1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo};
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
70 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
71 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
72 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
73 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
74 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
75 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
76 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
77 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
78 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
79 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
81 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
83 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
84 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
85 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
86 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
87 crate::sign::KeysManager,
91 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
95 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
98 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::cell::RefCell;
102 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
103 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
104 use core::time::Duration;
105 use core::ops::Deref;
107 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
108 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
109 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
111 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
113 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
114 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
115 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
117 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
118 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
119 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
120 // before we forward it.
122 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
123 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
124 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
125 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
126 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
128 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
131 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
132 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
134 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
135 /// do with the HTLC.
136 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
137 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
139 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
140 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
141 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
142 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
143 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
144 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
146 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
148 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
149 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
151 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
152 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
153 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
154 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
155 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
157 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
159 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
160 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
161 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
162 /// blinded path was not used.
164 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
165 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
166 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
168 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
169 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
170 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
171 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
173 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
176 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
179 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
180 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
181 requires_blinded_error: bool,
183 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
184 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
185 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
187 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
188 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
190 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
191 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
192 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
194 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
195 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
196 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
200 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
201 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
203 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
204 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
205 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
207 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
208 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
209 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
210 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
211 requires_blinded_error: bool,
215 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub struct BlindedForward {
218 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
219 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
220 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
221 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
222 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
223 /// the introduction node.
224 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
227 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
228 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
229 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
231 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
232 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
233 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
239 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
243 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
244 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
245 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
246 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
248 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
249 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
250 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
251 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
252 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
254 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
256 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
257 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
258 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
260 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
261 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
262 /// it along another path).
264 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
265 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
266 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
267 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
268 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
269 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
270 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
271 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
272 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
274 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
277 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
279 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
281 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
286 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
287 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
290 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
291 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
292 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
293 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
294 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
299 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
301 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
302 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
303 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
306 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
307 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
309 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
310 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
311 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
314 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
315 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
316 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
319 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
324 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
328 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
329 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
331 pub enum BlindedFailure {
332 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
333 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334 FromIntroductionNode,
335 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
336 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
343 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
344 short_channel_id: u64,
345 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
348 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
349 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
350 channel_id: ChannelId,
352 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
353 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
358 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
360 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
361 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
362 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
364 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
365 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
369 struct ClaimableHTLC {
370 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
372 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
374 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
375 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
376 sender_intended_value: u64,
377 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
379 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
380 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
381 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
382 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
384 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
389 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
390 events::ClaimedHTLC {
391 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
392 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
393 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
394 value_msat: val.value,
395 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
400 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
401 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
403 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
404 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
405 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408 /// Number of bytes in the id.
409 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
418 impl Readable for PaymentId {
419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
420 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
425 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
426 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
427 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
431 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
433 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
434 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
435 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
437 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
443 impl Readable for InterceptId {
444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
450 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
451 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
452 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
453 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
454 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
460 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
461 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
463 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
464 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
469 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
470 (0, short_channel_id, required),
471 (2, htlc_id, required),
473 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
474 (0, session_priv, required),
479 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
483 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486 session_priv: SecretKey,
487 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
488 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
489 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
490 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
494 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
495 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
499 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
505 payment_id.hash(hasher);
506 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
514 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
519 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
524 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
525 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
526 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
528 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
530 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
536 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
537 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
539 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
540 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
541 pub enum FailureCode {
542 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
543 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
544 TemporaryNodeFailure,
545 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
546 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
547 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
548 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
549 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
550 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
551 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
552 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
553 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
554 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
556 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
557 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
558 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
562 fn into(self) -> u16 {
564 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
565 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
566 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
567 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
572 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
573 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
574 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
575 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
576 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
578 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
579 err: msgs::LightningError,
580 closes_channel: bool,
581 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
583 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
585 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
587 err: LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 closes_channel: false,
597 shutdown_finish: None,
601 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
602 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
607 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
608 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
609 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
610 // commitment upon reconnecting.
611 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
613 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616 err: LightningError { err, action },
617 closes_channel: true,
618 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
622 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
628 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
632 log_level: Level::Warn,
635 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
639 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 closes_channel: false,
650 shutdown_finish: None,
654 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
678 struct ClaimingPayment {
680 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
682 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
683 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
684 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
687 (0, amount_msat, required),
688 (2, payment_purpose, required),
689 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
690 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
691 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
692 (9, onion_fields, option),
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704 /// failed/claimed by the user.
706 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
709 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
713 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
730 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731 /// are regenerated on startup.
732 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734 /// channel to continue normal operation.
736 /// In general this should be used rather than
737 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
741 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742 /// are regenerated on startup.
743 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
749 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
752 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754 channel_id: ChannelId,
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763 /// event can be generated.
764 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766 /// operation of another channel.
768 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
773 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774 event: events::Event,
775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
777 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
781 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
787 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788 /// stored for later processing.
789 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804 (4, blocking_action, required),
805 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
809 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815 // downgrades to prior versions.
816 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
845 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847 channel_id: ChannelId,
848 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
871 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
875 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881 latest_features: InitFeatures,
882 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886 /// user but which have not yet completed.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel.
891 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
895 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
900 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915 pub is_connected: bool,
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
926 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
928 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
936 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
940 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
945 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955 /// The original OpenChannel message.
956 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
965 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
966 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
968 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
971 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
972 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
973 struct PendingInboundPayment {
974 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
975 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
976 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
977 /// this payment being removed.
979 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
980 user_payment_id: u64,
981 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
982 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
983 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
986 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
987 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
988 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
989 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
990 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
991 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
992 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
993 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
995 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
997 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1005 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1008 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1009 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1010 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1015 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1016 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1017 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1018 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1019 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1020 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1021 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1022 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1023 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1025 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1026 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1027 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1036 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1039 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1040 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1041 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1046 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1048 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1050 pub trait AChannelManager {
1051 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1052 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1053 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1054 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1055 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1056 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1057 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1058 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1059 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1060 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1061 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1062 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1063 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1064 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1065 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1066 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1067 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1068 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1069 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1070 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1071 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1072 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1073 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1074 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1075 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1076 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1077 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1078 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1079 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1080 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1081 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1082 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1083 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1084 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1085 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1086 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1090 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1092 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1094 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1095 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1096 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1097 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1101 type Watch = M::Target;
1103 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1105 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1107 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1109 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1110 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1112 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1114 type Router = R::Target;
1116 type Logger = L::Target;
1118 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1121 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1122 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1124 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1125 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1127 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1128 /// closing channels
1129 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1130 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1131 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1132 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1134 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1135 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1137 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1138 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1139 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1140 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1141 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1142 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1144 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1145 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1147 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1149 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1150 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1151 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1152 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1153 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1155 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1156 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1157 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1159 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1160 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1161 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1163 /// # Initialization
1165 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1166 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1167 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1168 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1169 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1172 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1173 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1174 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1175 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1176 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1177 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1178 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1179 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1181 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1184 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1185 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1186 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1187 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1189 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1191 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1192 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1193 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1194 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1196 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1197 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1198 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1199 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1200 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1201 /// # mut reader: R,
1202 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1203 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1204 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1205 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1208 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1209 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1210 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1211 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1214 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1215 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1216 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1217 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1218 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1220 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1221 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1223 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1226 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1227 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1228 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1236 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1237 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1238 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1239 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1241 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1242 /// as documented by those traits
1243 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1245 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1246 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1247 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1249 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1250 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1252 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1253 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1254 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1255 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1259 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1260 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1261 /// currently open channels.
1264 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1266 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1267 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1268 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1269 /// for details in channels {
1270 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1275 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1276 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1277 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1278 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1280 /// ## Opening Channels
1282 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1283 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1284 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1287 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1288 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1289 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1290 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1292 /// # trait Wallet {
1293 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1294 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1295 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1298 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1299 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1300 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1301 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1302 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1303 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1304 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1307 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1308 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1309 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1310 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1311 /// user_channel_id, ..
1313 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1314 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1315 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1317 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1318 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1320 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1321 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1324 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1325 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1327 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1328 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1331 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1332 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1333 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1341 /// ## Accepting Channels
1343 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1344 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1345 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1348 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1349 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1350 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1352 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1354 /// # unimplemented!()
1357 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1358 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1359 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1360 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1361 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1362 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1363 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1365 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1366 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1371 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1372 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1373 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1375 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1376 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1385 /// ## Closing Channels
1387 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1388 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1389 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1390 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1391 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1394 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1395 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1396 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1397 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1399 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1400 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1402 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1403 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1404 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1405 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1408 /// // On the event processing thread
1409 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1410 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1411 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1412 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1422 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1423 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1424 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1425 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1426 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1429 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1430 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1431 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1432 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1434 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1436 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1437 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1438 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1439 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1440 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1441 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1443 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1444 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1445 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1448 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1449 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1451 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1452 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1453 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1454 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1455 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1457 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1458 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1461 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1464 /// // On the event processing thread
1465 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1466 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1467 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1468 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1469 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1470 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1472 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1473 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1475 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1476 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1477 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1478 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1483 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1484 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1485 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1493 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1494 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1497 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1498 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1499 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1500 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1502 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1503 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1504 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1506 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1507 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1508 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1509 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1510 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1511 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1513 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1514 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1517 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1518 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1520 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1522 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1523 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1524 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1530 /// // On the event processing thread
1531 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1532 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1533 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1540 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1542 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1543 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1544 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1545 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1546 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1547 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1550 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1551 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1552 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1554 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1555 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1556 /// let offer = channel_manager
1557 /// .create_offer_builder()?
1559 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1560 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1561 /// # let offer = builder
1562 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1563 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1565 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1567 /// // On the event processing thread
1568 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1569 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1570 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1571 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1572 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1574 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1575 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1580 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1581 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1590 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1591 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1592 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1595 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1596 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1597 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1599 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1600 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1601 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1603 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1604 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1605 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1606 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1608 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1609 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1612 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1613 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1615 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1617 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1621 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1623 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1625 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1629 /// // On the event processing thread
1630 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1631 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1632 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1633 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1640 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1642 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1643 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1644 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1645 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1648 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1649 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1650 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1651 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1653 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1654 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1655 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1656 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1657 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1658 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1659 /// let refund = channel_manager
1660 /// .create_refund_builder(
1661 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1664 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1665 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1666 /// # let refund = builder
1667 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1668 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1670 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1672 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1673 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1675 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1677 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1681 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1683 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1685 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1689 /// // On the event processing thread
1690 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1691 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1692 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1700 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1701 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1704 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1705 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1706 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1708 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1709 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1710 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1711 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1712 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1713 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1716 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1719 /// // On the event processing thread
1720 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1721 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1722 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1723 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1724 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1725 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1727 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1728 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1733 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1734 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1735 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1745 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1746 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1747 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1748 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1750 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1751 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1752 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1753 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1754 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1755 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1756 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1757 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1758 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1760 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1761 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1762 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1764 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1766 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1767 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1768 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1769 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1770 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1772 /// # DoS Mitigation
1774 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1775 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1776 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1777 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1779 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1780 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1781 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1785 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1786 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1787 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1788 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1789 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1791 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1792 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1793 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1794 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1795 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1796 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1797 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1798 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1799 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1800 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1801 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1802 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1803 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1804 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1805 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1806 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1807 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1808 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1809 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1810 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1811 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1812 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1813 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1814 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1815 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1816 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1817 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1818 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1819 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1820 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1821 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1822 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1823 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1824 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1825 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1826 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1827 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1828 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1829 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1830 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1833 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1834 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1835 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1836 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1837 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1841 // `pending_offers_messages`
1843 // `total_consistency_lock`
1845 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1847 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1849 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1851 // |__`per_peer_state`
1853 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1855 // |__`claimable_payments`
1857 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1861 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1863 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1865 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1869 // |__`pending_events`
1871 // |__`pending_background_events`
1873 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1875 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1877 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1878 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1879 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1884 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1885 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1886 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1892 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1894 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1896 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1897 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1899 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1900 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1901 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1902 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1904 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1905 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1907 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1908 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1909 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1910 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1911 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1912 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1913 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1914 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1916 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1918 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1919 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1921 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1923 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1924 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1925 /// and via the classic SCID.
