1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
66 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
68 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
70 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
71 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
72 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
74 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
75 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
76 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
77 // before we forward it.
79 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
80 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
81 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
82 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
83 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
85 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
86 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
88 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
89 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
92 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
93 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
97 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
98 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
99 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
100 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
102 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
103 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
106 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
107 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
108 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
109 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
112 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
115 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
116 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
119 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
121 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
123 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
124 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
125 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
127 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
129 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
133 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
137 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
138 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
139 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
140 short_channel_id: u64,
142 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
144 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
145 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
149 struct ClaimableHTLC {
150 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
152 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
153 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
154 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
155 /// are part of the same payment.
156 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
160 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
161 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
162 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
163 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
166 session_priv: SecretKey,
167 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
168 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
169 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
174 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
175 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
177 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
178 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
183 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
184 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
186 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
194 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
195 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
196 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
197 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
198 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
199 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
200 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
201 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
202 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
207 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
209 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
210 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
211 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
212 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
213 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
215 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
216 err: msgs::LightningError,
217 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
219 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
221 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
223 err: LightningError {
225 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
226 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
232 shutdown_finish: None,
236 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
238 err: LightningError {
240 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
242 shutdown_finish: None,
246 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
247 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
250 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
261 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
265 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
268 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
272 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
274 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
275 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
281 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
283 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
284 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
291 shutdown_finish: None,
296 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
297 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
298 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
299 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
300 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
302 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
303 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
304 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
305 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
306 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
307 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
308 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
310 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
314 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
315 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
316 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
317 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
318 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
319 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
320 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
321 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
322 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
323 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
324 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
325 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
326 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
328 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
329 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
330 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
331 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
334 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
335 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
337 latest_features: InitFeatures,
340 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
341 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
343 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
344 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
345 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
346 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
347 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
348 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
349 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
350 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
352 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
353 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
354 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
355 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
356 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
357 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
358 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
359 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
360 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
362 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
363 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
365 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
366 /// to individual Channels.
368 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
369 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
370 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
371 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
373 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
374 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
375 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
376 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
377 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
378 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
379 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
381 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
382 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
383 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
384 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
387 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
388 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
389 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
390 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
391 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
393 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
394 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
395 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
396 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
397 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
398 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
399 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
400 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
401 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
402 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
405 default_configuration: UserConfig,
406 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
412 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
414 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
415 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
416 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
419 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
420 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
421 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
422 our_network_key: SecretKey,
424 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
425 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
426 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
428 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
429 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
430 /// are currently open with that peer.
431 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
432 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
434 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
436 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
437 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
438 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
439 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
440 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
447 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
448 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
449 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
450 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
451 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
453 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
454 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
455 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
456 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
457 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
458 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
459 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
461 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
462 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
463 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
464 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
465 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
466 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
469 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
471 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
472 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
475 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
477 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
479 pub struct ChannelDetails {
480 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
481 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
482 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
483 /// lifetime of the channel.
484 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
485 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
486 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
487 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
488 /// The node_id of our counterparty
489 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
490 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
491 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
492 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
493 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
494 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
495 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
496 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
498 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
499 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
500 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
501 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
502 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
503 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
504 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
505 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
506 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
507 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
508 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
509 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
510 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
514 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
515 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
518 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
519 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
520 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
521 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
522 ParameterError(APIError),
523 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
524 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
525 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
528 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
530 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
531 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
532 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
533 /// paths than the ones selected).
534 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
535 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
536 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
537 /// in over-/re-payment.
539 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
540 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
541 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
543 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
544 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
545 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
546 /// with the latest update_id.
547 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
550 macro_rules! handle_error {
551 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
554 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
555 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
557 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
558 // entering the macro.
