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Merge pull request #2217 from alecchendev/2023-04-expose-hash-in-balance
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 //
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 //
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
92 //
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101         Forward {
102                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
106         },
107         Receive {
108                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112         },
113         ReceiveKeysend {
114                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117         },
118 }
119
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
125         /// Amount received
126         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128         /// may overshoot this in either case)
129         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 }
132
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 }
138
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 }
145
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
148
149         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152         // HTLCs.
153         //
154         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
156         prev_htlc_id: u64,
157         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 }
160
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163         FailHTLC {
164                 htlc_id: u64,
165                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
166         },
167 }
168
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173         short_channel_id: u64,
174         htlc_id: u64,
175         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
177
178         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180         outpoint: OutPoint,
181 }
182
183 enum OnionPayload {
184         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
185         Invoice {
186                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
189         },
190         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 }
193
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
197         cltv_expiry: u32,
198         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
199         value: u64,
200         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202         sender_intended_value: u64,
203         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
204         timer_ticks: u8,
205         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
209         total_msat: u64,
210 }
211
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
213 ///
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
217
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
220                 self.0.write(w)
221         }
222 }
223
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
227                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
228         }
229 }
230
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
232 ///
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
236
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
239                 self.0.write(w)
240         }
241 }
242
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
246                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
247         }
248 }
249
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 }
256 impl SentHTLCId {
257         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
258                 match source {
259                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
262                         },
263                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
265                 }
266         }
267 }
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271                 (2, htlc_id, required),
272         },
273         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274                 (0, session_priv, required),
275         };
276 );
277
278
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284         OutboundRoute {
285                 path: Path,
286                 session_priv: SecretKey,
287                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290                 payment_id: PaymentId,
291         },
292 }
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
296                 match self {
297                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
298                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
299                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
300                         },
301                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
303                                 path.hash(hasher);
304                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
307                         },
308                 }
309         }
310 }
311 impl HTLCSource {
312         #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
313         #[cfg(test)]
314         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
316                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
317                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
320                 }
321         }
322
323         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
329                 } else {
330                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
331                         true
332                 }
333         }
334 }
335
336 struct ReceiveError {
337         err_code: u16,
338         err_data: Vec<u8>,
339         msg: &'static str,
340 }
341
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
344 ///
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350         TemporaryNodeFailure             = 0x2000 | 2,
351         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing       = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 }
360
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
362
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370         err: msgs::LightningError,
371         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 }
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375         #[inline]
376         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377                 Self {
378                         err: LightningError {
379                                 err: err.clone(),
380                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
382                                                 channel_id,
383                                                 data: err
384                                         },
385                                 },
386                         },
387                         chan_id: None,
388                         shutdown_finish: None,
389                 }
390         }
391         #[inline]
392         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394         }
395         #[inline]
396         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397                 Self {
398                         err: LightningError {
399                                 err: err.clone(),
400                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
402                                                 channel_id,
403                                                 data: err
404                                         },
405                                 },
406                         },
407                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
409                 }
410         }
411         #[inline]
412         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413                 Self {
414                         err: match err {
415                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
416                                         err: msg.clone(),
417                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
419                                                         channel_id,
420                                                         data: msg
421                                                 },
422                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
423                                         },
424                                 },
425                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426                                         err: msg,
427                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428                                 },
429                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430                                         err: msg.clone(),
431                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
433                                                         channel_id,
434                                                         data: msg
435                                                 },
436                                         },
437                                 },
438                         },
439                         chan_id: None,
440                         shutdown_finish: None,
441                 }
442         }
443 }
444
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458         CommitmentFirst,
459         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
460         RevokeAndACKFirst,
461 }
462
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
465         amount_msat: u64,
466         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 }
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470         (0, amount_msat, required),
471         (2, payment_purpose, required),
472         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 });
474
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
479 }
480
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484         /// failed/claimed by the user.
485         ///
486         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488         ///
489         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492
493         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
497 }
498
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504         /// commitment transaction.
505         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
506 }
507
508 #[derive(Debug)]
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513         /// event can be generated.
514         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516         EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
517 }
518
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521         (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
522 );
523
524 /// State we hold per-peer.
525 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
526         /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
527         ///
528         /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
529         /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
530         /// `channel_id`.
531         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
532         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
533         latest_features: InitFeatures,
534         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
535         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
536         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
537         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
538         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
539         ///
540         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
541         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
542         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
543         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
544         ///
545         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
546         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
547         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
548         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
549         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
550         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
551         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
552         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
553         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
554         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
555         is_connected: bool,
556 }
557
558 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
559         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
560         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
561         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
562         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
563                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
564                         return false
565                 }
566                 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
567         }
568 }
569
570 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
571 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
572 ///
573 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
574 /// here.
575 ///
576 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
577 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
578 struct PendingInboundPayment {
579         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
580         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
581         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
582         /// this payment being removed.
583         expiry_time: u64,
584         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
585         user_payment_id: u64,
586         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
587         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
588         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
589 }
590
591 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
599 ///
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
602         Arc<M>,
603         Arc<T>,
604         Arc<KeysManager>,
605         Arc<KeysManager>,
606         Arc<KeysManager>,
607         Arc<F>,
608         Arc<DefaultRouter<
609                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
610                 Arc<L>,
611                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
612         >>,
613         Arc<L>
614 >;
615
616 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
622 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
623 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
624 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
625 ///
626 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
627 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
628
629 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
630 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
631 pub trait AChannelManager {
632         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
633         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
634         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
635         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
636         type EntropySource: EntropySource;
637         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
638         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
639         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
640         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
641         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
642         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
643         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
644         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
645         type Router: Router;
646         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
647         type Logger: Logger;
648         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
649         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
650 }
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
653 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
654 where
655         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
656         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
657         ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
658         NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
659         SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
660         F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
661         R::Target: Router + Sized,
662         L::Target: Logger + Sized,
663 {
664         type Watch = M::Target;
665         type M = M;
666         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
667         type T = T;
668         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
669         type ES = ES;
670         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
671         type NS = NS;
672         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
673         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
674         type SP = SP;
675         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
676         type F = F;
677         type Router = R::Target;
678         type R = R;
679         type Logger = L::Target;
680         type L = L;
681         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
682 }
683
684 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
685 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
686 ///
687 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
688 /// to individual Channels.
689 ///
690 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
691 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
692 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
693 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
694 ///
695 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
696 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
697 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
698 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
699 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
700 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
701 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
702 ///
703 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
704 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
705 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
706 ///
707 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
708 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
709 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
710 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
711 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
712 ///
713 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
714 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
715 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
716 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
717 ///
718 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
719 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
720 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
721 ///
722 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
723 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
724 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
725 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
726 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
727 ///
728 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
729 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
730 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
731 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
732 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
733 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
734 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
735 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
736 //
737 // Lock order:
738 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
739 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
740 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
741 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
742 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
743 //
744 // Lock order tree:
745 //
746 // `total_consistency_lock`
747 //  |
748 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
749 //  |   |
750 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
751 //  |
752 //  |__`per_peer_state`
753 //  |   |
754 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
755 //  |       |
756 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
757 //  |       |
758 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
759 //  |           |
760 //  |           |__`peer_state`
761 //  |               |
762 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
763 //  |               |
764 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
765 //  |               |
766 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
767 //  |               |
768 //  |               |__`best_block`
769 //  |               |
770 //  |               |__`pending_events`
771 //  |                   |
772 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
773 //
774 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
775 where
776         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
777         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
778         ES::Target: EntropySource,
779         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
780         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
781         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
782         R::Target: Router,
783         L::Target: Logger,
784 {
785         default_configuration: UserConfig,
786         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
787         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
788         chain_monitor: M,
789         tx_broadcaster: T,
790         #[allow(unused)]
791         router: R,
792
793         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
794         #[cfg(test)]
795         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
796         #[cfg(not(test))]
797         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
798         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
799
800         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
801         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
802         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
803         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
804         ///
805         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
807
808         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
809         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
810         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
811         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
812         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
813         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
814         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
815         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
816         ///
817         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
818         ///
819         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
821
822         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
823         ///
824         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
825         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
826         /// and via the classic SCID.
827         ///
828         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
829         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
830         ///
831         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
832         #[cfg(test)]
833         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
834         #[cfg(not(test))]
835         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
836         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
837         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
838         ///
839         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
841
842         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
843         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
844         ///
845         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
847
848         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
849         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
850         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
851         /// active channel list on load.
852         ///
853         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
855
856         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
857         ///
858         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
859         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
860         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
861         ///
862         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
863         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
864         /// the handling of the events.
865         ///
866         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
867         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
868         ///
869         /// TODO:
870         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
871         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
872         /// would break backwards compatability.
873         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
874         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
875         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
876         ///
877         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
878         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
879
880         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
881         ///
882         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
883         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
884         /// confirmation depth.
885         ///
886         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
887         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
888         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
889         ///
890         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
891         #[cfg(test)]
892         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
893         #[cfg(not(test))]
894         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
895
896         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
897
898         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
899
900         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
901         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
902         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
903         ///
904         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
905         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
906
907         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
908         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
909         /// keeping additional state.
910         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
911
912         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
913         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
914         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
915         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
916
917         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
918         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
919         ///
920         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
921         /// are currently open with that peer.
922         ///
923         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
924         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
925         /// channels.
926         ///
927         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
928         ///
929         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
931         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
932         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
933         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
934
935         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
936         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
937         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
938         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
939         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
940         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
941         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
942         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
943         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
944         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
945         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
946         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
947         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
948
949         persistence_notifier: Notifier,
950
951         entropy_source: ES,
952         node_signer: NS,
953         signer_provider: SP,
954
955         logger: L,
956 }
957
958 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
959 ///
960 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
961 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
962 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
963 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
964 pub struct ChainParameters {
965         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
966         pub network: Network,
967
968         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
969         ///
970         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
971         pub best_block: BestBlock,
972 }
973
974 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
975 enum NotifyOption {
976         DoPersist,
977         SkipPersist,
978 }
979
980 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
981 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
982 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
983 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
984 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
985 /// updates are ready for persistence).
986 ///
987 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
988 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
989 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
990 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
991         persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
992         should_persist: F,
993         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
994         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
995 }
996
997 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
998         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
999                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1000         }
1001
1002         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1003                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1004
1005                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1006                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
1007                         should_persist: persist_check,
1008                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1009                 }
1010         }
1011 }
1012
1013 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1014         fn drop(&mut self) {
1015                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1016                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1017                 }
1018         }
1019 }
1020
1021 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1022 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1023 ///
1024 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1025 ///
1026 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1027 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1028 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1029 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1030 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1031
1032 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1033 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1034 ///
1035 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1036 ///
1037 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1038 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1039 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1040 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1041 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1042 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1043 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1044 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1045 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1046 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1047 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1048 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1049 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1050
1051 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1052 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1053 /// this value.
1054 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1055 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1056 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1057 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1058
1059 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1060 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1061 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1062 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1063 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1064 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1065 #[deny(const_err)]
1066 #[allow(dead_code)]
1067 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1068
1069 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1070 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1071 #[deny(const_err)]
1072 #[allow(dead_code)]
1073 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1074
1075 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1076 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1077
1078 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1079 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1080 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1081 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1082
1083 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1084 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1085 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1086
1087 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1088 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1089 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1090
1091 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1092 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1093 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1094 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1095
1096 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1097 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1098 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1099
1100 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1101 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1102 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1103
1104 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1105 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1106 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1107         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1108         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1109         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1110         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1111         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1112         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1113         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1114         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1115 }
1116
1117 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1118 /// to better separate parameters.
1119 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1120 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1121         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1122         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1123         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1124         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1125         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1126         pub features: InitFeatures,
1127         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1128         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1129         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1130         ///
1131         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1132         ///
1133         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1134         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1135         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1136         /// payments to us through this channel.
1137         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1138         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1139         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1140         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1141         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1142         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1143         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1144 }
1145
1146 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1147 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1148 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1149         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1150         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1151         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1152         /// lifetime of the channel.
1153         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1154         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1155         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1156         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1157         /// our counterparty already.
1158         ///
1159         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1160         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1161         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1162         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1163         ///
1164         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1165         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1166         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1167         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1168         ///
1169         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1170         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1171         ///
1172         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1173         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1174         ///
1175         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1176         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1177         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1178         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1179         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1180         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1181         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1182         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1183         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1184         /// `Some(0)`).
1185         ///
1186         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1187         ///
1188         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1189         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1190         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1191         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1192         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1193         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1194         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1195         ///
1196         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1197         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1198         ///
1199         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1200         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1201         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1202         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1203         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1204         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1205         /// this value on chain.
1206         ///
1207         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1208         ///
1209         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1210         ///
1211         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1212         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1213         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1214         /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1215         /// 0.0.113.
1216         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1217         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1218         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1219         ///
1220         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1221         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1222         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1223         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1224         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1225         ///
1226         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1227         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1228         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1229         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1230         ///
1231         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1232         pub balance_msat: u64,
1233         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1234         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1235         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1236         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1237         ///
1238         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1239         ///
1240         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1241         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1242         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1243         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1244         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1245         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1246         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1247         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1248         ///
1249         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1250         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1251         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1252         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1253         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1254         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1255         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1256         ///
1257         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1258         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1259         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1260         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1261         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1262         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1263         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1264         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1265         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1266         ///
1267         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1268         ///
1269         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1270         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1271         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1272         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1273         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1274         ///
1275         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1276         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1277         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1278         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1279         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1280         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1281         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1282         ///
1283         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1284         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1285         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1286         pub is_outbound: bool,
1287         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1288         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1289         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1290         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1291         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1292         ///
1293         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1294         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1295         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1296         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1297         ///
1298         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1299         pub is_usable: bool,
1300         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1301         pub is_public: bool,
1302         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1303         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1304         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1305         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1306         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1307         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1308         ///
1309         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1310         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1311 }
1312
1313 impl ChannelDetails {
1314         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1315         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1316         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1317         ///
1318         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1319         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1320         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1321                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1322         }
1323
1324         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1325         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1326         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1327         ///
1328         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1329         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1330         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1331                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1332         }
1333
1334         fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1335                 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1336
1337                 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1338                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1339                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1340                 ChannelDetails {
1341                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1342                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1343                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1344                                 features: latest_features,
1345                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1346                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1347                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1348                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1349                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1350                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1351                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1352                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1353                                         Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1354                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1355                         },
1356                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1357                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1358                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1359                         channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1360                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1361                         outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1362                         inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1363                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1364                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1365                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1366                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1367                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1368                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1369                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1370                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1371                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1372                         confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1373                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1374                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1375                         is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1376                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1377                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1378                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1379                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1380                         config: Some(channel.config()),
1381                 }
1382         }
1383 }
1384
1385 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1386 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1387 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1388 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1389         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1390         Pending {
1391                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1392                 /// abandoned.