1927 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1928 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1930 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1932 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1934 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1935 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1936 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1939 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1941 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1943 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1944 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1945 /// and via the classic SCID.
1947 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1948 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1950 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1951 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1953 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1954 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1956 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1957 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1959 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1960 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1961 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1962 /// active channel list on load.
1964 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1965 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1967 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1969 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1970 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1971 /// the handling of the events.
1973 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1974 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1977 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1978 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1979 /// would break backwards compatability.
1980 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1981 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1982 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1984 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1986 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1988 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1990 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1992 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1993 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1994 /// confirmation depth.
1996 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1997 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1998 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2000 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2002 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2004 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2006 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2008 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2010 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2011 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2012 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2014 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2015 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2017 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2018 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2019 /// keeping additional state.
2020 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2022 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2023 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2024 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2025 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2027 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2028 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2030 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2031 /// are currently open with that peer.
2033 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2034 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2037 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2039 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2040 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2041 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2042 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2043 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2045 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2046 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2047 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2048 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2049 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2051 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2052 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2054 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2055 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2056 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2057 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2058 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2060 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2061 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2063 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2064 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2065 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2066 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2067 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2069 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2073 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2074 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2075 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2076 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2077 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2078 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2079 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2080 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2081 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2082 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2083 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2085 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2086 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2087 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2089 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2091 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2092 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2094 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2096 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2097 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2101 signer_provider: SP,
2106 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2108 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2109 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2110 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2111 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2112 pub struct ChainParameters {
2113 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2114 pub network: Network,
2116 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2118 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2119 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2122 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2126 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2127 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2130 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2131 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2132 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2133 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2134 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2135 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2137 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2138 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2139 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2140 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2141 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2142 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2144 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2145 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2148 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2149 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2150 /// events to handle.
2152 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2153 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2155 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2156 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2159 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2160 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2161 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2162 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2164 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2165 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2166 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2167 should_persist: move || {
2168 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2169 // processing and return that.
2170 let notify = persist_check();
2171 match (notify, force_notify) {
2172 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2173 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2174 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2175 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2176 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2179 _read_guard: read_guard,
2183 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2184 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2185 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2186 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2187 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2188 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2190 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2191 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2192 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2193 should_persist: persist_check,
2194 _read_guard: read_guard,
2199 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2200 fn drop(&mut self) {
2201 match (self.should_persist)() {
2202 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2203 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2204 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2206 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2207 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2208 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2213 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2214 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2216 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2218 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2219 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2220 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2221 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2222 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2224 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2225 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2227 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2229 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2230 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2231 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2232 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2233 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2234 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2235 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2236 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2237 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2238 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2239 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2240 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2241 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2243 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2244 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2246 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2247 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2248 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2249 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2251 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2252 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2253 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2254 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2255 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2256 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2258 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2260 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2261 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2263 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2265 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2266 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2268 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2269 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2270 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2272 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2273 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2274 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2276 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2277 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2278 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2279 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2281 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2282 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2283 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2285 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2286 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2287 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2289 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2290 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2291 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2292 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2293 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2295 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2296 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2297 payment_id: PaymentId,
2299 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2301 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2302 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2303 payment_id: PaymentId,
2304 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2306 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2307 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2308 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2311 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2312 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2313 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2315 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2316 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2317 payment_id: PaymentId,
2318 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2319 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2320 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2322 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2323 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2324 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2326 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2327 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2328 payment_id: PaymentId,
2329 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2330 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2334 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2336 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2338 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2339 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2340 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2341 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2343 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2344 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2345 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2348 macro_rules! handle_error {
2349 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2350 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2351 // entering the macro.
2352 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2353 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2357 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2358 let mut msg_event = None;
2360 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2361 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2362 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2363 let logger = WithContext::from(
2364 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2366 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2368 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2369 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2370 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2371 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2376 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2379 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2381 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2382 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2383 action: err.action.clone()
2387 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2388 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2389 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2390 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2391 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2395 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2402 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2403 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2404 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2405 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2407 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2408 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2409 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2411 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2412 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2413 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2414 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2415 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2417 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2418 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2420 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2424 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2425 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2426 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2428 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2429 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2432 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2434 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2435 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2436 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2437 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2438 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2439 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2441 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2446 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2447 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2449 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2450 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2453 match $channel_phase {
2454 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2455 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2457 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2458 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2460 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2461 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2463 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2464 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2465 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2467 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2468 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2469 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2475 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2476 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2480 let key = *$entry.key();
2481 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2483 $entry.remove_entry();
2491 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2492 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2496 let key = *$entry.key();
2497 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2499 $entry.remove_entry();
2507 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2508 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2510 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2511 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2517 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2518 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2519 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2520 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2521 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2523 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2524 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2525 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2526 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2527 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2528 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2529 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2530 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2531 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2532 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2537 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2538 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2539 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2540 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2541 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2542 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2543 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2544 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2545 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2546 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2548 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2553 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2554 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2555 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2556 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2557 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2558 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2559 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2560 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2561 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2563 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2568 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2569 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2570 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2571 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2572 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2573 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2574 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2575 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2576 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2577 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2578 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2579 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2581 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2582 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2583 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2589 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2590 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2592 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2593 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2594 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2595 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2596 updates.announcement_sigs);
2597 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2598 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2601 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2602 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2603 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2604 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2606 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2607 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2608 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2609 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2610 let mut batch_completed = false;
2611 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2612 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2613 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2614 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2616 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2617 channel_state.2 = true;
2619 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2621 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2623 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2626 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2627 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2628 if batch_completed {
2629 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2630 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2631 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2632 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2633 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2634 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2635 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2636 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2637 chan.set_batch_ready();
2638 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2639 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2643 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2644 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2645 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2650 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2652 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2653 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2655 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2656 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2658 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2659 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2660 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2661 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2666 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2667 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2668 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2669 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2671 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2672 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2673 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2674 panic!("{}", err_str);
2676 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2677 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2678 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2681 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2687 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2688 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2689 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2691 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2692 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2693 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2694 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2695 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2696 // filter for uniqueness here.
2697 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2698 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2699 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2700 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2702 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2703 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2705 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2706 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2707 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2713 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2714 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2715 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2716 while !processed_all_events {
2717 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2724 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2725 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2726 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2728 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2729 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2730 result = $self.process_background_events();
2732 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2733 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2734 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2735 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2739 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2740 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2741 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2742 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2745 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2747 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2748 $event_to_handle = event;
2750 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2751 post_event_actions.push(action);
2756 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2757 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2758 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2759 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2760 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2761 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2764 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2765 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2766 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2767 processed_all_events = false;
2771 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2772 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2773 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2775 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2776 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2777 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2783 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2785 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2786 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2787 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2788 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2789 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2794 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2796 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2798 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2799 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2801 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2803 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2804 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2805 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2808 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2809 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2810 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2812 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2813 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2814 current_timestamp: u32,
2816 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2817 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2818 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2819 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2821 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2822 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2823 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2828 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2830 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2831 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2832 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2833 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2834 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2835 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2836 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2837 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2838 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2840 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2843 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2844 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2846 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2848 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2850 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2852 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2853 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2854 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2855 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2856 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2857 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2858 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2859 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2861 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2862 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2872 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2873 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2874 &self.default_configuration
2877 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2878 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2879 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2882 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2883 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2885 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2887 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2891 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2896 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2898 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2899 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2900 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2901 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2902 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2904 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2905 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2907 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2908 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2909 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2911 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2912 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2913 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2915 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2916 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2918 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2919 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2920 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2921 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2922 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2923 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2925 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2926 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2927 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2928 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2929 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2930 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2934 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2935 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2937 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2939 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2940 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2942 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2944 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2945 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2951 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2952 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2953 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2954 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2955 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2956 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2960 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2965 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2967 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2968 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2973 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2979 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2980 node_id: their_network_key,
2983 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2986 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2987 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2988 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2989 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2990 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2991 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2992 // the same channel.
2993 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2995 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2997 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2998 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3000 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3001 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3002 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3003 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3007 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3008 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3009 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3017 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3018 /// more information.
3019 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3020 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3021 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3022 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3023 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3024 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3025 // the same channel.
3026 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3028 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3029 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3030 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3033 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3034 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3035 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3043 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3044 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3046 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3047 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3049 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3050 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3051 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3052 // really wanted anyway.
3053 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3056 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3057 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3058 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3061 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3062 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3063 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3064 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3065 let context_to_details = |context| {
3066 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3068 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3070 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3071 .map(context_to_details)
3077 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3078 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3080 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3081 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3082 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3084 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3085 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3086 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3087 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3088 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3089 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3091 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3092 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3093 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3095 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3096 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3097 payment_id: *payment_id,
3098 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3099 total_msat: *total_msat,
3102 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3103 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3105 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3106 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3108 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3113 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3116 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3117 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3122 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3123 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3125 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3126 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3131 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3132 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3133 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3134 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3135 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3137 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3138 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3139 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3140 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3141 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3145 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3146 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3148 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3149 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3150 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3151 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3154 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3155 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3161 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3162 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3169 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3170 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3171 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3172 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3175 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3176 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3182 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3183 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3184 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3186 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3187 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3189 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3190 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3191 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3192 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3194 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3196 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3197 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3198 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3201 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3202 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3203 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3204 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3205 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3206 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3209 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3210 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3211 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3213 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3214 /// the channel being closed or not:
3215 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3216 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3217 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3218 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3219 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3220 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3221 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3223 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3224 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3225 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3226 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3228 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3230 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3231 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3232 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3235 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3236 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3237 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3238 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3239 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3242 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3243 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3244 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3245 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3246 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3249 let logger = WithContext::from(
3250 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3253 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3254 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3255 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3256 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3257 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3258 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3259 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3261 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3262 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3263 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3264 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3265 // ignore the result here.
3266 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3268 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3269 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3270 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3271 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3273 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3274 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3275 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3276 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3277 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3278 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3279 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3282 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3285 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3286 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3291 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3292 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3293 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3294 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3295 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3296 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3297 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3298 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3301 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3302 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3303 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3307 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3308 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3312 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3313 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3314 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3315 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3317 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3318 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3319 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3320 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3321 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3322 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3324 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3326 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3327 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3328 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3329 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3330 mem::drop(peer_state);
3331 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3333 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3334 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3335 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3337 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3338 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3339 // Unfunded channel has no update
3340 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3342 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3343 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3344 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3345 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3346 // Unfunded channel has no update
3347 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3350 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3351 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3352 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3353 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3355 (None, *peer_node_id)
3357 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3360 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3361 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3362 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3363 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3368 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3371 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3373 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3374 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3376 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3377 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3378 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3379 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3380 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3382 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3393 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3394 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3395 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3397 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3398 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3399 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3402 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3403 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3404 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3406 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3407 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3408 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3409 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3410 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3413 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3414 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3415 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3416 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3417 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3421 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3422 /// local transaction(s).
3423 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3424 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3425 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3429 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3430 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3431 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3432 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3433 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3434 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3435 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3436 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3438 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3439 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3440 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3441 // we don't have the channel here.
3442 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3445 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3446 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3447 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3448 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3449 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3450 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3451 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3452 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3453 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3454 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3455 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3456 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3458 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3461 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3462 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3463 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3465 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3466 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3467 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3473 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3474 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3475 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3476 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3478 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3479 None => return None,
3480 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3483 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3484 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3489 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3490 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3493 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3497 fn can_forward_htlc(
3498 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3499 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3500 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3501 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3504 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3506 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3507 // intercept forward.