559 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
562 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
564 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
565 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
566 if let Some(update) = update_option {
567 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
573 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
574 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
576 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
577 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
578 action: err.action.clone()
582 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
583 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
586 // Return error in case higher-API need one
593 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
594 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
597 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
598 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
600 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
601 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
602 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
603 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
604 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
606 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
608 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
613 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
614 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
617 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
618 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
620 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
621 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
622 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
623 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
624 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
626 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
628 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
629 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
630 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
631 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
632 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
634 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
641 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
642 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
643 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
645 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
647 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
648 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
649 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
650 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
651 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
653 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
654 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
655 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
656 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
657 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
658 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
659 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
660 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
661 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
662 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
665 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
666 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
667 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
668 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
670 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
671 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
673 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
674 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
676 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
677 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
678 if !$resend_commitment {
679 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
682 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
684 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
685 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
691 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
692 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
693 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
695 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
696 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
700 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
701 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
702 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
703 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
704 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
707 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
712 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
713 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
715 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
716 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
719 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
721 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
722 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
724 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
726 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
728 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
729 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
731 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
732 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
733 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
734 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
737 default_configuration: config.clone(),
738 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
739 fee_estimator: fee_est,
743 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
744 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
747 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
748 by_id: HashMap::new(),
749 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
750 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
751 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
752 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
754 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
756 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
758 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
760 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
761 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
769 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
771 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
772 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
773 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
774 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
776 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
777 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
779 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
780 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
781 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
782 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
783 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
786 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
787 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
788 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
790 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
791 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
794 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
795 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
797 panic!("RNG is bad???");
800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
802 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
803 node_id: their_network_key,
809 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
810 let mut res = Vec::new();
812 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
813 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
814 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
815 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
816 res.push(ChannelDetails {
817 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
818 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
819 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
820 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
821 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
822 inbound_capacity_msat,
823 outbound_capacity_msat,
824 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
825 is_live: channel.is_live(),
829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
830 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
831 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
832 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
838 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
839 /// more information.
840 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
841 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
844 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
845 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
847 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
848 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
849 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
850 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
851 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
852 // really wanted anyway.
853 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
856 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
857 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
858 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
860 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
861 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
862 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
864 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
865 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
866 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
867 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
869 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
870 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
871 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
874 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
875 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
876 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
878 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
879 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
884 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
885 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
887 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
888 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
893 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
894 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
904 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
905 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
907 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
908 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
910 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
911 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
912 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
913 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
914 // ignore the result here.
915 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
919 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
920 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
921 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
922 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
925 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
926 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
927 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
928 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
929 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
936 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
937 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
938 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
939 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
946 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
947 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
948 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
949 for chan in self.list_channels() {
950 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
954 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
955 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
956 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
958 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
959 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
960 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
961 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
962 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
963 failure_code: $err_code,
964 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
969 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
970 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
973 let shared_secret = {
974 let mut arr = [0; 32];
975 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
978 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
980 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
981 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
982 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
983 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
984 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
985 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
986 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
987 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
990 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
991 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
992 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
993 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
994 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
997 let mut channel_state = None;
998 macro_rules! return_err {
999 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1001 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1002 if channel_state.is_none() {
1003 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1005 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1006 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1007 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1008 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1009 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1014 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1015 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1016 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1017 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1019 let error_code = match err {
1020 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1021 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1022 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1023 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1024 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1026 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1029 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1030 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1031 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1038 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1041 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1042 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1043 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1044 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1045 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1046 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1047 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1048 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1049 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1050 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1051 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1052 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1056 // final_expiry_too_soon
1057 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1058 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1059 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1060 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1061 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1062 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1064 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1065 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1066 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1068 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1069 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1070 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1073 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1074 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1075 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1076 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1079 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1080 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1081 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1082 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1084 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1085 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1087 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1089 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1090 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1091 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1092 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1095 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1096 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1097 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1099 // Check two things:
1100 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1101 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1102 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1104 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1106 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1107 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1108 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1110 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1112 let blinding_factor = {
1113 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1114 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1115 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1116 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1119 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1121 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1123 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1126 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1127 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1130 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1131 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1132 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1133 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1134 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1138 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1139 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1140 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1143 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1144 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1145 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1146 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1150 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1151 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1152 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1153 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1154 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1155 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1156 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1157 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1158 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1159 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1161 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1163 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1164 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1166 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1167 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1168 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1169 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1170 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1171 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1172 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1174 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1175 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1177 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1178 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1179 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1181 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1182 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1184 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1185 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1186 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1187 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1188 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1190 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1191 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1193 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1194 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1195 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1196 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1202 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1203 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1204 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1205 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1207 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1208 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1210 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1211 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1212 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1214 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1216 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1221 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1224 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1225 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1226 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1227 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1228 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1232 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1234 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1235 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1237 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1238 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1239 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1240 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1241 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1242 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1243 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1244 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1247 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1248 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1250 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1256 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1257 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1259 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1260 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1262 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1263 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1264 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1265 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1266 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1268 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1270 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1272 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1273 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1274 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1275 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1276 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1279 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1280 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1282 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1283 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1285 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1286 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1288 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1290 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1291 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1292 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1294 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1295 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1296 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1297 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1298 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1299 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1300 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1301 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1302 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1306 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1307 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1308 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1309 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1310 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1311 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1319 } else { unreachable!(); }
1323 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1324 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1326 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1331 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1333 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1334 /// fields for more info.