1393                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1394                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1395                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1396                 total_msat: u64,
1397         },
1398         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1399         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1400         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1401         Fulfilled {
1402                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1403                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1404                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1405         },
1406         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1407         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1408         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1409         Abandoned {
1410                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1411                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1412         },
1413 }
1414
1415 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1416 ///
1417 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1418 #[derive(Clone)]
1419 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1420         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1421         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1422         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1423         /// route hints.
1424         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1425         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1426         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1427 }
1428
1429 macro_rules! handle_error {
1430         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1431                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1432                 // entering the macro.
1433                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1434                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1435
1436                 match $internal {
1437                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1438                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1439                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1440
1441                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1442                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1443                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1444                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1445                                                         msg: update
1446                                                 });
1447                                         }
1448                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1449                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1450                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1451                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1452                                                 });
1453                                         }
1454                                 }
1455
1456                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1457                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1458                                 } else {
1459                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1460                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1461                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1462                                         });
1463                                 }
1464
1465                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1466                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1467                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1468                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1469                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1470                                         }
1471                                 }
1472
1473                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1474                                 Err(err)
1475                         },
1476                 }
1477         } }
1478 }
1479
1480 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1481         ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1482                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1483                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1484                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1485                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1486                 } else {
1487                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1488                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1489                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1490                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1491                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1492                         // stage.
1493                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1494                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1495                 }
1496                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1497         }}
1498 }
1499
1500 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1501 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1502         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1503                 match $err {
1504                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1505                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1506                         },
1507                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1508                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1509                         },
1510                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1511                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1512                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1513                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1514                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1515                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1516                         },
1517                 }
1518         }
1519 }
1520
1521 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1522         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1523                 match $res {
1524                         Ok(res) => res,
1525                         Err(e) => {
1526                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1527                                 if drop {
1528                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1529                                 }
1530                                 break Err(res);
1531                         }
1532                 }
1533         }
1534 }
1535
1536 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1537         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1538                 match $res {
1539                         Ok(res) => res,
1540                         Err(e) => {
1541                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1542                                 if drop {
1543                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1544                                 }
1545                                 return Err(res);
1546                         }
1547                 }
1548         }
1549 }
1550
1551 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1552         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1553                 {
1554                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1555                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1556                         channel
1557                 }
1558         }
1559 }
1560
1561 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1562         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1563                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1564                         node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1565                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1566                 });
1567                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1568                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1569                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1570                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1571                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1572                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1573                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1574                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1575                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1576                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1577                 }
1578         }}
1579 }
1580
1581 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1582         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1583                 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1584                         $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1585                                 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1586                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1587                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1588                                 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1589                                 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1590                         });
1591                         $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1592                 }
1593         }
1594 }
1595
1596 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1597         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1598                 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1599                         debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1600                         $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1601                                 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1602                                 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1603                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1604                                 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1605                         });
1606                         $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1607                 }
1608         }
1609 }
1610
1611 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1612         ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1613                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1614                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1615                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1616                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1617                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1618                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1619                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1620                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1621                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1622                         // now.
1623                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1624                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1625                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1626                                         msg,
1627                                 })
1628                         } else { None }
1629                 } else { None };
1630
1631                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1632                         .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1633
1634                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1635                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1636                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1637                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1638                         updates.announcement_sigs);
1639                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1640                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1641                 }
1642
1643                 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1644                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1645                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1646
1647                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1648
1649                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1650                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1651                 }
1652                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1653                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1654                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1655                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1656                 }
1657         } }
1658 }
1659
1660 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1661         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1662                 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1663                 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1664                 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1665                 match $update_res {
1666                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1667                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1668                                         log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1669                                 Ok(())
1670                         },
1671                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1672                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1673                                         log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1674                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1675                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1676                                         "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1677                                         $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1678                                         $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1679                                 $remove;
1680                                 res
1681                         },
1682                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1683                                 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1684                                         .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1685                                         .update_id == $update_id) &&
1686                                         $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1687                                 {
1688                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1689                                 }
1690                                 Ok(())
1691                         },
1692                 }
1693         } };
1694         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1695                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1696         }
1697 }
1698
1699 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1700         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1701                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1702                 while !processed_all_events {
1703                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1704                                 return;
1705                         }
1706
1707                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1708
1709                         {
1710                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1711                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1712                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1713
1714                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1715                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1716                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1717                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1718                                 }
1719                         }
1720
1721                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1722                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
1723                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1724                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1725                         }
1726
1727                         for event in pending_events {
1728                                 $event_to_handle = event;
1729                                 $handle_event;
1730                         }
1731
1732                         {
1733                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1734                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1735                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1736                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1737                         }
1738
1739                         if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1740                                 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1741                         }
1742                 }
1743         }
1744 }
1745
1746 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1747 where
1748         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1749         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1750         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1751         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1752         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1753         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1754         R::Target: Router,
1755         L::Target: Logger,
1756 {
1757         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1758         ///
1759         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1760         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1761         ///
1762         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1763         ///
1764         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1765         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1766         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1767         /// more details.
1768         ///
1769         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1770         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1771         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1772         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1773                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1774                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1775                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1776                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1777                 ChannelManager {
1778                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1779                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1780                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1781                         chain_monitor,
1782                         tx_broadcaster,
1783                         router,
1784
1785                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1786
1787                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1788                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1789                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1790                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1791                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1792                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1793                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1794                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1795
1796                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1797                         secp_ctx,
1798
1799                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1800                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1801
1802                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1803
1804                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1805
1806                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1807
1808                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1809                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1810                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1811                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1812                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1813
1814                         entropy_source,
1815                         node_signer,
1816                         signer_provider,
1817
1818                         logger,
1819                 }
1820         }
1821
1822         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1823         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1824                 &self.default_configuration
1825         }
1826
1827         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1828                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1829                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1830                 let mut i = 0;
1831                 loop {
1832                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1833                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1834                         } else {
1835                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1836                         }
1837                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1838                                 break;
1839                         }
1840                         i += 1;
1841                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1842                 }
1843                 outbound_scid_alias
1844         }
1845
1846         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1847         ///
1848         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1849         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1850         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1851         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1852         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1853         ///
1854         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1855         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1856         ///
1857         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1858         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1859         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1860         ///
1861         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1862         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1863         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1864         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1865         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1866         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1867         ///
1868         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1869         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1870         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1871         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1872                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1873                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1874                 }
1875
1876                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1877                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1878                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1879
1880                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1881
1882                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1883                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1884
1885                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1886                 let channel = {
1887                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1888                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1889                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1890                         match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1891                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1892                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1893                         {
1894                                 Ok(res) => res,
1895                                 Err(e) => {
1896                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1897                                         return Err(e);
1898                                 },
1899                         }
1900                 };
1901                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1902
1903                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1904                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1905                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1906                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
1907                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1908                                 } else {
1909                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1910                                 }
1911                         },
1912                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1913                 }
1914
1915                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1916                         node_id: their_network_key,
1917                         msg: res,
1918                 });
1919                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1920         }
1921
1922         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1923                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1924                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1925                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1926                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1927                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1928                 // the same channel.
1929                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1930                 {
1931                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1932                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1933                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1934                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1935                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1936                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1937                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1938                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1939                                         res.push(details);
1940                                 }
1941                         }
1942                 }
1943                 res
1944         }
1945
1946         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1947         /// more information.
1948         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1949                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1950         }
1951
1952         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1953         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1954         ///
1955         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1956         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1957         /// are.
1958         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1959                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1960                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1961                 // really wanted anyway.
1962                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1963         }
1964
1965         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1966         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1967                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1968                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1969
1970                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1971                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1972                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1973                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1974                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
1975                                 .iter()
1976                                 .map(|(_, channel)|
1977                                         ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1978                                 .collect();
1979                 }
1980                 vec![]
1981         }
1982
1983         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1984         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1985         ///
1986         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1987         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1988         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1989         ///
1990         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1991         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1992                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1993                         .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1994                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1995                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1996                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1997                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
1998                                         })
1999                                 },
2000                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2001                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2002                                 },
2003                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2004                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2005                                 },
2006                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2007                         })
2008                         .collect()
2009         }
2010
2011         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2012         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2013                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2014                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2015                         Some(transaction) => {
2016                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2017                         },
2018                         None => {},
2019                 }
2020                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2021                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2022                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2023                         reason: closure_reason
2024                 });
2025         }
2026
2027         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2028                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2029
2030                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2031                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2032                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2033
2034                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2035                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2036
2037                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2038                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2039                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2040                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2041                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2042                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2043                                         let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2044                                                 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
2045                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2046
2047                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2048                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2049                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2050                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2051                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2052                                                 msg: shutdown_msg,
2053                                         });
2054
2055                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2056                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2057                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2058                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2059                                                 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2060                                         }
2061
2062                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2063                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2064                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2065                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2066                                                                 msg: channel_update
2067                                                         });
2068                                                 }
2069                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2070                                         }
2071                                         break Ok(());
2072                                 },
2073                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2074                         }
2075                 };
2076
2077                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2078                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2079                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2080                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2081                 }
2082
2083                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2084                 Ok(())
2085         }
2086
2087         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2088         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2089         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2090         ///
2091         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2092         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2093         ///    estimate.
2094         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2095         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2096         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2097         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2098         ///
2099         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2100         ///
2101         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2102         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2103         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2104         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2105         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2106                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2107         }
2108
2109         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2110         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2111         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2112         ///
2113         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2114         /// the channel being closed or not:
2115         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2116         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2117         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2118         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2119         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2120         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2121         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2122         ///
2123         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2124         ///
2125         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2126         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2127         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2128         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2129         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2130                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2131         }
2132
2133         #[inline]
2134         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2135                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2136                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2137                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2138                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2139                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2140                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2141                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2142                 }
2143                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2144                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2145                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2146                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2147                         // ignore the result here.
2148                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2149                 }
2150         }
2151
2152         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2153         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2154         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2155         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2156                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2157                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2158                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2159                 let mut chan = {
2160                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2161                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2162                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2163                                 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2164                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2165                                 } else {
2166                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2167                                 }
2168                                 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2169                         } else {
2170                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2171                         }
2172                 };
2173                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2174                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2175                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2176                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2177                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2178                                 msg: update
2179                         });
2180                 }
2181
2182                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2183         }
2184
2185         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2186                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2187                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2188                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2189                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2190                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2191                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2192                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2193                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2194                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2195                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2196                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2197                                                         },
2198                                                 }
2199                                         );
2200                                 }
2201                                 Ok(())
2202                         },
2203                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2204                 }
2205         }
2206
2207         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2208         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2209         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2210         /// channel.
2211         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2212         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2213                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2214         }
2215
2216         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2217         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2218         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2219         ///
2220         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2221         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2222         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2223         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2224                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2225         }
2226
2227         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2228         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2229         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2230                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2231                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2232                 }
2233         }
2234
2235         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2236         /// local transaction(s).
2237         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2238                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2239                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2240                 }
2241         }
2242
2243         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2244                 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2245         {
2246                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2247                 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2248                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2249                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2250                                 err_code: 18,
2251                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2252                         })
2253                 }
2254                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2255                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2256                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2257                 //
2258                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2259                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2260                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2261                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2262                 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2263                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2264                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2265                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2266                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2267                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2268                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2269                         });
2270                 }
2271                 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2272                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2273                                 err_code: 19,
2274                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2275                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2276                         });
2277                 }
2278
2279                 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2280                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2281                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2282                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2283                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2284                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2285                                 });
2286                         },
2287                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2288                                 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2289                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2290                                                 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2291                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2292                                                 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2293                                         });
2294                                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2295                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2296                                                 payment_data: data,
2297                                                 payment_metadata,
2298                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2299                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2300                                         }
2301                                 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2302                                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2303                                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2304                                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2305                                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2306                                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2307                                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2308                                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2309                                                 return Err(ReceiveError {
2310                                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2311                                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2312                                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2313                                                 });
2314                                         }
2315
2316                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2317                                                 payment_preimage,
2318                                                 payment_metadata,
2319                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2320                                         }
2321                                 } else {
2322                                         return Err(ReceiveError {
2323                                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2324                                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2325                                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2326                                         });
2327                                 }
2328                         },
2329                 };
2330                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2331                         routing,
2332                         payment_hash,
2333                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2334                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2335                         outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2336                         outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2337                 })
2338         }
2339
2340         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2341                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2342                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2343                                 {
2344                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2345                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2346                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2347                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2348                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2349                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2350                                         }));
2351                                 }
2352                         }
2353                 }
2354
2355                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2356                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2357                 }
2358
2359                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2360                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2361                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2362
2363                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2364                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2365                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2366                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2367                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2368                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2369                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2370                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2371                 }
2372                 macro_rules! return_err {
2373                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2374                                 {
2375                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2376                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2377                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2378                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2379                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2380                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2381                                         }));
2382                                 }
2383                         }
2384                 }
2385
2386                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2387                         Ok(res) => res,
2388                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2389                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2390                         },
2391                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2392                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2393                         },
2394                 };
2395
2396                 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2397                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2398                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
2399                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2400                                         Ok(info) => {
2401                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2402                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2403                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2404                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2405                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2406                                         },
2407                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2408                                 }
2409                         },
2410                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2411                                 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2412                                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2413                                         version: 0,
2414                                         public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2415                                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2416                                         hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2417                                 };
2418
2419                                 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2420                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2421                                         msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2422                                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2423                                         },
2424                                 };
2425
2426                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2427                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2428                                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2429                                                 short_channel_id,
2430                                         },
2431                                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2432                                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2433                                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2434                                         outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2435                                         outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2436                                 })
2437                         }
2438                 };
2439
2440                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2441                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2442                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2443                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2444                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2445                                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2446                                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2447                                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2448                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2449                                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2450                                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2451                                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2452                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2453                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2454                                                         {
2455                                                                 None
2456                                                         } else {
2457                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2458                                                         }
2459                                                 },
2460                                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2461                                         };
2462                                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2463                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2464                                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2465                                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2466                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2467                                                 }
2468                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2469                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2470                                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2471                                                         None => {
2472                                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2473                                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
2474                                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2475                                                         },
2476                                                         Some(chan) => chan
2477                                                 };
2478                                                 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2479                                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2480                                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2481                                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2482                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2483                                                 }
2484                                                 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2485                                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2486                                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2487                                                         // we don't have the channel here.
