1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
138 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
139 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
142 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
145 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
146 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
149 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
150 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
152 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
153 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
154 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
160 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
161 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
164 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
165 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
168 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
173 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
174 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
175 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
176 short_channel_id: u64,
178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
179 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
181 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
182 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
187 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
189 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
190 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
191 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
194 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
197 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
198 struct ClaimableHTLC {
199 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
201 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
203 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
204 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
205 sender_intended_value: u64,
206 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
208 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
209 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
210 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
211 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
215 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
217 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
218 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
219 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
221 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227 impl Readable for PaymentId {
228 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
229 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
234 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
236 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
237 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
238 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
240 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
246 impl Readable for InterceptId {
247 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
248 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
253 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
254 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
255 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
256 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
257 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
260 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
263 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
264 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
267 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
271 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
272 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
273 (0, short_channel_id, required),
274 (2, htlc_id, required),
276 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
277 (0, session_priv, required),
282 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
283 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
284 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
285 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
286 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
289 session_priv: SecretKey,
290 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
291 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
292 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
293 payment_id: PaymentId,
296 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
297 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
298 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
302 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
307 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
308 payment_id.hash(hasher);
309 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
315 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
317 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
318 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
319 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
320 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
321 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
322 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
327 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
328 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
329 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
330 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
331 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
333 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
339 struct ReceiveError {
345 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
346 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
348 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
349 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
350 pub enum FailureCode {
351 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
352 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
353 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
354 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
355 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
356 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
357 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
358 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
359 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
360 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
361 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
501 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
502 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
503 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
504 enum BackgroundEvent {
505 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
506 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
507 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
508 /// need the counterparty node_id.
510 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
511 /// are regenerated on startup.
512 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
513 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
514 /// channel to continue normal operation.
516 /// In general this should be used rather than
517 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
518 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
519 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
521 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
522 /// are regenerated on startup.
523 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
524 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
525 funding_txo: OutPoint,
526 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
531 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
532 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
533 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
534 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
535 /// event can be generated.
536 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
537 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
538 /// operation of another channel.
540 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
541 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
542 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
543 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
545 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
546 event: events::Event,
547 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
552 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
553 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
554 (0, event, upgradable_required),
555 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
556 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
557 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
558 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
559 // downgrades to prior versions.
560 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
564 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
565 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
566 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
567 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
568 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
571 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
572 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
573 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
574 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
578 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
579 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
580 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
581 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
582 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
583 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
585 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
586 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
587 channel_id: [u8; 32],
588 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
593 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
595 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
596 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
597 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
598 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
603 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
604 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
608 /// State we hold per-peer.
609 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
610 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
612 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
613 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
615 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
616 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
617 latest_features: InitFeatures,
618 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
619 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
620 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
621 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
622 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
624 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
625 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
626 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
627 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
629 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
630 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
631 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
632 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
633 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
634 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
635 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
636 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
637 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
638 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
639 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
640 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
641 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
642 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
643 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
647 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
648 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
649 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
650 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
651 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
652 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
655 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
659 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
660 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
662 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
665 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
666 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
667 struct PendingInboundPayment {
668 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
669 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
670 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
671 /// this payment being removed.
673 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
674 user_payment_id: u64,
675 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
676 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
677 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
680 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
681 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
682 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
683 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
684 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
685 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
686 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
687 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
689 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
690 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
698 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
700 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
701 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
702 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
707 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
708 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
709 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
710 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
711 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
712 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
713 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
714 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
715 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
717 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
718 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
720 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
721 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
722 $vis trait AChannelManager {
723 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
724 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
725 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
726 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
727 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
728 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
729 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
730 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
731 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
732 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
733 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
734 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
735 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
736 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
737 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
738 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
739 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
740 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
743 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
744 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
745 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
746 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
747 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
748 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
750 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
751 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
752 ES::Target: EntropySource,
753 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
754 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
755 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
759 type Watch = M::Target;
761 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
763 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
765 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
767 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
768 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
770 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
772 type Router = R::Target;
774 type Logger = L::Target;
776 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
779 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
780 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
782 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
783 /// to individual Channels.
785 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
786 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
787 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
788 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
790 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
791 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
792 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
793 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
794 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
795 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
796 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
798 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
799 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
800 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
802 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
803 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
804 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
805 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
806 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
808 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
809 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
810 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
811 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
813 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
814 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
815 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
817 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
818 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
819 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
820 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
821 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
823 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
824 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
825 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
826 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
827 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
828 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
829 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
830 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
833 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
834 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
835 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
836 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
837 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
841 // `total_consistency_lock`
843 // |__`forward_htlcs`
845 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
847 // |__`per_peer_state`
849 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
851 // | |__`claimable_payments`
853 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
859 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
861 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
865 // | |__`pending_events`
867 // | |__`pending_background_events`
869 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
871 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
872 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
873 ES::Target: EntropySource,
874 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
875 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
876 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
880 default_configuration: UserConfig,
881 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
882 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
888 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
890 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
892 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
893 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
895 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
896 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
897 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
898 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
900 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
901 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
903 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
904 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
905 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
906 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
907 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
908 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
909 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
910 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
912 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
914 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
915 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
917 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
919 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
920 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
921 /// and via the classic SCID.
923 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
924 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
926 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
928 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
930 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
931 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
932 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
934 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
935 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
937 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
938 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
940 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
941 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
943 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
944 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
945 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
946 /// active channel list on load.
948 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
949 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
951 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
953 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
954 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
955 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
957 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
958 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
959 /// the handling of the events.
961 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
962 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
965 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
966 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
967 /// would break backwards compatability.
968 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
969 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
970 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
972 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
973 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
975 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
977 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
978 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
979 /// confirmation depth.
981 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
982 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
983 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
987 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
989 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
991 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
993 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
995 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
996 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
997 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
999 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1000 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1002 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1003 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1004 /// keeping additional state.
1005 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1007 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1008 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1009 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1010 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1012 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1013 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1015 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1016 /// are currently open with that peer.
1018 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1019 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1022 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1024 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1025 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1026 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1027 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1028 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1030 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1031 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1032 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1033 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1034 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1036 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1037 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1039 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1040 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1041 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1042 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1044 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1045 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1046 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1047 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1048 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1050 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1052 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1054 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1055 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1056 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1057 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1058 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1059 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1060 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1061 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1062 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1064 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1065 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1067 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1071 signer_provider: SP,
1076 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1078 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1079 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1080 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1081 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1082 pub struct ChainParameters {
1083 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1084 pub network: Network,
1086 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1088 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1089 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1092 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1099 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1100 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1101 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1102 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1103 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1104 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1106 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1107 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1108 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1109 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1110 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1112 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1113 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1116 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1117 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1118 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1119 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1121 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1122 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1123 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1124 _read_guard: read_guard,
1129 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1130 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1131 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1132 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1134 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1135 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1136 should_persist: persist_check,
1137 _read_guard: read_guard,
1142 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1143 fn drop(&mut self) {
1144 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1145 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1150 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1151 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1153 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1155 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1156 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1157 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1158 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1159 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1161 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1162 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1164 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1166 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1167 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1168 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1169 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1170 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1171 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1172 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1173 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1174 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1175 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1176 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1177 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1178 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1180 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1181 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1183 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1184 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1185 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1186 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1188 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1189 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1190 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1191 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1192 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1193 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1196 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1198 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1199 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1202 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1204 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1205 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1207 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1208 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1209 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1210 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1212 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1213 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1214 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1216 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1217 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1218 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1220 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1221 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1222 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1223 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1225 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1226 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1227 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1229 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1230 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1231 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1233 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1234 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1235 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1236 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1237 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1238 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1239 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1240 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1241 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1242 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1243 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1246 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1247 /// to better separate parameters.