1336 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1337 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1338 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1339 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1340 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1341 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1343 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1345 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1346 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1347 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1349 /// In general, a path may raise:
1350 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1351 /// node public key) is specified.
1352 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1353 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1355 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1356 /// relevant updates.
1358 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1359 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1360 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1362 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1363 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1364 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1365 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1367 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1368 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1369 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1370 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1371 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1372 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1374 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1375 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1376 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1377 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1378 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1380 let mut total_value = 0;
1381 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1382 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1383 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1384 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1385 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1386 continue 'path_check;
1388 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1389 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1390 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1391 continue 'path_check;
1394 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1395 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1397 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1398 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1401 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1402 let mut results = Vec::new();
1403 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1404 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1406 let mut has_ok = false;
1407 let mut has_err = false;
1408 for res in results.iter() {
1409 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1410 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1411 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1412 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1419 if has_err && has_ok {
1420 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1422 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1428 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1430 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1431 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1433 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1435 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1436 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1437 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1438 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1441 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1443 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1444 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1445 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1446 } else { unreachable!(); })
1451 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1452 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1455 Err(_) => { return; }
1459 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1461 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1466 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1474 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1475 if !chan.should_announce() {
1476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1480 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1482 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1484 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1485 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1487 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1488 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1489 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1490 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1491 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1496 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1497 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1498 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1500 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1503 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1504 // smaller than 500:
1505 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1507 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1508 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1509 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1511 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1512 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1514 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1515 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1516 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1517 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1519 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1520 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1521 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1523 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1524 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1527 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1528 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1529 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1530 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1531 rgb, alias, addresses,
1532 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1533 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1535 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1537 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1539 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1540 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1541 contents: announcement
1546 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1548 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1549 /// Will likely generate further events.
1550 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1551 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1553 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1554 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1555 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1557 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1558 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1560 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1561 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1562 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1563 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1565 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1566 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1567 match forward_info {
1568 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1569 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1570 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1571 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1572 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1573 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1574 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1576 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1577 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1580 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1581 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1582 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1583 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1584 // problem, not ours.
1591 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1592 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1593 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1594 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1595 match forward_info {
1596 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1597 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1599 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1600 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1602 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1603 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1604 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1605 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1606 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1608 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1610 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1613 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1615 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1616 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1617 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1623 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1625 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1626 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1627 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1628 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1629 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1630 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1631 // this channel currently :/.
1637 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1638 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1640 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1642 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1644 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1647 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1649 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1650 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1651 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1654 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1656 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1657 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1658 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1659 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1660 // messages when we can.
1661 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1662 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1663 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1670 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1671 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1674 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1675 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1676 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1677 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1678 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1679 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1681 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1683 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1684 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1685 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1687 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1689 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1691 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1695 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1696 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1699 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1700 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1701 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1702 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1703 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1704 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1705 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1707 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1715 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1716 match forward_info {
1717 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1718 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1719 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1720 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1721 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1722 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1723 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1724 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1725 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1728 let mut total_value = 0;
1729 let payment_secret_opt =
1730 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1731 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1732 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1733 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1735 value: amt_to_forward,
1736 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1737 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1739 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1740 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1741 total_value += htlc.value;
1742 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1743 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1745 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1747 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1748 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1749 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1750 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1751 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1752 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1756 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1757 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1758 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1759 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1762 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1765 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1766 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1768 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1773 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1775 payment_secret: None,
1776 amt: amt_to_forward,
1780 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1781 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1783 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1784 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1792 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1796 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1797 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1800 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1801 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1802 events.append(&mut new_events);
1805 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1806 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1807 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1809 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1810 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1811 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1812 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1814 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1815 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1816 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1817 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1822 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1824 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1825 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1830 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1831 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1832 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1833 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1834 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1835 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1836 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1838 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1839 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1840 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1841 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1842 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1843 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1844 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1845 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1847 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1848 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1849 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1855 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1856 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1857 // be surfaced to the user.
1858 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1859 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1861 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1862 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1863 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1865 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1866 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1868 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1873 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1875 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1877 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1878 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1879 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1881 rejected_by_dest: false,
1893 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1894 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1895 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1896 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1897 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1898 /// still-available channels.