3508 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3509 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3510 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3512 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3517 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3518 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3519 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3521 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3522 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3524 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3530 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3531 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3532 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3533 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3534 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3535 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3536 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3537 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3538 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3539 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3541 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3542 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3544 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3545 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3546 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3548 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3549 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3550 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3551 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3552 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3553 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3554 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3556 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3560 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3561 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3563 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3564 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3565 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3566 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3567 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3568 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3569 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3573 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3574 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3576 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3578 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3579 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3580 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3581 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3582 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3586 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3587 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3589 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3591 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3592 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3595 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3596 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3597 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3598 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3601 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3602 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3603 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3604 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3605 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3606 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3607 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3611 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3614 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3615 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3616 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3617 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3618 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3619 macro_rules! return_err {
3620 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3622 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3623 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3624 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3625 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3626 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3627 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3628 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3629 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3630 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3634 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3635 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3636 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3637 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3638 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3644 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3646 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3647 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3648 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3649 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3652 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3653 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3654 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3655 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3656 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3658 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3661 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3662 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3663 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3664 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3665 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3671 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3672 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3673 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3675 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3676 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3677 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3679 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3680 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3681 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3682 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3683 return Err(LightningError {
3684 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3685 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3688 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3689 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3691 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3692 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3693 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3696 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3697 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3698 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3699 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3701 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3702 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3703 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3705 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3706 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3707 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3708 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3709 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3710 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3711 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3715 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3718 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3719 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3720 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3721 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3723 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3724 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3725 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3726 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3727 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3730 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3731 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3733 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3734 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3735 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3736 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3737 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3738 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3739 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3740 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3742 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3743 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3744 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3746 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3748 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3755 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3756 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3757 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3758 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3759 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3763 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3764 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3765 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3768 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3769 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3770 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3771 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3773 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3774 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3775 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3777 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3778 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3782 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3783 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3785 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3786 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3789 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3792 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3794 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3795 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3798 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3799 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3802 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3803 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3804 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3805 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3806 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3808 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3809 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3810 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3811 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3813 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3814 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3816 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3817 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3818 Some(monitor_update) => {
3819 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3821 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3822 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3823 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3824 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3825 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3826 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3827 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3835 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3838 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3839 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3840 // `channel_by_id` map.
3841 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3842 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3846 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3847 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3849 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3854 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3856 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3857 /// fields for more info.
3859 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3860 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3862 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3864 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3865 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3866 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3867 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3868 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3870 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3871 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3872 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3873 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3874 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3876 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3877 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3878 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3879 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3881 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3883 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3884 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3885 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3887 /// In general, a path may raise:
3888 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3889 /// node public key) is specified.
3890 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3891 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3892 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3893 /// relevant updates.
3895 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3896 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3897 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3899 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3900 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3901 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3902 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3903 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3904 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3905 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3906 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3908 self.pending_outbound_payments
3909 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3910 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3911 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3914 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3915 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3916 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3917 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3919 self.pending_outbound_payments
3920 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3921 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3922 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3923 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3927 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3928 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3930 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3931 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3932 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3936 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3937 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3938 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3942 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3943 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3946 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3947 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3949 self.pending_outbound_payments
3950 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3951 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3952 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3953 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3954 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3958 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3959 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3960 /// retries are exhausted.
3962 /// # Event Generation
3964 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3965 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3967 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3968 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3969 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3971 /// # Requested Invoices
3973 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3974 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3975 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3976 /// once the invoice has been received.
3978 /// # Restart Behavior
3980 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3981 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3982 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3984 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3985 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3987 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3990 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3991 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3992 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3993 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3994 /// never reach the recipient.
3996 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3997 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3999 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4000 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4002 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4003 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4004 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4006 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4007 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4008 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4011 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4012 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4014 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4017 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4018 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4019 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4021 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4022 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4023 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4024 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4027 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4028 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4029 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4030 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4031 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4033 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4034 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4035 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4038 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4041 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4042 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4045 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4046 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4048 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4049 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4050 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4051 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4052 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4053 let payment_params =
4054 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4056 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4058 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4061 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4062 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4064 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4065 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4066 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4067 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4069 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4070 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4071 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4072 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4073 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4074 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4075 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4076 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4077 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4078 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4080 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4081 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4082 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4083 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4087 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4089 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4090 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4093 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4095 let mut res = Vec::new();
4097 for mut path in route.paths {
4098 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4099 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4100 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4101 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4102 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4105 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4108 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4109 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4111 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4113 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4114 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4119 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4122 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4127 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4128 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4129 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4131 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4132 let used_liquidity =
4133 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4135 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4136 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4138 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4141 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4146 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4147 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4148 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4155 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4156 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4157 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4158 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4159 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4160 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4161 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4162 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4163 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4168 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4169 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4170 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4172 let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4173 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4174 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4175 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4176 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4177 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4178 } else { unreachable!(); };
4180 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4181 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4182 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4185 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4186 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4188 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4189 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4190 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4194 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4195 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4197 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4198 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4199 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4200 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4205 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4206 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4208 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4209 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4212 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4213 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4214 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4218 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4219 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4220 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4224 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4226 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4229 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4230 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4234 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4235 funding_txo, o.get()
4237 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4238 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4239 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4240 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4241 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4242 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4245 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4252 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4253 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4254 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4258 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4260 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4261 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4263 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4264 /// across the p2p network.
4266 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4267 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4269 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4270 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4271 /// keys per-channel).
4273 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4274 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4275 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4277 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4278 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4279 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4281 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4282 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4283 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4284 /// for more details.
4286 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4287 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4288 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4289 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4292 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4294 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4295 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4297 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4298 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4299 /// signature for each channel.
4301 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4302 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4304 let mut result = Ok(());
4306 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4307 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4308 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4309 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4310 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4315 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4316 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4317 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4321 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4322 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4323 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4324 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4325 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4326 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4327 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4328 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4330 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4331 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4336 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4337 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4338 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4339 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4343 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4344 match states.entry(txid) {
4345 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4346 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4347 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4351 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4354 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4355 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4356 temporary_channel_id,
4357 counterparty_node_id,
4358 funding_transaction.clone(),
4361 let mut output_index = None;
4362 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4363 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4364 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4365 if output_index.is_some() {
4366 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4368 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4371 if output_index.is_none() {
4372 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4374 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4375 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4376 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4377 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4378 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4379 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4385 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4386 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4387 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4388 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4389 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4390 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4391 .into_iter().flatten()
4392 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4394 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4395 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4397 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4400 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4401 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4402 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4403 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4404 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4405 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4406 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4407 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4408 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4409 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4410 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4411 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4413 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4420 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4421 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4422 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4428 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4430 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4431 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4432 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4433 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4435 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4436 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4438 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4439 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4441 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4443 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4444 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4445 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4446 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4447 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4448 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4449 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4450 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4451 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4452 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4453 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4454 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4455 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4461 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4462 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4466 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4467 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4468 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4469 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4473 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4474 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4475 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4476 config.apply(config_update);
4477 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4480 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4481 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4482 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4483 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4484 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4486 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4493 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4494 debug_assert!(false);
4495 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4497 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4498 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4505 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4507 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4508 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4509 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4510 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4512 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4513 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4515 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4516 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4518 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4520 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4521 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4522 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4523 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4524 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4525 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4526 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4527 pub fn update_channel_config(
4528 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4529 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4530 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4533 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4534 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4536 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4537 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4539 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4540 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4541 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4542 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4543 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4545 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4546 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4547 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4550 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4553 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4554 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4555 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4556 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4557 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4558 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4561 let next_hop_scid = {
4562 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4563 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4564 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4567 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4568 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4569 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4570 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4571 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4574 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4576 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4577 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4578 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4581 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4582 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4583 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4584 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4585 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4592 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4593 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4594 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4597 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4598 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4599 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4600 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4603 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4605 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4606 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4607 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4608 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4609 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4612 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4613 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4614 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4615 payment.prev_channel_id,
4616 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4617 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4619 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4623 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4624 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4626 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4629 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4630 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4633 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4634 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4635 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4638 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4639 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4640 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4641 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4642 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4643 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4644 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4645 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4646 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4647 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4650 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4651 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4652 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4653 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4658 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4659 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4660 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4662 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4663 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4664 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4665 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4666 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4667 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4668 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4670 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4671 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4675 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4679 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4680 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4681 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4682 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4683 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4684 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4685 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4686 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4689 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4690 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4691 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4692 incoming_channel_details
4694 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4698 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4699 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4700 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4701 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4702 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4704 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4706 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4711 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4712 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4714 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4715 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4716 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4717 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4718 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4722 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4723 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4724 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4725 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4730 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4731 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4732 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4734 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4735 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4738 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4739 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4742 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4743 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4744 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4745 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4747 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4748 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4749 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4751 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4752 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4757 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4758 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4759 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4761 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4762 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4764 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4765 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4766 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4771 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4772 // proposed to as a batch.
4773 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4774 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4775 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4776 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4777 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4778 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4779 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4780 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4782 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4783 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4784 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4785 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4788 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4789 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4790 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4791 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4797 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4799 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4800 /// Will likely generate further events.
4801 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4804 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4806 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4807 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4808 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4810 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4811 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4813 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4814 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4815 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4816 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4818 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4819 match forward_info {
4820 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4821 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4822 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4823 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4824 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4827 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4828 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4829 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4830 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4832 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4833 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4834 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4835 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4836 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4837 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4838 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4839 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4840 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4843 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4844 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4846 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4849 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4850 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4856 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4857 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4859 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4863 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4864 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4866 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4870 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4871 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4872 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4873 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4874 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4875 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4876 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4879 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4880 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4881 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4882 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4883 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4885 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4887 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4888 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4892 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4893 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4894 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4895 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4896 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4897 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4899 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4900 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4906 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4909 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4912 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4913 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4914 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4915 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4916 // problem, not ours.
4922 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4923 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4924 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4926 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4930 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4932 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4933 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4934 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4939 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4940 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4941 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4942 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4943 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4944 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4945 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4946 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4947 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4948 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4949 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4952 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
4953 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4954 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4955 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4956 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4957 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4958 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4959 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4960 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4961 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4962 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4963 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4965 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4966 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4967 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4968 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4969 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4970 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4973 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4974 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4975 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4978 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4979 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4981 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4983 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4984 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4985 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4986 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4992 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4993 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4995 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4996 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4997 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4999 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5000 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5001 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5002 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5004 Some((res, htlc_id))
5007 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5008 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5009 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5010 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5012 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5014 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5015 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5016 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5022 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5026 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5027 match forward_info {
5028 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5029 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5030 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5031 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5032 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5035 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5036 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5037 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5038 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5039 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5040 requires_blinded_error: _
5042 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5043 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5044 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5045 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5046 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5048 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5049 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5050 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5052 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5053 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5057 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5058 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5061 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5064 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5065 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5067 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5068 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5069 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5070 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5071 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5072 phantom_shared_secret,
5075 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5076 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5077 // if routing nodes overpay
5078 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5079 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5081 total_value_received: None,
5082 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5085 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5088 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5090 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5091 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5092 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5093 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5094 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5095 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5097 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5098 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5099 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5100 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5101 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5102 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5103 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5104 phantom_shared_secret,
5107 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5108 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5110 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5113 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5114 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5115 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5116 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5117 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5120 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5121 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5122 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5123 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5124 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5125 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5126 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5128 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5129 .entry(payment_hash)
5130 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5131 .or_insert_with(|| {
5132 committed_to_claimable = true;
5134 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5137 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5138 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5140 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5142 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5144 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5146 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5147 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5148 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5151 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5153 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5154 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5155 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5156 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5157 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5158 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5159 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5161 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5162 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5164 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5166 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5167 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5168 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5169 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5170 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5171 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5173 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5174 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5175 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5176 committed_to_claimable = true;
5178 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5179 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5180 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5181 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5182 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5183 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5184 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5185 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5186 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5190 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5191 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5192 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5193 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5194 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5196 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5198 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5199 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5201 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5202 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5203 committed_to_claimable = true;
5206 payment_claimable_generated
5210 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5211 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5212 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5213 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5214 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5215 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5216 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5217 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5218 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5219 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5220 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5221 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5222 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5223 Ok(result) => result,
5225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5226 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5229 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5230 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5231 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5233 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5237 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5239 payment_data.payment_secret,
5242 check_total_value!(purpose);
5244 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5245 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5246 check_total_value!(purpose);
5250 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5251 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5253 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5255 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5256 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5258 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5259 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5261 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5262 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5264 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5265 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5266 payment_data.payment_secret,
5269 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5270 if payment_claimable_generated {
5271 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5277 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5278 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5286 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5287 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5288 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5289 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5291 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5292 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5294 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5296 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5297 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5298 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5300 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5302 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5303 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5304 events.append(&mut new_events);
5307 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5309 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5310 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5311 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5313 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5315 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5316 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5317 if background_events.is_empty() {
5318 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5321 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5323 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5324 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5325 // monitor updating completing.
