3291 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3292 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3294 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3295 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3296 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3299 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3300 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3301 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3302 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3306 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3307 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3308 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3309 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3310 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3311 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3312 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3313 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3314 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3316 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3317 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3318 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3319 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3321 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3322 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3324 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3325 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3326 Some(monitor_update) => {
3327 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3329 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3330 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3331 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3332 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3333 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3334 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3335 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3343 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3346 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3347 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3348 // `channel_by_id` map.
3349 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3350 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3354 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3355 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3357 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3362 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3364 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3365 /// fields for more info.
3367 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3368 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3370 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3372 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3373 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3374 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3375 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3376 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3378 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3379 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3380 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3381 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3382 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3384 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3385 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3386 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3387 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3389 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3391 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3392 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3393 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3395 /// In general, a path may raise:
3396 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3397 /// node public key) is specified.
3398 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3399 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3400 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3401 /// relevant updates.
3403 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3404 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3405 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3407 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3408 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3409 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3410 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3411 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3412 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3413 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3414 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3416 self.pending_outbound_payments
3417 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3418 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3419 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3422 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3423 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3424 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3425 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3427 self.pending_outbound_payments
3428 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3429 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3430 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3431 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3435 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3436 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3438 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3439 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3440 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3444 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3445 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3446 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3450 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3451 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3454 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3455 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3457 self.pending_outbound_payments
3458 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3459 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3460 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3461 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3462 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3466 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3467 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3468 /// retries are exhausted.
3470 /// # Event Generation
3472 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3473 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3475 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3476 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3477 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3479 /// # Requested Invoices
3481 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3482 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3483 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3484 /// once the invoice has been received.
3486 /// # Restart Behavior
3488 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3489 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3490 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3492 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3493 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3495 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3498 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3499 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3500 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3501 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3502 /// never reach the recipient.
3504 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3505 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3507 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3508 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3510 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3511 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3515 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3516 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3519 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3520 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3522 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3525 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3526 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3527 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3529 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3530 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3531 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3532 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3535 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3536 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3537 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3538 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3539 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3541 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3542 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3543 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3546 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3549 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3550 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3553 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3554 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3556 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3557 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3558 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3559 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3560 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3561 let payment_params =
3562 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3564 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3566 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3569 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3570 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3572 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3573 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3574 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3575 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3577 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3578 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3579 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3580 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3581 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3582 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3583 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3584 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3585 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3586 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3588 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3589 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3590 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3591 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3595 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3597 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3598 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3601 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3603 let mut res = Vec::new();
3605 for mut path in route.paths {
3606 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3607 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3608 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3609 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3610 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3613 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3616 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3617 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3619 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3621 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3622 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3627 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3630 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3635 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3636 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3637 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3639 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3640 let used_liquidity =
3641 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3643 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3644 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3646 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3649 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3654 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3655 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3656 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3663 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3664 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3665 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3666 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3667 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3668 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3670 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3671 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3673 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3674 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3675 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3676 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3677 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3679 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3680 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3681 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3682 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3683 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3684 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3685 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3686 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3687 } else { unreachable!(); });
3689 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3690 Err((chan, err)) => {
3691 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3692 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3693 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3694 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3695 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3701 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3702 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3704 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3705 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3708 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3709 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3710 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3714 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3715 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3716 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3722 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3725 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3726 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3727 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3729 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3736 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3737 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3738 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3742 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3744 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3745 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3747 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3748 /// across the p2p network.
3750 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3751 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3753 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3754 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3755 /// keys per-channel).
3757 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3758 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3759 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3761 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3762 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3763 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3765 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3766 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3767 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3768 /// for more details.
3770 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3771 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3772 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3773 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3776 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3778 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3779 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3781 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3782 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3783 /// signature for each channel.
3785 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3786 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3788 let mut result = Ok(());
3790 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3791 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3792 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3793 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3794 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3799 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3800 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3801 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3805 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3806 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3807 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3808 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3809 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3810 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3811 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3812 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3814 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3815 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3820 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3821 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3822 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3823 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3827 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3828 match states.entry(txid) {
3829 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3830 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3831 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3835 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3838 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3839 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3840 temporary_channel_id,
3841 counterparty_node_id,
3842 funding_transaction.clone(),
3845 let mut output_index = None;
3846 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3847 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3848 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3849 if output_index.is_some() {
3850 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3851 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3854 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3857 if output_index.is_none() {
3858 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3859 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3862 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3863 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3864 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3870 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3871 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3872 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3873 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3874 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3875 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3876 .into_iter().flatten()
3877 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3879 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3880 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3882 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3885 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3886 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3887 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3888 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3890 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3891 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3892 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3896 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3897 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3903 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3905 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3906 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3907 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3908 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3910 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3911 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3913 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3914 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3916 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3918 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3919 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3920 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3921 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3922 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3923 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3924 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3925 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3926 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3927 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3928 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3929 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3930 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3936 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3937 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3940 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3941 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3942 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3943 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3947 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3948 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3949 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3950 config.apply(config_update);
3951 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3954 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3955 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3956 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3957 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3958 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3959 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3966 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3967 debug_assert!(false);
3968 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3970 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3971 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3978 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3980 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3981 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3982 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3983 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3985 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3986 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3988 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3989 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3991 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3993 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3994 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3995 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3996 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3997 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3998 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3999 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4000 pub fn update_channel_config(
4001 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4002 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4003 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4006 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4007 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4009 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4010 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4012 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4013 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4014 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4015 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4016 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4018 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4019 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4020 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4023 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4026 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4027 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4028 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4029 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4030 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4031 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4034 let next_hop_scid = {
4035 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4036 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4037 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4040 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4041 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4042 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4043 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4044 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4047 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4049 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4050 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4051 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4054 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4055 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4056 log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4057 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4064 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4065 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4066 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4069 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4070 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4071 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4072 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4075 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4077 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4078 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4079 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4080 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4081 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4084 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4085 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4086 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4087 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4088 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4090 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4094 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4095 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4097 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4100 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4101 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4104 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4105 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4106 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4109 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4110 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4111 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4112 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4113 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4114 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4115 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4116 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4117 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4120 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4121 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4122 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4123 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4128 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4130 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4131 /// Will likely generate further events.
4132 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4135 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4136 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4137 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4139 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4140 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4142 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4143 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4144 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4146 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4147 match forward_info {
4148 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4149 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4150 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4151 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4152 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4155 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4156 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4157 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4159 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4160 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4161 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4162 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4163 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4164 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4165 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4166 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4169 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4170 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4172 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4175 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4176 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4182 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4183 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4185 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4189 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4190 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4192 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4196 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4197 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4198 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4199 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4200 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4201 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4202 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4205 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4206 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4207 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4208 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4209 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4211 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4213 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4214 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4218 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4219 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4220 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4221 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4222 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4223 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4225 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4226 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4232 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4235 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4238 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4239 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4240 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4241 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4242 // problem, not ours.