1248 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1249 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1250 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1251 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1252 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1253 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1254 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1255 pub features: InitFeatures,
1256 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1257 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1258 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1260 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1262 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1263 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1264 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1265 /// payments to us through this channel.
1266 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1267 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1268 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1269 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1270 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1271 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1272 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1275 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1276 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1277 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1278 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1279 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1280 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1281 /// lifetime of the channel.
1282 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1283 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1284 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1285 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1286 /// our counterparty already.
1288 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1289 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1290 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1291 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1293 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1294 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1295 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1296 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1298 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1299 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1301 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1302 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1304 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1305 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1306 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1307 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1308 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1309 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1310 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1311 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1312 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1315 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1317 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1318 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1319 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1320 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1321 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1322 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1323 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1325 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1326 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1328 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1329 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1330 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1331 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1332 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1333 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1334 /// this value on chain.
1336 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1338 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1340 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1341 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1342 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1343 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1345 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1346 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1347 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1349 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1350 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1351 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1352 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1353 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1355 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1356 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1357 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1358 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1360 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1361 pub balance_msat: u64,
1362 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1363 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1364 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1365 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1367 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1369 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1370 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1371 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1372 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1373 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1374 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1375 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1376 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1378 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1379 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1380 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1381 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1382 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1383 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1384 /// route which is valid.
1385 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1386 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1387 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1388 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1389 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1390 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1392 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1393 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1394 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1395 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1396 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1397 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1398 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1399 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1400 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1402 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1404 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1405 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1406 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1407 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1408 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1410 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1411 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1412 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1413 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1414 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1415 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1416 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1418 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1419 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1420 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1421 pub is_outbound: bool,
1422 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1423 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1424 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1425 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1426 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1428 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1429 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1430 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1431 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1433 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1434 pub is_usable: bool,
1435 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1436 pub is_public: bool,
1437 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1438 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1439 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1440 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1441 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1442 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1444 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1445 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1448 impl ChannelDetails {
1449 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1450 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1451 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1453 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1454 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1455 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1459 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1460 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1461 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1463 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1464 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1465 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1466 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1469 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1470 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1472 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1473 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1474 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1476 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1477 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1478 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1479 features: latest_features,
1480 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1481 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1482 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1483 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1484 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1485 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1486 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1487 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1488 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1489 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1491 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1492 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1493 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1494 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1495 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1496 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1497 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1498 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1499 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1500 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1501 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1502 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1503 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1504 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1505 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1506 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1507 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1508 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1509 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1510 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1511 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1512 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1513 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1514 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1515 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1516 config: Some(context.config()),
1521 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1522 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1523 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1524 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1525 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1527 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1529 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1530 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1531 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1534 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1535 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1536 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1538 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1539 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1540 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1542 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1543 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1544 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1546 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1547 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1551 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1553 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1555 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1556 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1557 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1558 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1560 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1561 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1562 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1565 macro_rules! handle_error {
1566 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1567 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1568 // entering the macro.
1569 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1570 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1574 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1575 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1577 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1578 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1579 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1580 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1584 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1585 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1586 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1587 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1592 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1593 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1595 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1596 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1597 action: err.action.clone()
1601 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1602 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1603 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1605 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1609 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1616 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1617 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1618 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.context.channel_id());
1619 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1620 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1621 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1623 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1624 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1625 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1626 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1627 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1629 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
1630 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1632 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
1636 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1637 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1638 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1640 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1641 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1643 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1644 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1646 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1647 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1648 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1649 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1650 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1651 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1657 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1658 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1662 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1664 $entry.remove_entry();
1672 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1673 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1677 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1679 $entry.remove_entry();
1687 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1688 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1690 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1691 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1697 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1698 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1699 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1700 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1701 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1703 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1704 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1705 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1706 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1707 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1708 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1709 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1710 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1711 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1712 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1717 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1718 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1719 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1720 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1721 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1722 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1723 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1724 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1725 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1727 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1732 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1733 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1734 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1735 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1736 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1737 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1738 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1739 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1740 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1742 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1747 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1748 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1749 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1750 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1751 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1752 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1753 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1754 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1755 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1756 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1757 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1759 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1760 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1761 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1767 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1768 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1770 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1771 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1772 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1773 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1774 updates.announcement_sigs);
1775 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1776 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1779 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1780 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1781 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1783 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1785 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1786 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1788 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1789 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1790 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1791 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1796 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1797 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1798 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1799 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1800 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1801 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1802 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1805 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1806 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1807 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1810 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1811 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1812 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1813 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1814 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1815 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1816 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1817 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1821 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1822 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1823 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1824 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1830 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1831 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1835 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1836 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1837 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1838 while !processed_all_events {
1839 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1843 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1846 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1847 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1848 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1850 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1851 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1852 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1854 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1855 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1856 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1857 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1861 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1862 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1863 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1864 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1867 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1869 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1870 $event_to_handle = event;
1872 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1873 post_event_actions.push(action);
1878 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1879 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1880 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1881 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1884 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1885 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1886 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1887 processed_all_events = false;
1890 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1891 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1899 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1900 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1901 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1902 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1908 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1910 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1911 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1913 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1915 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1916 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1917 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1920 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1921 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1922 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1923 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1924 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1925 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1926 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1927 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1929 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1930 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1931 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1936 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1938 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1939 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1940 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1941 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1942 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1943 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1944 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1945 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1947 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1950 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1951 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1953 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1955 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1957 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1959 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1960 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1961 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1962 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1963 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1964 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
1965 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1975 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1976 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1977 &self.default_configuration
1980 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1981 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1982 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1985 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1986 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1988 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1990 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1994 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1999 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2001 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2002 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2003 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2004 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2005 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2007 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2008 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2010 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2011 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2012 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2014 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2015 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2016 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2018 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2019 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2020 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2021 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2022 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2023 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2025 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2026 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2027 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2028 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2029 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2034 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2035 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2039 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2040 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2042 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2044 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2045 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2046 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2047 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2048 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2049 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2053 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2058 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2060 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2061 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2064 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2066 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2072 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2073 node_id: their_network_key,
2076 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2079 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2080 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2081 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2082 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2083 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2084 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2085 // the same channel.
2086 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2088 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2090 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2093 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2094 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2095 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2103 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2104 /// more information.
2105 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2106 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2109 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2110 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2112 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2113 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2115 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2116 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2117 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2118 // really wanted anyway.
2119 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2122 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2123 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2124 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2127 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2128 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2129 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2130 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2131 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2134 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2140 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2141 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2143 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2144 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2145 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2147 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2148 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2149 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2150 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2151 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2152 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2153 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2154 total_msat: *total_msat,
2157 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2158 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2160 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2161 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2163 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2168 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2169 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2170 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2171 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2172 Some(transaction) => {
2173 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2174 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2179 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2180 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2181 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2182 reason: closure_reason
2186 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2189 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2190 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2193 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2194 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2198 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2200 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2201 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2202 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2203 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2204 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2206 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2207 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2208 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2209 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2210 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2214 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2215 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2216 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2217 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2218 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2221 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2222 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2223 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2224 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2228 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2236 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2237 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2238 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2242 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2246 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2247 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2248 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2250 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2251 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2253 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2254 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2255 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2256 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2258 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2260 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2261 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2262 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2265 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2266 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2267 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2268 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2269 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2270 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2273 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2274 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2275 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2277 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2278 /// the channel being closed or not:
2279 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2280 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2281 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2282 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2283 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2284 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2285 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2287 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2288 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2289 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2290 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2292 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2294 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2295 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2296 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2299 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2300 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2301 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2302 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2303 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2304 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2308 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2309 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2311 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2312 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2313 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2314 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2315 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2317 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2318 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2319 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2320 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2321 // ignore the result here.