5326 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5328 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5329 let mut updated_chan = false;
5331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5332 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5335 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5337 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5338 updated_chan = true;
5339 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5340 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5342 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5350 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5351 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5354 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5356 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5359 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5360 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5362 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5363 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5364 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5365 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5366 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5372 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5375 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5376 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5377 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5378 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5379 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5382 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5383 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5385 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5387 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5388 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5389 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5391 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5392 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5393 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5394 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5396 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5397 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5399 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5400 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5404 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5405 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5406 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5407 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5408 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5409 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5410 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5412 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5413 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5416 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5419 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5420 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5422 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5427 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5428 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5436 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5438 /// This currently includes:
5439 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5440 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5441 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5443 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5444 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5445 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5446 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5447 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5448 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5449 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5450 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5452 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5453 /// estimate fetches.
5455 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5456 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5457 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5458 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5459 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5461 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5462 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5464 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5465 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5466 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5467 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5469 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5470 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5471 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5472 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5473 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5474 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5476 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5477 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5478 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5480 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5481 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5482 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5483 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5484 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5487 channel_id: *chan_id,
5488 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5500 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5501 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5502 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5503 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5504 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5505 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5507 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5508 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5513 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5514 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5516 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5517 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5518 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5519 if needs_close { return false; }
5522 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5523 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5524 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5525 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5526 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5527 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5528 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5529 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5531 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5532 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5533 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5534 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5535 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5539 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5541 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5544 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5546 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5547 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5548 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5549 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5550 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5554 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5556 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5562 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5564 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5565 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5566 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5567 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5568 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5569 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5570 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5571 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5572 channel_id: *chan_id,
5573 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5581 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5582 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5583 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5585 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5586 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5587 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5589 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5590 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5591 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5592 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5594 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5595 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5596 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5597 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5602 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5603 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5604 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5605 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5606 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5607 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5608 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5609 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5610 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5616 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5618 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5619 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5624 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5625 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5626 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5627 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5628 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5629 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5630 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5631 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5632 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5633 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5634 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5636 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5637 // have no channels to the peer.
5638 let remove_entry = {
5639 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5640 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5643 entry.remove_entry();
5646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5651 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5652 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5653 // This should be unreachable
5654 debug_assert!(false);
5657 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5658 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5659 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5660 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5661 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5662 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5663 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5666 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5667 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5668 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5670 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5671 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5678 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5679 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5680 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5681 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5682 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5685 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5686 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5689 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5690 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5693 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5694 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5695 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5696 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5697 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5698 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5699 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5702 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5703 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5706 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5707 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5708 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5709 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5710 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5717 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5718 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5719 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5721 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5722 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5723 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5724 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5726 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5727 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5728 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5729 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5730 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5731 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5734 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5735 /// reason for the failure.
5737 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5738 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5741 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5742 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5743 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5744 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5745 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5746 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5747 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5752 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5753 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5754 match failure_code {
5755 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5756 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5757 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5758 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5759 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5760 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5762 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5763 let fail_data = match data {
5764 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5767 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5772 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5773 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5775 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5777 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5778 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5779 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5780 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5781 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5782 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5783 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5785 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5787 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5788 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5790 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5795 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5796 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5797 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5798 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5799 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5800 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5801 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5802 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5803 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5804 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5806 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5807 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5808 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5809 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5811 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5812 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5813 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5814 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5815 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5819 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5820 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5821 // be surfaced to the user.
5822 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5823 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5824 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5826 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5828 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5833 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5834 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5836 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5837 debug_assert!(false);
5838 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5843 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5846 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5847 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5848 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5849 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5853 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5854 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5855 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5858 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5859 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5860 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5861 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5862 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5863 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5864 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5865 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5866 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5867 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5870 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5871 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5872 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5875 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5876 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5877 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5878 let mut push_forward_event;
5880 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5881 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5882 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5883 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5885 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5886 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5887 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5890 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
5891 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5892 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5894 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5895 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5896 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5897 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5898 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5900 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5902 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5903 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5905 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5906 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5910 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5911 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5913 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5917 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5918 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5919 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5920 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5922 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5925 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5928 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5929 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5930 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5931 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5932 failed_next_destination: destination,
5939 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5940 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5942 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5943 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5944 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5945 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5947 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5948 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5949 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5950 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5952 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5953 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5954 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5956 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5957 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5958 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5959 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5960 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5961 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5962 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5963 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5964 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5967 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5968 /// even type numbers.
5972 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5973 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5975 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5976 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5977 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5980 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5981 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5986 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5987 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5988 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5989 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5990 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5991 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5992 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5993 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5998 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
5999 .entry(payment_hash)
6001 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6002 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6005 .or_insert_with(|| {
6006 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6007 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6009 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6010 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6013 sender_intended_value,
6014 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6018 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6019 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6020 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6021 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6022 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6023 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6024 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6025 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6026 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6027 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6037 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6039 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6040 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6041 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6042 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6043 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6044 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6045 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6046 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6047 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6048 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6049 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6050 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6051 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6052 debug_assert!(false);
6056 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6058 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6059 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6060 debug_assert!(false);
6064 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6065 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6067 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6068 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6069 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6070 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6073 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6074 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6075 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6076 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6080 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6081 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6082 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6083 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6084 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6085 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6086 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6089 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6090 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6091 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6092 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
6093 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6094 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6099 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6100 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6101 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6102 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6103 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6104 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6105 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6107 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6110 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6111 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6112 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6113 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6117 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6118 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6119 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6120 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6122 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6123 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6124 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6125 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6127 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6128 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6129 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6130 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6134 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6135 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6136 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6140 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6141 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6142 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6145 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6148 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6149 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6150 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6151 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6152 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6155 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6156 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6157 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6159 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6162 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6163 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6165 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6166 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6167 // monitor update as a background event.
6168 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6169 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6170 counterparty_node_id,
6171 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6172 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6173 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6177 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6178 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6183 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6185 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6187 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6188 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6189 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6190 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6191 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6193 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6195 debug_assert!(false,
6196 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6199 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6200 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6201 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6202 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6203 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6205 let mut found_blocker = false;
6206 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6207 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6208 // which case we need to only remove the one
6209 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6210 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6211 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6212 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6214 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6217 debug_assert!(false);
6226 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6227 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6228 counterparty_node_id: None,
6229 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6232 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6236 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6237 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6238 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6239 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6240 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6241 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6242 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6243 // again on restart.
6244 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6245 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6246 payment_preimage, update_res);
6249 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6250 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6252 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6253 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6254 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6255 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6256 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6257 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6258 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6259 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6260 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6261 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6264 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6265 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6266 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6267 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6268 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6269 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6273 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6274 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6277 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6278 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6279 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6280 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6283 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6284 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6285 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6286 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6287 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6289 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6290 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6291 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6293 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6294 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6298 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6299 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6300 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6301 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6302 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6303 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6304 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6305 let chan_to_release =
6306 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6307 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6309 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6310 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6311 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6312 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6317 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6318 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6319 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6320 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6321 // in the background.
6322 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6323 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6324 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6325 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6327 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6328 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6329 funding_txo, update, ..
6331 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6332 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6333 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6334 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6336 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6342 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6343 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6344 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6346 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6347 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6349 monitor_update.updates[0],
6350 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6355 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6356 // immediately once we get going.
6357 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6360 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6362 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6365 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6366 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6367 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6368 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6369 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6370 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6371 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6375 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6376 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6377 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6380 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6381 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6382 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6383 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6384 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6385 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6386 prev_user_channel_id,
6387 next_user_channel_id,
6388 total_fee_earned_msat,
6390 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6391 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6393 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6397 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6398 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6399 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6405 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6406 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6407 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6410 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6411 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6412 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6413 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6415 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6417 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6418 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6419 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6421 payment_purpose: purpose,
6424 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6427 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6431 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6433 sender_intended_total_msat,
6438 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6439 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6441 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6442 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6443 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6446 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6447 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6449 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6450 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6451 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6452 downstream_channel_id,
6453 Some(blocking_action),
6460 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6461 /// update completion.
6462 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6463 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6464 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6465 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6466 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6467 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6468 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6469 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6470 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6471 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6472 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6473 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6474 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6475 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6476 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6477 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6479 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6480 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6482 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6483 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6484 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6485 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6487 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6488 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6489 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6492 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6493 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6495 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6496 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6497 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6502 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6503 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6505 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6510 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6511 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6512 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6513 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6514 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6519 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6523 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6529 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6530 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6531 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6535 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6536 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6537 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6540 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6543 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6544 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6546 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6547 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6549 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6550 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6551 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6552 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6553 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6559 let mut peer_state_lock;
6560 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6561 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6562 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6565 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6568 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6569 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6570 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6571 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6572 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6575 let remaining_in_flight =
6576 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6577 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6580 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6581 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6582 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6583 remaining_in_flight);
6584 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6587 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6590 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6592 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6593 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6596 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6597 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6598 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6600 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6601 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6602 /// used to accept such channels.
6604 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6605 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6606 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6607 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6610 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6611 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6613 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6614 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6615 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6617 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6618 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6620 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6621 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6623 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6624 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6626 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6627 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6628 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6629 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6632 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6634 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6637 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6638 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6639 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6640 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6642 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6643 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6645 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6647 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6648 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6649 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6651 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6652 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6653 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6655 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6656 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6658 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6659 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6660 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6661 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6664 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6665 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6667 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6673 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6674 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6675 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6676 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6678 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6682 Ok(mut channel) => {
6684 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6685 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6686 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6687 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6688 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6689 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6690 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6693 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6694 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6695 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6697 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6699 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6700 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6701 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6702 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6703 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6704 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6705 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6706 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6709 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6710 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6711 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6713 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6717 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6718 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6719 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6722 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6723 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6726 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6733 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6734 /// or 0-conf channels.
6736 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6737 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6738 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6739 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6740 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6741 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6743 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6745 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6746 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6747 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6748 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6749 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6753 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6756 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6757 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6759 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6760 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6762 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6763 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6764 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6765 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6766 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6768 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6771 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6772 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6773 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6776 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6777 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6778 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6779 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6780 // included in the unfunded count.
6781 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6782 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6783 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6786 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6787 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6790 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6791 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6792 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6793 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6798 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6801 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6802 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6803 // likely to be lost on restart!
6804 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6806 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6809 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6811 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6814 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6815 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6816 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6817 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6818 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6821 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6823 debug_assert!(false);
6824 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6825 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6826 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6831 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6832 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6833 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6834 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6835 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6836 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6838 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6839 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6840 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6843 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6844 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6845 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6846 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6847 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6850 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6851 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6853 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6854 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6855 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6858 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6859 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6860 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6861 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6863 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6865 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6866 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6867 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6868 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6869 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6870 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6873 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6874 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6875 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6880 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6881 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6882 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6883 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6884 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6885 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6886 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6889 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6894 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6895 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6897 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6898 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6900 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6901 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6902 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6903 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6906 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6907 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6910 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6911 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6913 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6917 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6918 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6919 // likely to be lost on restart!
6920 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6921 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6922 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6924 debug_assert!(false);
6925 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6927 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6928 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6929 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6931 match phase.get_mut() {
6932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6933 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6934 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6937 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6944 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6945 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6946 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6947 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6948 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6950 user_channel_id: user_id,
6955 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6956 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6958 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6959 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6961 debug_assert!(false);
6962 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6967 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6968 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6969 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6970 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
6971 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6973 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6974 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6975 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6976 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6977 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6978 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6979 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6980 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6981 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6985 Some(mut phase) => {
6986 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6987 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6988 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6990 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6993 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6995 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6996 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6997 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6998 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6999 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7000 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7002 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7003 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7004 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7007 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7009 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7011 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7012 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7013 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7015 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7018 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7019 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7020 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7021 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7023 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7024 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7025 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7026 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7027 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7029 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7034 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7035 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7036 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7038 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7042 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7043 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7044 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7052 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7053 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7055 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7057 debug_assert!(false);
7058 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7061 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7062 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7063 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7065 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7066 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7067 let logger = WithContext::from(
7069 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7070 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7074 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7076 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7077 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7078 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7079 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7080 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7081 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7082 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7083 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7084 } else { unreachable!(); }
7087 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7088 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7089 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7090 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7091 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7092 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7093 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7097 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7098 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7099 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7100 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7101 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7102 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7113 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7114 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7115 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7116 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7117 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7119 debug_assert!(false);
7120 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7122 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7123 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7124 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7126 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7127 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7128 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7129 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7130 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7131 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7133 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7134 msg: announcement_sigs,
7136 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7137 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7138 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7139 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7140 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7141 // announcement_signatures.