2488                                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2489                                                 }
2490                                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2491
2492                                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2493                                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2494                                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2495                                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2496                                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2497                                                 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2498                                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2499                                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2500                                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2501                                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2502                                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2503                                                         } else {
2504                                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2505                                                         }
2506                                                 }
2507                                                 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2508                                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2509                                                 }
2510                                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2511                                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2512                                                 }
2513                                                 chan_update_opt
2514                                         } else {
2515                                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2516                                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2517                                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2518                                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2519                                                         break Some((
2520                                                                 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2521                                                                 0x2000 | 2, None,
2522                                                         ));
2523                                                 }
2524                                                 None
2525                                         };
2526
2527                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2528                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2529                                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2530                                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2531                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2532                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2533                                         }
2534                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2535                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2536                                         }
2537                                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2538                                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2539                                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2540                                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2541                                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2542                                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2543                                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2544                                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2545                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2546                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2547                                         }
2548
2549                                         break None;
2550                                 }
2551                                 {
2552                                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2553                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2554                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2555                                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2556                                                 }
2557                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2558                                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2559                                                 }
2560                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2561                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2562                                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2563                                                 }
2564                                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2565                                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2566                                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2567                                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2568                                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2569                                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2570                                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2571                                                 // instead.
2572                                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
2573                                         }
2574                                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2575                                 }
2576                         }
2577                 }
2578
2579                 pending_forward_info
2580         }
2581
2582         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2583         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2584         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2585         ///
2586         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2587         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2588         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2589         ///
2590         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2591         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2592         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2593                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2594                         return Err(LightningError {
2595                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2596                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2597                         });
2598                 }
2599                 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2600                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2601                 }
2602                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2603                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2604         }
2605
2606         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2607         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2608         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2609         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2610         ///
2611         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2612         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2613         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2614         ///
2615         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2616         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2617         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2618                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2619                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2620                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2621                         Some(id) => id,
2622                 };
2623
2624                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2625         }
2626         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2627                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2628                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2629
2630                 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2631                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2632                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2633                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2634                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2635                 };
2636
2637                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2638                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2639                         short_channel_id,
2640                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2641                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2642                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2643                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2644                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2645                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2646                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2647                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2648                 };
2649                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2650                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2651                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2652                 // channel.
2653                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2654
2655                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2656                         signature: sig,
2657                         contents: unsigned
2658                 })
2659         }
2660
2661         #[cfg(test)]
2662         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2663                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2664                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2665         }
2666
2667         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2668                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2669                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2670
2671                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2672                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2673                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2674
2675                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2676                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2677                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2678                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2679                         return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2680                 }
2681                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2682
2683                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2684                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2685                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2686                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2687                         };
2688
2689                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2690                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2691                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2692                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2693                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2694                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2695                                 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2696                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2697                                 }
2698                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2699                                 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2700                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2701                                                 path: path.clone(),
2702                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2703                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2704                                                 payment_id,
2705                                         }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2706                                 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2707                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
2708                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2709                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2710                                                 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2711                                                         break Err(e);
2712                                                 }
2713                                                 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2714                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2715                                                         // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2716                                                         // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2717                                                         // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2718                                                         // which we do in the send_payment check for
2719                                                         // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2720                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2721                                                 }
2722                                         },
2723                                         None => { },
2724                                 }
2725                         } else {
2726                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2727                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2728                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
2729                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2730                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2731                         }
2732                         return Ok(());
2733                 };
2734
2735                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2736                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2737                         Err(e) => {
2738                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2739                         },
2740                 }
2741         }
2742
2743         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2744         ///
2745         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2746         /// fields for more info.
2747         ///
2748         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2749         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2750         ///
2751         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2752         ///
2753         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2754         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2755         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2756         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2757         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2758         ///
2759         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2760         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2761         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2762         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2763         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2764         ///
2765         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2766         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2767         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2768         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2769         ///
2770         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2771         ///
2772         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2773         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2774         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2775         ///
2776         /// In general, a path may raise:
2777         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2778         ///    node public key) is specified.
2779         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2780         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2781         ///    failure).
2782         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2783         ///    relevant updates.
2784         ///
2785         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2786         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2787         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2788         ///
2789         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2790         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2791         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2792         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2793         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2794         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2795                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2796                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2797                 self.pending_outbound_payments
2798                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2799                                 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2800                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2801         }
2802
2803         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2804         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2805         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2806                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2807                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2808                 self.pending_outbound_payments
2809                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2810                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2811                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2812                                 &self.pending_events,
2813                                 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2814                                 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2815         }
2816
2817         #[cfg(test)]
2818         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2819                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2820                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2821                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2822                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2823                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2824         }
2825
2826         #[cfg(test)]
2827         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2828                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2829                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2830         }
2831
2832         #[cfg(test)]
2833         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2834                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2835         }
2836
2837
2838         /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2839         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2840         /// retries are exhausted.
2841         ///
2842         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2843         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2844         ///
2845         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2846         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2847         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2848         ///
2849         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2850         /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2851         ///
2852         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2853         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2854         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2855                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2856                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2857         }
2858
2859         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2860         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2861         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2862         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2863         /// never reach the recipient.
2864         ///
2865         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2866         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2867         ///
2868         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2869         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2870         ///
2871         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2872         ///
2873         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2874         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2875                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2876                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2877                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2878                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2879                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2880                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2881                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2882         }
2883
2884         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2885         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2886         ///
2887         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2888         /// payments.
2889         ///
2890         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2891         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2892                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2893                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2894                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2895                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2896                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2897                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2898                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2899                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2900         }
2901
2902         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2903         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2904         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2905         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2906                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2907                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2908                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2909                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2910                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2911         }
2912
2913         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2914         /// payment probe.
2915         #[cfg(test)]
2916         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2917                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2918         }
2919
2920         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2921         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2922         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2923                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2924         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2925                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2926                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2927                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2928
2929                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2930                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2931                 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2932                         Some(mut chan) => {
2933                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2934
2935                                 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2936                                         .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2937                                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2938                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
2939                                 match funding_res {
2940                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2941                                         Err(_) => {
2942                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2943                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2944
2945                                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2946                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2947                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2948                                                 });
2949                                         },
2950                                 }
2951                         },
2952                         None => {
2953                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2954                                         err: format!(
2955                                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2956                                                 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2957                                 })
2958                         },
2959                 };
2960
2961                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2962                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2963                         msg,
2964                 });
2965                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2966                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2967                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2968                         },
2969                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2970                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2971                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2972                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2973                                 }
2974                                 e.insert(chan);
2975                         }
2976                 }
2977                 Ok(())
2978         }
2979
2980         #[cfg(test)]
2981         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2982                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2983                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2984                 })
2985         }
2986
2987         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2988         ///
2989         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2990         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2991         ///
2992         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2993         /// across the p2p network.
2994         ///
2995         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2996         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2997         ///
2998         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2999         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3000         /// keys per-channel).
3001         ///
3002         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3003         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3004         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3005         ///
3006         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3007         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3008         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3009         ///
3010         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3011         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3012         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3013         /// for more details.
3014         ///
3015         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3016         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3017         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3018                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3019
3020                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3021                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3022                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3023                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3024                                 });
3025                         }
3026                 }
3027                 {
3028                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3029                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3030                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3031                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3032                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3033                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3034                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3035                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3036                                 });
3037                         }
3038                 }
3039                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3040                         let mut output_index = None;
3041                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3042                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3043                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3044                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3045                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3046                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3047                                                 });
3048                                         }
3049                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3050                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3051                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3052                                                 });
3053                                         }
3054                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3055                                 }
3056                         }
3057                         if output_index.is_none() {
3058                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3059                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3060                                 });
3061                         }
3062                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3063                 })
3064         }
3065
3066         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3067         ///
3068         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3069         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3070         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3071         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3072         ///
3073         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3074         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3075         ///
3076         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3077         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3078         ///
3079         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3080         ///
3081         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3082         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3083         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3084         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3085         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3086         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3087         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3088         pub fn update_channel_config(
3089                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3090         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3091                 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3092                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3093                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3094                         });
3095                 }
3096
3097                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3098                         &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3099                 );
3100                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3101                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3102                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3103                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3104                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3105                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3106                         if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3107                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3108                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3109                                 });
3110                         }
3111                 }
3112                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3113                         let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3114                         if !channel.update_config(config) {
3115                                 continue;
3116                         }
3117                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3118                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3119                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3120                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3121                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3122                                         msg,
3123                                 });
3124                         }
3125                 }
3126                 Ok(())
3127         }
3128
3129         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3130         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3131         ///
3132         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3133         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3134         ///
3135         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3136         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3137         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3138         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3139         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3140         ///
3141         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3142         /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3143         ///
3144         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3145         /// backwards.
3146         ///
3147         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3148         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3149         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3150         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3151         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3152                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3153
3154                 let next_hop_scid = {
3155                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3156                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3157                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3158                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3159                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3160                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3161                                 Some(chan) => {
3162                                         if !chan.is_usable() {
3163                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3164                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3165                                                 })
3166                                         }
3167                                         chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3168                                 },
3169                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3170                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3171                                 })
3172                         }
3173                 };
3174
3175                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3176                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3177                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3178                         })?;
3179
3180                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3181                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3182                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3183                         },
3184                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3185                 };
3186                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3187                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3188                 };
3189
3190                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3191                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3192                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3193                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3194                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3195                 )];
3196                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3197                 Ok(())
3198         }
3199
3200         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3201         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3202         ///
3203         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3204         /// backwards.
3205         ///
3206         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3207         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3208                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3209
3210                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3211                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3212                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3213                         })?;
3214
3215                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3216                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3217                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3218                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3219                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3220                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3221                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3222                         });
3223
3224                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3225                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3226                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3227                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3228
3229                 Ok(())
3230         }
3231
3232         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3233         ///
3234         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3235         /// Will likely generate further events.
3236         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3237                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3238
3239                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3240                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3241                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3242                 {
3243                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3244                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3245
3246                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3247                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3248                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3249                                                 () => {
3250                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3251                                                                 match forward_info {
3252                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3253                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3254                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3255                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3256                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3257                                                                                 }
3258                                                                         }) => {
3259                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3260                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3261                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3262
3263                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3264                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3265                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3266                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3267                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3268                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3269                                                                                                 });
3270
3271                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3272                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3273                                                                                                 } else {
3274                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3275                                                                                                 };
3276
3277                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3278                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3279                                                                                                         reason
3280                                                                                                 ));
3281                                                                                                 continue;
3282                                                                                         }
3283                                                                                 }
3284                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3285                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3286                                                                                                 {
3287                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3288                                                                                                 }
3289                                                                                         }
3290                                                                                 }
3291                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3292                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3293                                                                                                 {
3294                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3295                                                                                                 }
3296                                                                                         }
3297                                                                                 }
3298                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3299                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3300                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3301                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3302                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3303                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
3304                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3305                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3306                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3307                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3308                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3309                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
3310                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3311                                                                                                         },
3312                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3313                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3314                                                                                                         },
3315                                                                                                 };
3316                                                                                                 match next_hop {
3317                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3318                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3319                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3320                                                                                                                         Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3321                                                                                                                 }
3322                                                                                                         },
3323                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
3324                                                                                                 }
3325                                                                                         } else {
3326                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3327                                                                                         }
3328                                                                                 } else {
3329                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3330                                                                                 }
3331                                                                         },
3332                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3333                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3334                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3335                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3336                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
3337                                                                         }
3338                                                                 }
3339                                                         }
3340                                                 }
3341                                         }
3342                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3343                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3344                                                 None => {
3345                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3346                                                         continue;
3347                                                 }
3348                                         };
3349                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3350                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3351                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3352                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3353                                                 continue;
3354                                         }
3355                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3356                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3357                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3358                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3359                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3360                                                         continue;
3361                                                 },
3362                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3363                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3364                                                                 match forward_info {
3365                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3366                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3367                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3368                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3369                                                                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3370                                                                                 },
3371                                                                         }) => {
3372                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3373                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3374                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3375                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3376                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3377                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3378                                                                                         // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3379                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
3380                                                                                 });
3381                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3382                                                                                         payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3383                                                                                         onion_packet, &self.logger)
3384                                                                                 {
3385                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3386                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3387                                                                                         } else {
3388                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3389                                                                                         }
3390                                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3391                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3392                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3393                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3394                                                                                         ));
3395                                                                                         continue;
3396                                                                                 }
3397                                                                         },
3398                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3399                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3400                                                                         },
3401                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3402                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3403                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3404                                                                                         htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3405                                                                                 ) {
3406                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3407                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3408                                                                                         } else {
3409                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3410                                                                                         }
3411                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3412                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3413                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3414                                                                                         continue;
3415                                                                                 }
3416                                                                         },
3417                                                                 }
3418                                                         }
3419                                                 }
3420                                         }
3421                                 } else {
3422                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3423                                                 match forward_info {
3424                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3425                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3426                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3427                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3428                                                                 }
3429                                                         }) => {
3430                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3431                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3432                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3433                                                                                 let onion_fields =
3434                                                                                         RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3435                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3436                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3437                                                                         },
3438                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3439                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3440                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3441                                                                                         None, None, onion_fields)
3442                                                                         },
3443                                                                         _ => {
3444                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3445                                                                         }
3446                                                                 };
3447                                                                 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3448                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3449                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3450                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3451                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3452                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3453                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3454                                                                         },
3455                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3456                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3457                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
3458                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3459                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3460                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
3461                                                                         total_value_received: None,
3462                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3463                                                                         cltv_expiry,
3464                                                                         onion_payload,
3465                                                                 };
3466
3467                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3468
3469                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3470                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3471                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3472                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3473                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3474                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3475                                                                                 );
3476                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3477                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3478                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3479                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3480                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3481                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3482                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
3483                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3484                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3485                                                                                 ));
3486                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3487                                                                         }
3488                                                                 }
3489                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3490                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3491                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3492                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3493                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3494                                                                 }
3495
3496                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3497                                                                         ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3498                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3499                                                                                 let purpose = || {
3500                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3501                                                                                                 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3502                                                                                                 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3503                                                                                         }
3504                                                                                 };
3505                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3506                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3507                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3508                                                                                 }
3509                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3510                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
3511                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3512                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
3513                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3514                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
3515                                                                                                         purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3516                                                                                                 }
3517                                                                                         });
3518                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3519                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3520                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3521                                                                                         }
3522                                                                                 } else {
3523                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3524                                                                                 }
3525                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3526                                                                                 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3527                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3528                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3529                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3530                                                                                         }
3531                                                                                 }
3532                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3533                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3534                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3535                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3536                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3537                                                                                         match &htlc.onion_payload {
3538                                                                                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3539                                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3540                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3541                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3542                                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3543                                                                                                         }
3544                                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3545                                                                                                 },
3546                                                                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
3547                                                                                         }
3548                                                                                 }
3549                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3550                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3551                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3552                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3553                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3554                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3555                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3556                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3557                                                                                 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3558                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3559                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3560                                                                                         }
3561                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3562                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3563                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3564                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3565                                                                                         new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3566                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3567                                                                                                 payment_hash,
3568                                                                                                 purpose: purpose(),
3569                                                                                                 amount_msat,
3570                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3571                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3572                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3573                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3574                                                                                         });
3575                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
3576                                                                                 } else {
3577                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3578                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3579                                                                                         // MPP parts.