2322 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2326 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2327 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2328 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2329 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2331 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2332 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2337 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2338 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2340 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2342 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2344 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2347 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2348 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2349 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2350 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2351 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2356 Ok(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2359 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2361 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2362 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2364 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2365 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2367 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2368 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2381 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2382 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2383 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2385 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2386 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2387 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2390 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2391 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2392 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2394 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2395 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2396 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2397 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2398 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2401 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2402 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2403 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2404 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2405 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2409 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2410 /// local transaction(s).
2411 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2412 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2413 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2417 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2418 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2420 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2421 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2422 return Err(ReceiveError {
2423 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2425 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2428 // final_expiry_too_soon
2429 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2430 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2432 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2433 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2434 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2435 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2436 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2437 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2438 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2439 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2440 return Err(ReceiveError {
2441 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2442 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2445 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2446 return Err(ReceiveError {
2448 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2449 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2453 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2454 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2455 return Err(ReceiveError {
2456 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2457 err_data: Vec::new(),
2458 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2461 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2462 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2463 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2464 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2465 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2466 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2467 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2468 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2469 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2470 return Err(ReceiveError {
2471 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2472 err_data: Vec::new(),
2473 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2476 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2477 return Err(ReceiveError {
2478 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2479 err_data: Vec::new(),
2480 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2483 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2487 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2489 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2490 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2493 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2494 phantom_shared_secret,
2497 return Err(ReceiveError {
2498 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2499 err_data: Vec::new(),
2500 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2505 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2508 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2509 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2510 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2511 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2515 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2516 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2517 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2519 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2520 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2521 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2522 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2523 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2524 failure_code: $err_code,
2530 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2531 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2534 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2535 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2536 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2538 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2539 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2540 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2541 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2542 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2543 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2544 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2545 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2547 macro_rules! return_err {
2548 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2550 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2551 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2552 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2553 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2554 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2555 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2561 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2563 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2564 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2566 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2567 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2571 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2572 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2574 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2576 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2577 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2578 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2579 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2580 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2582 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2585 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2586 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2587 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2589 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2590 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2591 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2594 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2595 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2596 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2597 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2601 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2602 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2603 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2606 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2607 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2608 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2609 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2610 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2615 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2616 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2617 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2618 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2619 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2620 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2621 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2622 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2623 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2624 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2625 // phantom or an intercept.
2626 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2627 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2628 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2632 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2635 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2637 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2639 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2640 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2641 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2645 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2647 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2648 // have no consistency guarantees.
2649 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2653 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2654 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2655 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2656 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2657 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2659 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2660 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2661 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2662 // we don't have the channel here.
2663 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2665 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2667 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2668 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2669 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2670 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2671 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2672 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2673 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2674 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2675 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2676 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2677 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2679 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2682 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2683 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2685 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2686 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2690 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2691 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2692 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2693 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2695 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2702 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2703 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2704 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2705 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2706 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2707 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2709 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2710 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2712 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2713 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2714 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2715 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2716 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2717 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2718 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2719 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2720 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2721 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2727 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2728 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2729 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2730 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2732 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2733 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2735 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2736 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2737 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2739 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2740 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2741 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2742 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2743 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2744 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2745 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2749 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2754 pending_forward_info
2757 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2758 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2759 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2761 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2762 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2763 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2765 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2766 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2767 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2768 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2769 return Err(LightningError {
2770 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2771 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2774 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2775 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2778 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2781 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2782 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2783 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2784 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2786 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2787 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2788 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2790 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2791 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2792 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2794 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2795 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2799 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2801 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2803 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2805 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2806 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2807 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2808 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2809 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2812 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2813 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2815 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2816 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2817 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2818 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2819 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2820 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2821 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2822 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2824 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2825 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2826 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2828 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2830 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2837 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2838 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2842 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2843 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2844 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2846 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2847 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2848 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2850 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2851 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2852 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2854 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2855 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2857 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2858 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2859 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2860 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2864 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2865 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2866 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2868 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2869 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
2870 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2872 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2873 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2874 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2876 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2877 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2879 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2880 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2881 Some(monitor_update) => {
2882 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2883 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2884 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2887 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2888 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2889 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2890 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2891 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2892 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2893 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2894 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2900 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2901 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2902 // `channel_by_id` map.
2903 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2904 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2909 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2910 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2912 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2917 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2919 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2920 /// fields for more info.
2922 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2923 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2925 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2927 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2928 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2929 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2930 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2931 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2933 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2934 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2935 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2936 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2937 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2939 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2940 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2941 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2942 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2944 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2946 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2947 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2948 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2950 /// In general, a path may raise:
2951 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2952 /// node public key) is specified.
2953 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2954 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2956 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2957 /// relevant updates.
2959 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2960 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2961 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2963 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2964 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2965 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2966 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2967 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2968 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2969 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2971 self.pending_outbound_payments
2972 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2973 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2974 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2977 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
2978 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2979 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2980 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2982 self.pending_outbound_payments
2983 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2984 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2985 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2986 &self.pending_events,
2987 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2988 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2992 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2993 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2995 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2996 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2997 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3001 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3002 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3003 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3007 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3008 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3012 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3013 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3014 /// retries are exhausted.
3016 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3017 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3019 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3020 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3021 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3023 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3024 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3026 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3027 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3028 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3029 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3030 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3033 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3034 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3035 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3036 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3037 /// never reach the recipient.
3039 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3040 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3042 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3043 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3045 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3046 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3047 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3049 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3050 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3051 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3052 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3053 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3056 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3057 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3059 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3062 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3063 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3064 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3066 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3067 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3068 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3069 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3070 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3071 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3074 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3075 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3076 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3077 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3078 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3080 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3081 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3082 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3085 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3088 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3089 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3092 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3093 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3094 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3095 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3096 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3099 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3103 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3105 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3107 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3108 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3109 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3110 } else { unreachable!(); });
3112 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3114 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3115 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3117 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3118 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3119 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3125 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3127 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3128 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3134 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3137 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3139 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3142 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3143 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3144 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3153 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3154 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3155 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3159 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3161 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3162 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3164 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3165 /// across the p2p network.
3167 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3168 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3170 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3171 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3172 /// keys per-channel).
3174 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3175 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3176 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3178 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3179 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3180 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3182 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3183 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3184 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3185 /// for more details.
3187 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3188 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3189 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3192 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3193 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3194 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3195 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3200 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3201 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3202 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3203 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3204 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3205 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3206 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3207 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3211 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3212 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3213 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3214 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3218 let mut output_index = None;
3219 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3220 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3221 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3222 if output_index.is_some() {
3223 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3224 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3227 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3230 if output_index.is_none() {
3231 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3232 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3235 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3239 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3241 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3242 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3243 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3244 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3246 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3247 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3249 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3250 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3252 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3254 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3255 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3256 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3257 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3258 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3259 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3260 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3261 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3262 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3263 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3264 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3265 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3266 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3272 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3273 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3276 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3277 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3278 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3279 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3283 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3284 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3285 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3286 config.apply(config_update);
3287 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3290 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3291 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3292 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3293 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3294 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3302 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3304 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3305 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3306 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3307 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3309 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3310 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3312 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3313 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3315 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3317 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3318 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3319 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3320 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3321 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3322 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3323 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3324 pub fn update_channel_config(
3325 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3326 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3327 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3330 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3331 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3333 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3334 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3336 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3337 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3338 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3339 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3340 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3342 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3343 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3345 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3348 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3349 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3350 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3351 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3352 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3355 let next_hop_scid = {
3356 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3357 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3358 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3360 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3361 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3363 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3364 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3365 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3368 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3370 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3371 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3376 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3377 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3378 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3381 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3382 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3383 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3385 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3387 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3388 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3391 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3392 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3393 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3394 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3395 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3397 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3401 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3402 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3404 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3407 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3408 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3411 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3412 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3413 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3416 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3417 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3418 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3419 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3420 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3421 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3422 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3425 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3426 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3427 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3428 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3433 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3435 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3436 /// Will likely generate further events.