7142 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7143 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7144 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7145 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7152 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7153 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7158 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7159 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7162 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7163 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7168 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7169 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7170 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7172 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7173 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7175 debug_assert!(false);
7176 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7180 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7181 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7183 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7184 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7185 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7186 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7188 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7191 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7192 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7193 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7194 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7196 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7197 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7198 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7199 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7200 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7201 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7205 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7206 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7207 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7208 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7212 let context = phase.context_mut();
7213 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7214 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7215 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7216 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7218 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7219 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7220 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7221 let context = phase.context_mut();
7222 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7223 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7224 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7228 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7231 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7232 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7233 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7234 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7236 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7237 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7243 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7245 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7247 debug_assert!(false);
7248 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7250 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7251 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7252 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7253 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7254 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7255 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7256 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7257 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7258 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7259 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7260 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7265 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7266 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7267 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7268 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7269 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7270 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7271 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7273 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7274 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7280 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7281 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7282 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7283 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7285 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7286 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7287 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7288 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7293 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7294 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7295 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7300 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7301 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7302 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7303 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7305 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7306 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7307 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7308 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7310 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7311 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7313 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7317 debug_assert!(false);
7318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7322 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7324 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7325 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7326 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7327 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7328 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7329 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7331 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7333 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7334 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7335 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7336 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7337 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7338 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7339 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7340 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7341 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7342 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7343 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7344 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7348 match pending_forward_info {
7349 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7350 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7352 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7353 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7354 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7355 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7356 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7358 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7359 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7360 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7361 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7362 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7365 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7371 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7373 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7374 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7382 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7384 let next_user_channel_id;
7385 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7387 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7389 debug_assert!(false);
7390 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7392 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7393 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7394 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7396 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7397 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7398 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7399 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7401 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7403 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7404 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7405 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7407 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7408 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7409 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7410 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7411 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7412 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7413 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7414 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7417 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7418 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7424 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7425 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7426 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7432 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7433 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7434 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7436 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7438 debug_assert!(false);
7439 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7443 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7445 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7446 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7448 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7449 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7457 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7458 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7459 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7461 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7463 debug_assert!(false);
7464 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7468 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7470 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7471 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7472 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7474 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7475 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7477 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7478 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7486 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7490 debug_assert!(false);
7491 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7495 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7497 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7498 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7499 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7500 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7501 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7502 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7503 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7507 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7508 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7515 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7516 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7517 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7518 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7519 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7520 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7524 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7528 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7529 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7530 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7534 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7535 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7536 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7537 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7538 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7539 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7540 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7541 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7542 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7543 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7544 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7546 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7547 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7549 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7550 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7551 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7552 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7554 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7555 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7558 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7559 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7561 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7562 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7563 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7565 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7566 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7567 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7568 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7569 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7572 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7573 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7576 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7577 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7578 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7579 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7580 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7581 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7582 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7583 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7584 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7585 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7586 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7589 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7590 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7591 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7596 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7597 // payments are being processed.
7598 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7599 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7600 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7607 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7608 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7611 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7612 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7613 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7619 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7620 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7621 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7622 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7623 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7625 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7626 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7627 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7628 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7629 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7630 // real by taking more time.
7631 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7632 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7633 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7638 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7639 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7640 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7641 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7642 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7643 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7644 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7646 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7647 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7648 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7649 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7650 channel_funding_outpoint,
7652 counterparty_node_id,
7657 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7658 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7659 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7662 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7663 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7664 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7666 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7667 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7668 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7674 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7675 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7677 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7679 debug_assert!(false);
7680 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7681 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7683 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7684 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7685 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7686 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7687 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7688 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7689 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7690 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7691 *counterparty_node_id)
7693 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7694 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7695 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7696 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7697 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7698 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7699 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7703 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7704 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7710 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7714 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7716 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7718 debug_assert!(false);
7719 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7721 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7722 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7723 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7724 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7725 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7726 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7727 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7729 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7730 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7738 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7740 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7742 debug_assert!(false);
7743 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7747 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7749 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7750 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7754 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7755 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7756 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7757 msg, &self.default_configuration
7758 ), chan_phase_entry),
7759 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7760 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7761 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7764 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7765 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7773 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7774 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7775 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7776 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7778 // It's not a local channel
7779 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7783 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7784 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7785 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7789 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7791 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7792 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7793 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7794 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7795 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7796 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7797 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7801 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7802 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7803 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7804 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7806 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7807 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7808 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7809 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7812 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7816 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7817 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7822 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7825 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7826 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7829 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7831 debug_assert!(false);
7832 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7833 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7837 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7840 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7842 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7843 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7844 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7845 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7846 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7847 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7848 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7849 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7850 let mut channel_update = None;
7851 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7852 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7853 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7856 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7857 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7858 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7859 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7860 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7861 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7862 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7867 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7868 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7869 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7870 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7871 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7872 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7873 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7874 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7878 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7879 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7883 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7885 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7886 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7887 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7888 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7889 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7890 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7892 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7893 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7894 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7895 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7896 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7897 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7898 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7899 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7900 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7901 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7902 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7903 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7904 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7905 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7906 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7907 next_funding_txid: None,
7910 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7911 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7912 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7918 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7919 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7921 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7924 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7925 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7926 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7928 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7929 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7930 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7931 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7932 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7933 match monitor_event {
7934 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7935 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
7936 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7937 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7938 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7939 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7940 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7942 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7943 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7944 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7948 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7949 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7950 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7952 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7953 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7954 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7955 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7958 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7960 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7963 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7964 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7965 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7966 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7969 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7971 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7972 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7973 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7974 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7978 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7979 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7980 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7981 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7989 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7990 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7996 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7997 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8000 has_pending_monitor_events
8003 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8004 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8005 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8007 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8009 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8012 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8013 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8014 /// update was applied.
8015 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8016 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8017 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8019 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8020 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8021 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8022 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8025 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8028 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8029 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8030 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8032 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8033 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8034 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8035 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8036 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8037 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8039 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8040 has_monitor_update = true;
8042 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8043 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8044 continue 'peer_loop;
8053 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8054 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8055 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8061 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8062 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8064 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8065 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8067 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8068 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8069 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8072 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8073 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8075 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8076 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8077 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8078 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8083 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8084 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8089 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8090 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8093 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8094 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8095 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8106 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8107 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8108 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8110 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8111 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8115 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8116 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8117 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8118 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8119 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8125 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8126 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8127 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8128 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8129 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8130 let mut has_update = false;
8131 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8135 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8136 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8138 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8139 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8141 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8142 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8143 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8144 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8145 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8147 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8148 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8151 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8152 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8153 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8155 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8156 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8157 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8158 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8159 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8160 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8165 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8166 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8167 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8173 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8174 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8179 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8185 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8186 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8189 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8190 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8196 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8197 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8199 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8200 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8201 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8202 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8203 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8204 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8205 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8206 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8207 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8208 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8209 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8210 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8211 assert!(should_broadcast);
8212 } else { unreachable!(); }
8213 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8214 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8215 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8218 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8223 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8224 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8225 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8226 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8230 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8231 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8232 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8233 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8234 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8236 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8240 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8245 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8247 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8248 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8249 pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8250 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8251 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8252 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8253 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8255 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8256 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8257 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8259 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8266 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8267 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8268 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8272 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8273 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8275 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8276 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8277 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8280 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8281 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8282 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8284 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8285 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8289 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8290 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8291 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8292 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8293 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8295 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8299 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8300 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8305 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8306 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8307 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8309 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8310 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8311 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8312 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8313 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8314 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8315 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8316 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8317 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8318 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8319 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8320 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8322 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8323 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8324 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8326 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8327 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8332 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8333 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8334 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8335 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8337 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8343 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8345 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8346 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8347 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8348 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8349 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8354 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8355 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8356 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8357 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8360 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8362 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8364 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8365 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8366 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8368 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8369 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8370 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8371 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8372 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8373 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8374 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8376 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8377 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8381 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8382 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8385 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8386 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8387 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8391 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8392 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8393 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8394 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8398 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8399 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8400 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8405 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8406 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8407 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8408 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8411 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8412 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8413 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8414 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8415 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8416 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8417 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8418 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8419 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8420 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8421 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8422 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8423 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8424 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8425 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8427 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8428 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8430 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8432 let builder = match quantity {
8434 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8436 let builder = match amount_msats {
8438 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8440 let builder = match payer_note {
8442 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8444 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8445 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8447 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8449 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8450 self.pending_outbound_payments
8451 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8452 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8454 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8456 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8457 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8458 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8459 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8460 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8461 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8462 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8463 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8464 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8465 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8466 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8468 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8470 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8471 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8472 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8473 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8476 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8478 debug_assert!(false);
8479 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8485 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8488 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8489 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8490 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8494 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8495 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8496 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8497 /// received and no retries will be made.
8502 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8503 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8506 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8507 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8508 &self, refund: &Refund
8509 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8510 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8511 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8512 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8514 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8515 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8517 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8518 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8523 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8524 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8525 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8526 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8527 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8529 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8531 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8532 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8533 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8535 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8536 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8537 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8539 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8540 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8541 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8543 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8544 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8545 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8546 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8548 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8549 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8550 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8551 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8552 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8555 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8557 for path in refund.paths() {
8558 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8559 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8560 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8561 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8563 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8569 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8573 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8576 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8577 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8579 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8580 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8581 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8583 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8585 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8586 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8590 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8591 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8593 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8595 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8596 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8598 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8599 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8600 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8601 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8602 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8603 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8604 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8605 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8606 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8607 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8610 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8611 /// stored external to LDK.
8613 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8614 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8615 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8617 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8618 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8621 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8622 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8623 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8624 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8626 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8627 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8628 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8629 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8630 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8632 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8633 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8634 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8635 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8636 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8638 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8639 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8641 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8642 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8646 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8647 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8649 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8651 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8652 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8654 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8655 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8656 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8657 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8658 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8659 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8660 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8663 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8664 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8666 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8667 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8668 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8671 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8673 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8674 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8675 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8676 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8678 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8680 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8681 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8682 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8684 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8686 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8687 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8688 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8690 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8693 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8694 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8697 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8698 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8699 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8700 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8701 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8702 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8704 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8705 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8706 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8707 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8708 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8710 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8712 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8716 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8717 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8721 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8722 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8724 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8725 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8726 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8727 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8729 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8730 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8731 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8732 Some(_) => continue,
8733 None => return scid_candidate
8738 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8740 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8741 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8743 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8744 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8745 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8749 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8750 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8751 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8753 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8754 /// times to get a unique scid.
8755 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8756 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8757 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8759 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8760 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8761 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8762 return scid_candidate
8766 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8767 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8768 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8769 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8772 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8775 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8776 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8778 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8779 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8780 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8789 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8790 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8791 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8792 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8793 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8797 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8798 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8799 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8800 events.push_back((event, None));
8804 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8805 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8806 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8810 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8811 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8815 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8816 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8819 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8820 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8821 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8822 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8823 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8825 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8827 let logger = WithContext::from(
8828 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
8831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8832 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8833 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8835 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8836 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8837 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8838 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8840 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8844 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8845 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8846 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8847 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8848 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8849 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8854 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8856 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8857 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8858 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8859 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8861 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8862 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8863 if further_update_exists {
8864 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8869 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8876 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8877 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8883 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8884 for action in actions {
8886 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8887 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8889 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8895 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8896 /// using the given event handler.