3580                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3581                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3582                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
3583                                                                                         }
3584                                                                                 }
3585                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
3586                                                                         }}
3587                                                                 }
3588
3589                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3590                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3591                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3592                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3593                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3594                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3595                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3596                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3597                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3598                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3599                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3600                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3601                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3602                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
3603                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
3604                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3605                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3606                                                                                                         }
3607                                                                                                 };
3608                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3609                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3610                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3611                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3612                                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3613                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3614                                                                                                         }
3615                                                                                                 }
3616                                                                                                 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3617                                                                                         },
3618                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3619                                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3620                                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3621                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3622                                                                                                 }
3623                                                                                                 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3624                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3625                                                                                                                 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3626                                                                                                                 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3627                                                                                                                 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3628                                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3629                                                                                                                 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3630                                                                                                                         purpose: purpose.clone(),
3631                                                                                                                         onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3632                                                                                                                         htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3633                                                                                                                 });
3634                                                                                                                 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3635                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3636                                                                                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3637                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
3638                                                                                                                         amount_msat,
3639                                                                                                                         purpose,
3640                                                                                                                         via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3641                                                                                                                         via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3642                                                                                                                         claim_deadline,
3643                                                                                                                         onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3644                                                                                                                 });
3645                                                                                                         },
3646                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3647                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3648                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3649                                                                                                         }
3650                                                                                                 }
3651                                                                                         }
3652                                                                                 }
3653                                                                         },
3654                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3655                                                                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
3656                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3657                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3658                                                                                 };
3659                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3660                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3661                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3662                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3663                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3664                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3665                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3666                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3667                                                                                 } else {
3668                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3669                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
3670                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3671                                                                                         }
3672                                                                                 }
3673                                                                         },
3674                                                                 };
3675                                                         },
3676                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3677                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3678                                                         }
3679                                                 }
3680                                         }
3681                                 }
3682                         }
3683                 }
3684
3685                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3686                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3687                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3688                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3689                         |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3690                         self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3691
3692                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3693                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3694                 }
3695                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3696
3697                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3698                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3699                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3700                 // network stack.
3701                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3702
3703                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3704                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3705                 events.append(&mut new_events);
3706         }
3707
3708         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3709         ///
3710         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3711         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3712         ///
3713         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3714         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3715                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3716                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3717                 if background_events.is_empty() {
3718                         return false;
3719                 }
3720
3721                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3722                         match event {
3723                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3724                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3725                                         // monitor updating completing.
3726                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3727                                 },
3728                         }
3729                 }
3730                 true
3731         }
3732
3733         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3734         /// Process background events, for functional testing
3735         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3736                 self.process_background_events();
3737         }
3738
3739         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3740                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3741                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3742                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3743                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3744                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3745                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3746                 }
3747                 if !chan.is_live() {
3748                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3749                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3750                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3751                 }
3752                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3753                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3754
3755                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3756                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3757         }
3758
3759         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
3760         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3761         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3762         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3763         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3764         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3765                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3766                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3767
3768                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3769
3770                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3771                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3772                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3773                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3774                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3775                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3776                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3777                                 }
3778                         }
3779
3780                         should_persist
3781                 });
3782         }
3783
3784         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3785         ///
3786         /// This currently includes:
3787         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3788         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3789         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3790         ///    the channel.
3791         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3792         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3793         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3794         ///
3795         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3796         /// estimate fetches.
3797         ///
3798         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3799         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3800         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3801                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3802                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3803                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3804
3805                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3806
3807                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3808                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3809                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3810                         {
3811                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3812                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3813                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3814                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3815                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3816                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3817                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3818                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3819                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3820
3821                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3822                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3823                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3824                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
3825                                                 }
3826
3827                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3828                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3829                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3830                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3831                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3832                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3833                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3834                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3835                                                                 n += 1;
3836                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3837                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3838                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3839                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3840                                                                                         msg: update
3841                                                                                 });
3842                                                                         }
3843                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3844                                                                 } else {
3845                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3846                                                                 }
3847                                                         },
3848                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3849                                                                 n += 1;
3850                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3851                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3852                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3853                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3854                                                                                         msg: update
3855                                                                                 });
3856                                                                         }
3857                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3858                                                                 } else {
3859                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3860                                                                 }
3861                                                         },
3862                                                         _ => {},
3863                                                 }
3864
3865                                                 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3866
3867                                                 true
3868                                         });
3869                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3870                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3871                                         }
3872                                 }
3873                         }
3874
3875                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3876                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3877                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3878                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3879                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3880                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3881                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3882                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3883                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3884                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3885                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3886                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3887                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3888                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
3889                                                         let remove_entry = {
3890                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3891                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3892                                                         };
3893                                                         if remove_entry {
3894                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
3895                                                         }
3896                                                 },
3897                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3898                                         }
3899                                 }
3900                         }
3901
3902                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3903                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3904                                         // This should be unreachable
3905                                         debug_assert!(false);
3906                                         return false;
3907                                 }
3908                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3909                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3910                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3911                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3912                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3913                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3914                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3915                                         {
3916                                                 return true;
3917                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3918                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3919                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3920                                         }) {
3921                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3922                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3923                                                 return false;
3924                                         }
3925                                 }
3926                                 true
3927                         });
3928
3929                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3930                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3931                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3932                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3933                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3934                         }
3935
3936                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3937                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3938                         }
3939
3940                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3941
3942                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3943                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3944                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3945                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3946                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3947                         }
3948
3949                         should_persist
3950                 });
3951         }
3952
3953         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3954         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3955         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3956         ///
3957         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3958         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3959         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3960         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3961         ///
3962         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3963         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3964         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3965         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3966         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3967                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3968         }
3969
3970         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3971         /// reason for the failure.
3972         ///
3973         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3974         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3975                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3976
3977                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3978                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3979                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3980                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3981                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3982                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3983                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3984                         }
3985                 }
3986         }
3987
3988         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3989         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3990                 match failure_code {
3991                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3992                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3993                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3994                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3995                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3996                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3997                         }
3998                 }
3999         }
4000
4001         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4002         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4003         ///
4004         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4005         /// forwarding
4006         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4007                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4008                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4009                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4010                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4011                 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4012                         chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4013                 } else {
4014                         chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4015                 };
4016                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4017                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4018                 } else {
4019                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4020                 }
4021         }
4022
4023
4024         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4025         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4026         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4027                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4028                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4029                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4030                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4031                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4032                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4033                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4034                         }
4035                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4036                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4037                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4038                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4039                 } else {
4040                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4041                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4042                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4043                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4044                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4045                 }
4046         }
4047
4048         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4049         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4050         // be surfaced to the user.
4051         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4052                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4053                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4054         ) {
4055                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4056                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4057                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4058                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4059                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4060                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4061                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4062                                                 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4063                                         },
4064                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4065                                 }
4066                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4067                 };
4068
4069                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4070                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4071                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4072                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4073                 }
4074         }
4075
4076         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4077         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4078         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4079                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4080                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4081                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4082                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4083                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4084                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4085                 }
4086
4087                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4088                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4089                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4090                 //timer handling.
4091
4092                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4093                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4094                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4095                 match source {
4096                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4097                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4098                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4099                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4100                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4101                         },
4102                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4103                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4104                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4105
4106                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4107                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4108                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4109                                         push_forward_ev = true;
4110                                 }
4111                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4112                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4113                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4114                                         },
4115                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4116                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4117                                         }
4118                                 }
4119                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4120                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4121                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4122                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4123                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4124                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
4125                                 });
4126                         },
4127                 }
4128         }
4129
4130         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4131         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4132         ///
4133         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4134         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4135         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4136         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4137         ///
4138         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4139         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4140         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4141         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4142         ///
4143         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4144         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4145         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4146         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4147         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4148         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4149         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4150                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4151
4152                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4153
4154                 let mut sources = {
4155                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4156                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4157                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4158                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4159                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4160                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4161                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4162                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4163                                                 break;
4164                                         }
4165                                 }
4166
4167                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4168                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4169                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4170                                 });
4171                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4172                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4173                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4174                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4175                                 }
4176                                 payment.htlcs
4177                         } else { return; }
4178                 };
4179                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4180
4181                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4182                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4183                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4184                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4185                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4186                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4187                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4188                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4189                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4190                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4191                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4192                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4193                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4194                                 debug_assert!(false);
4195                                 valid_mpp = false;
4196                                 break;
4197                         }
4198                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4199
4200                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4201                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4202                                 debug_assert!(false);
4203                                 valid_mpp = false;
4204                                 break;
4205                         }
4206                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4207
4208                         if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4209                                 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4210                                 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4211                                 if sources.len() != 1 {
4212                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4213                                         debug_assert!(false);
4214                                         valid_mpp = false;
4215                                         break;
4216                                 }
4217                         }
4218
4219                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4220                 }
4221                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4222                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4223                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4224                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4225                         return;
4226                 }
4227                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4228                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4229                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4230                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4231                         return;
4232                 }
4233                 if valid_mpp {
4234                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4235                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4236                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4237                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4238                                 {
4239                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4240                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4241                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4242                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4243                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4244                                 }
4245                         }
4246                 }
4247                 if !valid_mpp {
4248                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4249                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4250                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4251                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4252                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4253                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4254                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4255                         }
4256                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4257                 }
4258
4259                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4260                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4261                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4262                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4263                 }
4264         }
4265
4266         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4267                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4268         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4269                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4270
4271                 {
4272                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4273                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4274                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4275                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4276                                 None => None
4277                         };
4278
4279                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4280                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4281                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4282                         ).unwrap_or(None);
4283
4284                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4285                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4286                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4287                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4288                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4289                                         let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4290
4291                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4292                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4293                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4294                                                                 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4295                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4296                                                 }
4297                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4298                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4299                                                 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4300                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4301                                                 if let Err(e) = res {
4302                                                         // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4303                                                         // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4304                                                         // update over and over again until morale improves.
4305                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4306                                                         return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4307                                                 }
4308                                         }
4309                                         return Ok(());
4310                                 }
4311                         }
4312                 }
4313                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4314                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4315                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4316                                 payment_preimage,
4317                         }],
4318                 };
4319                 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4320                 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4321                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4322                 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4323                         // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4324                         // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4325                         // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4326                         // again on restart.
4327                         log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4328                                 payment_preimage, update_res);
4329                 }
4330                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4331                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4332                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4333                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4334                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4335                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4336                 Ok(())
4337         }
4338
4339         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4340                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4341         }
4342
4343         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4344                 match source {
4345                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4346                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4347                         },
4348                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4349                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4350                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4351                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4352                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4353                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4354                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4355                                                         } else { None };
4356
4357                                                         let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4358                                                         let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4359
4360                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4361                                                                 fee_earned_msat,
4362                                                                 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4363                                                                 prev_channel_id,
4364                                                                 next_channel_id,
4365                                                                 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4366                                                         }})
4367                                                 } else { None }
4368                                         });
4369                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4370                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4371                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4372                                 }
4373                         },
4374                 }
4375         }
4376
4377         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4378         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4379                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4380         }
4381
4382         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4383                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4384                         match action {
4385                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4386                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4387                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4388                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4389                                                         payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4390                                                 });
4391                                         }
4392                                 },
4393                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4394                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4395                                 },
4396                         }
4397                 }
4398         }
4399
4400         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4401         /// update completion.
4402         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4403                 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4404                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4405                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4406                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4407         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4408                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4409                         log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4410                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4411                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4412                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4413                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4414                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4415
4416                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4417
4418                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4419                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4420                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4421                                 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4422                 }
4423
4424                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4425                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4426                 }
4427                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4428                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4429                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4430                                 msg,
4431                         });
4432                 }
4433
4434                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4435                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4436                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4437                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4438                                         updates: update,
4439                                 });
4440                         }
4441                 } }
4442                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4443                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4444                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4445                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4446                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4447                                 });
4448                         }
4449                 } }
4450                 match order {
4451                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4452                                 handle_cs!();
4453                                 handle_raa!();
4454                         },
4455                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4456                                 handle_raa!();
4457                                 handle_cs!();
4458                         },
4459                 }
4460
4461                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4462                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4463                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4464                 }
4465
4466                 {
4467                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4468                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4469                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4470                 }
4471
4472                 htlc_forwards
4473         }
4474
4475         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4476                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4477
4478                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4479                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4480                         None => {
4481                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4482                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4483                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4484                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4485                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4486                                         None => return,
4487                                 }
4488                         }
4489                 };
4490                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4491                 let mut peer_state_lock;
4492                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4493                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4494                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4495                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4496                 let mut channel = {
4497                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4498                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4499                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4500                         }
4501                 };
4502                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4503                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4504                 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4505                         return;
4506                 }
4507                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4508         }
4509
4510         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4511         ///
4512         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4513         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4514         /// the channel.
4515         ///
4516         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4517         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4518         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4519         ///
4520         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4521         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4522         /// used to accept such channels.
4523         ///
4524         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4525         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4526         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4527                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4528         }
4529
4530         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4531         /// it as confirmed immediately.
4532         ///
4533         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4534         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4535         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4536         ///
4537         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4538         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4539         ///
4540         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4541         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4542         ///
4543         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4544         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4545         ///
4546         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4547         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4548         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4549                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4550         }
4551
4552         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4553                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4554
4555                 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4556                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4557                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4558                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4559                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4560                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4561                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4562                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4563                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4564                                 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4565                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4566                                 }
4567                                 if accept_0conf {
4568                                         channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4569                                 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4570                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4571                                                 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4572                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4573                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4574                                                 }
4575                                         };
4576                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4577                                         let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4578                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4579                                 } else {
4580                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4581                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4582                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4583                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4584                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4585                                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4586                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4587                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4588                                                         }
4589                                                 };
4590                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4591                                                 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4592                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4593                                         }
4594                                 }
4595
4596                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4597                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4598                                         msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4599                                 });
4600                         }
4601                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4602                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4603                         }
4604                 }
4605                 Ok(())
4606         }
4607
4608         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4609         /// or 0-conf channels.