4248 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4249 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4250 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4252 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4256 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4257 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4258 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4259 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4264 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4265 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4266 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4267 match forward_info {
4268 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4269 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4270 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4271 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4272 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4273 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4274 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4277 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4278 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4279 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4280 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4281 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4282 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4283 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4284 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4285 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4286 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4288 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4289 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4290 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4291 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4292 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4293 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4296 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4297 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4298 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4301 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4302 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4304 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4306 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4307 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4308 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4309 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4314 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4315 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4317 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4318 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4319 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4320 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4322 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4323 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4325 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4327 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4328 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4329 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4336 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4340 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4341 match forward_info {
4342 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4343 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4344 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4345 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4346 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4349 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4350 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4351 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4352 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4353 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4354 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4355 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4356 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4358 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4359 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4360 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4364 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4365 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4368 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4371 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4372 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4373 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4374 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4375 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4376 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4377 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4378 phantom_shared_secret,
4381 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4382 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4383 // if routing nodes overpay
4384 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4385 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4387 total_value_received: None,
4388 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4391 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4394 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4396 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4397 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4398 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4399 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4400 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4401 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4403 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4404 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4405 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4406 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4407 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4408 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4409 phantom_shared_secret,
4410 blinded_failure: None,
4412 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4413 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4415 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4418 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4419 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4420 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4421 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4422 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4425 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4426 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4427 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4428 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4429 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4430 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4432 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4433 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4434 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4436 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4437 .entry(payment_hash)
4438 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4439 .or_insert_with(|| {
4440 committed_to_claimable = true;
4442 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4445 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4446 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4448 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4450 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4451 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4452 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4454 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4455 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4456 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4459 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4461 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4462 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4463 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4464 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4465 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4466 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4467 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4469 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4470 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4472 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4474 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4475 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4476 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4477 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4478 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4481 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4482 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4483 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4484 committed_to_claimable = true;
4486 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4487 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4488 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4489 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4490 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4491 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4492 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4493 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4494 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4495 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4499 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4500 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4501 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4502 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4503 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4505 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4507 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4508 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4510 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4511 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4512 committed_to_claimable = true;
4515 payment_claimable_generated
4519 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4520 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4521 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4522 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4523 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4524 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4525 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4526 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4528 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4529 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4530 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4531 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4532 Ok(result) => result,
4534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4535 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4538 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4539 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4540 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4541 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4542 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4543 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4546 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4547 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4548 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4550 check_total_value!(purpose);
4552 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4553 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4554 check_total_value!(purpose);
4558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4559 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4560 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4561 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4563 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4564 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4565 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4566 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4567 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4569 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4570 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4572 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4573 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4574 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4576 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4577 if payment_claimable_generated {
4578 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4584 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4585 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4593 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4594 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4595 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4596 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4598 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4599 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4601 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4603 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4604 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4605 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4607 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4609 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4610 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4611 events.append(&mut new_events);
4614 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4616 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4617 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4618 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4620 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4622 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4623 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4624 if background_events.is_empty() {
4625 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4628 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4630 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4631 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4632 // monitor updating completing.
4633 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4635 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4636 let mut updated_chan = false;
4638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4639 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4640 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4642 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4644 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4645 updated_chan = true;
4646 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4647 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4649 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4657 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4658 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4661 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4663 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4664 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4665 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4666 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4667 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4669 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4670 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4671 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4672 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4673 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4679 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4682 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4683 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4684 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4685 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4686 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4689 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4690 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4692 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4694 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4695 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4696 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4697 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4698 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4700 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4702 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4703 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4704 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4705 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4707 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4708 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4710 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4711 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4715 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4716 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4717 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4718 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4719 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4720 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4721 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4723 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4724 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4727 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4730 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4731 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4733 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4738 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4739 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4747 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4749 /// This currently includes:
4750 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4751 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4752 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4754 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4755 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4756 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4757 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4758 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4759 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4760 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4761 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4763 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4764 /// estimate fetches.
4766 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4767 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4768 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4769 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4770 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4772 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4773 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4775 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4776 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4777 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4778 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4780 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4781 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4782 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4783 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4784 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4785 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4787 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4788 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4789 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4791 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4792 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4793 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4794 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4795 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4796 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4797 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4798 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4799 channel_id: *chan_id,
4800 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4811 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4812 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4815 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4816 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4817 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4819 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4820 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4825 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4826 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4828 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4829 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4830 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4831 if needs_close { return false; }
4834 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4835 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4836 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4837 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4838 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4839 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4840 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4841 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4843 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4844 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4845 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4846 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4850 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4852 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4855 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4857 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4858 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4859 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4864 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4866 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4872 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4874 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4875 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4876 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4877 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4878 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4879 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4880 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4881 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4882 channel_id: *chan_id,
4883 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4891 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4892 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4893 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4895 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4896 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4897 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4902 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4903 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4904 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4905 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4906 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4907 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4908 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4909 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4910 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4916 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4918 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4919 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4924 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4925 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4926 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4927 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4928 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4929 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4930 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4931 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4932 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4933 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4934 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4936 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4937 // have no channels to the peer.
4938 let remove_entry = {
4939 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4940 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4943 entry.remove_entry();
4946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4951 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4952 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4953 // This should be unreachable
4954 debug_assert!(false);
4957 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4958 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4959 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4960 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4961 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4962 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4963 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4966 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4967 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4968 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4970 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4971 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4978 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4979 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4980 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4981 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4985 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4986 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4989 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4990 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4993 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4994 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4995 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4996 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4997 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4998 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4999 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5002 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5003 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5006 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5007 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5008 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5009 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5010 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5017 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5018 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5019 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5021 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5022 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5023 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5024 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5026 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5027 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5028 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5029 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5030 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5031 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5034 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5035 /// reason for the failure.
5037 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5038 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5041 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5042 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5043 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5044 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5045 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5046 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5047 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5052 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5053 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5054 match failure_code {
5055 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5056 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5057 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5058 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5059 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5060 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5062 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5063 let fail_data = match data {
5064 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5067 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5072 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5073 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5075 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5077 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5078 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5079 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5080 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5081 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5082 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5083 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5085 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5087 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5088 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5090 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5095 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5096 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5097 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5098 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5099 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5100 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5101 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5102 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5103 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5104 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5106 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5107 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5108 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5109 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5111 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5112 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5113 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5114 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5115 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5119 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5120 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5121 // be surfaced to the user.
5122 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5123 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5124 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5126 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5128 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5131 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5133 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5134 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5136 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5137 debug_assert!(false);
5138 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5143 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5146 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5147 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5148 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5149 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5153 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5154 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5155 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5156 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5157 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5158 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5159 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5160 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5161 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5162 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5165 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5166 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5167 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5170 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5171 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5172 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5174 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5175 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5176 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5177 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5178 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5180 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5181 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5182 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5185 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5186 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5187 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5189 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5190 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5191 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5192 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5193 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5197 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5201 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5202 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5203 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5204 push_forward_ev = true;
5206 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5208 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5211 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5214 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5215 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5216 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5217 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5218 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5219 failed_next_destination: destination,
5225 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5226 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5228 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5229 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5230 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5231 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5233 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5234 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5235 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5236 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5238 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5239 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5240 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5242 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5243 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5244 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5245 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5246 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5247 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5248 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5249 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5250 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5253 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5254 /// even type numbers.
5258 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5259 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5261 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5262 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5263 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5266 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5267 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5272 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5273 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5274 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5275 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5276 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5277 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5278 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5279 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5284 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5285 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5286 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5287 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5288 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5290 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5291 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5292 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5296 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5297 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5298 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5299 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5300 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5301 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5302 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5303 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5304 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5305 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5315 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5317 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5318 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5319 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5320 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5321 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5322 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5323 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5324 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5325 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5326 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5327 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5328 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5329 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5330 debug_assert!(false);
5334 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5336 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5337 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5338 debug_assert!(false);
5342 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5343 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5345 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5346 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5347 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5348 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5351 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5352 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5353 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5354 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5358 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5359 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5360 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5361 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5362 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5363 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5366 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5367 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5368 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5369 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5370 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5375 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5376 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5377 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5378 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5379 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5380 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5381 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5383 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5386 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5387 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5388 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5389 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5393 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5394 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5395 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5396 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5398 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5399 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5400 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5401 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5403 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5404 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5405 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5406 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5409 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5410 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5411 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5412 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5416 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5417 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5418 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5421 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5424 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5425 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5426 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5427 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5428 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5431 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5432 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5433 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5435 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5438 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5439 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5441 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5442 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5443 // monitor update as a background event.
5444 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5445 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5446 counterparty_node_id,
5447 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5448 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5452 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5453 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5458 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5460 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5462 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5463 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5464 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5465 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5466 blocking_action: blocker,
5468 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5470 debug_assert!(false,
5471 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5474 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5475 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5476 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5477 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5478 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5480 let mut found_blocker = false;
5481 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5482 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5483 // which case we need to only remove the one
5484 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5485 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5486 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5487 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5489 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5492 debug_assert!(false);
5501 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5502 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5503 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5509 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5510 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5511 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5512 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5513 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5514 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5515 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5516 // again on restart.
5517 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5518 payment_preimage, update_res);
5521 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5522 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5524 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5525 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5526 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5527 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5528 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5529 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5530 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5531 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5532 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5533 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5536 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5537 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5538 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5539 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5540 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5541 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5545 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5546 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5549 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5550 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5551 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5554 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5555 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5556 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5557 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5558 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5560 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5561 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5562 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5564 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5565 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5568 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5569 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5570 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5571 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5572 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5573 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5574 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5575 let chan_to_release =
5576 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5577 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5579 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5580 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5581 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5582 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5587 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5588 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5589 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5590 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5591 // in the background.