3437 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3440 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3441 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3442 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3444 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3445 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3447 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3448 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3449 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3451 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3452 match forward_info {
3453 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3454 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3455 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3456 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3457 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3460 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3461 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3462 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3464 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3465 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3466 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3467 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3468 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3469 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3472 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3473 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3475 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3478 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3479 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3485 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3486 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3488 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3492 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3493 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3495 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3499 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3500 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3501 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3502 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3503 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3505 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3506 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3507 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3508 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3509 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3511 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3513 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3514 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3518 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3519 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3520 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3521 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3527 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3530 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3533 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3534 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3535 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3536 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3537 // problem, not ours.
3543 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3544 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3546 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3551 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3552 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3553 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3558 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3560 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3564 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3565 match forward_info {
3566 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3567 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3568 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3569 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3570 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3574 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3575 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3576 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3577 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3578 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3579 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3580 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3582 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3583 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3584 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3586 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3587 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3589 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3591 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3592 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3593 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3594 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3599 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3600 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3602 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3603 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3604 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3605 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3607 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3608 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3610 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3612 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3613 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3614 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3623 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3624 match forward_info {
3625 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3626 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3627 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3628 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3631 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3632 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3633 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3635 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3636 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3637 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3639 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3640 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3641 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3644 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3645 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3648 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3651 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3652 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3653 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3654 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3655 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3656 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3657 phantom_shared_secret,
3659 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3660 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3661 // if routing nodes overpay
3662 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3663 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3665 total_value_received: None,
3666 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3671 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3673 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3674 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3675 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3676 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3677 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3678 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3680 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3681 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3682 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3683 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3684 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3685 phantom_shared_secret,
3687 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3688 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3690 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3693 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3694 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3695 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3696 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3697 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3700 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3701 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3702 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3703 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3704 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3705 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3707 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3708 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3709 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3711 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3712 .entry(payment_hash)
3713 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3714 .or_insert_with(|| {
3715 committed_to_claimable = true;
3717 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3720 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3721 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3723 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3725 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3727 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3729 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3730 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3731 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3734 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3736 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3737 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3738 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3739 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3740 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3741 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3742 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3744 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3745 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3747 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3749 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3750 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3751 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3752 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3753 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3754 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3755 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3756 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3757 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3758 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3759 committed_to_claimable = true;
3761 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3762 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3763 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3764 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3765 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3766 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3770 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3771 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3772 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3773 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3775 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3777 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3778 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3780 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3781 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3782 committed_to_claimable = true;
3785 payment_claimable_generated
3789 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3790 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3791 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3792 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3793 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3794 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3795 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3796 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3798 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3799 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3800 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3801 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3802 Ok(result) => result,
3804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3805 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3808 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3809 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3810 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3812 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3813 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3816 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3817 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3818 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3820 check_total_value!(purpose);
3822 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3823 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3824 check_total_value!(purpose);
3828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3829 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3830 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3831 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3833 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3834 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3835 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3836 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3837 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3839 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3840 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3842 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3843 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
3844 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3846 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
3847 if payment_claimable_generated {
3848 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3854 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3855 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3863 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3864 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3865 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3866 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3867 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3868 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3870 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3871 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3873 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3875 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3876 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3877 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3879 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3881 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3882 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3883 events.append(&mut new_events);
3886 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3888 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3889 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3890 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3892 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3893 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3895 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3896 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3897 if background_events.is_empty() {
3898 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3901 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3903 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3904 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3905 // monitor updating completing.
3906 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3908 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3909 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3912 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3913 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3914 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3915 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3916 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3918 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3924 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3925 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3926 // however, ensure that.
3928 log_error!(self.logger,
3929 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3931 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3935 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3938 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3939 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3940 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3941 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3942 let _ = self.process_background_events();
3945 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3946 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3947 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3948 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3950 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3951 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3953 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3954 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3955 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3956 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3959 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3961 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3962 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3966 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3967 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3968 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3969 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3970 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3971 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3972 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3974 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3977 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3978 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3979 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3980 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3981 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3982 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3990 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3992 /// This currently includes:
3993 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3994 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3995 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3997 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3998 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3999 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4001 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4002 /// estimate fetches.
4004 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4005 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4006 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4007 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4008 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4010 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4012 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4013 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4014 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4017 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4020 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4021 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4022 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4023 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4024 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4026 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4027 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4028 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4029 if needs_close { return false; }
4032 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4033 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4034 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4035 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4036 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4037 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4038 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4039 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4041 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4042 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4043 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4048 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4050 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4053 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4055 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4056 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4057 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4058 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4062 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4064 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4070 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4072 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4073 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4074 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4075 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4076 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4077 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4078 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4079 channel_id: *chan_id,
4080 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4088 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4089 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4094 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4095 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4096 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4097 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4098 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4099 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4100 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4101 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4102 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4103 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4104 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4106 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4107 // have no channels to the peer.
4108 let remove_entry = {
4109 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4110 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4113 entry.remove_entry();
4116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4121 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4122 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4123 // This should be unreachable
4124 debug_assert!(false);
4127 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4128 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4129 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4130 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4131 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4132 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4133 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4136 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4137 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4138 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4140 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4141 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4148 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4149 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4150 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4151 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4152 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4155 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4156 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4159 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4161 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4162 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4163 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4164 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4165 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4172 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4173 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4174 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4176 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4177 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4178 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4179 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4181 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4182 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4183 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4184 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4185 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4186 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4189 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4190 /// reason for the failure.
4192 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4193 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4196 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4197 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4198 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4199 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4200 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4201 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4202 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4207 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4208 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4209 match failure_code {
4210 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4211 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4212 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4213 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4214 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4215 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4220 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4221 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4223 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4225 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4226 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4227 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4228 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4229 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4230 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4231 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4233 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4235 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4236 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4238 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4243 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4244 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4245 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4246 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4247 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4248 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4249 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4250 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4251 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4252 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4254 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4255 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4256 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4257 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4259 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4260 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4261 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4262 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4263 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4267 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4268 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4269 // be surfaced to the user.
4270 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4271 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4272 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4274 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4276 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4279 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4281 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4285 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4288 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4289 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4290 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4291 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4295 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4296 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4297 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4298 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4299 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4300 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4301 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4302 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4303 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4306 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4307 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4308 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4311 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4312 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4313 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4316 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4317 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4318 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4319 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4321 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4323 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4325 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4326 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4327 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4328 push_forward_ev = true;
4330 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4332 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4335 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4338 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4339 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4341 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4342 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4343 failed_next_destination: destination,
4349 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4350 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4352 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4353 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4354 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4355 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4357 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4358 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4359 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4360 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4362 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4363 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4364 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4365 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4366 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4367 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4368 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4369 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4374 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4375 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4376 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4377 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4378 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4379 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4380 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4381 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4386 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4387 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4388 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4390 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4391 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4392 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4393 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4398 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4400 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4401 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4402 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4403 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4404 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4405 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4406 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4407 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4408 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4409 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4410 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4411 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4412 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4413 debug_assert!(false);
4417 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4419 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4420 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4421 debug_assert!(false);
4425 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4426 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4428 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4429 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4430 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4431 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4434 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4435 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4436 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4437 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4441 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4442 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4443 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4444 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4446 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4447 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4448 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4449 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4450 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4455 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4456 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4457 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4458 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4459 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4460 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4461 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4463 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4466 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4467 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4468 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4469 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4473 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4474 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4475 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4476 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4479 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4480 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4481 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4482 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4486 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4487 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4488 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4491 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4492 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4494 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4495 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4496 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4498 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4499 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4501 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4502 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4504 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4505 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4506 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4507 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4508 if let Err(e) = res {
4509 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4510 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4511 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4512 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4513 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4520 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4521 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4522 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4526 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4527 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4528 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4529 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4530 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4531 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4532 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4533 // again on restart.