4610         ///
4611         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4612         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4613         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4614         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4615                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4616                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4617                 {
4618                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4619                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4620                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4621                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4622                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4623                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4624                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4625                                 }
4626                         }
4627                 }
4628                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4629         }
4630
4631         fn unfunded_channel_count(
4632                 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4633         ) -> usize {
4634                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4635                 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4636                         if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4637                                 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4638                         {
4639                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4640                         }
4641                 }
4642                 num_unfunded_channels
4643         }
4644
4645         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4647                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4648                 }
4649
4650                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4651                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4652                 }
4653
4654                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4655                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4656                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4657                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4658
4659                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4660                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4661                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4662                 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4663
4664                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4665                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4666                     .ok_or_else(|| {
4667                                 debug_assert!(false);
4668                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4669                         })?;
4670                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4671                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4672
4673                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4674                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4675                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4676                 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4677                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4678                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4679                 {
4680                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4681                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4682                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4683                 }
4684
4685                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4686                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4687                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4688                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4689                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4690                 }
4691
4692                 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4693                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4694                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4695                 {
4696                         Err(e) => {
4697                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4698                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4699                         },
4700                         Ok(res) => res
4701                 };
4702                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4703                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4704                                 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4705                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4706                         },
4707                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4708                                 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4709                                         if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4710                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4711                                         }
4712                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4713                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4714                                                 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4715                                         });
4716                                 } else {
4717                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4718                                         pending_events.push(
4719                                                 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4720                                                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4721                                                         counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4722                                                         funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4723                                                         push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4724                                                         channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4725                                                 }
4726                                         );
4727                                 }
4728
4729                                 entry.insert(channel);
4730                         }
4731                 }
4732                 Ok(())
4733         }
4734
4735         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4736                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4737                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4738                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4739                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
4740                                         debug_assert!(false);
4741                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4742                                 })?;
4743                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4744                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4745                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4746                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4747                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4748                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4749                                 },
4750                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4751                         }
4752                 };
4753                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4754                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4755                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4756                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4757                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
4758                         output_script,
4759                         user_channel_id: user_id,
4760                 });
4761                 Ok(())
4762         }
4763
4764         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4765                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4766
4767                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4768                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4769                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4770                                 debug_assert!(false);
4771                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4772                         })?;
4773
4774                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4775                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4776                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4777                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4778                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4779                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4780                                 },
4781                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4782                         };
4783
4784                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4785                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4786                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4787                         },
4788                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4789                                 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4790                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4791                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4792                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4793                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
4794                                         },
4795                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4796                                                 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4797                                         }
4798                                 }
4799
4800                                 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4801                                 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4802                                 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4803                                 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4804                                 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4805                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4806                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4807                                         msg: funding_msg,
4808                                 });
4809
4810                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4811
4812                                 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4813                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4814                                         per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4815
4816                                 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4817                                 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4818                                 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4819                                 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4820                                 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4821                                 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4822                                 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4823                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4824                                         res.0 = None;
4825                                 }
4826                                 res
4827                         }
4828                 }
4829         }
4830
4831         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4832                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4833                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4834                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4835                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4836                                 debug_assert!(false);
4837                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4838                         })?;
4839
4840                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4841                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4842                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4843                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4844                                 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4845                                         chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4846                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4847                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4848                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4849                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4850                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4851                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4852                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4853                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4854                                         }
4855                                 }
4856                                 res
4857                         },
4858                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4859                 }
4860         }
4861
4862         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4863                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4864                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4865                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4866                                 debug_assert!(false);
4867                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4868                         })?;
4869                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4870                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4871                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4872                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4873                                 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4874                                         self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4875                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4876                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4877                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4878                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4879                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4880                                         });
4881                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4882                                         // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4883                                         // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4884                                         // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4885                                         // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4886                                         // announcement_signatures.
4887                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4888                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4889                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4890                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4891                                                         msg,
4892                                                 });
4893                                         }
4894                                 }
4895
4896                                 {
4897                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4898                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4899                                 }
4900
4901                                 Ok(())
4902                         },
4903                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4904                 }
4905         }
4906
4907         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4908                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4909                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4910                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4911                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4912                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
4913                                         debug_assert!(false);
4914                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4915                                 })?;
4916                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4917                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4918                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4919                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4920
4921                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4922                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4923                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4924                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4925                                         }
4926
4927                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4928                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4929                                                 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4930                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4931
4932                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4933                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4934                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4935                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4936                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4937                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4938                                                         msg,
4939                                                 });
4940                                         }
4941
4942                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4943                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4944                                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4945                                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4946                                                 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4947                                         }
4948                                         break Ok(());
4949                                 },
4950                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4951                         }
4952                 };
4953                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4954                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4955                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4956                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4957                 }
4958
4959                 result
4960         }
4961
4962         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4963                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4964                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4965                         .ok_or_else(|| {
4966                                 debug_assert!(false);
4967                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4968                         })?;
4969                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4970                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4971                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4972                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4973                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4974                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4975                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4976                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4977                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4978                                                         msg,
4979                                                 });
4980                                         }
4981                                         if tx.is_some() {
4982                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4983                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4984                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4985                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4986                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4987                                                 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4988                                         } else { (tx, None) }
4989                                 },
4990                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4991                         }
4992                 };
4993                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4994                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4995                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4996                 }
4997                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4998                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4999                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5000                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5001                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5002                                         msg: update
5003                                 });
5004                         }
5005                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5006                 }
5007                 Ok(())
5008         }
5009
5010         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5011                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5012                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5013                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5014                 //
5015                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5016                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5017                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5018                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5019
5020                 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5021                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5022                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5023                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5024                                 debug_assert!(false);
5025                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5026                         })?;
5027                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5028                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5029                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5030                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5031
5032                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5033                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5034                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5035                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5036                                         match pending_forward_info {
5037                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5038                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5039                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5040                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5041                                                         } else {
5042                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5043                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5044                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5045                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5046                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5047                                                                 reason
5048                                                         };
5049                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5050                                                 },
5051                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
5052                                         }
5053                                 };
5054                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5055                         },
5056                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5057                 }
5058                 Ok(())
5059         }
5060
5061         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5062                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5063                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5064                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5065                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5066                                         debug_assert!(false);
5067                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5068                                 })?;
5069                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5070                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5071                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5072                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5073                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5074                                 },
5075                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5076                         }
5077                 };
5078                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5079                 Ok(())
5080         }
5081
5082         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5083                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5084                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5085                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5086                                 debug_assert!(false);
5087                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5088                         })?;
5089                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5090                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5092                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5093                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5094                         },
5095                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5096                 }
5097                 Ok(())
5098         }
5099
5100         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5101                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5102                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5103                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5104                                 debug_assert!(false);
5105                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5106                         })?;
5107                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5108                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5109                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5110                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5111                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5112                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5113                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5114                                 }
5115                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5116                                 Ok(())
5117                         },
5118                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5119                 }
5120         }
5121
5122         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5123                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5124                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5125                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5126                                 debug_assert!(false);
5127                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5128                         })?;
5129                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5130                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5131                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5132                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5133                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5134                                 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5135                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5136                                 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5137                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5138                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5139                         },
5140                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5141                 }
5142         }
5143
5144         #[inline]
5145         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5146                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5147                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
5148                         let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5149                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5150                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5151                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5152                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5153                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5154                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5155                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5156                                         };
5157                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5158                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5159
5160                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5161                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5162                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5163                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5164                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5165                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5166                                                 },
5167                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5168                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5169                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5170                                                         {
5171                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5172                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5173                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5174                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5175                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5176                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5177                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5178                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5179                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5180                                                                                         intercept_id
5181                                                                                 });
5182                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5183                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5184                                                                         },
5185                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5186                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5187                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5188                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5189                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5190                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5191                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5192                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
5193                                                                                 });
5194
5195                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5196                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5197                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5198                                                                                 ));
5199                                                                         }
5200                                                                 }
5201                                                         } else {
5202                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5203                                                                 // payments are being processed.
5204                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5205                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
5206                                                                 }
5207                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5208                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5209                                                         }
5210                                                 }
5211                                         }
5212                                 }
5213                         }
5214
5215                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5216                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5217                         }
5218
5219                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5220                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5221                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5222                         }
5223                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5224                 }
5225         }
5226
5227         // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5228         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5229                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5230                 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5231                         .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5232                         .is_some();
5233                 if !forward_ev_exists {
5234                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5235                                 time_forwardable:
5236                                         Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5237                         });
5238                 }
5239         }
5240
5241         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5242                 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5243                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5244                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5245                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5246                                         debug_assert!(false);
5247                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5248                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5249                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5250                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5251                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5252                                         let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5253                                         let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5254                                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5255                                         let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5256                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5257                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5258                                         (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5259                                 },
5260                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5261                         }
5262                 };
5263                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5264                 res
5265         }
5266
5267         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5268                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5269                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5270                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5271                                 debug_assert!(false);
5272                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5273                         })?;
5274                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5275                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5276                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5277                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5278                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5279                         },
5280                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5281                 }
5282                 Ok(())
5283         }
5284
5285         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5286                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5287                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5288                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5289                                 debug_assert!(false);
5290                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5291                         })?;
5292                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5293                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5294                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5295                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5296                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5297                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5298                                 }
5299
5300                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5301                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5302                                                 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5303                                                 msg, &self.default_configuration
5304                                         ), chan),
5305                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5306                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5307                                         update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5308                                 });
5309                         },
5310                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5311                 }
5312                 Ok(())
5313         }
5314
5315         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5316         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5317                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5318                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5319                         None => {
5320                                 // It's not a local channel
5321                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5322                         }
5323                 };
5324                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5325                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5326                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5327                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5328                 }
5329                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5330                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5331                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5332                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5333                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5334                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
5335                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5336                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5337                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5338                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5339                                         }
5340                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5341                                 }
5342                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5343                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5344                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5345                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5346                                 } else {
5347                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5348                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5349                                 }
5350                         },
5351                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5352                 }
5353                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5354         }
5355
5356         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5357                 let htlc_forwards;
5358                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5359                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5360
5361                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5362                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5363                                         debug_assert!(false);
5364                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5365                                 })?;
5366                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5367                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5368                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5369                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5370                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5371                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5372                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5373                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5374                                         let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5375                                                 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5376                                                 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5377                                         let mut channel_update = None;
5378                                         if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5379                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5380                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5381                                                         msg,
5382                                                 });
5383                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5384                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5385                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5386                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5387                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5388                                                         channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5389                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5390                                                                 msg,
5391                                                         });
5392                                                 }
5393                                         }
5394                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5395                                         htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5396                                                 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5397                                                 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5398                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5399                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5400                                         }
5401                                         need_lnd_workaround
5402                                 },
5403                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5404                         }
5405                 };
5406
5407                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5408                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5409                 }
5410
5411                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5412                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5413                 }
5414                 Ok(())
5415         }
5416
5417         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5418         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5419                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5420
5421                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5422                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5423                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5424                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5425                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5426                                 match monitor_event {
5427                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5428                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5429                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5430                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5431                                                 } else {
5432                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5433                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5434                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5435                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5436                                                 }
5437                                         },
5438                                         MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5439                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5440                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5441                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5442                                                         None => {
5443                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5444                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5445                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5446                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5447                                                         }
5448                                                 };
5449                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5450                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5451                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5452                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5453                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5454                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5455                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5456                                                                         let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5457                                                                         failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5458                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5459                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5460                                                                                         msg: update
5461                                                                                 });
5462                                                                         }
5463                                                                         let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5464                                                                                 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5465                                                                         } else {
5466                                                                                 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5467                                                                         };
5468                                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5469                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5470                                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5471                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5472                                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5473                                                                                 },
5474                                                                         });
5475                                                                 }
5476                                                         }
5477                                                 }
5478                                         },
5479                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5480                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5481                                         },
5482                                 }
5483                         }
5484                 }
5485
5486                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5487                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5488                 }
5489
5490                 has_pending_monitor_events
5491         }
5492
5493         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5494         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5495         /// update events as a separate process method here.
5496         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5497         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5498                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5499                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5500                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5501                         } else {
5502                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5503                         }
5504                 });
5505         }
5506
5507         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5508         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5509         /// update was applied.
5510         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5511                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5512                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5513                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5514
5515                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5516                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5517                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5518                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5519                 'peer_loop: loop {
5520                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5521                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5522                                 'chan_loop: loop {
5523                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5524                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5525                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5526                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5527                                                 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5528                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5529                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5530                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5531                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5532                                                 }
5533                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5534                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
5535
5536                                                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5537                                                                 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5538                                                         let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5539                                                         let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5540                                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5541                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5542                                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5543                                                         if res.is_err() {
5544                                                                 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5545                                                         }
5546                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
5547                                                 }
5548                                         }
5549                                         break 'chan_loop;
5550                                 }
5551                         }
5552                         break 'peer_loop;
5553                 }
5554
5555                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5556                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5557                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5558                 }
5559
5560                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5561                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5562                 }
5563
5564                 has_update
5565         }
5566
5567         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5568         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5569         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5570         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5571                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5572                 let mut has_update = false;
5573                 {
5574                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5575
5576                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5577                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5578                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5579                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5580                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5581                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5582                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5583                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5584                                                                 has_update = true;
5585                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5586                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5587                                                                 });
5588                                                         }
5589                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5590                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5591                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5592                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5593                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5594                                                                                 msg: update
5595                                                                         });
5596                                                                 }
5597
5598                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5599
5600                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5601                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5602                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5603                                                                 false
5604                                                         } else { true }
5605                                                 },
5606                                                 Err(e) => {
5607                                                         has_update = true;
5608                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5609                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5610                                                         !close_channel
5611                                                 }
5612                                         }
5613                                 });
5614                         }
5615                 }
5616
5617                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5618                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5619                 }
5620
5621                 has_update
5622         }
5623
5624         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5625         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5626         /// Channel object.
5627         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5628                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5629                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5630                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5631                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
5632                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5633                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5634                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5635                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5636                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5637                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5638                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5639                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
5640                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
5641                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5642                         }
5643                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5644                 }
5645         }
5646
5647         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5648                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5649
5650                 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5651                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5652                 }
5653
5654                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5655
5656                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5657                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5658                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5659                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5660                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5661                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5662                                         user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5663                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5664                                         // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5665                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5666                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5667                                         // never fail a payment too early.
5668                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5669                                         // timestamps.
5670                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5671                                 });
5672                         },
5673                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5674                 }
5675                 Ok(payment_secret)
5676         }
5677
5678         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5679         /// to pay us.
5680         ///
5681         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5682         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5683         ///
5684         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5685         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5686         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5687         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5688         ///
5689         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5690         ///
5691         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5692         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5693         ///
5694         /// # Note
5695         ///
5696         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5697         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5698         ///
5699         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5700         ///
5701         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5702         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5703         ///
5704         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5705         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5706         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5707         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5708         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5709         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5710         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5711                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5712                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5713                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5714                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5715         }
5716
5717         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5718         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5719         ///
5720         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5721         ///
5722         /// # Note
5723         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5724         ///
5725         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5726         #[deprecated]
5727         pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5728                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5729                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5730                 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5731                 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5732         }
5733
5734         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5735         /// stored external to LDK.