5592 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5593 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5594 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5595 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5597 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5598 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5599 funding_txo, update, ..
5601 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5602 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5603 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5604 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5606 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5612 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5613 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5614 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5616 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5617 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5619 monitor_update.updates[0],
5620 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5625 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5626 // immediately once we get going.
5627 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5630 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5632 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5635 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5636 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5637 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5638 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5639 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5640 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5644 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5645 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5646 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5649 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5650 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5652 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5653 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5654 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5655 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5657 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5661 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5662 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5663 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5669 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5670 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5671 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5674 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5675 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5676 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5677 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5679 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5681 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5682 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5683 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5685 payment_purpose: purpose,
5688 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5690 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5694 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5696 sender_intended_total_msat,
5700 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5701 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5703 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5704 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5705 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5708 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5709 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5711 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5712 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5713 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5714 Some(blocking_action),
5721 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5722 /// update completion.
5723 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5724 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5725 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5726 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5727 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5728 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5729 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5730 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5731 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5732 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5733 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5734 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5735 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5736 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5738 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5740 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5741 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5742 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5743 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5746 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5747 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5749 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5751 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5756 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5757 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5758 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5759 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5764 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5765 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5766 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5767 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5768 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5773 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5777 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5783 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5784 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5785 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5789 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5790 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5791 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5797 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5798 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5800 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5801 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5803 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5804 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5805 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5806 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5807 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5813 let mut peer_state_lock;
5814 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5815 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5816 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5819 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5822 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5823 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5824 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5825 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5826 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5829 let remaining_in_flight =
5830 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5831 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5834 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5835 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5836 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5837 remaining_in_flight);
5838 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5841 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5844 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5846 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5847 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5850 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5851 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5852 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5854 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5855 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5856 /// used to accept such channels.
5858 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5859 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5860 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5861 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5864 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5865 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5867 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5868 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5869 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5871 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5872 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5874 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5875 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5877 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5878 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5880 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5881 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5882 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5883 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5886 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5889 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5890 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5891 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5892 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5893 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5894 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5895 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5896 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5898 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5899 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5900 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5902 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5903 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5904 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5905 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5906 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5907 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5908 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5910 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5914 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5915 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5916 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5917 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5918 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5919 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5920 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5923 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5926 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5927 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5928 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5929 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5930 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5931 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5932 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5933 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5936 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5941 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5942 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5943 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5945 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5946 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5947 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5950 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5955 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5956 /// or 0-conf channels.
5958 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5959 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5960 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5961 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5962 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5963 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5965 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5966 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5967 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5968 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5969 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5970 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5971 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5975 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5978 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5979 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5981 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5982 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5984 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5985 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5986 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5987 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5988 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5990 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5993 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5994 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5995 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5998 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5999 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6004 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6007 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6008 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6009 // likely to be lost on restart!
6010 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6011 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6014 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6018 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6019 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6020 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6021 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6022 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6027 debug_assert!(false);
6028 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6033 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6034 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6035 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6036 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6037 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6038 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6040 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6041 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6042 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6045 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6046 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6048 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6049 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6052 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6053 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6055 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6058 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6059 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6060 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6061 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6062 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6063 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6064 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6065 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6066 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6068 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6069 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6070 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6075 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6076 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6077 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6078 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6079 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6080 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6081 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6089 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6090 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6093 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6094 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6097 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6098 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6100 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6101 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6102 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6104 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6108 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6109 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6110 // likely to be lost on restart!
6111 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6113 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6115 debug_assert!(false);
6116 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6118 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6119 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6120 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6122 match phase.get_mut() {
6123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6124 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6125 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6135 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6136 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6137 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6138 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6139 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6141 user_channel_id: user_id,
6146 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6147 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6149 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6150 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6152 debug_assert!(false);
6153 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6156 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6157 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6158 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6159 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6160 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6161 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6162 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6164 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6165 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6166 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6167 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6168 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6169 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6170 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6172 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6176 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6179 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6182 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6184 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6185 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6186 chan.context.channel_id()
6189 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6190 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6191 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6192 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6194 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6195 chan.context.channel_id()))
6197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6198 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6199 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6200 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6201 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6203 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6204 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6205 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6206 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6207 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6208 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6209 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6214 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6215 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6216 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6218 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6222 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6223 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6224 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6225 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6226 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6228 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6229 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6238 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6239 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6240 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6241 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6243 debug_assert!(false);
6244 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6247 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6248 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6249 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6250 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6251 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6252 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6253 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6254 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6255 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6256 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6257 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6260 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6264 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6272 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6273 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6274 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6276 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6278 debug_assert!(false);
6279 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6283 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6285 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6286 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6287 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6288 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6289 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6290 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6291 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6292 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6293 msg: announcement_sigs,
6295 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6296 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6297 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6298 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6299 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6300 // announcement_signatures.
6301 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6302 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6304 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6311 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6312 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6317 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6318 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6322 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6327 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6328 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6329 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6332 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6334 debug_assert!(false);
6335 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6339 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6340 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6342 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6343 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6344 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6345 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6347 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6350 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6351 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6352 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6353 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6355 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6356 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6357 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6358 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6360 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6364 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6365 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6366 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6367 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6370 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6371 let context = phase.context_mut();
6372 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6373 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6374 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6375 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6376 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6380 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6383 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6384 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6385 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6386 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6388 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6389 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6395 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6397 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6399 debug_assert!(false);
6400 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6402 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6405 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6407 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6408 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6409 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6410 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6411 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6412 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6417 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6418 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6419 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6420 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6421 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6422 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6423 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6425 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6426 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6432 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6433 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6434 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6435 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6437 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6438 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6441 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6445 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6447 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6448 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6449 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6454 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6455 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6456 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6457 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6459 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6460 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6461 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6462 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6464 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6465 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6467 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6471 debug_assert!(false);
6472 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6476 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6478 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6479 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6480 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6481 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6482 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6483 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6485 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6486 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6487 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6488 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6489 match pending_forward_info {
6490 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6491 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6493 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6494 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6495 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6496 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6497 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6499 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6500 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6501 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6502 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6503 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6506 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6508 _ => pending_forward_info
6511 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6512 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6514 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6515 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6523 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6525 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6527 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6529 debug_assert!(false);
6530 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6534 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6536 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6537 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6538 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6539 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6541 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6543 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6544 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6545 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6547 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6548 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6549 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6550 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6551 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6552 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6553 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6556 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6557 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6563 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6567 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6568 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6569 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6570 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6571 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6573 debug_assert!(false);
6574 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6576 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6577 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6578 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6580 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6581 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6583 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6584 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6592 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6593 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6594 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6595 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6596 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6598 debug_assert!(false);
6599 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6603 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6605 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6606 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6607 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6609 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6610 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6612 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6613 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6621 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6625 debug_assert!(false);
6626 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6632 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6633 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6634 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6635 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6636 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6637 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6638 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6642 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6643 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6651 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6652 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6653 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6654 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6655 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6656 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6657 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6658 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6659 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6660 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6661 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6663 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6664 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6666 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6667 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6668 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6670 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6671 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6674 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6675 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6677 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6678 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6679 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6681 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6682 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6683 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6684 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6685 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6688 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6689 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6692 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6693 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6694 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6695 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6696 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6697 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6698 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6699 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6700 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6701 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6704 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6705 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6706 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6711 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6712 // payments are being processed.
6713 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6714 push_forward_event = true;
6716 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6717 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6724 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6725 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6728 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6729 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6730 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6732 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6736 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6737 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6738 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6739 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6740 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6742 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6743 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6744 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6745 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6746 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6747 // real by taking more time.