8898 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8899 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8903 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8907 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8909 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8910 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8911 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8912 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8913 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8914 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8918 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8919 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8920 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8921 /// is always placed next to each other.
8923 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8924 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8925 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8926 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8928 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8929 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
8930 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8931 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8932 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8933 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8934 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8936 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8937 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8938 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8939 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8942 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8943 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8945 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8946 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8949 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
8950 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8952 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8955 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8956 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8958 if peer_state.is_connected {
8959 is_any_peer_connected = true
8963 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
8964 if is_any_peer_connected {
8965 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8966 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
8969 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8970 events.replace(pending_events);
8979 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8981 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8982 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8983 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8984 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8985 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8986 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8990 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8992 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8993 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8994 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8996 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9000 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9002 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9003 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9004 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9005 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9006 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9007 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9011 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9013 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9014 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9015 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9016 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9017 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9020 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9021 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9024 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9025 let _persistence_guard =
9026 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9027 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9028 let new_height = height - 1;
9030 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9031 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9032 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9033 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9034 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9035 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9038 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9042 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9044 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9045 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9046 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9047 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9048 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9049 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9053 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9054 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9055 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9056 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9058 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9059 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9061 let _persistence_guard =
9062 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9063 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9064 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9065 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9067 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9068 if height < last_best_block_height {
9069 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9070 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9074 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9075 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9076 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9077 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9079 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9080 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9082 let _persistence_guard =
9083 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9084 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9085 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9087 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9089 macro_rules! max_time {
9090 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9092 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9093 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9094 // having an explicit local time source.
9095 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9096 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9097 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9098 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9099 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9105 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9106 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9107 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9108 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9112 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9113 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9114 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9115 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9116 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9117 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9118 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9119 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9120 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9121 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9122 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9129 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9130 let _persistence_guard =
9131 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9132 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9133 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9134 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9135 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9136 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9137 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9138 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9143 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9145 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9147 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9148 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9149 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9150 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9154 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9155 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9157 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9158 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9159 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9160 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9161 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9163 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9164 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9166 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9167 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9170 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9172 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9174 // Retain unfunded channels.
9175 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9176 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9177 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9178 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9179 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9180 let res = f(channel);
9181 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9182 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9183 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9184 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9185 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9187 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9188 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9189 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9190 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9191 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9192 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9193 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9194 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9199 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9204 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9205 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9208 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9209 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9210 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9211 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9212 msg: announcement_sigs,
9214 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9215 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9216 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9218 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9219 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9220 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9225 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9226 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9227 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9228 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9229 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9230 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9231 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9232 // is always consistent.
9233 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9234 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9235 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9236 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9237 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9240 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9241 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9242 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9243 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9244 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9245 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9246 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9247 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9248 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9252 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9253 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9255 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9256 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9257 data: reason_message,
9270 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9271 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9272 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9273 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9274 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9275 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9276 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9277 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9278 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9279 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9281 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9282 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9283 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9287 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9290 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9291 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9292 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9293 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9294 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9295 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9296 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9297 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9298 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9299 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9300 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9301 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9304 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9305 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9306 _ => unreachable!(),
9308 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9309 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9310 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9311 let logger = WithContext::from(
9312 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9314 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9320 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9322 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9323 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9327 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9328 /// may have events that need processing.
9330 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9331 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9333 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9334 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9335 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9336 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9339 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9341 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9342 /// indicates this should be checked.
9343 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9344 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9347 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9348 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9349 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9352 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9353 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9354 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9355 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9358 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9359 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9360 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9361 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9364 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9365 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9367 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9368 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9369 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9370 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9371 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9374 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9375 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9376 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9377 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9380 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9381 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9382 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9383 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9386 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9387 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9388 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9389 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9392 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9393 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9394 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9395 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9399 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9400 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9402 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9403 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9404 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9405 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9406 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9407 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9411 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9412 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9413 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9414 // change to the contents.
9415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9416 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9417 let persist = match &res {
9418 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9419 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9420 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9422 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9424 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9429 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9430 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9431 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9432 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9435 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9436 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9437 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9438 // change to the contents.
9439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9440 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9441 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9445 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9446 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9447 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9448 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9451 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9453 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9456 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9458 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9461 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9462 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9463 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9464 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9465 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9467 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9468 let persist = match &res {
9469 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9470 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9472 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9477 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9478 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9479 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9480 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9484 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9485 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9486 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9487 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9491 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9492 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9493 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9494 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9498 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9499 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9500 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9501 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9504 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9509 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9514 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9515 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9516 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9517 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9519 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9520 let persist = match &res {
9521 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9522 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9523 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9525 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9530 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9532 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9535 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9536 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9537 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9538 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9540 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9541 let persist = match &res {
9542 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9543 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9544 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9546 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9551 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9552 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9553 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9554 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9556 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9557 let persist = match &res {
9558 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9559 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9560 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9562 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9567 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9572 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9577 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9578 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9579 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9580 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9582 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9583 let persist = match &res {
9584 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9585 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9586 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9588 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9593 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9595 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9598 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9599 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9600 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9603 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9608 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9610 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9611 let persist = match &res {
9612 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9613 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9614 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9616 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9621 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9623 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9624 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9625 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9628 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9629 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9630 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9632 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9635 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9636 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9637 let context = match phase {
9638 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9639 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9640 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9641 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9646 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9647 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9648 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9649 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9650 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9654 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9655 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9658 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9659 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9662 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9663 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9667 // Clean up for removal.
9668 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9669 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9672 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9673 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9674 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9675 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9677 // V1 Channel Establishment
9678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9680 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9681 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9682 // V2 Channel Establishment
9683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9685 // Common Channel Establishment
9686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9689 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9691 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9692 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9693 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9694 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9695 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9698 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9699 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9700 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9701 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9703 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9704 // Channel Operations
9705 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9706 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9707 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9708 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9709 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9710 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9713 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9714 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9715 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9716 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9717 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9720 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9721 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9722 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9723 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9725 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9728 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9729 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9730 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9731 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9734 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9736 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9738 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9739 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9743 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9744 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9745 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9746 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9750 let mut res = Ok(());
9752 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9753 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9754 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9755 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9756 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9757 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9758 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9761 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9762 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9764 if inbound_peer_limited {
9766 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9768 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9769 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9770 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9771 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9772 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9773 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9774 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9775 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9780 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9781 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9783 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9784 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9785 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9786 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9789 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9792 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9793 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9798 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9801 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9804 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9806 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9808 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9809 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9811 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9812 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9816 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9817 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9818 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9819 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9823 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9824 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9825 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9827 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9828 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9832 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9833 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9834 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9835 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9836 debug_assert!(false);
9839 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9840 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9841 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9842 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9843 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9844 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9845 debug_assert!(false);
9851 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9852 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9857 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9858 match &msg.data as &str {
9859 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9860 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9862 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9863 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9864 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9865 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9866 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9867 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9868 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9869 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9870 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9872 || -> NotifyOption {
9873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9874 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9875 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9876 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9877 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9878 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9879 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9880 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9884 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9885 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9886 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9887 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9888 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9889 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9891 log_level: Level::Trace,
9894 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9895 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9896 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9898 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9909 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9910 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9912 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9913 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9916 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9917 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9918 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9919 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9921 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9922 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9923 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9927 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9929 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9930 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9933 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9934 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9935 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9936 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9937 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9943 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9944 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9945 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9946 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9947 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9953 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9954 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9955 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9959 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9960 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9964 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9965 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9968 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9969 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9972 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9973 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9976 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9977 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9978 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9979 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9982 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9983 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9984 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9985 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9988 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9989 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9990 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9991 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9994 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9995 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9996 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9997 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10000 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10001 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10002 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10003 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10006 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10007 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10008 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10009 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10012 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10013 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10014 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10015 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10018 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10019 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10020 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10021 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10024 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10025 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10026 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10027 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10031 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10032 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10034 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10035 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10036 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10037 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10038 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10039 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10043 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10044 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10045 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10048 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10049 let responder = match responder {
10050 Some(responder) => responder,
10051 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10053 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10056 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10057 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10059 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10060 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10062 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10063 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10067 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10068 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10069 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10071 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10073 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10074 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10078 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10079 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10080 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10082 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10083 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10085 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10087 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10088 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10092 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10093 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10094 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10097 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10098 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10099 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10100 payment_paths, payment_hash
10102 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10103 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10104 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10107 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10108 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10109 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10111 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10112 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10113 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10114 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10115 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10118 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10119 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10120 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10121 .and_then(|invoice| {
10123 let mut invoice = invoice;
10125 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10126 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10128 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10133 Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10134 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10137 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10138 let response = invoice
10139 .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10140 .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10141 .and_then(|payment_id| {
10142 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10143 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10144 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10146 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10149 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10154 match (responder, response) {
10155 (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10156 (None, Err(_)) => {
10159 "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
10161 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10163 _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10166 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10168 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10173 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10174 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10178 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10179 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10190 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10191 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10195 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10196 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10197 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10198 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10199 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10203 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10204 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10206 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10207 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10208 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10209 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10210 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10213 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10214 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10215 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10216 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10219 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10220 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10221 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10222 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10225 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10226 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10227 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10228 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10231 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10232 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10233 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10234 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10235 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10236 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10237 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10238 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10239 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10240 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10241 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10242 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10243 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10244 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10245 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10246 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10247 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10248 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10249 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10250 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10251 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10256 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10257 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10259 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10260 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10261 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10262 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10265 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10266 (2, node_id, required),
10267 (4, features, required),
10268 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10269 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10270 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10271 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10274 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10275 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10276 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10277 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10278 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10279 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10280 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10281 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10282 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10283 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10284 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10285 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10286 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10287 (7, self.config, option),
10288 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10289 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10290 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10291 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10292 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10293 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10294 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10295 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10296 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10297 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10298 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10299 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10300 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10301 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10302 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10303 (32, self.is_public, required),
10304 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10305 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10306 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10307 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10308 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10309 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10310 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10316 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10317 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10318 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10319 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10320 (2, channel_id, required),
10321 (3, channel_type, option),
10322 (4, counterparty, required),
10323 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10324 (6, funding_txo, option),
10325 (7, config, option),
10326 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10327 (9, confirmations, option),
10328 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10329 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10330 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10331 (16, balance_msat, required),
10332 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10333 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10334 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10335 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10336 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10337 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10338 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10339 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10340 (26, is_outbound, required),
10341 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10342 (30, is_usable, required),
10343 (32, is_public, required),
10344 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10345 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10346 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10347 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10348 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10349 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10350 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10353 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10354 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10355 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10356 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10357 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10360 inbound_scid_alias,
10361 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10363 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10364 outbound_scid_alias,
10368 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10369 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10371 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10372 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10373 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10374 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10375 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10376 confirmations_required,
10378 force_close_spend_delay,
10379 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10380 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10381 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10382 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10383 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10384 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10385 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10386 channel_shutdown_state,
10387 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10388 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10393 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10394 (2, channels, required_vec),
10395 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10396 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10399 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10400 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10401 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10404 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10406 (0, onion_packet, required),
10407 (1, blinded, option),
10408 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10411 (0, payment_data, required),
10412 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10413 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10414 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10415 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10416 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10417 (9, payment_context, option),
10419 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10420 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10421 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10422 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10423 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10424 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10425 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10429 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10430 (0, routing, required),
10431 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10432 (4, payment_hash, required),
10433 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10434 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10435 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10436 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10440 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10441 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10443 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10444 0u8.write(writer)?;
10445 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10446 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10447 reason.write(writer)?;
10449 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10450 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10452 1u8.write(writer)?;
10453 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10454 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10455 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10456 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10463 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10464 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10465 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10468 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10469 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10470 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10471 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10475 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10476 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10477 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10478 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10479 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10482 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10483 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10484 // messages contained in the variants.