1899 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1900 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1901 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1902 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1905 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1907 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1908 match &onion_error {
1909 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1911 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1913 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1914 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1915 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1916 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1917 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1918 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1919 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1924 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1925 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1926 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1927 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1929 error_code: onion_error_code,
1931 error_data: onion_error_data
1935 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1941 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1942 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1943 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1944 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1946 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1947 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1948 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1949 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1950 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1951 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1953 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1955 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1961 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
1962 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1963 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1965 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1966 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1968 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1970 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1974 let mut forward_event = None;
1975 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1976 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1978 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1980 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1983 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1986 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1987 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1988 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1989 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1990 time_forwardable: time
1997 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1998 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1999 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2001 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2002 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2003 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2004 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2005 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2006 /// motivated attackers.
2008 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2009 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2011 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2012 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2013 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2015 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2017 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2018 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2019 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2020 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2022 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2023 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2024 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2025 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2027 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2028 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2029 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2030 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2031 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2034 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2035 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2036 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2038 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2042 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2043 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2044 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2049 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2050 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2051 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2052 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2053 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2054 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2055 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2056 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2058 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2059 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2060 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2062 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2064 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2065 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2066 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2067 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2068 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2069 } else { errs.push(e); }
2071 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2073 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2075 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2080 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2081 // which were generated.
2082 channel_state.take();
2084 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2085 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2086 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2093 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2094 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2095 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2096 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2097 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2103 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2104 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2105 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2106 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2107 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2108 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2109 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2110 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2112 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2116 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2118 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2119 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2120 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2121 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2122 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2123 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2132 // TODO: Do something with e?
2133 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2134 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2135 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2136 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2137 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2138 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2139 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2143 } else { unreachable!(); }
2146 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2148 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2149 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2150 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2151 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2155 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2156 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2157 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2160 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2161 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2162 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2163 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2166 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2167 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2168 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2169 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2170 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2171 payment_preimage, e);
2175 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2177 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2178 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2179 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2185 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2186 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2187 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2190 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2191 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2194 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2195 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2197 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2198 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2199 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2200 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2202 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2203 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2204 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2205 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2206 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2207 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2208 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2209 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2210 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2211 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2213 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2214 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2215 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2216 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2219 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2221 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2222 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2223 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2227 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2231 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2232 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2233 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2235 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2237 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2238 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2239 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2240 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2245 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2246 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2248 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2249 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2254 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2258 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2263 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2264 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2265 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2266 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2269 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2271 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2274 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2276 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2277 msg: announcement_sigs,
2280 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2284 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2286 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2287 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2289 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2291 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2292 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2296 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2297 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2301 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2302 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2303 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2304 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2305 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2309 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2310 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2312 entry.insert(channel);
2318 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2319 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2320 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2324 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2327 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2328 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2333 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2334 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2335 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2336 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2338 user_channel_id: user_id,
2343 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2344 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2345 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2349 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2352 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2357 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2358 // lock before watch_channel
2359 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2361 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2362 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2363 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2364 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2365 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2366 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2367 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2368 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2369 let (_funding_txo_option, _monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2370 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2371 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2373 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2374 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2375 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2376 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2377 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2378 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2382 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2383 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2384 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2388 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2389 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2390 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2399 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2400 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2401 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2402 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2403 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2405 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2408 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2409 Ok(update) => update,
2410 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2412 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2413 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2415 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2420 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2421 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2423 user_channel_id: user_id,
2428 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2429 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2430 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2431 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2433 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2436 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2437 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2439 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2440 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2441 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2442 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2443 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2444 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2445 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2446 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2447 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2449 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2450 msg: announcement_sigs,
2455 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2459 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2460 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2461 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2462 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2466 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2469 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2470 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2471 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2472 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2476 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2477 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2478 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2482 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2483 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2484 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2486 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2487 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2492 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2495 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2496 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2497 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2506 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2507 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2508 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2509 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2510 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2512 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2515 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2516 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2518 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2523 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2524 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2525 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2526 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2527 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2528 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2529 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2531 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2532 } else { (tx, None) }
2534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2537 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2539 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2541 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2542 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2543 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2544 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2552 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2553 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2554 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2555 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2557 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2558 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2559 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2560 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2562 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2563 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2565 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2567 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2568 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2571 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2572 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2573 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2574 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2575 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2576 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2577 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2578 match pending_forward_info {
2579 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2580 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2581 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2582 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2583 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2584 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2585 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2589 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2590 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2591 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2592 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2593 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2594 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2595 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2596 // no problem just calling this
2597 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2598 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2600 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2601 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2602 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2605 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2607 _ => pending_forward_info