6748 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6749 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6750 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6755 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6756 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6757 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6758 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6759 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6760 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6761 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6763 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6764 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6765 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6766 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6767 channel_funding_outpoint,
6768 counterparty_node_id,
6773 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6774 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6778 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6779 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6782 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6783 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6784 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6790 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6791 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6793 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6795 debug_assert!(false);
6796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6797 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6799 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6801 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6802 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6803 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6804 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6805 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6806 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6807 *counterparty_node_id)
6809 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6810 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6811 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6812 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6813 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6814 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6815 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6819 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6820 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6826 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6830 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6832 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6834 debug_assert!(false);
6835 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6837 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6838 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6839 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6841 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6842 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6843 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6845 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6846 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6854 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6858 debug_assert!(false);
6859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6865 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6866 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6867 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6870 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6871 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6872 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6873 msg, &self.default_configuration
6874 ), chan_phase_entry),
6875 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6876 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6877 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6880 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6881 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6889 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6890 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6891 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6892 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6894 // It's not a local channel
6895 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6899 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6900 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6901 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6905 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6907 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6908 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6909 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6910 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6911 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6912 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6913 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6917 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6918 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6919 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6920 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6922 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6923 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6924 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6925 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6928 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6932 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6933 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6936 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6938 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6941 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6943 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6946 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6948 debug_assert!(false);
6949 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6950 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6954 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
6955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6957 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6958 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6959 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6960 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6961 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6962 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6963 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6964 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6965 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6966 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6967 let mut channel_update = None;
6968 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6969 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6970 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6973 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6974 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6975 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6976 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6977 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6978 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6979 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6984 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6985 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6986 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6987 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6988 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6989 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6993 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6994 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6998 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6999 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7000 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7001 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7002 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7003 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7004 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7005 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7007 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7008 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7009 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7010 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7011 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7012 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7013 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7014 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7015 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7016 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7017 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7018 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7019 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7020 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7021 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7022 next_funding_txid: None,
7025 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7026 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7027 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7033 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7034 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7035 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7036 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7039 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7040 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7045 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7046 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7047 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7049 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7050 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7051 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7052 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7053 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7054 match monitor_event {
7055 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7056 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7057 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7058 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7059 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7061 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7062 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7063 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7067 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7068 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7069 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7071 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7072 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7073 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7074 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7077 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7079 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7080 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7082 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7083 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7084 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7085 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7086 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7087 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7091 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7092 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7093 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7094 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7095 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7103 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7104 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7110 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7111 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7114 has_pending_monitor_events
7117 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7118 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7119 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7121 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7123 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7126 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7127 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7128 /// update was applied.
7129 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7130 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7131 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7133 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7134 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7135 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7136 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7138 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7139 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7142 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7143 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7144 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7146 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7147 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7148 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7149 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7150 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7151 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7153 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7154 has_monitor_update = true;
7156 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7157 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7158 continue 'peer_loop;
7167 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7168 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7169 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7175 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7176 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7178 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7179 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7181 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7182 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7183 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7184 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7187 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7188 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7189 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7190 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7191 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7192 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7197 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7198 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7203 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7204 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7209 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7210 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7216 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7217 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7220 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7221 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7225 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7228 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7229 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7235 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7236 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7237 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7238 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7239 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7240 let mut has_update = false;
7241 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7245 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7246 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7247 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7248 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7249 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7251 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7252 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7253 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7254 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7255 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7258 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7261 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7262 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7263 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7265 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7266 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7267 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7268 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7274 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7276 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7277 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7278 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7284 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7285 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7290 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7296 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7297 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7300 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7301 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7307 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7308 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7310 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7311 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7312 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7313 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7314 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7315 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7316 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7317 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7318 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7319 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7320 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7321 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7322 assert!(should_broadcast);
7323 } else { unreachable!(); }
7324 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7325 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7326 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7329 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7333 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7334 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7335 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7339 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7340 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7341 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7342 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7346 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7349 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7351 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7352 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7353 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7354 &self, description: String
7355 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7356 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7357 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7358 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7359 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7360 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7362 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7363 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7367 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7368 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7372 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7373 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7375 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7376 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7377 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7380 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7381 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7382 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7384 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7385 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7389 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7390 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7391 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7392 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7396 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7397 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7401 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7402 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7404 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7406 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7407 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7408 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7409 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7410 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7411 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7412 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7413 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7414 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7415 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7416 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7417 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7419 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7420 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7422 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7423 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7426 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7427 self.pending_outbound_payments
7428 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7429 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7431 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7436 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7437 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7438 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7440 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7441 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7442 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7443 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7444 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7445 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7446 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7448 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7449 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7453 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7454 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7457 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7458 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7459 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7463 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7464 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7465 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7466 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7470 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7471 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7472 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7476 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7477 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7479 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7480 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7481 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7482 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7483 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7484 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7485 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7486 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7487 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7488 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7489 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7490 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7491 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7492 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7493 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7496 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7497 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7498 let builder = match quantity {
7500 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7502 let builder = match amount_msats {
7504 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7506 let builder = match payer_note {
7508 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7511 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7512 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7514 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7515 self.pending_outbound_payments
7516 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7517 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7519 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7521 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7522 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7523 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7524 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7525 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7528 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7530 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7531 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7532 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7533 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7534 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7535 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7536 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7537 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7538 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7540 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7547 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7550 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7551 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7552 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7556 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7557 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7558 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7559 /// received and no retries will be made.
7561 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7562 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7563 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7564 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7565 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7567 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7568 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7570 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7571 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7572 let payment_paths = vec![
7573 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7575 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7576 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7577 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7579 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7580 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7581 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7583 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7584 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7585 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7587 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7588 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7590 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7591 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7592 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7593 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7594 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7597 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7599 for path in refund.paths() {
7600 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7601 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7602 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7603 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7605 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7611 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7615 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7618 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7619 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7621 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7622 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7623 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7624 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7626 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7628 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7629 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7633 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7634 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7636 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7638 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7639 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7641 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7642 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7643 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7644 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7645 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7646 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7647 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7648 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7649 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7650 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7651 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7654 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7655 /// stored external to LDK.
7657 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7658 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7659 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7661 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7662 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7665 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7666 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7667 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7668 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7670 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7671 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7672 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7673 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7674 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7676 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7677 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7678 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7679 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7680 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7682 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7683 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7685 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7686 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7690 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7691 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7693 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7695 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7696 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7698 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7699 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7700 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7701 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7702 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7703 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7704 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7707 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7708 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7710 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7711 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7712 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7715 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7717 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7718 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7719 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7720 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7723 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7725 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7726 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7727 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7728 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7729 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7731 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7732 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7733 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7735 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7737 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7740 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7741 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7742 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7746 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7747 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7749 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7750 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7751 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7752 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7754 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7755 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7756 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7757 Some(_) => continue,
7758 None => return scid_candidate
7763 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7765 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7766 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7768 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7769 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7770 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7774 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7775 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7776 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7778 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7779 /// times to get a unique scid.
7780 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7781 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7782 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7784 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7785 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7786 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7787 return scid_candidate
7791 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7792 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7793 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7794 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7797 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7800 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7801 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7803 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7804 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7805 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7814 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7815 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7816 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7817 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7818 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7822 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7823 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7824 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7825 events.push_back((event, None));
7829 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7830 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7831 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7835 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7836 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7840 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7841 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7844 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7845 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7846 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7847 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7848 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7849 let logger = WithContext::from(
7850 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7854 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7855 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7857 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7858 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7859 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7860 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7862 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7866 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7867 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7868 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7869 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7870 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7871 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7872 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7876 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7877 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7878 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7879 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7880 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7881 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7882 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7883 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7884 if further_update_exists {
7885 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7890 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7891 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7897 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7898 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7904 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7905 for action in actions {
7907 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7908 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7910 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7916 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7917 /// using the given event handler.
7919 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7920 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7924 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7928 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7930 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7931 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7932 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7933 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7934 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7935 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7939 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7940 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7941 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7942 /// is always placed next to each other.