4534 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4535 payment_preimage, update_res);
4537 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4538 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4539 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4540 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4541 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4542 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4546 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4547 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4550 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4552 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4553 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4555 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4556 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4557 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4558 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4559 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4560 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4561 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4564 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4565 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4567 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4568 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4569 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4570 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4572 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4576 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4577 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4578 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4584 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4585 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4586 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4589 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4590 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4592 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4593 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4594 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4595 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4596 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4600 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4601 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4603 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4604 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4605 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4612 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4613 /// update completion.
4614 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4615 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4616 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4617 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4618 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4619 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4621 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4622 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4623 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4624 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4625 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4626 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4628 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4630 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4631 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4632 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4633 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4636 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4637 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4639 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4641 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4646 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4647 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4649 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4654 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4655 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4656 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4657 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4658 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4663 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4667 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4673 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4674 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4675 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4679 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4680 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4681 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4687 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4688 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4690 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4691 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4693 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4694 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4695 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4696 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4697 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4702 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4703 let mut peer_state_lock;
4704 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4705 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4706 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4709 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4714 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4715 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4716 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4719 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4722 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4724 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4725 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4728 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4729 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4730 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4732 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4733 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4734 /// used to accept such channels.
4736 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4738 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4739 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4742 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4743 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4745 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4746 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4747 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4749 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4750 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4752 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4753 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4755 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4756 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4758 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4759 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4760 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4761 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4764 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4767 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4770 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4773 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4776 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4780 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4781 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4782 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4783 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4784 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4785 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4788 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4789 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4790 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4792 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4793 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4794 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4795 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4796 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4797 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4798 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4799 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4803 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4804 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4808 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4809 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4810 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4814 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4820 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4821 /// or 0-conf channels.
4823 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4824 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4825 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4826 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4827 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4828 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4830 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4831 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4832 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4833 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4834 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4835 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4836 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4840 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4843 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4844 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4846 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4847 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4848 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4849 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4851 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4854 num_unfunded_channels
4857 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4858 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4862 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4863 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4866 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4867 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4868 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4869 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4871 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4872 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4873 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4874 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4877 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4879 debug_assert!(false);
4880 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4885 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4886 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4887 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4888 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4889 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4890 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4893 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4894 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4897 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4898 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4900 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4901 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4904 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4905 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4906 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4909 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4910 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4914 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.context.channel_id()) {
4915 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4916 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4920 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4921 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4924 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4925 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4926 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4929 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4930 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4931 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4932 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4933 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4934 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4935 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
4939 entry.insert(channel);
4945 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4946 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4948 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4950 debug_assert!(false);
4951 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4955 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4956 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4957 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4958 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
4960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4963 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4965 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4966 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4967 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4969 user_channel_id: user_id,
4974 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4975 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4978 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4980 debug_assert!(false);
4981 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4986 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4987 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4989 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4994 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4996 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4999 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5000 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5002 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5003 funding_msg.channel_id))
5005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5006 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5010 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5011 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5012 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5013 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5014 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5016 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5020 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5022 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5023 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5024 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5026 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5027 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5028 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5029 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5030 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5031 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5032 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5033 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5041 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5042 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5044 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5046 debug_assert!(false);
5047 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5052 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5054 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5055 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5056 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5057 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5058 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5059 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5060 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5061 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5062 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5063 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5072 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5076 debug_assert!(false);
5077 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5081 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5083 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5084 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5085 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5086 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5087 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5088 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5089 msg: announcement_sigs,
5091 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5092 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5093 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5094 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5095 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5096 // announcement_signatures.
5097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5098 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5099 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5100 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5107 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5108 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5117 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5118 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5119 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5123 debug_assert!(false);
5124 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5131 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5132 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5133 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5134 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5137 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5138 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5139 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5140 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5142 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5143 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5144 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5145 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5146 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5147 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5152 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5153 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5154 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5155 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5156 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5163 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5164 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5165 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5166 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5172 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5176 debug_assert!(false);
5177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5179 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5182 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5184 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5185 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5186 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5187 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5192 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5193 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5194 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5195 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5196 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5197 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5198 } else { (tx, None) }
5200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5203 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5204 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5205 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5207 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5208 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5215 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5220 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5221 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5222 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5223 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5225 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5226 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5227 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5228 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5230 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5232 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5234 debug_assert!(false);
5235 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5237 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5238 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5239 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5242 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5243 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5244 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5245 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5246 match pending_forward_info {
5247 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5248 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5249 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5250 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5252 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5253 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5254 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5255 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5256 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5259 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5261 _ => pending_forward_info
5264 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5266 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5271 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5272 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5274 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5276 debug_assert!(false);
5277 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5279 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5280 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5281 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5282 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5283 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5288 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5292 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5296 debug_assert!(false);
5297 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5301 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5303 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5310 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5311 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5312 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5314 debug_assert!(false);
5315 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5319 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5321 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5322 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5323 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5325 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5332 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5334 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5336 debug_assert!(false);
5337 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5341 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5342 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5343 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5344 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5345 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5346 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5347 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5348 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5349 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5357 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5358 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5359 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5360 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5361 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5362 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5363 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5364 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5365 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5366 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5367 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5369 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5370 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5372 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5373 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5374 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5376 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5377 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5380 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5381 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5383 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5384 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5385 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5387 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5388 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5389 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5390 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5391 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5394 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5395 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5398 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5399 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5400 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5401 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5402 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5403 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5404 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5407 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5408 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5409 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5414 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5415 // payments are being processed.
5416 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5417 push_forward_event = true;
5419 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5420 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5427 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5428 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5431 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5432 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5433 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5435 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5439 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5440 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5441 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5442 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5443 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5445 if !forward_ev_exists {
5446 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5448 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5453 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5454 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5455 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5456 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5457 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5458 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5459 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5461 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5462 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5463 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5464 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5465 channel_funding_outpoint,
5466 counterparty_node_id,
5471 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5472 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5474 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5476 debug_assert!(false);
5477 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5478 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5480 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5482 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5483 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5484 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5485 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5486 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5487 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5488 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5490 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5495 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5499 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5501 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5503 debug_assert!(false);
5504 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5508 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5510 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5517 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5519 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5521 debug_assert!(false);
5522 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5526 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5528 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5532 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5533 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5534 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5535 msg, &self.default_configuration
5537 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5538 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5539 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5547 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5548 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5549 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5550 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5552 // It's not a local channel
5553 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5557 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5558 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5559 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5561 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5562 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5563 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5564 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5565 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5566 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5567 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5568 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5569 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5570 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5572 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5574 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5575 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5576 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5577 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5579 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5580 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5585 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5588 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5590 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5593 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5595 debug_assert!(false);
5596 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5600 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5602 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5603 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5604 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5605 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5606 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5607 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5608 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5609 let mut channel_update = None;
5610 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5612 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5615 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5616 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5617 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5618 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5619 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5620 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5621 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5626 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5627 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5628 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5629 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5630 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5631 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5639 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5640 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5643 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5644 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5649 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5650 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5651 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5653 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5654 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5655 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5656 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5657 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5658 match monitor_event {
5659 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5660 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5661 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5662 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5665 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5666 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5667 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5670 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5671 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5672 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5673 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5675 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5676 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5677 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5678 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5681 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5683 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5684 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5686 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5687 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5688 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5689 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5690 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5695 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5696 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5698 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5700 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5702 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5703 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5704 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5711 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5712 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5718 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5719 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5722 has_pending_monitor_events
5725 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5726 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5727 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5729 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5731 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5734 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5735 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5736 /// update was applied.