2610 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2617 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2618 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2620 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2621 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2623 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2626 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2628 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2631 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2635 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2636 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2637 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2640 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2641 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2643 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2650 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2651 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2652 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2653 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2655 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2658 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2659 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2660 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2662 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2669 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2670 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2671 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2672 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2674 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2677 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2678 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2679 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2680 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2681 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2682 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2683 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2688 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2689 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2690 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2692 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2693 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2694 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2696 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2697 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2698 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2699 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2700 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2701 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2702 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2703 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2705 commitment_signed: msg,
2709 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2711 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2722 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2723 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2724 let mut forward_event = None;
2725 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2726 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2727 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2728 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2730 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2731 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2732 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2733 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2736 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2737 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2740 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2741 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2746 match forward_event {
2748 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2749 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2750 time_forwardable: time
2758 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2759 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2762 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2763 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2764 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2765 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2766 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2768 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2769 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2770 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2771 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2772 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2773 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2774 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2775 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2777 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2779 } else { unreachable!(); }
2782 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2783 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2784 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2788 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2790 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2794 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2799 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2801 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2802 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2805 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2812 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2813 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2814 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2815 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2817 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2827 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2833 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2836 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2840 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2841 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2842 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2844 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2845 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2847 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2848 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2849 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2850 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2852 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2853 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2856 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2857 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2863 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2865 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2866 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2867 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2868 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2869 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2870 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2871 contents: announcement,
2873 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2881 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2882 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2883 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2885 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2887 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2888 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2890 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2891 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2892 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2893 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2894 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2895 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2896 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2897 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2898 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2899 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2900 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2901 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2902 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2904 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2905 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2907 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2908 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2911 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2912 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2913 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2917 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2918 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2920 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2925 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2926 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2928 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2934 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2938 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2943 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2944 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2945 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2955 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2956 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2957 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2958 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2959 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
2961 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2962 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2963 let counterparty_node_id;
2964 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2965 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2966 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2968 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2971 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2974 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2975 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2977 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2978 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2980 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2981 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2982 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2984 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2987 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2988 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2989 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2990 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2991 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2992 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2993 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2994 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3004 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3005 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3006 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3010 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3011 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3012 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3014 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3015 match monitor_event {
3016 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3017 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3018 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3019 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3022 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3025 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3026 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3027 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3028 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3029 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3030 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3031 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3032 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3033 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3035 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3036 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3037 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3047 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3048 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3053 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3054 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3055 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3056 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3057 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3060 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3061 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3062 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3063 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3065 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3066 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3067 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3072 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3073 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3074 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3075 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3076 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3079 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3080 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3081 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3082 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3084 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3085 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3086 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3091 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3092 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3094 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3098 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3099 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3100 let header_hash = header.block_hash();
3101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
3102 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3103 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3104 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3106 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3107 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3108 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3109 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3110 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3111 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3112 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3113 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3114 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3115 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3116 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3120 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3122 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3123 msg: funding_locked,
3125 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3127 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3128 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3129 msg: announcement_sigs,
3132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3134 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3136 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3138 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3139 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3143 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3144 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3145 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3146 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3148 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3149 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3151 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3152 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3153 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3154 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3155 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3168 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3169 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3170 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3171 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3172 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3173 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3174 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3175 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3176 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3177 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3178 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3179 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3184 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3187 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3188 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3191 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3192 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3194 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3195 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3197 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3198 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3199 // having an explicit local time source.
3200 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3201 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3202 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3203 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3204 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3210 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3212 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3213 /// in the shutdown.
3214 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3215 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3216 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3218 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3220 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3221 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3222 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3223 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3224 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3225 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3227 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3228 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3229 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3239 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3240 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3242 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3243 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
3247 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3248 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3249 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3250 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3251 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3252 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3255 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3256 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3260 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3261 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3262 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3265 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3266 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3270 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3271 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3275 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3276 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3280 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3281 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3282 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3285 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3286 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3287 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3290 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3291 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3295 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3296 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3297 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3300 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3301 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3302 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3305 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3306 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3310 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3311 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3315 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3316 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3320 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3321 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3325 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3326 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3330 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3331 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3332 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3335 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3336 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3337 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3338 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3339 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3341 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3342 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3343 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3344 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3345 if no_connection_possible {
3346 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3347 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3348 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3349 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3350 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3352 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3353 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3354 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3364 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3365 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3366 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3367 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3368 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3369 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3370 // reestablish logic.