5736         ///
5737         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5738         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5739         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5740         ///
5741         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5742         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5743         /// payments.
5744         ///
5745         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5746         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5747         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5748         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5749         ///
5750         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5751         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5752         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5753         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5754         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5755         ///
5756         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5757         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5758         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5759         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5760         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5761         ///
5762         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5763         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5764         ///
5765         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5766         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5767         ///
5768         /// # Note
5769         ///
5770         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5771         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5772         ///
5773         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5774         ///
5775         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5776         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5777         ///
5778         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5779         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5780         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5781                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5782                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5783                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5784                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
5785         }
5786
5787         /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5788         /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5789         ///
5790         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5791         ///
5792         /// # Note
5793         /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5794         ///
5795         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5796         #[deprecated]
5797         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5798                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5799         }
5800
5801         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5802         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5803         ///
5804         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5805         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5806                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5807         }
5808
5809         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5810         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5811         ///
5812         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5813         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5814                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5815                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5816                 loop {
5817                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5818                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5819                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5820                                 Some(_) => continue,
5821                                 None => return scid_candidate
5822                         }
5823                 }
5824         }
5825
5826         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5827         ///
5828         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5829         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5830                 PhantomRouteHints {
5831                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5832                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5833                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5834                 }
5835         }
5836
5837         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5838         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5839         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5840         ///
5841         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5842         /// times to get a unique scid.
5843         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5844                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5845                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5846                 loop {
5847                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5848                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5849                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5850                         return scid_candidate
5851                 }
5852         }
5853
5854         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5855         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5856         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5857                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5858
5859                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5860                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5861                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5862                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5863                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5864                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5865                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5866                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5867                                         }
5868                                 }
5869                         }
5870                 }
5871
5872                 inflight_htlcs
5873         }
5874
5875         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5876         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5877                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5878                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5879                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5880                 events.into_inner()
5881         }
5882
5883         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5884         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5885                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5886                 events.push(event);
5887         }
5888
5889         #[cfg(test)]
5890         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5891                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5892                 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5893         }
5894
5895         #[cfg(test)]
5896         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5897                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5898         }
5899
5900         #[cfg(test)]
5901         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5902                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5903         }
5904
5905         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5906         /// using the given event handler.
5907         ///
5908         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5909         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5910                 &self, handler: H
5911         ) {
5912                 let mut ev;
5913                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
5914         }
5915 }
5916
5917 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5918 where
5919         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5920         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5921         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5922         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5923         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5924         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5925         R::Target: Router,
5926         L::Target: Logger,
5927 {
5928         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5929         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5930         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5931         /// is always placed next to each other.
5932         ///
5933         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5934         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5935         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5936         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5937         ///
5938         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5939         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5940         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5941         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5942                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5943                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5944                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5945
5946                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5947                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5948                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5949                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5950                         }
5951
5952                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5953                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5954                         }
5955                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5956                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5957                         }
5958
5959                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5960                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5961                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5962                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5963                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5964                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5965                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5966                                 }
5967                         }
5968
5969                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5970                                 events.replace(pending_events);
5971                         }
5972
5973                         result
5974                 });
5975                 events.into_inner()
5976         }
5977 }
5978
5979 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5980 where
5981         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5982         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5983         ES::Target: EntropySource,
5984         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5985         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5986         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5987         R::Target: Router,
5988         L::Target: Logger,
5989 {
5990         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5991         ///
5992         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5993         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5994         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5995                 let mut ev;
5996                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
5997         }
5998 }
5999
6000 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6001 where
6002         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6003         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6004         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6005         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6006         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6007         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6008         R::Target: Router,
6009         L::Target: Logger,
6010 {
6011         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6012                 {
6013                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6014                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6015                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6016                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6017                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6018                 }
6019
6020                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6021                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6022         }
6023
6024         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6025                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6026                 let new_height = height - 1;
6027                 {
6028                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6029                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6030                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6031                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6032                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6033                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6034                 }
6035
6036                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6037         }
6038 }
6039
6040 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6041 where
6042         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6043         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6044         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6045         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6046         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6047         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6048         R::Target: Router,
6049         L::Target: Logger,
6050 {
6051         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6052                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6053                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6054                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6055
6056                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6057                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6058
6059                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6060                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6061                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6062
6063                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6064                 if height < last_best_block_height {
6065                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6066                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6067                 }
6068         }
6069
6070         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6071                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6072                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6073                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6074
6075                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6076                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6077
6078                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6079
6080                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6081
6082                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6083
6084                 macro_rules! max_time {
6085                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
6086                                 loop {
6087                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6088                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6089                                         // having an explicit local time source.
6090                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6091                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6092                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6093                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6094                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6095                                                 break;
6096                                         }
6097                                 }
6098                         }
6099                 }
6100                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6101                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6102                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6103                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6104                 });
6105         }
6106
6107         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6108                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6109                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6110                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6111                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6112                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6113                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6114                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6115                                 }
6116                         }
6117                 }
6118                 res
6119         }
6120
6121         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6122                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6123                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6124                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6125                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6126                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6127                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6128                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6129                 });
6130         }
6131 }
6132
6133 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6134 where
6135         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6136         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6137         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6138         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6139         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6140         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6141         R::Target: Router,
6142         L::Target: Logger,
6143 {
6144         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6145         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6146         /// the function.
6147         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6148                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6149                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6150                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6151                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6152
6153                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6154                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6155                 {
6156                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6157                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6158                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6159                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6160                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6161                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6162                                         let res = f(channel);
6163                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6164                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6165                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6166                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6167                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6168                                                 }
6169                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6170                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6171                                                         if channel.is_usable() {
6172                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6173                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6174                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6175                                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6176                                                                                 msg,
6177                                                                         });
6178                                                                 }
6179                                                         } else {
6180                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6181                                                         }
6182                                                 }
6183
6184                                                 {
6185                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6186                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6187                                                 }
6188
6189                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6190                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6191                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6192                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6193                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
6194                                                         });
6195                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6196                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6197                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6198                                                                                 msg: announcement,
6199                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6200                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6201                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6202                                                                         });
6203                                                                 }
6204                                                         }
6205                                                 }
6206                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6207                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6208                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6209                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6210                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6211                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6212                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6213                                                                 // is always consistent.
6214                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6215                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6216                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6217                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6218                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6219                                                         }
6220                                                 }
6221                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6222                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6223                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6224                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6225                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6226                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6227                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6228                                                                 msg: update
6229                                                         });
6230                                                 }
6231                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6232                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6233                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6234                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6235                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6236                                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6237                                                                 data: reason_message,
6238                                                         } },
6239                                                 });
6240                                                 return false;
6241                                         }
6242                                         true
6243                                 });
6244                         }
6245                 }
6246
6247                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6248                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6249                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6250                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6251                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6252                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6253                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6254                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6255                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6256                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6257
6258                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6259                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6260                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6261                                                 false
6262                                         } else { true }
6263                                 });
6264                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6265                         });
6266
6267                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6268                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6269                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6270                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6271                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6272                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6273                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6274                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6275                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6276                                         });
6277
6278                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6279                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6280                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
6281                                         };
6282                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6283                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6284                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6285                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6286                                         false
6287                                 } else { true }
6288                         });
6289                 }
6290
6291                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6292
6293                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6294                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6295                 }
6296         }
6297
6298         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6299         ///
6300         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6301         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6302         ///
6303         pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6304                 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6305         }
6306
6307         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6308         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6309                 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6310         }
6311
6312         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6313         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6314         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6315                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6316         }
6317
6318         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6319         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6320         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6321                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6322         }
6323
6324         /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6325         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6326         ///
6327         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6328         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6329         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6330         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6331                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6332         }
6333
6334         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6335         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6336         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6337                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6338         }
6339
6340         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6341         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6342         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6343                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6344         }
6345
6346         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6347         /// [`ChannelManager`].
6348         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6349                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6350         }
6351 }
6352
6353 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6354         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6355 where
6356         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6357         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6358         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6359         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6360         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6361         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6362         R::Target: Router,
6363         L::Target: Logger,
6364 {
6365         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6366                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6367                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6368         }
6369
6370         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6371                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6372                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6373         }
6374
6375         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6376                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6377                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6378         }
6379
6380         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6381                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6382                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6383         }
6384
6385         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6386                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6387                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6388         }
6389
6390         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6391                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6393         }
6394
6395         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6396                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6398         }
6399
6400         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6401                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6402                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6403         }
6404
6405         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6406                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6407                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6408         }
6409
6410         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6411                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6413         }
6414
6415         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6416                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6417                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6418         }
6419
6420         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6421                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6422                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6423         }
6424
6425         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6426                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6427                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6428         }
6429
6430         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6431                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6433         }
6434
6435         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6436                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6437                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6438         }
6439
6440         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6441                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6442                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6443                                 persist
6444                         } else {
6445                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6446                         }
6447                 });
6448         }
6449
6450         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6451                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6452                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6453         }
6454
6455         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6456                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6458                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6459                 let remove_peer = {
6460                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6461                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6462                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6463                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6466                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6467                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6468                                         if chan.is_shutdown() {
6469                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6470                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6471                                                 return false;
6472                                         }
6473                                         true
6474                                 });
6475                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6476                                         match msg {
6477                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6478                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6479                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6480                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6481                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6482                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6483                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6484                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6485                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6486                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6487                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6488                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6489                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6490                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6491                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6492                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6493                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6494                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6495                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6496                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6497                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6498                                         }
6499                                 });
6500                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6501                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6502                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6503                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6504                 };
6505                 if remove_peer {
6506                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6507                 }
6508                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6509
6510                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6511                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6512                 }
6513         }
6514
6515         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6516                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6517                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6518                         return Err(());
6519                 }
6520
6521                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6522
6523                 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6524                 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6525                 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6526                 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6527                 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6528                 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6529
6530                 {
6531                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6532                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6533                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6534                                         if inbound_peer_limited {
6535                                                 return Err(());
6536                                         }
6537                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6538                                                 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6539                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6540                                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6541                                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6542                                                 is_connected: true,
6543                                         }));
6544                                 },
6545                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6546                                         let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6547                                         peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6548
6549                                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6550                                         if inbound_peer_limited &&
6551                                                 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6552                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6553                                         {
6554                                                 return Err(());
6555                                         }
6556
6557                                         debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6558                                         peer_state.is_connected = true;
6559                                 },
6560                         }
6561                 }
6562
6563                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6564
6565                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6566                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6567                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6568                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6569                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6570                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6571                                 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6572                                         if !chan.have_received_message() {
6573                                                 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6574                                                 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6575                                                 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6576                                                 // drop it.
6577                                                 false
6578                                         } else {
6579                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6580                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6581                                                         msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6582                                                 });
6583                                                 true
6584                                         }
6585                                 } else { true };
6586                                 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6587                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6588                                                 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6589                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6590                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6591                                                                 msg, update_msg,
6592                                                         });
6593                                                 }
6594                                         }
6595                                 }
6596                                 retain
6597                         });
6598                 }
6599                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6600                 Ok(())
6601         }
6602
6603         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6604                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6605
6606                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6607                         let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6608                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6609                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6610                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6611                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6612                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6613                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6614                         };
6615                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
6616                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6617                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6618                         }
6619                 } else {
6620                         {
6621                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6622                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6623                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6624                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6625                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6626                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6627                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6628                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6629                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6630                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6631                                                         msg,
6632                                                 });
6633                                                 return;
6634                                         }
6635                                 }
6636                         }
6637
6638                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6639                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6640                 }
6641         }
6642
6643         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6644                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6645         }
6646
6647         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6648                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6649         }
6650 }
6651
6652 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6653 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6654 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6655         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6656 }
6657
6658 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6659 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6660 ///
6661 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6662 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6663 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6664 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6665         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6666 }
6667
6668 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6669 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6670 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6671         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6672 }
6673
6674 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6675 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6676 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6677         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6678 }
6679
6680 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6681 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6682 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6683         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6684         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6685         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6686         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6687         features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6688         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6689         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6690         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6691         features.set_payment_secret_required();
6692         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6693         features.set_wumbo_optional();
6694         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6695         features.set_channel_type_optional();
6696         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6697         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6698         #[cfg(anchors)]
6699         { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6700                 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6701                         features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6702                 }
6703         }
6704         features
6705 }
6706
6707 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6708 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6709
6710 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6711         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6712         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6713         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6714 });
6715
6716 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6717         (2, node_id, required),
6718         (4, features, required),
6719         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6720         (8, forwarding_info, option),
6721         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6722         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6723 });
6724
6725 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6726         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6727                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6728                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6729                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6730                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6731                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6732                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6733                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
6734                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
6735                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
6736                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6737                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6738                         (7, self.config, option),
6739                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6740                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
6741                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6742                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6743                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6744                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6745                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6746                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6747                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6748                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6749                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6750                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6751                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6752                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6753                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6754                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
6755                         (32, self.is_public, required),
6756                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6757                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6758                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6759                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6760                 });
6761                 Ok(())
6762         }
6763 }
6764
6765 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6766         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6767                 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6768                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6769                         (2, channel_id, required),
6770                         (3, channel_type, option),
6771                         (4, counterparty, required),
6772                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6773                         (6, funding_txo, option),
6774                         (7, config, option),
6775                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
6776                         (9, confirmations, option),
6777                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6778                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6779                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6780                         (16, balance_msat, required),
6781                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6782                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6783                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6784                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6785                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6786                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
6787                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6788                         (26, is_outbound, required),
6789                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6790                         (30, is_usable, required),
6791                         (32, is_public, required),
6792                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6793                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6794                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6795                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6796                 });
6797
6798                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6799                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6800                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6801                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6802                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6803
6804                 Ok(Self {
6805                         inbound_scid_alias,
6806                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6807                         channel_type,
6808                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6809                         outbound_scid_alias,
6810                         funding_txo,
6811                         config,
6812                         short_channel_id,
6813                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6814                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6815                         user_channel_id,
6816                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6817                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6818                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6819                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6820                         confirmations_required,
6821                         confirmations,
6822                         force_close_spend_delay,
6823                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6824                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6825                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6826                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6827                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6828                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6829                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6830                 })
6831         }
6832 }
6833
6834 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6835         (2, channels, vec_type),
6836         (4, phantom_scid, required),
6837         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6838 });
6839
6840 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6841         (0, Forward) => {
6842                 (0, onion_packet, required),
6843                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6844         },
6845         (1, Receive) => {
6846                 (0, payment_data, required),
6847                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6848                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6849                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6850         },
6851         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6852                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6853                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6854                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6855         },
6856 ;);
6857
6858 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6859         (0, routing, required),
6860         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6861         (4, payment_hash, required),
6862         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6863         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6864         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6865 });
6866
6867
6868 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6869         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6870                 match self {
6871                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6872                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
6873                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6874                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6875                                 reason.write(writer)?;
6876                         },
6877                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6878                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6879                         }) => {
6880                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
6881                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6882                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6883                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6884                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6885                         },
6886                 }
6887                 Ok(())
6888         }
6889 }
6890
6891 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6892         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6893                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894                 match id {
6895                         0 => {
6896                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6897                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6898                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6899                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6900                                 }))
6901                         },
6902                         1 => {
6903                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6904                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6905                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6906                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6907                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6908                                 }))
6909                         },
6910                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6911                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6912                         // messages contained in the variants.