7944 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7945 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7946 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7947 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7949 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7950 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7951 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7952 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7953 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7954 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7955 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7957 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7958 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7959 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7960 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7963 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7964 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7966 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7967 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7970 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7972 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7975 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7976 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7980 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7981 events.replace(pending_events);
7990 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7992 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7993 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7994 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7995 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7996 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7997 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8001 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8003 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8004 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8005 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8007 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8011 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8013 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8014 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8015 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8016 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8017 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8018 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8022 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8024 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8025 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8026 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8027 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8028 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8031 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8032 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8035 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8036 let _persistence_guard =
8037 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8038 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8039 let new_height = height - 1;
8041 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8042 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8043 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8044 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8045 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8046 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8049 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8053 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8055 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8056 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8057 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8058 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8059 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8064 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8065 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8066 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8067 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8069 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8070 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8072 let _persistence_guard =
8073 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8074 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8075 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8076 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8078 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8079 if height < last_best_block_height {
8080 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8081 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8085 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8086 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8087 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8088 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8090 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8091 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8093 let _persistence_guard =
8094 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8095 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8096 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8098 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8100 macro_rules! max_time {
8101 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8103 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8104 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8105 // having an explicit local time source.
8106 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8107 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8108 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8109 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8110 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8116 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8117 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8118 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8119 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8123 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8124 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8125 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8128 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8129 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8130 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8131 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8132 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8133 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8140 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8141 let _persistence_guard =
8142 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8143 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8144 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8145 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8146 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8147 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8148 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8149 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8154 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8156 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8157 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8158 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8159 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8160 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8165 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8166 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8168 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8169 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8170 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8171 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8172 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8174 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8175 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8178 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8181 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8182 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8184 // Retain unfunded channels.
8185 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8186 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8187 let res = f(channel);
8188 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8189 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8190 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8191 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8192 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8194 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8195 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8196 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8197 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8198 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8199 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8200 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8201 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8206 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8212 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8215 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8216 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8218 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8219 msg: announcement_sigs,
8221 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8222 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8223 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8225 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8226 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8227 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8232 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8233 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8234 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8235 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8236 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8237 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8238 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8239 // is always consistent.
8240 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8241 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8242 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8243 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8244 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8247 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8248 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8249 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8250 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8251 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8252 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8257 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8258 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8259 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8260 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8261 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8262 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8263 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8264 data: reason_message,
8277 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8278 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8279 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8280 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8281 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8282 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8283 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8284 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8285 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8286 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8288 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8289 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8290 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8294 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8297 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8298 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8299 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8300 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8301 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8302 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8303 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8304 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8305 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8306 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8307 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8310 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8311 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8312 _ => unreachable!(),
8314 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8315 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8316 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8317 let logger = WithContext::from(
8318 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8320 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8326 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8328 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8329 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8333 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8334 /// may have events that need processing.
8336 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8337 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8339 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8340 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8341 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8342 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8345 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8346 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8347 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8350 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8351 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8352 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8355 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8356 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8357 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8358 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8361 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8362 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8363 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8364 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8367 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8368 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8370 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8371 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8372 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8373 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8374 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8377 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8378 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8379 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8380 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8383 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8384 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8385 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8386 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8389 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8390 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8391 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8392 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8395 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8396 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8397 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8398 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8402 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8403 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8405 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8406 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8407 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8408 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8409 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8410 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8414 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8415 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8416 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8417 // change to the contents.
8418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8419 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8420 let persist = match &res {
8421 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8422 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8423 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8425 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8427 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8432 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8433 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8434 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8435 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8438 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8439 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8440 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8441 // change to the contents.
8442 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8443 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8444 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8448 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8449 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8450 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8451 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8454 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8456 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8459 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8461 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8464 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8465 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8466 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8467 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8468 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8470 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8471 let persist = match &res {
8472 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8473 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8475 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8480 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8481 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8482 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8483 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8486 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8487 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8488 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8489 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8492 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8493 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8494 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8495 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8498 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8499 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8500 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8501 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8504 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8509 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8514 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8515 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8516 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8517 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8519 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8520 let persist = match &res {
8521 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8522 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8523 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8525 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8530 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8532 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8535 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8536 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8537 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8538 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8540 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8541 let persist = match &res {
8542 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8543 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8544 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8546 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8551 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8552 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8553 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8554 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8556 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8557 let persist = match &res {
8558 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8559 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8560 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8562 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8567 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8572 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8577 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8578 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8579 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8580 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8582 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8583 let persist = match &res {
8584 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8585 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8586 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8588 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8593 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8595 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8598 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8599 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8600 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8603 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8608 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8610 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8611 let persist = match &res {
8612 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8613 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8614 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8616 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8621 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8623 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8624 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8625 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8628 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8629 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8630 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8632 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8635 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8636 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8637 let context = match phase {
8638 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8639 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8640 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8641 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8646 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8647 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8650 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8654 // Clean up for removal.
8655 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8656 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8657 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8660 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8661 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8662 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8663 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8665 // V1 Channel Establishment
8666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8670 // V2 Channel Establishment
8671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8673 // Common Channel Establishment
8674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8680 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8681 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8682 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8685 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8688 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8689 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8690 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8691 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8692 // Channel Operations
8693 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8694 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8695 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8698 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8700 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8701 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8702 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8703 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8704 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8705 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8706 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8707 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8708 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8711 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8712 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8713 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8714 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8717 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8719 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8721 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8722 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8726 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8727 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8728 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8729 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8733 let mut res = Ok(());
8735 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8736 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8737 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8738 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8739 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8740 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8741 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8744 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8745 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8747 if inbound_peer_limited {
8749 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8751 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8752 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8753 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8754 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8755 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8756 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8757 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8758 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8763 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8764 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8766 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8767 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8768 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8769 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8772 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8775 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8776 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8781 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8784 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8787 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8789 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8790 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8791 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8792 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8793 // worry about closing and removing them.
8794 debug_assert!(false);
8798 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8800 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8801 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8806 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8807 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8812 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8815 match &msg.data as &str {
8816 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8817 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8819 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8820 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8821 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8822 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8823 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8824 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8825 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8826 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8828 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8829 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8830 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8831 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8832 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8833 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8834 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8839 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8840 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8841 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8842 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8843 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8845 log_level: Level::Trace,
8855 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8856 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8858 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8859 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8862 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8863 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8864 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8865 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8867 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8868 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8869 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8873 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8875 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8876 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8879 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8880 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8881 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8882 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8890 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8891 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8895 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8896 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8899 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8900 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8903 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8904 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8907 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8908 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8909 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8910 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8913 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8914 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8915 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8916 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8919 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8920 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8921 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8922 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8925 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8926 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8927 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8928 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8931 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8932 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8933 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8934 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8937 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8938 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8939 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8940 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8943 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8944 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8945 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8946 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8949 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8950 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8951 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8952 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8955 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8956 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8957 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8958 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8962 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8963 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8965 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8966 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8967 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8968 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8969 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8970 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8974 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8975 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8976 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8979 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8980 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8983 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8984 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8986 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8987 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8989 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8990 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8993 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8995 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8996 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8997 let payment_paths = vec![
8998 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9000 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9001 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9002 payment_paths, payment_hash
9004 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9005 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9006 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9008 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9009 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9010 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9012 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9013 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9014 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9017 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9018 let payment_paths = vec![
9019 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9021 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9022 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9023 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9024 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9025 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9027 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9028 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9029 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9031 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9032 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9034 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9035 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9036 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9037 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9039 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9040 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9044 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9045 Err(error) => Some(error),
9049 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9053 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9054 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9056 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9058 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9059 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9062 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9064 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9071 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9072 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9078 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9079 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9083 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9084 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9085 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9086 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9087 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9091 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9092 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9094 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9095 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9096 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9097 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9098 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9101 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9102 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9103 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9104 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9107 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9108 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9109 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9110 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9113 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9114 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9115 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9116 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9119 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9120 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9121 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9122 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9123 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9124 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9125 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9126 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9127 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9128 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9129 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9130 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9131 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9132 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9133 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9134 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9135 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9136 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9137 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9138 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9143 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9144 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9146 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9147 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9148 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9149 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9152 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9153 (2, node_id, required),
9154 (4, features, required),
9155 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9156 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9157 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9158 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9161 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9162 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9163 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9164 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9165 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9166 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9167 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9168 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9169 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9170 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9171 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9172 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9173 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9174 (7, self.config, option),
9175 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9176 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9177 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9178 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9179 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9180 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9181 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9182 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9183 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9184 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9185 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9186 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9187 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9188 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9189 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9190 (32, self.is_public, required),
9191 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9192 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9193 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9194 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9195 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9201 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9202 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9203 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9204 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9205 (2, channel_id, required),
9206 (3, channel_type, option),
9207 (4, counterparty, required),
9208 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9209 (6, funding_txo, option),
9210 (7, config, option),
9211 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9212 (9, confirmations, option),
9213 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9214 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9215 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9216 (16, balance_msat, required),
9217 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9218 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9219 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9220 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9221 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9222 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9223 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9224 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9225 (26, is_outbound, required),
9226 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9227 (30, is_usable, required),
9228 (32, is_public, required),
9229 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9230 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9231 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9232 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9233 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9236 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9237 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9238 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9239 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9240 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9244 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9246 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9247 outbound_scid_alias,
9251 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9252 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9254 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9255 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9256 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9257 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9258 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9259 confirmations_required,
9261 force_close_spend_delay,
9262 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9263 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9264 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9265 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9266 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9267 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9268 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9269 channel_shutdown_state,
9274 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9275 (2, channels, required_vec),
9276 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9277 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9280 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9281 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9284 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9286 (0, onion_packet, required),
9287 (1, blinded, option),
9288 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9291 (0, payment_data, required),
9292 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9293 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9294 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9295 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9297 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9298 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9299 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9300 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9301 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9302 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9306 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9307 (0, routing, required),
9308 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9309 (4, payment_hash, required),
9310 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9311 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9312 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9313 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9317 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9318 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9320 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9322 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9323 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9324 reason.write(writer)?;
9326 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9327 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9330 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9331 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9332 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9333 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9340 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9341 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9342 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9345 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9346 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9347 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9348 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9352 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9353 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9354 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9355 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9356 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9359 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9360 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9361 // messages contained in the variants.