3371 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3372 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3373 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3374 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3375 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3377 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3378 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3379 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3383 no_channels_remain = false;
3389 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3391 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3393 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3396 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3397 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3398 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3399 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3400 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3401 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3402 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3403 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3404 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3405 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3406 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3407 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3408 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3412 if no_channels_remain {
3413 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3416 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3417 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3419 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3420 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3426 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3427 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3429 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3432 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3433 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3435 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3436 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3440 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3445 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3446 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3447 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3448 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3449 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3450 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3451 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3452 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3453 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3458 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3459 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3465 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3468 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3469 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3471 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3472 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3473 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3474 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3478 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3483 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3484 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3486 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3487 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3488 match &self.routing {
3489 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3491 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3492 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3494 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3496 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3497 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3500 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3501 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3502 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3503 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3508 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3509 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3510 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3511 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3512 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3513 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3514 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3516 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3517 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3518 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3520 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3522 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3523 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3524 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3525 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3530 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3533 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3535 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3537 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3539 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3546 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3547 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3548 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3549 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3550 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3551 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3556 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3557 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3559 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3561 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3563 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3565 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3572 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3573 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3574 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3575 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3576 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3577 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3582 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3586 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3589 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3596 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3597 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3599 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3601 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3603 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3605 path.write(writer)?;
3606 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3607 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3614 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3615 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3616 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3617 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3618 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3619 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3620 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3621 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3623 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3628 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3629 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3631 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3635 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3637 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3638 data.write(writer)?;
3645 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3646 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3647 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3648 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3649 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3650 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3651 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3653 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3658 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3659 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3661 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3663 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3664 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3665 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3666 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3668 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3670 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3671 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3678 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3679 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3680 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3681 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3682 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3683 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3684 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3685 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3687 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3688 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3689 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3691 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3696 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3697 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3698 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3699 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3703 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3704 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3706 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3707 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3709 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3710 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3711 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3713 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3714 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3715 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3716 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3717 unfunded_channels += 1;
3720 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3721 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3722 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3723 channel.write(writer)?;
3727 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3728 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3729 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3730 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3731 for forward in pending_forwards {
3732 forward.write(writer)?;
3736 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3737 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3738 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3739 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3740 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3741 htlc.write(writer)?;
3745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3746 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3747 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3748 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3749 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3750 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3753 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3754 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3755 for event in events.iter() {
3756 event.write(writer)?;
3759 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3765 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3767 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3769 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3770 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3771 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3772 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3773 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3774 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3775 /// ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3776 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3777 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
3778 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3779 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3780 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3782 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3783 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3786 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3787 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
3789 pub keys_manager: K,
3791 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3793 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3794 pub fee_estimator: F,
3795 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3797 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3798 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3799 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3800 pub chain_monitor: M,
3802 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3803 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3804 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3805 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3806 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3807 /// deserialization.
3809 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3810 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3811 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3813 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3814 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3816 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3817 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3818 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3819 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3821 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3824 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
3825 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3828 impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3829 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3830 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3831 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3832 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3833 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3836 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
3837 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
3838 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
3839 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
3840 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>) -> Self {
3842 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
3843 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
3848 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3849 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3850 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3851 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3852 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3853 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3854 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3855 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3858 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3859 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3860 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3864 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3865 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3866 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3867 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3868 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3872 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3873 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3874 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3875 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3876 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3879 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3880 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3881 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3883 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3885 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3886 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3887 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3888 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3889 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3890 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
3891 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3895 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3896 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3897 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3898 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3899 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3900 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3901 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3902 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3904 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3905 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3906 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3907 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3908 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3909 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3910 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3911 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3913 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3914 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3916 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3923 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3924 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3925 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3929 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3930 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3931 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3932 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3933 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3934 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3935 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3936 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3937 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3939 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3942 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3943 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3944 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3945 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3946 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3947 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3948 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3949 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3951 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3954 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3955 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3956 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3957 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3958 let peer_state = PeerState {
3959 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3961 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3964 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3965 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3966 for _ in 0..event_count {
3967 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3968 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3973 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3975 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3977 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3978 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3979 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3981 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3982 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3983 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3985 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3990 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3992 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3994 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3996 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3998 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3999 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4000 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4001 logger: args.logger,
4002 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4005 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4006 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4009 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4010 //connection or two.
4012 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))