6913                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6914                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6915                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6916                         2 => {
6917                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6918                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6919                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6920                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6921                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6922                         },
6923                         3 => {
6924                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6926                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6927                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6928                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6929                         },
6930                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6931                 }
6932         }
6933 }
6934
6935 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6936         (0, Forward),
6937         (1, Fail),
6938 );
6939
6940 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6941         (0, short_channel_id, required),
6942         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6943         (2, outpoint, required),
6944         (4, htlc_id, required),
6945         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6946 });
6947
6948 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6949         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6950                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6951                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6952                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6953                 };
6954                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6955                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6956                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
6957                         (2, self.value, required),
6958                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6959                         (4, payment_data, option),
6960                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6961                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6962                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6963                 });
6964                 Ok(())
6965         }
6966 }
6967
6968 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6969         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6970                 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6971                 let mut value = 0;
6972                 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6973                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6974                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6975                 let mut total_value_received = None;
6976                 let mut total_msat = None;
6977                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6978                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6979                         (0, prev_hop, required),
6980                         (1, total_msat, option),
6981                         (2, value, required),
6982                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6983                         (4, payment_data, option),
6984                         (5, total_value_received, option),
6985                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6986                         (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6987                 });
6988                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6989                         Some(p) => {
6990                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
6991                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6992                                 }
6993                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
6994                                         total_msat = Some(value);
6995                                 }
6996                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6997                         },
6998                         None => {
6999                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
7000                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
7001                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7002                                         }
7003                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7004                                 }
7005                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7006                         },
7007                 };
7008                 Ok(Self {
7009                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7010                         timer_ticks: 0,
7011                         value,
7012                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7013                         total_value_received,
7014                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7015                         onion_payload,
7016                         cltv_expiry,
7017                 })
7018         }
7019 }
7020
7021 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7022         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7023                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024                 match id {
7025                         0 => {
7026                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7027                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7028                                 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7029                                 let mut payment_id = None;
7030                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7031                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7032                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7033                                         (0, session_priv, required),
7034                                         (1, payment_id, option),
7035                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7036                                         (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7037                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7038                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
7039                                 });
7040                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
7041                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7042                                         // instead.
7043                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7044                                 }
7045                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7046                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7047                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7048                                 }
7049                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7050                                         if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
7051                                                 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7052                                         }
7053                                 }
7054                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7055                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7056                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
7057                                         path,
7058                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7059                                 })
7060                         }
7061                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7062                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7063                 }
7064         }
7065 }
7066
7067 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7068         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7069                 match self {
7070                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7071                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
7072                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7073                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7074                                         (0, session_priv, required),
7075                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7076                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7077                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7078                                         (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7079                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7080                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7081                                  });
7082                         }
7083                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7084                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
7085                                 field.write(writer)?;
7086                         }
7087                 }
7088                 Ok(())
7089         }
7090 }
7091
7092 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7093         (0, forward_info, required),
7094         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7095         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7096         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7097         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7098 });
7099
7100 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7101         (1, FailHTLC) => {
7102                 (0, htlc_id, required),
7103                 (2, err_packet, required),
7104         };
7105         (0, AddHTLC)
7106 );
7107
7108 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7109         (0, payment_secret, required),
7110         (2, expiry_time, required),
7111         (4, user_payment_id, required),
7112         (6, payment_preimage, required),
7113         (8, min_value_msat, required),
7114 });
7115
7116 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7117 where
7118         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7119         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7120         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7121         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7122         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7123         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7124         R::Target: Router,
7125         L::Target: Logger,
7126 {
7127         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7128                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7129
7130                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7131
7132                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7133                 {
7134                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7135                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7136                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7137                 }
7138
7139                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7140                 {
7141                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7142                         let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7143                         let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7144                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7145                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7146                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7147                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7148                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
7149                                 }
7150                                 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7151                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7152                                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7153                                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
7154                                         }
7155                                 }
7156                         }
7157
7158                         ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7159
7160                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7161                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7162                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7163                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7164                                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7165                                                 channel.write(writer)?;
7166                                         }
7167                                 }
7168                         }
7169                 }
7170
7171                 {
7172                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7173                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7174                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7175                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7176                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7177                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
7178                                         forward.write(writer)?;
7179                                 }
7180                         }
7181                 }
7182
7183                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7184
7185                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7186                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7187                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7188
7189                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7190                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7191                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7192                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7193                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7194                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7195                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7196                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
7197                         }
7198                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7199                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7200                 }
7201
7202                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7203                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7204                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7205                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7206                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7207                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
7208                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7209                 }
7210
7211                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7212                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7213                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7214                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7215                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7216                         // no channels.
7217                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7218                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7219                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7220                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7221                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7222                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7223                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7224                                 }
7225                         }
7226                 }
7227
7228                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7229                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7230                 for event in events.iter() {
7231                         event.write(writer)?;
7232                 }
7233
7234                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7235                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7236                 for event in background_events.iter() {
7237                         match event {
7238                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7239                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
7240                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7241                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7242                                 },
7243                         }
7244                 }
7245
7246                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7247                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7248                 // likely to be identical.
7249                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7250                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7251
7252                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7253                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7254                         hash.write(writer)?;
7255                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7256                 }
7257
7258                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7259                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7260                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7261                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7262                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7263                         }
7264                 }
7265                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7266                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7267                         match outbound {
7268                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7269                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7270                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7271                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7272                                         }
7273                                 }
7274                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7275                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7276                         }
7277                 }
7278
7279                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7280                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7281                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7282                         match outbound {
7283                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7284                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7285                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7286                                 },
7287                                 _ => {},
7288                         }
7289                 }
7290
7291                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7292                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7293                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7294                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7295                 }
7296
7297                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7298                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7299                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7300                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7301                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
7302                 }
7303
7304                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7305                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7306                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7307                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7308                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7309                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7310                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7311                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7312                         (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7313                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7314                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7315                 });
7316
7317                 Ok(())
7318         }
7319 }
7320
7321 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7322 ///
7323 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7324 /// is:
7325 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7326 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7327 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7328 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7329 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7330 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7331 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7332 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7333 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7334 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7335 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7336 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7337 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7338 ///    the next step.
7339 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7340 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7341 ///
7342 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7343 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7344 ///
7345 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7346 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7347 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7348 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7349 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7350 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7351 ///
7352 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7353 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7354 where
7355         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7356         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7357         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7358         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7359         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7360         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7361         R::Target: Router,
7362         L::Target: Logger,
7363 {
7364         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7365         pub entropy_source: ES,
7366
7367         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7368         pub node_signer: NS,
7369
7370         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7371         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7372         /// signing data.
7373         pub signer_provider: SP,
7374
7375         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7376         ///
7377         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7378         pub fee_estimator: F,
7379         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7380         ///
7381         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7382         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7383         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7384         pub chain_monitor: M,
7385
7386         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7387         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7388         /// force-closed during deserialization.
7389         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7390         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7391         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7392         ///
7393         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7394         pub router: R,
7395         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7396         /// deserialization.
7397         pub logger: L,
7398         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7399         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7400         pub default_config: UserConfig,
7401
7402         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7403         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7404         ///
7405         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7406         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7407         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7408         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7409         ///
7410         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7411         /// this struct.
7412         ///
7413         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7414         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7415 }
7416
7417 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7418                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7419 where
7420         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7421         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7422         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7423         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7424         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7425         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7426         R::Target: Router,
7427         L::Target: Logger,
7428 {
7429         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7430         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7431         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7432         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7433                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7434                 Self {
7435                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7436                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7437                 }
7438         }
7439 }
7440
7441 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7442 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7443 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7444         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7445 where
7446         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7447         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7448         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7449         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7450         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7451         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7452         R::Target: Router,
7453         L::Target: Logger,
7454 {
7455         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7456                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7457                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7458         }
7459 }
7460
7461 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7462         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7463 where
7464         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7465         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7466         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7467         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7468         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7469         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7470         R::Target: Router,
7471         L::Target: Logger,
7472 {
7473         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7474                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7475
7476                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7479
7480                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7481
7482                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7484                 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7485                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7486                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7487                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7488                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7489                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7490                         let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7491                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7492                         ))?;
7493                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7494                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7495                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7496                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7497                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7498                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7499                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7500                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7501                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7502                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7503                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7504                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7505                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7506                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7507                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7508                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7509                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7510                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7511                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7512                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7513                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7514                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7515                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7516                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7517                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7518                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7519                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7520                                                 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7521                                         }
7522                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7523                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7524                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7525                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7526                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7527                                         });
7528                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7529                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
7530                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7531                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7532                                                 }
7533                                                 if !found_htlc {
7534                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7535                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7536                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7537                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7538                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7539                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7540                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7541                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
7542                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7543                                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7544                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7545                                                 }
7546                                         }
7547                                 } else {
7548                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7549                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7550                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7551                                         }
7552                                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7553                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7554                                         }
7555                                         match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7556                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7557                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7558                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7559                                                 },
7560                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7561                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7562                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7563                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
7564                                                 }
7565                                         }
7566                                 }
7567                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7568                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7569                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7570                                 // safely discard the channel.
7571                                 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7572                                 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7573                                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7574                                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7575                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7576                                 });
7577                         } else {
7578                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7579                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7580                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7581                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7582                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7583                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7584                         }
7585                 }
7586
7587                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7588                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7589                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7590                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7591                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7592                                 };
7593                                 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7594                         }
7595                 }
7596
7597                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7598                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7599                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7600                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7601                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7602                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7603                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7604                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7605                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7606                         }
7607                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7608                 }
7609
7610                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7611                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7612                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7613                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7614                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7615                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7616                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7617                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7618                         }
7619                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7620                 }
7621
7622                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7623                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7624                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7625                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7626                         let peer_state = PeerState {
7627                                 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7628                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7629                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7630                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7631                                 is_connected: false,
7632                         };
7633                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7634                 }
7635
7636                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7637                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7638                 for _ in 0..event_count {
7639                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7640                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7641                                 None => continue,
7642                         }
7643                 }
7644
7645                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7646                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7647                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7648                                 0 => {
7649                                         let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7650                                         if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7651                                                 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7652                                                 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7653                                         }).is_none() {
7654                                                 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7655                                         }
7656                                 }
7657                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7658                         }
7659                 }
7660
7661                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7662                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7663
7664                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7665                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7666                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7667                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7668                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7669                         }
7670                 }
7671
7672                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7673                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7674                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7675                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7676                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7677                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7678                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7679                         };
7680                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7681                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7682                         };
7683                 }
7684
7685                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7686                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7687                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7688                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7689                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7690                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7691                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7692                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7693                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7694                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7695                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7696                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7697                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7698                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7699                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7700                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7701                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7702                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7703                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7704                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7705                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7706                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7707                 });
7708                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7709                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7710                 }
7711
7712                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7713                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7714                 }
7715
7716                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7717                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7718                 }
7719
7720                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7721                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7722                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7723                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7724                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7725                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7726                         }
7727                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7728                 }
7729                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7730                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7731                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7732                 };
7733
7734                 {
7735                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7736                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7737                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7738                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7739                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7740                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7741                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7742                         // 0.0.102+
7743                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7744                                 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7745                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7746                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7747                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
7748                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7749                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7750                                                         }
7751
7752                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
7753                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7754                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7755                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7756                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7757                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7758                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7759                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7760                                                                 },
7761                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7762                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
7763                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7764                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
7765                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7766                                                                                 payment_params: None,
7767                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7768                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7769                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7770                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7771                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7772                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7773                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7774                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
7775                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7776                                                                         });
7777                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7778                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7779                                                                 }
7780                                                         }
7781                                                 }
7782                                         }
7783                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7784                                                 match htlc_source {
7785                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7786                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7787                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7788                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7789                                                                 };
7790                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7791                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7792                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7793                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7794                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7795                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7796                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
7797                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7798                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7799                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7800                                                                                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7801                                                                                                 false
7802                                                                                         } else { true }
7803                                                                                 } else { true }
7804                                                                         });
7805                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
7806                                                                 });
7807                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7808                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7809                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7810                                                                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7811                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7812                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7813                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
7814                                                                                         } else { true }
7815                                                                                 });
7816                                                                                 false
7817                                                                         } else { true }
7818                                                                 });
7819                                                         },
7820                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7821                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7822                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7823                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7824                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7825                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7826                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7827                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7828                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7829                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7830                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7831                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7832                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7833                                                                 }
7834                                                         },
7835                                                 }
7836                                         }
7837                                 }
7838                         }
7839                 }
7840
7841                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7842                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7843                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7844                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7845                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7846                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7847                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7848                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7849                         });
7850                 }
7851
7852                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7853                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7854
7855                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7856                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7857                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7858                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7859                         }
7860                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7861                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7862                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7863                                 }
7864                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7865                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7866                                 {
7867                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7868                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7869                                         });
7870                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7871                                 }
7872                         } else {
7873                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7874                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7875                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7876                                         });
7877                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7878                                 }
7879                         }
7880                 } else {
7881                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7882                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7883                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7884                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7885                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7886                                 }
7887                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7888                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7889                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7890                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7891                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7892                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7893                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7894                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7895                                                                                 Err(()) => {
7896                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7897                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7898                                                                                 }
7899                                                                         }
7900                                                                 },
7901                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7902                                                         }
7903                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7904                                         },
7905                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7906                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7907                                 };
7908                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7909                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7910                                 });
7911                         }
7912                 }
7913
7914                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7915                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7916
7917                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7918                         Ok(key) => key,
7919                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7920                 };
7921                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7922                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7923                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7924                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7925                         }
7926                 }
7927
7928                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7929                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7930                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7931                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7932                         for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7933                                 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7934                                         let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7935                                         loop {
7936                                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7937                                                         .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7938                                                 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7939                                         }
7940                                         chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7941                                 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7942                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7943                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7944                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7945                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7946                                 }
7947                                 if chan.is_usable() {
7948                                         if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7949                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7950                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7951                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7952                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7953                                         }
7954                                 }
7955                         }
7956                 }
7957
7958                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7959
7960                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7961                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7962                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7963                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7964                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7965                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7966                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7967                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7968                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7969                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7970                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7971                                         }
7972                                         for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7973                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7974
7975                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7976                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7977                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7978                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7979                                                 //
7980                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7981                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7982                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7983                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7984                                                 // reason to.