9362 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9363 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9364 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9366 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9367 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9368 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9369 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9370 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9373 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9374 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9375 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9376 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9377 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9379 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9384 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9389 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9390 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9393 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9394 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9395 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9396 (2, outpoint, required),
9397 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9398 (4, htlc_id, required),
9399 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9400 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9403 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9404 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9405 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9406 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9407 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9409 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9410 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9411 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9412 (2, self.value, required),
9413 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9414 (4, payment_data, option),
9415 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9416 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9417 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9418 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9424 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9425 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9426 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9427 (0, prev_hop, required),
9428 (1, total_msat, option),
9429 (2, value_ser, required),
9430 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9431 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9432 (5, total_value_received, option),
9433 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9434 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9435 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9437 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9438 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9439 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9441 if payment_data.is_some() {
9442 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9444 if total_msat.is_none() {
9445 total_msat = Some(value);
9447 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9450 if total_msat.is_none() {
9451 if payment_data.is_none() {
9452 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9454 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9456 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9460 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9463 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9464 total_value_received,
9465 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9467 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9468 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9473 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9474 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9475 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9478 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9479 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9480 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9481 let mut payment_id = None;
9482 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9483 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9484 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9485 (0, session_priv, required),
9486 (1, payment_id, option),
9487 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9488 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9489 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9490 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9492 if payment_id.is_none() {
9493 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9495 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9497 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9498 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9499 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9501 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9502 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9503 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9504 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9508 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9509 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9510 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9512 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9515 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9516 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9521 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9522 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9524 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9526 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9527 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9528 (0, session_priv, required),
9529 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9530 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9531 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9532 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9533 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9534 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9537 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9539 field.write(writer)?;
9546 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9547 (0, forward_info, required),
9548 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9549 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9550 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9551 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9554 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9556 (0, htlc_id, required),
9557 (2, err_packet, required),
9562 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9563 (0, payment_secret, required),
9564 (2, expiry_time, required),
9565 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9566 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9567 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9570 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9572 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9573 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9574 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9575 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9576 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9577 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9581 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9582 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9584 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9586 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9588 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9589 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9590 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9593 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9595 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9596 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9597 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9600 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9601 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9604 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9605 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9609 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9611 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9614 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9615 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9616 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9619 channel.write(writer)?;
9625 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9626 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9627 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9628 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9629 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9630 for forward in pending_forwards {
9631 forward.write(writer)?;
9636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9638 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9639 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9640 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9642 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9643 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9644 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9645 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9646 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9647 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9648 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9649 htlc.write(writer)?;
9651 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9652 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9655 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9656 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9657 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9658 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9659 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9660 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9661 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9664 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9665 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9666 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9667 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9668 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9670 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9671 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9672 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9673 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9674 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9675 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9676 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9681 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9682 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9683 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9684 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9685 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9686 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9687 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9688 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9689 0u64.write(writer)?;
9691 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9692 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9693 event.write(writer)?;
9697 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9698 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9699 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9700 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9701 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9702 0u64.write(writer)?;
9704 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9705 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9706 // likely to be identical.
9707 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9708 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9710 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9711 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9712 hash.write(writer)?;
9713 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9716 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9717 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9718 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9719 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9720 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9723 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9724 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9726 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9727 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9728 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9729 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9732 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9733 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9734 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9735 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9739 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9740 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9741 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9743 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9744 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9745 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9751 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9752 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9753 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9754 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9757 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9758 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9759 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9760 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9761 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9764 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9765 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9766 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9767 if !updates.is_empty() {
9768 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9769 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9774 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9775 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9776 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9777 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9778 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9779 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9780 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9781 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9782 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9783 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9784 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9785 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9786 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9793 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9795 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9796 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9800 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9801 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9802 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9803 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9804 // check that the event is sane here.
9805 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9806 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9807 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9808 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9814 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9815 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9816 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9817 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9818 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9819 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9822 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9823 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9824 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9825 events.push_back((ev, action));
9826 } else if action.is_some() {
9827 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9834 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9835 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9836 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9837 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9838 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9839 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9842 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9844 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9846 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9847 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9848 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9849 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9850 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9851 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9852 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9853 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9854 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9855 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9856 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9857 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9858 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9860 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9861 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9863 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9864 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9866 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9867 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9868 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9869 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9870 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9871 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9873 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9874 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9876 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9878 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9879 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9880 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9881 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9885 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9886 pub entropy_source: ES,
9888 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9889 pub node_signer: NS,
9891 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9892 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9894 pub signer_provider: SP,
9896 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9898 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9899 pub fee_estimator: F,
9900 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9902 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9903 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9904 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9905 pub chain_monitor: M,
9907 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9908 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9909 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9910 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9911 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9912 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9914 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9916 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9917 /// deserialization.
9919 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9920 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9921 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9923 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9924 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9926 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9927 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9928 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9929 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9931 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9934 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9935 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9938 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9939 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9941 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9943 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9944 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9945 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9950 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9951 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9952 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9953 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9954 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9956 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9957 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9962 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9963 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9964 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9965 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9967 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9968 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9969 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9970 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9971 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9972 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9976 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9977 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9978 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9982 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9983 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9985 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9986 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9987 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9988 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9989 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9990 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9994 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9995 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9997 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9998 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9999 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10001 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10003 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10004 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10005 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10006 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10007 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10008 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10009 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10010 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10011 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10012 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10014 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10015 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10016 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10017 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10018 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10019 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10020 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10021 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10022 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10023 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10024 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10025 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10026 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10027 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10029 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10030 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10031 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10033 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10034 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10035 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10037 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10038 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10039 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10041 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10042 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10043 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10045 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10046 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10047 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10050 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10051 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10052 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10053 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10054 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10055 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10056 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10058 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10059 let mut found_htlc = false;
10060 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10061 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10064 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10065 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10066 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10067 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10068 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10069 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10070 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10072 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10073 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10074 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10078 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10079 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10080 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10081 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10082 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10084 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10085 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10087 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10089 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10090 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10093 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10094 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10095 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10099 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10100 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10101 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10102 // safely discard the channel.
10103 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10104 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10105 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10106 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10107 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10108 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10109 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10112 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10113 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10114 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10115 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10116 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10117 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10121 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10122 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10123 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10124 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10125 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10126 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10127 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10128 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10130 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10134 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10135 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10136 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10137 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10138 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10139 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10140 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10141 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10142 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10144 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10147 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10148 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10149 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10150 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10151 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10152 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10153 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10154 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10156 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10159 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10162 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10163 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10164 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10165 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10166 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10167 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10168 is_connected: false,
10172 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10173 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10174 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10175 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10176 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10177 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10178 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10179 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10182 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10183 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10184 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10185 for _ in 0..event_count {
10186 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10187 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10192 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10193 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10194 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10196 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10197 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10198 // on-startup monitor updates.