5737 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5738 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5739 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5740 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5742 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5743 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5744 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5745 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5748 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5751 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5752 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5753 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5754 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5755 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5756 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5757 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5758 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5760 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5761 has_monitor_update = true;
5763 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5764 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5765 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5766 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5767 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5768 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5769 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5771 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5773 continue 'peer_loop;
5782 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5783 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5784 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5787 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5788 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5794 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5795 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5796 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5797 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5798 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5799 let mut has_update = false;
5801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5803 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5806 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5807 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5808 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5809 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5810 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5812 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5813 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5816 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5817 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5818 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5819 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5820 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5825 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5827 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5828 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5829 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5835 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5836 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5844 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5845 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5851 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5852 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5854 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5855 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5856 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5857 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5858 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5859 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5860 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5861 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5862 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5863 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5864 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5865 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5866 assert!(should_broadcast);
5867 } else { unreachable!(); }
5868 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5869 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5870 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5873 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5877 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5878 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5880 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5881 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5884 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5887 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5888 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5890 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5891 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5892 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5893 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5894 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5895 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5896 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5897 // never fail a payment too early.
5898 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5900 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5908 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5911 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5912 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5914 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5915 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5916 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5917 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5919 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5921 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5922 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5926 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5927 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5929 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5931 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5932 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5934 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5935 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5936 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5937 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5938 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5939 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5940 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5941 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5942 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5943 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5944 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5947 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5948 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5950 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5953 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5955 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5957 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5958 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5959 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5960 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5961 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5964 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5965 /// stored external to LDK.
5967 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5968 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5969 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5971 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5972 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5975 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5976 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5977 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5978 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5980 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5981 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5982 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5983 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5984 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5986 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5987 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5988 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5989 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5990 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5992 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5993 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5995 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5996 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6000 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6001 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6003 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6005 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6006 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6008 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6009 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6010 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6011 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6012 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6013 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6014 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6017 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6018 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6020 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6023 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6025 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6027 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6028 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6031 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6032 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6034 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6035 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6036 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6039 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6040 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6042 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6043 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6044 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6045 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6047 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6048 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6049 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6050 Some(_) => continue,
6051 None => return scid_candidate
6056 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6058 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6059 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6061 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6062 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6063 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6067 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6068 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6069 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6071 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6072 /// times to get a unique scid.
6073 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6074 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6075 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6077 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6078 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6079 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6080 return scid_candidate
6084 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6085 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6086 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6087 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6090 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6093 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6094 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6095 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6096 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6106 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6107 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6108 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6109 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6113 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6114 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6115 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6116 events.push_back((event, None));
6120 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6121 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6122 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6126 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6127 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6131 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6132 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6135 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6136 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6137 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6138 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6139 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6140 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6143 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6144 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6147 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6148 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6149 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6150 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6152 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6156 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6157 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6158 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6159 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6160 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6162 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6166 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6167 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6168 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6169 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6170 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6171 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6172 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6173 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6174 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6176 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6178 if further_update_exists {
6179 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6184 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6185 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6189 log_debug!(self.logger,
6190 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6191 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6195 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6196 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6197 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6202 for action in actions {
6204 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6205 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6207 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6213 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6214 /// using the given event handler.
6216 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6217 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6221 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6225 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6227 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6228 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6229 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6230 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6231 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6236 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6237 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6238 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6239 /// is always placed next to each other.
6241 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6242 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6243 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6244 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6246 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6247 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6248 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6249 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6250 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6251 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6252 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6254 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6255 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6256 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6257 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6260 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6261 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6263 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6264 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6267 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6269 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6272 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6273 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6277 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6278 events.replace(pending_events);
6287 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6289 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6291 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6292 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6293 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6298 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6300 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6301 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6302 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6304 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6308 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6310 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6311 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6312 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6313 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6314 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6315 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6319 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6321 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6322 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6323 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6324 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6325 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6328 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6329 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6332 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6334 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6335 let new_height = height - 1;
6337 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6338 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6339 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6340 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6341 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6342 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6345 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6349 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6351 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6352 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6353 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6354 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6355 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6360 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6361 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6362 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6363 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6365 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6366 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6369 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6370 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6371 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6373 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6374 if height < last_best_block_height {
6375 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6376 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6380 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6381 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6382 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6383 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6385 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6386 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6389 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6390 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6392 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6394 macro_rules! max_time {
6395 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6397 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6398 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6399 // having an explicit local time source.
6400 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6401 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6402 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6403 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6404 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6410 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6411 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6412 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6413 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6417 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6418 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6419 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6422 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6423 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6424 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6431 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6433 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6434 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6435 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6436 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6437 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6438 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6439 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6444 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6446 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6447 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6448 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6449 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6450 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6451 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6455 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6456 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6458 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6459 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6460 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6461 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6462 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6464 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6465 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6468 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6471 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6472 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6473 let res = f(channel);
6474 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6475 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6476 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6477 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6478 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6480 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6481 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6482 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6484 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6485 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6486 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6496 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6497 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6500 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6503 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6504 msg: announcement_sigs,
6506 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6507 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6508 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6510 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6511 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6512 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6517 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6518 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6519 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6520 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6521 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6522 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6523 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6524 // is always consistent.