7985                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7986                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7987                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7988                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7989                                                 // restart.
7990                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7991                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7992                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7993                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7994                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7995                                                         if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7996                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7997                                                         }
7998                                                 }
7999                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8000                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8001                                                 }
8002                                         }
8003                                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8004                                                 receiver_node_id,
8005                                                 payment_hash,
8006                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
8007                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8008                                         });
8009                                 }
8010                         }
8011                 }
8012
8013                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8014                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8015                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8016                         } else {
8017                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8018                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8019                         }
8020                 }
8021
8022                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8023                         genesis_hash,
8024                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8025                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8026                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8027                         router: args.router,
8028
8029                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8030
8031                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8032                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8033                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8034                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8035
8036                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8037                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8038                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8039                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8040                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8041                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8042
8043                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8044
8045                         our_network_pubkey,
8046                         secp_ctx,
8047
8048                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8049
8050                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8051
8052                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8053                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8054                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8055                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8056                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8057
8058                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8059                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
8060                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8061
8062                         logger: args.logger,
8063                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
8064                 };
8065
8066                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8067                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8068                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8069                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8070                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8071                 }
8072
8073                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8074                 //connection or two.
8075
8076                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8077         }
8078 }
8079
8080 #[cfg(test)]
8081 mod tests {
8082         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8083         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8084         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8085         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8086         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8087         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8088         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8089         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8090         use crate::ln::msgs;
8091         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8092         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8093         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8094         use crate::util::test_utils;
8095         use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8096         use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
8097
8098         #[test]
8099         fn test_notify_limits() {
8100                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8101                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8102                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8103                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8104                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8105                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8106
8107                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8108                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8109                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8110                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8111                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8112
8113                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8114
8115                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8116                 // to connect messages with new values
8117                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8118                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8119                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8120                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8121                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8122                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8123
8124                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8125                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8126                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8127                 // ... but the last node should not.
8128                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8129                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8130                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8131                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8132
8133                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8134                 // about the channel.
8135                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8136                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8137                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8138
8139                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8140                 // parties.
8141                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8142                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8143                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8144                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8145                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8146                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8147
8148                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8149                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8150                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8151
8152                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8153                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8154                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8155                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8156                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8157                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8158
8159                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8160                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8161                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8162                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8163                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8164                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8165                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8166                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8167
8168                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8169                 // the channel info has updated.
8170                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8171                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8172                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8173                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8174                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8175                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8176         }
8177
8178         #[test]
8179         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8180                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8181                 // expected.
8182                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8183                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8184                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8185                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8186                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8187
8188                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8189                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8190                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8191                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8192
8193                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8194                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8195                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8196                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8197                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8198                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8199                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8200                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8201                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8202                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8203                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8204                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8205
8206                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8207                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8208                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8209                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8210                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8211                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8212                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8213                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8214                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8215                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8216                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8217                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8218                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8220                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8221                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8222                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8223                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8224                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8225                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8226                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8227                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8228                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8229
8230                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8231                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8232                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8234                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8235                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8236                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8237
8238                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8239                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8240                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8241                 // lightning messages manually.
8242                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8243                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8244                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8245
8246                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8247                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8248                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8249                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8250                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8251                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8252                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8253                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8254                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8255                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8256                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8257                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8258                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8260                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8261                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8262                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8263                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8264                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8265                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8266                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8268                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8269                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8270                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8271
8272                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8273                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8274                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8275                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8276                 match events[0] {
8277                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8278                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8279                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8280                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8281                         },
8282                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8283                 }
8284                 match events[1] {
8285                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8286                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8287                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8288                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8289                         },
8290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8291                 }
8292                 match events[2] {
8293                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8294                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8295                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8296                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8297                         },
8298                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8299                 }
8300         }
8301
8302         #[test]
8303         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8304                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8305                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8306                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8307                 //      fails as expected.
8308                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8309                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8310                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8311                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8312                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8313                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8314                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8315
8316                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8317                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8318                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8319
8320                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8321                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8322                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8323                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
8324                 };
8325                 let route = find_route(
8326                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8327                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8328                 ).unwrap();
8329                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8330                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8331                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8333                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8334                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8335                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8336                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8337                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8338                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8339                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8340                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8341                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8342                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8344                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8345                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8346                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8347                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8348                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8349                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8350                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8351                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8352                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8353
8354                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8355                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8356
8357                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8358                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8359                 let route = find_route(
8360                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8361                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8362                 ).unwrap();
8363                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8364                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8366                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8367                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8368                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8369                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8370                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8371
8372                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8373                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8374                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8375                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8376                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8377                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8378                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8379                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8380                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8381                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8382                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8383                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8384                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8385                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8387                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8388                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8389                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8390                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8391                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8392                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8393                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8394                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8395                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8396
8397                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8398                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8399         }
8400
8401         #[test]
8402         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8403                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8404                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8405                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8406                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8407                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8408                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8409
8410                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8411                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8412
8413                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8414                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8415                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8416                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
8417                 };
8418                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8419                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8420                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8421                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8422                 let route = find_route(
8423                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8424                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8425                 ).unwrap();
8426
8427                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8428                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8429                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8430                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8431                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8432                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8433                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8434
8435                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8436                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8437                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8438                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8439                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8440                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8441                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8442
8443                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8444         }
8445
8446         #[test]
8447         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8448                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8449                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8450                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8451                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8452                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8453
8454                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8455                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8456
8457                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8458                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8459                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8460                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
8461                 };
8462                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8463                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8464                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8465                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8466                 let route = find_route(
8467                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8468                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8469                 ).unwrap();
8470
8471                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8472                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8473                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8474                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8475                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8476                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8477                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8478                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8480
8481                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8482                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8483                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8484                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8485                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8486                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8487                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8488
8489                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8490         }
8491
8492         #[test]
8493         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8494                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8495                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8496                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8497                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8498
8499                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8500                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8501                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8502                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8503
8504                 // Marshall an MPP route.
8505                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8506                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8507                 route.paths.push(path);
8508                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8509                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8510                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8511                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8512                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8513                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8514
8515                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8516                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8517                 .unwrap_err() {
8518                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8519                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8520                         },
8521                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8522                 }
8523         }
8524
8525         #[test]
8526         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8527                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8528                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8529                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8530                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8531
8532                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8533
8534                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8535                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8536
8537                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8538                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8539                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8540                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8541
8542                 {
8543                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8544                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8545                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8546                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8547                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8548                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8549                 }
8550
8551                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8552
8553                 {
8554                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8555                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8556                 }
8557         }
8558
8559         #[test]
8560         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8561                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8562                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8563                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8564                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8565                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8566
8567                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8568                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8569                         payment_secret,
8570                         total_msat: 100_000,
8571                 };
8572
8573                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8574                 // payment verification fails as expected.
8575                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8576                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8577                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8578                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8579                         Err(()) => {
8580                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8581                         }
8582                 }
8583
8584                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8585                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8586         }
8587
8588         #[test]
8589         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8590                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8591                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8592                 // the channel is successfully closed.
8593                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8594                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8595                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8596                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8597
8598                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8599                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8600                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8601                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8602                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8603
8604                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8605                 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8606                 {
8607                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8608                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8609                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8610                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8611                 }
8612
8613                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8614                 {
8615                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8616                         // as it has the funding transaction.
8617                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8618                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8619                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8620                 }
8621
8622                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8623
8624                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8625
8626                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8627                 {
8628                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8629                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8630                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8631                 }
8632                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8633
8634                 {
8635                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8636                         // as it has the funding transaction.
8637                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8638                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8639                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8640                 }
8641                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8642                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8643                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8644                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8645                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8646                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8647                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8648                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8649
8650                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8651                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8652                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8653                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8654
8655                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8656                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8657                 {
8658                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8659                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8660                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8661                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8662                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8663                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8664                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8665                 }
8666
8667                 {
8668                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8669                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8670                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8671                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8672                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8673                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8674                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8675                 }
8676
8677                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8678                 {
8679                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8680                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8681                         // closing transaction).
8682                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8683                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8684                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8685
8686                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8687                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8688                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8689                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8690                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8691                 }
8692
8693                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694
8695                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8696                 {
8697                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8698                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8699                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8700                 }
8701                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8702
8703                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8704                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8705         }
8706
8707         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8708                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8709                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8710         }
8711
8712         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8713                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8714                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8715         }
8716
8717         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8718                 match res_err {
8719                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8720                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8721                         },
8722                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8723                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8724                         },
8725                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8726                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8727                 }
8728         }
8729
8730         #[test]
8731         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8732                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8733                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8734                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8735                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8736                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8737                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8738                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8739
8740                 // Dummy values
8741                 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8742                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8743                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8744
8745                 // Test the API functions.
8746                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8747
8748                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8749
8750                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8751
8752                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8753
8754                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8755
8756                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8757
8758                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8759         }
8760
8761         #[test]
8762         fn test_connection_limiting() {
8763                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8764                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8765                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8766                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8767                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8768
8769                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8770
8771                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8772                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8773
8774                 let mut funding_tx = None;
8775                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8776                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8777                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8778
8779                         if idx == 0 {
8780                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8781                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8782                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8783                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8784                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8785
8786                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8787                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8788                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8789
8790                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8791
8792                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8793                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8794                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8795                         }
8796                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8797                 }
8798
8799                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8800                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8801                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8802                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8803                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8804
8805                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8806                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8807                 // limit.
8808                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8809                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8810                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8811                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8812                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8813                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8814                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8815                 }
8816                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8817                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8818                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8819                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8820
8821                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8822                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8823                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8824                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8825                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8826                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8827                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8828                 }
8829                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8830                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8831                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8832                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8833
8834                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8835                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8836                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8837                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8838
8839                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8840                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8841                 // open channels.
8842                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8843                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8844                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8845                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8846                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8847                 }
8848                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8849                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8850                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8851
8852                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8853                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8854                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8855
8856                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8857                 // "protected" and can connect again.
8858                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8859                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8860                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8861                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8862
8863                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8864                 // last_random_pk.
8865                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8866                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8867         }
8868
8869         #[test]
8870         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8871                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8872                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8873                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8874                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8875                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8876
8877                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8878
8879                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8880                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8881
8882                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8883                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8884                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8885                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8886                 }
8887
8888                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8889                 // rejected.
8890                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8891                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8892                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8893
8894                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8895                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8896                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8897
8898                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8899                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8900                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8901                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8902         }
8903
8904         #[test]
8905         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8906                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8907                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8908                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8909                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8910                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8911                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8912                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8913                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8914
8915                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8916
8917                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8918                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8919
8920                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8921                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8922                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8923                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8924                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8925                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8926
8927                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8928                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8929                         match events[0] {
8930                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8931                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8932                                 }
8933                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8934                         }
8935                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8936                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8937                 }
8938
8939                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8940                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8941                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8942                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8943                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8944                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8945                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8946                 match events[0] {
8947                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8948                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8949                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8950                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8951                                         _ => panic!(),
8952                                 }
8953                         }
8954                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8955                 }
8956                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8957                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8958
8959                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8960                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8961                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8962                 match events[0] {
8963                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8964                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8965                         }
8966                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8967                 }
8968                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8969         }
8970
8971         #[cfg(anchors)]
8972         #[test]
8973         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8974                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8975                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8976                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8977                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8978                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8979                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8980                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8981                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8982                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8983                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8984
8985                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8986                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8987                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8988
8989                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8990                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8991                 match events[0] {
8992                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8993                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8994                         }
8995                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8996                 }
8997
8998                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8999                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9000
9001                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9002                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9003
9004                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9005         }
9006 }
9007
9008 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9009 pub mod bench {
9010         use crate::chain::Listen;
9011         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9012         use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9013         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9014         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9015         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9016         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9017         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9018         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9019         use crate::util::test_utils;
9020         use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9021
9022         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9023         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9024         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9025
9026         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9027
9028         use test::Bencher;
9029
9030         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9031                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9032                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9033                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9034                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9035                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9036                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9037
9038         struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9039                 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9040         }
9041         impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9042                 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9043                 #[inline]
9044                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9045                 #[inline]
9046                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9047         }
9048
9049         #[cfg(test)]
9050         #[bench]
9051         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9052                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9053         }
9054
9055         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9056                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9057                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9058                 // calls per node.
9059                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9060
9061                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9062                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9063                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9064                 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9065                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9066
9067                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9068                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9069
9070                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9071                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9072                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9073                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9074                         network,
9075                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9076                 });
9077                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9078
9079                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9080                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9081                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9082                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9083                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9084                         network,
9085                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9086                 });
9087                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9088
9089                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9090                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9091                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9092                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9093                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9094
9095                 let tx;
9096                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9097                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9098                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9099                         }]};
9100                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9101                 } else { panic!(); }
9102
9103                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9104                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9105                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9106                 match events_b[0] {
9107                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9108                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9109                         },
9110                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9111                 }
9112
9113                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9114                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9115                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9116                 match events_a[0] {
9117                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9118                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9119                         },
9120                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9121                 }
9122
9123                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9124
9125                 let block = Block {
9126                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9127                         txdata: vec![tx],
9128                 };
9129                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9130                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9131
9132                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9133                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9134                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9135                 match msg_events[0] {
9136                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9137                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9138                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9139                         },
9140                         _ => panic!(),
9141                 }
9142                 match msg_events[1] {
9143                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9144                         _ => panic!(),
9145                 }
9146
9147                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9148                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9149                 match events_a[0] {
9150                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9151                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9152                         },
9153                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9154                 }
9155
9156                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9157                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9158                 match events_b[0] {
9159                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9160                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9161                         },
9162                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9163                 }
9164
9165                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9166                 macro_rules! send_payment {
9167                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9168                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9169                                         .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9170                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9171                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9172                                 payment_count += 1;
9173                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9174                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9175
9176                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9177                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9178                                                 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9179                                         }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9180                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9181                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9182                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9183                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9184                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9185                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9186                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9187
9188                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9189                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9190                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9191                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9192
9193                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9194                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9195                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9196                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9197                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9198                                         },
9199                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9200                                 }
9201
9202                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9203                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9204                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9205                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9206
9207                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9208                         }
9209                 }
9210
9211                 bench.iter(|| {
9212                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9213                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
9214                 });
9215         }
9216 }