10199 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10200 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10202 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10206 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10207 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10209 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10210 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10211 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10212 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10217 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10218 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10219 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10220 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10221 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10222 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10223 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10225 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10226 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10230 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10231 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10232 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10233 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10234 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10235 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10236 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10237 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10238 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10239 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10240 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10241 let mut events_override = None;
10242 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10243 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10244 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10245 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10246 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10247 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10248 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10249 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10250 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10251 (8, events_override, option),
10252 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10253 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10254 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10255 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10257 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10258 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10261 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10262 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10265 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10266 pending_events_read = events;
10269 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10270 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10273 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10274 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10275 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10276 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10277 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10278 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10280 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10282 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10283 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10284 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10287 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10288 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10289 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10290 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10291 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10293 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10294 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10295 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10297 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10298 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10299 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10300 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10301 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10303 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10304 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10305 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10306 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10307 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10308 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10309 pending_background_events.push(
10310 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10311 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10312 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10313 update: update.clone(),
10316 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10317 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10318 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10319 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10320 pending_background_events.push(
10321 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10322 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10323 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10326 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10327 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10330 max_in_flight_update_id
10334 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10335 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10336 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10337 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10338 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10339 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10341 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10343 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10344 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10345 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10346 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10347 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10348 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10349 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10350 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10351 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10354 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10355 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10356 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10357 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10358 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10359 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10360 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10361 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10362 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10363 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10367 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10368 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10369 debug_assert!(false);
10370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10375 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10376 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10377 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10378 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10379 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10380 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10381 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10382 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10383 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10385 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10386 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10387 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10389 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10390 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10391 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10392 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10393 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10394 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10395 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10401 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10402 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10404 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10405 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10406 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10407 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10410 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10411 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10412 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10413 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10414 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10415 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10416 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10418 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10419 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10420 let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
10421 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10422 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, None, Some(chan_id));
10423 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10424 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10425 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10426 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10427 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10430 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10431 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10432 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10433 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10435 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10436 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10437 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
10439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10440 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10441 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10442 retry_strategy: None,
10443 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10444 payment_params: None,
10445 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10446 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10447 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10448 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10449 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10450 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10451 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10452 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10453 total_msat: path_amt,
10454 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10455 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10457 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10458 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10463 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10464 match htlc_source {
10465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10466 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10467 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10468 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10470 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10471 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10472 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10473 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10474 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10475 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10476 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10477 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10478 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10479 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10480 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10485 !forwards.is_empty()
10487 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10488 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10489 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10490 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10491 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10492 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10493 intercepted_id != ev_id
10500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10501 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10502 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10503 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10504 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10505 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10506 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10507 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10508 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10509 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10510 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10512 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10513 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10514 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10516 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10517 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10518 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10525 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10526 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10528 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10530 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10531 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10532 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10533 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10534 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10535 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10536 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10537 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10538 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10539 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10542 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10543 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10544 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10545 // channel still live case here.
10549 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10550 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10555 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10556 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10557 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10558 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10559 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10560 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10561 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10562 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10566 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10567 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10569 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10570 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10571 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10572 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10574 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10575 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10578 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10579 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10581 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10582 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10584 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10587 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10588 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10589 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10591 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10595 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10596 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10597 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10598 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10601 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10602 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10603 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10604 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10605 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10606 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10607 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10608 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10610 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10611 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10615 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10617 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10619 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10620 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10622 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10623 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10628 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10629 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10631 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10633 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10635 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10636 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10637 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10642 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10643 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10644 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10646 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10647 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10648 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10649 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10650 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10652 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10653 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10654 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10656 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10657 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10658 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10659 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10660 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10661 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10663 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10664 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10665 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10666 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10667 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10668 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10672 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10673 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10674 debug_assert!(false);
10675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10680 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10682 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10683 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10684 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10685 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10686 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10687 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10688 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10689 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10690 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10691 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10692 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10694 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10695 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10697 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10698 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10699 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10700 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10702 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10703 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10704 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10705 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10707 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10708 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10709 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10710 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10712 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10713 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10714 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10717 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10718 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10719 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10722 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10723 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, previous_hop_monitor);
10724 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &&logger);
10727 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10730 purpose: payment.purpose,
10731 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10732 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10733 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10739 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10740 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10741 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10742 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10743 for action in actions.iter() {
10744 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10745 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10746 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10748 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10750 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10751 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10752 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10753 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10754 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10756 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10757 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10758 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10759 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10763 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10764 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10768 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10770 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10775 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10777 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10778 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10779 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10780 router: args.router,
10782 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10784 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10785 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10786 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10787 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10789 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10790 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10791 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10792 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10793 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10794 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10796 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10798 our_network_pubkey,
10801 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10803 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10805 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10806 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10807 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10808 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10809 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10811 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10812 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10814 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10816 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10818 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10819 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10820 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10822 logger: args.logger,
10823 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10826 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10827 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10828 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10829 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10830 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10833 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10834 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10835 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10836 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10837 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10838 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10841 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10842 //connection or two.
10844 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10850 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10851 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10852 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10853 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10854 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10855 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10856 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10857 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10858 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10859 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10860 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10861 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10862 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10863 use crate::util::test_utils;
10864 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10865 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10868 fn test_notify_limits() {
10869 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10870 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10874 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10876 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10877 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10878 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10879 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10880 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10882 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10884 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10885 // to connect messages with new values
10886 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10887 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10888 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10889 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10890 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10891 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10893 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10894 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10895 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10896 // ... but the last node should not.
10897 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10898 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10899 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10900 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10902 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10903 // about the channel.
10904 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10905 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10906 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10908 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10910 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10911 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10912 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10913 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10914 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10915 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10917 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10918 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10919 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10921 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10922 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10923 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10924 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10925 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10926 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10928 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10929 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10930 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10931 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10932 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10933 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10934 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10935 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10937 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10938 // the channel info has updated.
10939 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10940 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10941 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10942 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10943 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10944 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10948 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10949 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10951 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10952 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10953 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10954 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10955 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10957 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10958 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10959 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10960 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10962 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10963 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10964 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10965 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10966 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10967 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10968 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10969 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10971 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10973 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10975 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10976 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10977 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10979 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10980 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10981 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10982 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10983 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10985 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10986 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10989 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10990 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10991 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10992 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10993 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10994 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10995 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10997 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10999 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11000 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11001 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11003 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11005 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11007 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11008 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11009 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11010 // lightning messages manually.
11011 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11012 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11015 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11016 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11017 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11018 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11020 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11021 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11023 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11024 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11026 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11027 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11028 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11030 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11031 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11032 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11034 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11036 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11038 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11039 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11042 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11043 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11044 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11047 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11048 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11049 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11050 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11055 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11056 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11057 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11058 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11065 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11066 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11067 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11070 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11071 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11072 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11073 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11074 // fails as expected.
11075 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11076 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11077 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11078 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11079 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11080 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11083 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11084 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11086 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11088 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11089 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11091 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11092 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11093 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11095 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11096 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11097 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11098 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11099 let route = find_route(
11100 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11101 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11103 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11104 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11106 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11108 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11109 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11110 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11113 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11114 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11118 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11119 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11120 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11121 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11122 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11123 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11125 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11126 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11128 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11129 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11131 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11132 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11133 let route = find_route(
11134 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11135 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11137 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11138 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11140 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11142 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11143 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11144 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11146 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11147 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11148 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11149 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11151 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11153 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11154 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11155 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11157 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11161 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11162 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11163 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11164 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11165 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11166 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11169 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11171 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11174 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11175 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11176 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11177 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11179 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11181 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11182 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11183 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11185 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11186 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11187 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11190 let route = find_route(
11191 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11192 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11194 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11195 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11196 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11198 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11200 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11201 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11202 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11205 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11208 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11209 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11210 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11211 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11212 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11213 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11214 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11215 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11216 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11218 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11219 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11223 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11224 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11225 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11231 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11232 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11234 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11235 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11236 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11237 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11238 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11239 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11240 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11241 let route = find_route(
11242 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11243 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11246 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11247 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11248 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11249 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11250 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11251 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11254 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11255 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11256 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11257 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11258 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11259 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11260 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11262 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11266 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11267 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11268 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11269 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11270 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11274 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11276 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11277 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11279 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11280 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11281 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11282 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11283 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11284 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11285 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11286 let route = find_route(
11287 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11288 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11291 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11292 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11293 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11294 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11295 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11296 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11297 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11298 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11301 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11302 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11303 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11304 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11305 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11306 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11307 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11309 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11313 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11314 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11315 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11316 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11317 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11319 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11320 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11321 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11322 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11324 // Marshall an MPP route.