6525 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6526 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6527 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6528 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6529 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6532 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6533 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6534 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6535 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6536 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6537 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6542 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6543 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6544 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6545 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6546 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6547 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6548 data: reason_message,
6558 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6559 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6560 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6561 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6562 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6563 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6564 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6565 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6566 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6567 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6569 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6570 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6571 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6575 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6578 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6579 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6580 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6581 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6582 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6583 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6584 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6585 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6586 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6589 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6590 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6591 _ => unreachable!(),
6593 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6594 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6595 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6596 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6602 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6604 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6605 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6609 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6611 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6612 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6614 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6615 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6618 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6619 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6620 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6623 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6624 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6625 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6626 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6629 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6630 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6631 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6632 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6635 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6636 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6638 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6639 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6640 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6641 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6642 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6645 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6646 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6647 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6648 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6651 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6652 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6653 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6654 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6657 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6658 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6659 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6660 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6664 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6665 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6667 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6668 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6669 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6670 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6671 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6672 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6676 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6678 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6681 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6682 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6683 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6684 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6687 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6689 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6692 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6693 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6694 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6695 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6698 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6700 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6703 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6705 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6708 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6710 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6713 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6715 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6718 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6720 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6723 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6725 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6728 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6730 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6733 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6735 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6738 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6740 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6743 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6745 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6748 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6749 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6750 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6753 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6755 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6758 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6760 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6763 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6764 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6765 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6766 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6767 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6769 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6774 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6776 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6779 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6781 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6782 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6784 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6785 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6786 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6789 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6790 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6791 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6792 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6793 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6794 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6799 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6801 // V1 Channel Establishment
6802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6804 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6806 // V2 Channel Establishment
6807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6809 // Common Channel Establishment
6810 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6812 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6813 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6819 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6822 // Channel Operations
6823 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6824 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6825 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6827 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6828 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6830 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6831 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6832 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6833 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6834 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6835 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6836 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6841 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6842 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6843 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6844 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6847 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6849 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6851 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6852 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6856 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6857 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6858 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6864 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6865 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6866 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6867 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6868 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6869 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6872 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6873 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6875 if inbound_peer_limited {
6878 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6879 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6880 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6881 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6882 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6883 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6888 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6889 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6891 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6892 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6893 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6894 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6899 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6900 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6905 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6907 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6908 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6911 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6912 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6913 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6914 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
6915 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6916 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6917 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6921 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6922 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6923 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6928 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6929 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6930 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6931 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6932 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6941 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6945 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6948 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6949 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6952 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6955 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6957 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6958 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6959 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6963 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6965 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6966 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6969 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6970 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6971 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6972 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6980 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6981 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6985 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6986 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6989 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6990 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6993 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
6994 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
6997 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6998 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6999 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7000 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7003 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7004 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7005 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7006 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7009 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7010 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7011 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7012 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7015 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7016 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7017 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7018 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7021 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7022 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7023 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7024 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7027 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7028 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7029 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7030 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7033 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7034 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7035 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7036 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7039 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7040 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7041 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7042 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7045 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7046 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7047 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7048 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7052 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7053 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7054 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7055 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7058 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7059 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7061 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7062 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7063 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7064 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7065 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7068 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7069 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7070 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7071 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7074 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7075 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7076 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7077 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7080 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7081 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7082 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7083 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7084 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7085 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7086 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7087 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7088 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7089 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7090 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7091 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7092 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7093 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7094 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7095 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7096 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7097 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7099 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7100 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7101 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7107 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7108 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7110 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7111 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7112 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7113 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7116 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7117 (2, node_id, required),
7118 (4, features, required),
7119 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7120 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7121 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7122 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7125 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7126 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7127 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7128 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7129 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7130 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7131 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7132 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7133 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7134 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7135 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7136 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7137 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7138 (7, self.config, option),
7139 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7140 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7141 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7142 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7143 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7144 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7145 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7146 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7147 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7148 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7149 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7150 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7151 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7152 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7153 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7154 (32, self.is_public, required),
7155 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7156 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7157 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7158 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7164 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7165 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7166 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7167 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7168 (2, channel_id, required),
7169 (3, channel_type, option),
7170 (4, counterparty, required),
7171 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7172 (6, funding_txo, option),
7173 (7, config, option),
7174 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7175 (9, confirmations, option),
7176 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7177 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7178 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7179 (16, balance_msat, required),
7180 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7181 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7182 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7183 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7184 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7185 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7186 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7187 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7188 (26, is_outbound, required),
7189 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7190 (30, is_usable, required),
7191 (32, is_public, required),
7192 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7193 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7194 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7195 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7198 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7199 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7200 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7201 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7202 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7206 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7208 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7209 outbound_scid_alias,
7213 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7214 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7216 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7217 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7218 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7219 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7220 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7221 confirmations_required,
7223 force_close_spend_delay,
7224 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7225 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7226 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7227 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7228 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7229 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7230 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7235 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7236 (2, channels, vec_type),
7237 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7238 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7241 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7243 (0, onion_packet, required),
7244 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7247 (0, payment_data, required),
7248 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7249 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7250 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7252 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7253 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7254 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7255 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7256 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7260 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7261 (0, routing, required),
7262 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7263 (4, payment_hash, required),
7264 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7265 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7266 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7270 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7271 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7273 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7275 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7276 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7277 reason.write(writer)?;
7279 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7280 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7283 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7284 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7285 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7286 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7293 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7294 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7295 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7299 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7300 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7301 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7305 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7306 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7307 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7308 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7309 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7312 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7313 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7314 // messages contained in the variants.
7315 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7316 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7317 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7319 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7321 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7322 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7323 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7326 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7328 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7329 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7330 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7332 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7337 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7342 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7343 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7344 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7345 (2, outpoint, required),
7346 (4, htlc_id, required),
7347 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7350 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7351 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7352 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7353 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7354 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7356 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7357 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7358 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7359 (2, self.value, required),
7360 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7361 (4, payment_data, option),
7362 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7363 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7364 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7370 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7371 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7372 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7374 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7375 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7376 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7377 let mut total_value_received = None;
7378 let mut total_msat = None;
7379 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7380 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7381 (0, prev_hop, required),
7382 (1, total_msat, option),
7383 (2, value, required),
7384 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7385 (4, payment_data, option),
7386 (5, total_value_received, option),
7387 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7388 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7390 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7392 if payment_data.is_some() {
7393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7395 if total_msat.is_none() {
7396 total_msat = Some(value);
7398 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7401 if total_msat.is_none() {
7402 if payment_data.is_none() {
7403 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7405 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7407 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7411 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7414 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7415 total_value_received,
7416 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7423 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7424 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7425 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7429 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7430 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7431 let mut payment_id = None;
7432 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7433 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7434 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7435 (0, session_priv, required),
7436 (1, payment_id, option),
7437 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7438 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7439 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7440 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7442 if payment_id.is_none() {
7443 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7445 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7447 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7448 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7449 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7451 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7452 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7453 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7454 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7458 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7459 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7460 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7462 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7465 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7466 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7471 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7472 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7474 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7476 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7477 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7478 (0, session_priv, required),
7479 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7480 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7481 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7482 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7483 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7484 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7487 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7489 field.write(writer)?;
7496 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7497 (0, forward_info, required),
7498 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7499 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7500 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7501 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7504 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7506 (0, htlc_id, required),
7507 (2, err_packet, required),
7512 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7513 (0, payment_secret, required),
7514 (2, expiry_time, required),
7515 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7516 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7517 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7520 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7522 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7523 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7524 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7525 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7526 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7527 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7532 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7534 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7536 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7538 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7539 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7540 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7543 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7546 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7547 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7548 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7551 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7552 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7554 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7555 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7556 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7557 unfunded_channels += 1;
7562 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7564 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7567 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7568 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7569 channel.write(writer)?;
7576 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7577 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7578 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7579 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7580 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7581 for forward in pending_forwards {
7582 forward.write(writer)?;
7587 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7589 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7590 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7591 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7593 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7594 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7595 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7596 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7597 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7598 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7599 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7600 htlc.write(writer)?;
7602 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7603 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7606 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7607 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7608 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7609 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7610 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7611 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7612 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7615 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7616 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7617 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7618 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7619 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7621 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7622 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7623 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7624 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7625 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7626 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7627 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7632 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7633 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7634 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7635 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7636 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7637 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7638 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7639 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7640 0u64.write(writer)?;
7642 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7643 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7644 event.write(writer)?;
7648 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7649 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7650 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7651 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7652 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7653 0u64.write(writer)?;
7655 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7656 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7657 // likely to be identical.
7658 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7659 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7661 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7662 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7663 hash.write(writer)?;
7664 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7667 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7668 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7669 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7670 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7671 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7674 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7675 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7677 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7678 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7679 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7680 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7683 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7684 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7688 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7689 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7690 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7692 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7693 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7694 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7700 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7701 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7702 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7703 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7706 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7707 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7708 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7709 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7710 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7713 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7714 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7715 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7716 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7717 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7718 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7719 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7720 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7721 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7722 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7723 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7724 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7731 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7733 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7734 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7737 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7738 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7739 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7740 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7741 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7742 // check that the event is sane here.