10485 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10486 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10487 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10489 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10490 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10491 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10492 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10493 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10496 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10497 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10498 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10499 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10500 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10502 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10507 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10512 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10513 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10514 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10517 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10518 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10519 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10520 (2, outpoint, required),
10521 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10522 (4, htlc_id, required),
10523 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10524 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10525 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10526 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10527 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10530 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10532 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10533 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10534 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10536 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10538 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10539 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10540 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10541 (2, self.value, required),
10542 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10543 (4, payment_data, option),
10544 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10545 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10546 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10547 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10553 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10554 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10555 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10556 (0, prev_hop, required),
10557 (1, total_msat, option),
10558 (2, value_ser, required),
10559 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10560 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10561 (5, total_value_received, option),
10562 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10563 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10564 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10566 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10567 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10568 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10570 if payment_data.is_some() {
10571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10573 if total_msat.is_none() {
10574 total_msat = Some(value);
10576 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10579 if total_msat.is_none() {
10580 if payment_data.is_none() {
10581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10583 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10585 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10589 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10592 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10593 total_value_received,
10594 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10596 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10597 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10602 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10603 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10604 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10607 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10608 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10609 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10610 let mut payment_id = None;
10611 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10612 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10613 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10614 (0, session_priv, required),
10615 (1, payment_id, option),
10616 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10617 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10618 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10619 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10621 if payment_id.is_none() {
10622 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10624 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10626 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10627 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10628 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10630 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10631 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10632 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10633 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10637 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10638 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10639 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10641 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10644 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10645 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10650 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10651 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10653 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10654 0u8.write(writer)?;
10655 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10656 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10657 (0, session_priv, required),
10658 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10659 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10660 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10661 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10662 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10663 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10666 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10667 1u8.write(writer)?;
10668 field.write(writer)?;
10675 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10676 (0, forward_info, required),
10677 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10678 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10679 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10680 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10681 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10682 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10683 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10686 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10687 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10688 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10690 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10694 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10695 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10696 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10697 (0, htlc_id, required),
10698 (2, err_packet, required),
10701 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10702 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10703 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10704 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10705 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10706 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10707 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10708 (0, htlc_id, required),
10709 (1, failure_code, required),
10710 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10711 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10719 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10720 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10721 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10723 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10725 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10726 (0, htlc_id, required),
10727 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10728 (2, err_packet, required),
10729 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10731 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10732 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10733 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10735 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10739 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10740 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10744 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10749 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10750 (0, payment_secret, required),
10751 (2, expiry_time, required),
10752 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10753 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10754 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10757 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10759 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10760 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10761 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10762 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10763 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10764 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10768 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10769 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10771 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10773 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10775 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10776 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10777 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10782 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10784 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10785 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10786 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10788 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10789 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10792 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10793 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10797 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10799 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10802 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10803 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10804 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10807 channel.write(writer)?;
10813 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10814 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10815 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10816 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10817 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10818 for forward in pending_forwards {
10819 forward.write(writer)?;
10824 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10825 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10826 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10827 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10830 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10831 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10832 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10834 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10835 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10836 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10837 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10838 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10839 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10840 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10841 htlc.write(writer)?;
10843 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10844 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10847 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10848 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10849 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10850 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10851 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10852 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10853 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10856 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10857 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10858 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10859 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10860 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10862 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10863 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10864 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10865 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10866 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10867 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10868 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10873 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10874 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10875 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10876 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10877 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10878 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10879 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10880 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10881 0u64.write(writer)?;
10883 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10884 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10885 event.write(writer)?;
10889 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10890 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10891 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10892 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10893 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10894 0u64.write(writer)?;
10896 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10897 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10898 // likely to be identical.
10899 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10900 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10902 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10903 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10904 hash.write(writer)?;
10905 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10908 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10909 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10910 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10911 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10912 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10915 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10916 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10918 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10919 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10920 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10921 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10924 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10925 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10926 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10927 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10931 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10932 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10933 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10935 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10936 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10937 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10943 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10944 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10945 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10946 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10949 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10950 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10951 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10952 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10953 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10956 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10957 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10958 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10959 if !updates.is_empty() {
10960 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10961 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10966 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10967 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10968 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10969 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10970 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10971 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10972 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10973 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10974 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10975 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10976 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10977 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10978 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10979 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10986 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10987 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10988 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10989 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10992 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10993 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10994 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10995 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10996 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10997 // check that the event is sane here.
10998 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10999 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11000 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11001 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11007 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11008 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11009 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11010 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11011 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11012 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11015 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11016 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11017 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11018 events.push_back((ev, action));
11019 } else if action.is_some() {
11020 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11027 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11028 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11029 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11030 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11031 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11032 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11035 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11037 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11039 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11040 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11041 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11042 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11043 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11044 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11045 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11046 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11047 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11048 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11049 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11050 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11051 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11053 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11054 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11056 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11057 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11059 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11060 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11061 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11062 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11063 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11064 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11066 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11067 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11069 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11070 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11071 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11072 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11073 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11078 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11079 pub entropy_source: ES,
11081 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11082 pub node_signer: NS,
11084 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11085 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11087 pub signer_provider: SP,
11089 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11091 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11092 pub fee_estimator: F,
11093 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11095 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11096 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11097 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11098 pub chain_monitor: M,
11100 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11101 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11102 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11103 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11104 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11105 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11107 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11109 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11110 /// deserialization.
11112 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11113 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11114 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11116 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11117 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11119 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11120 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11121 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11122 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11124 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11127 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11128 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11131 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11132 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11134 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11135 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11136 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11137 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11138 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11143 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11144 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11145 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11146 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11147 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11149 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11150 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11151 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11157 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11158 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11159 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11160 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11162 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11163 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11164 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11165 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11166 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11171 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11172 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11173 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11177 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11178 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11180 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11181 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11182 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11183 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11184 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11185 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11189 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11190 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11192 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11193 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11194 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11196 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11198 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11199 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11200 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11201 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11202 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11203 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11204 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11205 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11206 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11207 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11208 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11210 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11211 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11212 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11213 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11214 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11215 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11216 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11217 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11218 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11219 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11220 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11221 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11222 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11223 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11224 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11226 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11227 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11228 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11230 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11231 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11232 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11234 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11235 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11236 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11238 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11239 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11240 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11242 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11243 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11244 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11247 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11248 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11249 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11250 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11251 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11252 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11253 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11254 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11256 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11257 let mut found_htlc = false;
11258 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11259 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11262 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11263 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11264 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11265 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11266 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11267 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11268 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11269 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11271 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11272 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11273 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11277 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11278 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11279 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11280 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11281 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11282 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11284 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11285 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11287 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11289 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11290 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11293 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11294 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11295 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11299 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11300 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11301 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11302 // safely discard the channel.
11303 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11304 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11305 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11306 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11307 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11308 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11309 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11310 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11313 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11314 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11315 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11316 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11317 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11318 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11322 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11323 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11324 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11325 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11326 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11328 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11329 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11330 counterparty_node_id: None,
11331 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11332 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11334 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11338 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11339 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11340 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11341 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11342 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11343 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11344 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11345 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11346 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11348 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11351 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11352 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11353 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11354 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11355 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11356 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11357 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11358 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11360 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11363 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11366 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11367 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11368 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11369 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11370 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11371 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11372 is_connected: false,
11376 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11377 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11378 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11379 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11380 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11381 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11382 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11383 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11386 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11387 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11388 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11389 for _ in 0..event_count {
11390 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11391 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11396 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11397 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11398 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11400 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11401 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11402 // on-startup monitor updates.
11403 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11404 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11406 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11410 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11411 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11413 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11414 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11415 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11416 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11417 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11421 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11422 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11423 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11424 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11425 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11426 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11427 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11429 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11430 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11434 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11435 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11436 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11437 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11438 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11439 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11440 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11441 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11442 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11443 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11444 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11445 let mut events_override = None;
11446 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11447 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11448 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11449 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11450 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11451 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11452 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11453 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11454 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11455 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11456 (8, events_override, option),
11457 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11458 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11459 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11460 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11461 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11463 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11464 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11465 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11468 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11469 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11472 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11473 pending_events_read = events;
11476 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11477 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11480 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11481 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11482 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11483 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11484 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11485 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11487 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11489 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11490 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11491 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11494 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11495 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11496 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11497 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11498 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11500 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11501 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11502 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11504 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11505 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11506 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11507 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11508 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11510 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11511 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11512 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11513 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11514 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11515 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11516 pending_background_events.push(
11517 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11518 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11519 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11520 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11521 update: update.clone(),
11524 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11525 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11526 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11527 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11528 pending_background_events.push(
11529 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11530 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11531 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11534 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11535 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11536 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11538 max_in_flight_update_id
11542 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11545 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11546 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11547 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11549 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11551 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11552 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11553 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11554 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11555 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11556 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11557 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11558 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11559 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11562 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11563 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11564 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11565 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11566 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11567 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11568 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11569 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11570 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11571 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11572 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11575 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11576 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11577 debug_assert!(false);
11578 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11583 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11584 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11585 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11586 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11587 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11588 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11589 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11590 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11591 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11592 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11594 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11595 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11596 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11598 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11599 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11600 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11601 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11602 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11603 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11604 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11605 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11606 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11611 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11612 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11614 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11615 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11616 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11617 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11620 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11621 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11622 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11623 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11624 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11625 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11626 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11628 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11629 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11630 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11631 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11632 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11633 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11634 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11635 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11636 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11639 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11640 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11641 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11642 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11644 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11645 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11646 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11648 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11649 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11650 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11651 retry_strategy: None,
11652 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11653 payment_params: None,
11654 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11655 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11656 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11657 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11658 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11659 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11660 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11661 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11662 total_msat: path_amt,
11663 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11664 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11666 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11667 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11672 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11673 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11674 match htlc_source {
11675 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11676 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11677 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11678 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11680 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11681 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11682 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11683 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11684 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11685 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11686 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11687 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11688 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11690 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11691 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11695 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11697 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11698 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11699 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11700 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11701 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11702 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11707 !forwards.is_empty()
11709 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11710 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11711 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11712 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11713 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11714 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11715 intercepted_id != ev_id
11722 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11723 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11724 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11725 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11726 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11727 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11728 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11729 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11730 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11731 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11732 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11734 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11735 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11736 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11737 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11739 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11740 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11741 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11748 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11749 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11751 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11753 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11754 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11755 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11756 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11757 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11758 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11759 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11760 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11761 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11762 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11765 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11766 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11767 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11768 // channel still live case here.
11772 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11773 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11778 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11779 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11780 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11781 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11782 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11783 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11784 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11785 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11789 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11790 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11792 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11793 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11794 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11797 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11798 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11801 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11802 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11804 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11805 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11807 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11810 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11811 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11812 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11814 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11818 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11819 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11820 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11821 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11824 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11825 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11826 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11827 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11828 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11829 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11830 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11831 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11833 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11838 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11840 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11842 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11843 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11845 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11846 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11851 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11852 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11854 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11856 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11858 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11859 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11860 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11861 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11865 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11866 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11869 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11870 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11871 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11872 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11873 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11875 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11876 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11877 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11879 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11880 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11881 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11882 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11883 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11884 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11886 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11887 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11888 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11889 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11890 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11891 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11895 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11896 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11897 debug_assert!(false);
11898 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11903 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11905 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11906 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11907 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11908 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11909 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11910 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11911 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11912 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11913 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11914 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11915 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11917 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11918 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11920 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11921 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11922 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11923 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11925 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11926 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11927 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11928 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11930 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11931 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11932 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11933 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11935 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11936 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11937 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11940 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11941 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
11942 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11945 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11946 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11949 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11952 purpose: payment.purpose,
11953 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11954 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11955 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11956 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
11962 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11963 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11964 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11965 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
11966 for action in actions.iter() {
11967 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11968 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11969 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11971 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11973 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11974 blocked_channel_id);
11975 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11976 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11977 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11979 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11980 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11981 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11982 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11986 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11987 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11991 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11993 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11994 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11998 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12000 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12001 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12002 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12003 router: args.router,
12005 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12007 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12008 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12009 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12010 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12012 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12013 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12014 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12015 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12016 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12017 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12018 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12020 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12022 our_network_pubkey,
12025 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12027 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12029 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12030 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12031 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12032 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12033 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12035 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12036 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12038 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12040 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12042 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12044 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12045 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12046 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12048 logger: args.logger,
12049 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12052 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12053 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12054 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12055 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12056 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12059 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12060 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12061 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12062 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12063 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12064 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12065 downstream_channel_id, None
12069 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12070 //connection or two.