11325 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11326 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11327 route.paths.push(path);
11328 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11329 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11330 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11331 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11332 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11333 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11335 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11336 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11338 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11339 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11341 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11346 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11350 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11352 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11354 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11355 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11357 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11358 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11360 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11363 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11364 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11365 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11366 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11367 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11368 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11371 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11374 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11375 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11380 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11381 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11385 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11387 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11388 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11390 total_msat: 100_000,
11393 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11394 // payment verification fails as expected.
11395 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11396 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11397 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11398 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11400 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11404 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11405 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11409 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11410 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11411 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11412 // the channel is successfully closed.
11413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11418 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11419 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11420 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11421 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11422 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11424 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11425 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11427 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11428 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11429 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11430 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11433 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11435 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11436 // as it has the funding transaction.
11437 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11438 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11439 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11442 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11444 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11446 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11448 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11449 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11450 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11452 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11455 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11456 // as it has the funding transaction.
11457 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11458 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11459 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11462 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11463 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11465 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11466 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11467 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11468 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11470 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11471 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11472 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11473 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11475 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11476 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11478 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11479 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11480 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11481 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11482 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11483 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11484 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11488 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11489 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11490 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11491 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11492 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11493 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11494 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11497 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11499 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11500 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11501 // closing transaction).
11502 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11503 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11504 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11506 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11507 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11508 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11509 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11510 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11513 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11515 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11517 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11518 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11519 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11521 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11524 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11527 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11528 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11529 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11532 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11533 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11534 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11537 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11538 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11539 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11542 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11543 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11544 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11547 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11549 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11550 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11552 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11553 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11555 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11556 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11561 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11562 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11563 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11564 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11565 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11566 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11567 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11568 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11571 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11572 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11573 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11575 // Test the API functions.
11576 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11578 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11580 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11582 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11584 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11586 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11588 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11592 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11593 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11594 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11595 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11596 // the given `channel_id`.
11597 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11598 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11599 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11602 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11605 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11607 // Test the API functions.
11608 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11610 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11612 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11614 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11616 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11618 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11622 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11623 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11629 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11631 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11632 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11634 let mut funding_tx = None;
11635 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11637 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11640 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11641 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11642 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11643 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11644 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11648 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11650 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11652 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11654 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11656 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11659 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11660 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11661 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11662 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11663 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11665 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11666 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11668 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11669 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11670 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11671 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11672 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11673 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11674 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11677 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11678 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11679 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11680 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11681 }, true).unwrap_err();
11683 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11684 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11685 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11686 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11687 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11688 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11689 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11691 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11692 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11694 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11695 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11696 }, true).unwrap_err();
11698 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11699 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11700 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11701 }, false).unwrap();
11702 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11704 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11705 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11707 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11708 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11709 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11710 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11711 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11713 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11714 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11715 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11717 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11718 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11719 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11721 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11722 // "protected" and can connect again.
11723 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11724 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11725 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11727 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11729 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11731 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11732 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11736 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11737 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11743 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11745 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11746 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11748 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11749 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11750 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11751 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11754 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11756 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11757 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11758 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11760 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11761 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11762 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11764 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11765 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11766 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11767 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11771 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11772 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11773 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11776 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11777 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11778 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11779 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11781 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11783 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11784 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11786 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11787 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11788 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11789 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11790 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11791 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11795 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11797 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11798 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11802 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11803 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11806 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11807 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11808 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11809 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11810 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11812 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11813 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11815 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11816 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11817 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11818 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11824 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11825 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11827 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11828 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11829 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11831 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11832 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11836 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11840 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11841 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11842 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11843 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11844 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11845 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11846 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11847 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11849 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11850 payment_metadata: None,
11851 keysend_preimage: None,
11852 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11853 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11855 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11857 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11858 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11859 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11860 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11861 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11862 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11863 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11865 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11866 } else { panic!(); }
11868 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11869 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11871 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11872 payment_metadata: None,
11873 keysend_preimage: None,
11874 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11875 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11877 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11879 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11880 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11881 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11882 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11886 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11887 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11888 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11889 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11890 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11892 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11893 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11895 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11896 payment_metadata: None,
11897 keysend_preimage: None,
11898 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11899 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11901 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11902 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11903 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11905 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11906 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11907 // is not satisfied.
11908 assert!(result.is_ok());
11912 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11913 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11914 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11915 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11916 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11918 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11919 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11924 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11925 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11927 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11928 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11930 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11931 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11932 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11933 match &msg_events[0] {
11934 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11935 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11937 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11938 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11939 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11945 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11946 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11948 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11949 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11952 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11956 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11957 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11958 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11959 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11962 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11963 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11964 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11968 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11969 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11970 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11972 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11973 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11975 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11976 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11981 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11982 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11984 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11985 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11987 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11988 // not have generated any events.
11989 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11993 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11994 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11995 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11996 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11997 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11998 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11999 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12000 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12002 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12003 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12006 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12007 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12008 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12009 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12012 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12013 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12016 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12017 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12018 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12020 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12021 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12022 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12023 ..Default::default()
12025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12026 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12029 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12030 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12033 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12034 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12035 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12036 ..Default::default()
12038 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12039 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12040 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12043 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12044 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12047 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12048 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12049 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12050 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12051 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12054 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12055 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12056 ..Default::default()
12058 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12061 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12062 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12063 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12068 fn test_payment_display() {
12069 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12070 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12071 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12072 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12073 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12074 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12078 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12079 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12080 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12081 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12082 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12083 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12085 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12086 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12087 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12088 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12089 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12090 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12091 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12092 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12094 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12095 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12096 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12099 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12100 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12102 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12103 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12105 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12106 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12107 }, false).unwrap();
12108 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12109 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12110 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12112 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12114 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12115 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12116 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12117 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12118 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12119 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12120 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12121 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12122 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12123 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12124 } else { panic!() };
12125 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12126 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12127 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12128 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12130 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12132 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12133 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12134 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12141 use crate::chain::Listen;
12142 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12143 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12144 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12145 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12146 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12147 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12148 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12149 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12150 use crate::util::test_utils;
12151 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12153 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12154 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12155 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12156 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12158 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12160 use criterion::Criterion;
12162 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12163 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12164 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12165 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12166 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12167 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12168 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12170 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12171 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12173 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12174 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12176 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12178 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12181 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12182 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12185 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12186 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12187 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12189 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12190 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12192 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12193 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12194 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12195 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12196 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12198 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12199 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12200 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12202 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12203 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12204 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12205 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12207 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12208 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12209 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12211 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12212 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12213 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12214 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12215 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12217 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12218 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12219 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12221 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12222 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12224 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12225 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12226 }, false).unwrap();
12227 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12228 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12229 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12232 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12233 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12234 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12236 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12237 } else { panic!(); }
12239 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12240 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12241 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12242 match events_b[0] {
12243 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12244 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12249 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12250 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12251 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12252 match events_a[0] {
12253 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12254 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12259 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12261 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12262 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12263 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12265 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12266 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12267 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12268 match msg_events[0] {
12269 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12270 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12271 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12275 match msg_events[1] {
12276 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12280 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12281 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12282 match events_a[0] {
12283 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12284 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12289 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12290 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12291 match events_b[0] {
12292 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12293 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12298 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12299 macro_rules! send_payment {
12300 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12301 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12302 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12303 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12304 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12305 payment_count += 1;
12306 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12307 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12309 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12310 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12311 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12312 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12313 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12314 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12315 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12316 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12317 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12318 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12319 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12321 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12322 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12323 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12324 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12326 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12327 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12328 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12329 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12330 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12332 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12335 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12336 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12337 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12338 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12340 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12344 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12345 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12346 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);