12072 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12078 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12079 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12080 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12081 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12082 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12083 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12084 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12085 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12086 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12087 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12088 use crate::prelude::*;
12089 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12090 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12091 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12092 use crate::util::test_utils;
12093 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12094 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12097 fn test_notify_limits() {
12098 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12099 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12103 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12105 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12106 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12108 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12109 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12111 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12113 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12114 // to connect messages with new values
12115 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12116 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12117 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12118 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12119 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12120 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12122 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12123 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12124 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12125 // ... but the last node should not.
12126 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12127 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12128 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12129 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12131 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12132 // about the channel.
12133 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12134 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12135 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12137 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12140 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12142 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12143 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12144 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12146 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12147 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12148 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12150 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12151 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12152 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12153 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12154 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12155 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12157 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12158 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12159 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12160 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12161 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12162 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12163 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12164 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12166 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12167 // the channel info has updated.
12168 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12169 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12170 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12171 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12172 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12173 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12177 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12178 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12186 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12187 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12188 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12189 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12191 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12192 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12193 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12194 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12195 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12196 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12197 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12198 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12200 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12202 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12204 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12205 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12206 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12208 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12210 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12211 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12212 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12214 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12218 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12219 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12220 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12221 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12222 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12223 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12224 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12225 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12226 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12228 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12229 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12230 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12232 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12234 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12236 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12237 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12238 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12239 // lightning messages manually.
12240 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12241 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12244 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12245 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12246 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12247 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12249 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12250 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12252 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12253 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12255 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12256 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12257 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12259 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12260 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12261 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12263 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12265 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12267 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12268 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12271 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12272 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12273 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12274 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12276 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12277 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12278 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12279 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12284 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12285 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12286 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12287 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12294 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12295 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12296 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12299 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12300 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12301 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12302 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12303 // fails as expected.
12304 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12305 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12306 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12307 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12308 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12309 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12311 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12312 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12313 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12317 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12318 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12320 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12321 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12322 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12324 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12325 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12326 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12327 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12328 let route = find_route(
12329 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12330 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12332 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12333 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12335 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12336 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12337 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12338 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12339 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12341 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12342 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12343 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12344 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12345 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12347 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12348 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12349 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12350 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12351 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12352 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12353 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12354 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12355 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12357 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12358 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12360 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12361 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12362 let route = find_route(
12363 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12364 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12366 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12367 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12369 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12371 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12372 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12373 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12375 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12376 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12377 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12378 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12380 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12382 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12383 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12384 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12386 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12387 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12388 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12390 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12391 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12392 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12393 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12394 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12395 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12396 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12397 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12398 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12400 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12401 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12403 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12404 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12405 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12406 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12408 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12410 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12411 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12412 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12414 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12415 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12416 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12419 let route = find_route(
12420 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12421 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12423 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12424 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12425 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12429 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12430 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12431 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12437 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12438 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12439 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12440 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12441 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12442 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12443 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12444 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12445 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12447 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12448 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12452 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12453 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12454 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12455 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12456 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12458 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12460 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12461 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12463 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12464 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12465 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12466 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12467 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12468 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12469 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12470 let route = find_route(
12471 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12472 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12475 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12476 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12477 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12478 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12479 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12480 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12483 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12484 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12485 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12486 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12487 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12488 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12491 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12495 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12496 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12497 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12498 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12499 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12505 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12506 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12508 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12509 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12510 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12511 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12512 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12513 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12514 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12515 let route = find_route(
12516 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12517 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12520 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12521 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12522 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12523 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12524 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12525 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12526 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12527 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12530 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12531 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12532 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12533 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12534 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12535 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12538 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12542 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12546 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12548 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12549 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12550 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12551 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12553 // Marshall an MPP route.
12554 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12555 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12556 route.paths.push(path);
12557 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12558 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12559 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12560 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12561 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12562 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12564 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12565 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12567 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12568 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12570 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12575 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12579 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12581 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12583 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12585 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12587 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12588 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12589 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12592 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12593 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12594 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12597 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12598 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12599 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12601 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12602 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12604 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12605 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12607 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12608 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12609 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12611 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12612 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12613 }, false).unwrap();
12615 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12616 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12617 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12618 match &node_0_events[0] {
12619 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12623 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12624 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12625 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12630 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12636 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12638 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12639 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12641 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12642 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12644 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12647 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12648 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12649 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12650 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12651 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12652 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12658 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12659 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12664 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12665 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12666 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12669 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12671 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12672 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12674 total_msat: 100_000,
12677 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12678 // payment verification fails as expected.
12679 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12680 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12681 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12682 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12684 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12688 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12689 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12693 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12694 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12695 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12696 // the channel is successfully closed.
12697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12700 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12702 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12703 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12704 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12705 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12706 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12708 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12709 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12711 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12712 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12713 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12714 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12717 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12719 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12720 // as it has the funding transaction.
12721 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12722 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12723 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12726 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12728 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12730 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12732 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12733 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12734 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12736 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12739 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12740 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12741 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12742 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12743 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12746 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12747 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12749 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12750 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12751 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12752 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12754 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12755 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12756 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12757 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12759 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12760 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12762 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12763 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12764 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12765 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12766 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12767 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12768 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12772 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12773 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12774 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12775 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12776 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12777 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12778 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12781 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12783 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12784 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12785 // closing transaction).
12786 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12787 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12788 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12790 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12791 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12792 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12793 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12794 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12797 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12799 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12801 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12802 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12805 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12807 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12808 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12811 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12812 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12813 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12816 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12817 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12818 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12821 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12822 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12823 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12826 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12827 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12828 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12831 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12833 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12834 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12836 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12837 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12839 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12840 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12845 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12846 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12847 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12848 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12849 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12850 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12851 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12852 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12855 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12856 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12857 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12859 // Test the API functions.
12860 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12862 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12864 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12866 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12868 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12870 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12872 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12876 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12877 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12878 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12879 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12880 // the given `channel_id`.
12881 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12882 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12883 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12884 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12886 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12889 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12891 // Test the API functions.
12892 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12894 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12896 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12898 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12900 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12902 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12906 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12907 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12911 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12913 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12915 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12916 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12918 let mut funding_tx = None;
12919 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12920 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12921 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12924 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12925 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12926 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12927 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12928 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12930 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12932 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12934 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12936 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12938 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12940 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12943 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12944 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12945 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12946 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12947 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12948 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12950 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12951 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12953 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12954 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12955 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12956 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12957 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12958 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12959 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12962 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12963 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12964 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12965 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12966 }, true).unwrap_err();
12968 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12969 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12970 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12971 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12972 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12973 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12974 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12976 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12977 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12979 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12980 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12981 }, true).unwrap_err();
12983 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12984 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12985 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12986 }, false).unwrap();
12987 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12989 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12990 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12992 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12993 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12994 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12995 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12996 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12998 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12999 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13000 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13002 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13003 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13004 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13006 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13007 // "protected" and can connect again.
13008 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13009 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13010 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13012 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13014 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13016 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13017 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13021 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13022 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13023 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13024 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13025 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13026 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13028 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13030 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13031 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13033 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13035 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13036 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13039 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13041 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13042 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13043 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13045 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13046 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13047 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13049 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13050 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13051 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13052 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13056 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13057 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13058 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13059 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13060 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13061 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13062 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13064 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13066 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13068 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13069 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13071 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13072 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13073 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13074 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13075 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13076 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13079 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13080 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13082 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13083 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13087 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13088 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13091 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13092 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13093 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13094 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13095 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13097 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13098 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13100 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13101 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13102 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13103 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13109 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13110 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13112 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13113 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13114 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13116 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13117 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13121 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13125 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13126 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13127 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13128 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13129 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13130 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13131 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13132 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13133 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13134 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13135 payment_metadata: None,
13136 keysend_preimage: None,
13137 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13138 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13140 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13142 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13143 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13144 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13145 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13146 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13147 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13148 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13150 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13151 } else { panic!(); }
13153 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13154 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13155 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13156 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13157 payment_metadata: None,
13158 keysend_preimage: None,
13159 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13160 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13162 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13164 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13165 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13166 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13167 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13171 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13172 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13173 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13174 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13175 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13177 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13178 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13179 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13180 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13181 payment_metadata: None,
13182 keysend_preimage: None,
13183 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13184 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13186 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13187 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13188 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13190 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13191 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13192 // is not satisfied.
13193 assert!(result.is_ok());
13197 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13198 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13199 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13200 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13201 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13203 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13204 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13209 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13210 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13212 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13213 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13215 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13216 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13217 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13218 match &msg_events[0] {
13219 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13220 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13222 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13223 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13224 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13230 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13231 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13233 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13234 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13237 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13241 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13242 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13243 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13244 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13247 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13248 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13249 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13253 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13254 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13255 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13257 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13258 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13260 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13261 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13266 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13267 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13269 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13270 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13272 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13273 // not have generated any events.
13274 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13278 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13279 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13280 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13281 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13282 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13284 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13285 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13287 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13288 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13289 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13291 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13292 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13293 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13294 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13295 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13297 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13298 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13301 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13302 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13305 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13306 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13307 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13308 ..Default::default()
13310 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13311 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13314 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13315 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13318 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13319 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13320 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13321 ..Default::default()
13323 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13324 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13325 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13328 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13329 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13332 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13333 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13334 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13335 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13336 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13339 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13340 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13341 ..Default::default()
13343 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13346 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13347 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13348 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13353 fn test_payment_display() {
13354 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13355 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13356 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13357 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13358 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13359 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13363 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13364 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13365 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13366 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13367 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13370 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13371 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13372 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13373 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13374 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13375 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13376 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13377 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13379 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13380 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13381 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13384 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13385 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13387 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13388 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13390 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13391 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13392 }, false).unwrap();
13393 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13394 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13395 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13397 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13399 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13400 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13401 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13402 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13403 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13404 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13405 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13406 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13407 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13408 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13409 } else { panic!() };
13410 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13411 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13412 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13413 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13415 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13417 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13418 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13419 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13424 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13425 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13426 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13427 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13430 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13431 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13432 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13434 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13435 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13437 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13438 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13441 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13442 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13443 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13445 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13449 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13450 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13451 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13453 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13458 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13459 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13460 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13461 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13463 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13464 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13465 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13467 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13469 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13470 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13471 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13472 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13474 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13475 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13477 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13483 use crate::chain::Listen;
13484 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13485 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13486 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13487 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13488 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13489 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13490 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13491 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13492 use crate::util::test_utils;
13493 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13495 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13496 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13497 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13498 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13499 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13500 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13502 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13504 use criterion::Criterion;
13506 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13507 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13508 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13509 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13510 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13511 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13512 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13514 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13515 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13517 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13518 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13520 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13522 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13525 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13526 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13529 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13530 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13531 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13533 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13534 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13536 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13537 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13538 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13539 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13540 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13542 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13543 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13544 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13546 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13547 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13548 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13549 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13551 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13552 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13553 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13555 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13556 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13557 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13558 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13559 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13561 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13562 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13563 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13565 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13566 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13568 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13569 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13570 }, false).unwrap();
13571 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13572 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13573 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13576 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13577 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13578 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13580 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13581 } else { panic!(); }
13583 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13584 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13585 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13586 match events_b[0] {
13587 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13588 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13593 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13594 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13595 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13596 match events_a[0] {
13597 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13598 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13603 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13605 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13606 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13607 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13609 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13610 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13611 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13612 match msg_events[0] {
13613 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13614 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13615 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13619 match msg_events[1] {
13620 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13624 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13625 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13626 match events_a[0] {
13627 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13628 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13633 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13634 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13635 match events_b[0] {
13636 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13637 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13642 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13643 macro_rules! send_payment {
13644 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13645 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13646 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13647 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13648 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13649 payment_count += 1;
13650 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13651 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13653 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13654 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13655 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13656 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13657 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13658 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13659 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13660 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13661 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13662 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13663 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13665 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13666 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13667 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13668 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13670 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13671 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13672 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13673 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13674 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13676 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13679 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13680 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13681 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13682 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13684 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13688 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13689 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13690 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);