7743 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7744 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7745 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7746 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7752 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7753 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7754 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7755 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7756 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7757 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7760 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7761 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7762 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7763 events.push_back((ev, action));
7764 } else if action.is_some() {
7765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7772 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7774 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7776 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7777 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7778 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7779 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7780 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7781 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7782 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7783 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7784 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7785 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7786 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7787 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7788 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7790 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7791 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7793 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7794 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7796 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7797 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7798 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7799 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7800 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7801 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7803 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7804 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7806 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7807 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7808 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7809 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7810 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7811 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7815 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7816 pub entropy_source: ES,
7818 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7819 pub node_signer: NS,
7821 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7822 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7824 pub signer_provider: SP,
7826 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7828 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7829 pub fee_estimator: F,
7830 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7832 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7833 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7834 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7835 pub chain_monitor: M,
7837 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7838 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7839 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7840 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7841 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7842 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7844 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7846 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7847 /// deserialization.
7849 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7850 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7851 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7853 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7854 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7856 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7857 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7858 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7859 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7861 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7864 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7865 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7868 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7869 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7871 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7872 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7873 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7874 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7875 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7876 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7880 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7881 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7882 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7883 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7884 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7886 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7887 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7892 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7893 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7894 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7895 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7897 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7906 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7907 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7908 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7912 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7913 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7915 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7916 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7917 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7918 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7919 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7920 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7924 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7925 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7927 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7928 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7929 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7933 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7935 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7936 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7937 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7938 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7939 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7940 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7941 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7942 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7944 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7945 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7946 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7947 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7948 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7949 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7950 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7951 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7952 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7953 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7954 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7955 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7956 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7957 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7958 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7959 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7960 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7961 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7962 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7963 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7964 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7965 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7966 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7967 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7968 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7969 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7972 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7973 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7974 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7975 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
7976 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7978 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7979 let mut found_htlc = false;
7980 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7981 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7984 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7985 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7986 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7987 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7988 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7989 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7990 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7991 log_info!(args.logger,
7992 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7993 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7994 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7998 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
7999 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8000 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8001 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8002 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8003 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8005 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8006 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8008 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8010 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8011 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8014 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8015 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8016 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8020 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8021 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8022 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8023 // safely discard the channel.
8024 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
8025 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8026 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8027 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8028 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8031 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8032 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8033 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8034 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8035 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8036 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8040 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8041 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8042 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8043 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8044 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8045 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8046 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8048 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8052 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8053 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8054 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8055 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8056 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8057 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8058 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8059 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8060 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8062 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8065 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8066 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8067 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8068 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8069 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8070 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8071 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8072 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8074 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8077 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8078 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8079 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8080 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8081 let peer_state = PeerState {
8082 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8083 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8084 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8085 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8086 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8087 is_connected: false,
8089 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8092 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8093 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8094 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8095 for _ in 0..event_count {
8096 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8097 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8102 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8103 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8104 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8106 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8107 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8108 // on-startup monitor updates.
8109 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8110 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8112 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8116 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8117 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8118 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8119 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8120 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8121 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8122 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8123 pending_background_events.push(
8124 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8125 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8128 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8134 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8135 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8137 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8138 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8139 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8140 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8145 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8146 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8147 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8148 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8149 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8150 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8151 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8153 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8154 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8158 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8159 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8160 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8161 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8162 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8163 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8164 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8165 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8166 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8167 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8168 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8169 let mut events_override = None;
8170 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8171 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8172 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8173 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8174 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8175 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8176 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8177 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8178 (8, events_override, option),
8179 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8180 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8181 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8183 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8184 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8187 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8188 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8191 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8192 pending_events_read = events;
8195 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8196 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8199 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8200 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8201 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8202 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8203 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8204 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8206 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8208 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8209 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8210 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8214 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8215 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8216 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8217 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8218 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8219 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8220 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8222 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8223 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8224 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8225 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8226 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8227 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8228 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8231 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8232 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8233 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8234 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8236 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8237 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8238 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8241 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8242 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8243 retry_strategy: None,
8244 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8245 payment_params: None,
8246 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8247 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8248 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8249 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8250 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8251 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8252 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8253 total_msat: path_amt,
8254 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8256 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8257 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8262 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8264 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8265 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8266 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8267 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8269 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8270 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8271 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8272 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8273 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8274 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8275 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8276 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8277 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8278 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8279 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8284 !forwards.is_empty()
8286 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8287 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8288 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8289 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8290 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8291 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8292 intercepted_id != ev_id
8299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8300 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8301 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8302 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8303 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8304 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8305 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8306 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8307 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8308 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8309 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8310 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8311 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8320 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8321 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8322 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8323 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8324 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8325 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8326 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8327 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8331 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8332 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8334 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8335 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8336 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8337 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8339 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8340 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8341 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8343 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8344 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8346 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8347 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8349 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8352 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8353 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8354 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8356 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8360 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8361 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8362 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8363 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8366 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8367 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8368 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8369 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8370 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8371 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8372 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8373 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8375 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8376 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8380 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8382 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8384 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8385 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8387 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8388 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8393 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8394 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8396 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8398 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8400 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8401 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8402 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8403 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8407 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8408 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8411 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8412 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8413 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8415 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8416 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8417 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8419 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8420 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8421 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8422 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8423 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8426 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8427 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8428 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8429 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8430 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8437 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8439 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8440 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8441 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8442 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8443 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8444 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8445 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8446 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8447 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8448 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8449 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8451 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8452 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8454 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8455 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8456 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8457 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8459 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8460 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8461 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8462 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8464 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8465 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8466 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8467 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8469 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8470 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8471 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8474 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8475 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8478 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8479 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8482 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8485 purpose: payment.purpose,
8486 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8492 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8493 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8494 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8495 for action in actions.iter() {
8496 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8497 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8498 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8500 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8501 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8502 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8503 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8508 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8510 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8511 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8515 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8517 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8518 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8519 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8520 router: args.router,
8522 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8524 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8525 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8526 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8527 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8529 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8530 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8531 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8532 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8533 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8534 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8536 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8541 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8543 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8545 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8546 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8547 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8548 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8549 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8550 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8551 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8553 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8554 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8555 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8557 logger: args.logger,
8558 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8561 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8562 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8563 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8564 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8565 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8568 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8569 //connection or two.
8571 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8577 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8578 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8579 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8580 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8581 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8582 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8583 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8584 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8585 use crate::ln::msgs;
8586 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8587 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8588 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8589 use crate::util::test_utils;
8590 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8591 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8594 fn test_notify_limits() {
8595 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8596 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8600 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8602 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8603 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8604 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8605 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8606 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8608 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8610 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8611 // to connect messages with new values
8612 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8613 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8614 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8615 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8616 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8617 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8619 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8620 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8621 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8622 // ... but the last node should not.
8623 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8624 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8625 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8626 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8628 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8629 // about the channel.
8630 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8631 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8632 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8634 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8636 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8637 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8638 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8639 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8640 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8641 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8643 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8644 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8645 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8647 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8648 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8649 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8650 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8651 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8652 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8654 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8655 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8656 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8658 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8659 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8660 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8661 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8663 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8664 // the channel info has updated.
8665 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8666 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8667 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8668 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8669 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8670 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8674 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8675 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8680 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8681 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8683 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8684 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8685 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8686 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8688 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8689 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8690 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8691 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8692 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8693 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8694 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8695 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8697 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8699 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8701 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8702 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8703 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8707 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8708 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8711 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8712 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8715 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8716 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8717 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8718 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8719 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8720 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8721 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8722 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8723 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8725 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8726 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8727 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8729 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8731 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8733 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8734 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8735 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8736 // lightning messages manually.
8737 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8738 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8741 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8742 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8743 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8745 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8746 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8748 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8749 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8751 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8753 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8755 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8756 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8757 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8759 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8761 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8763 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8764 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8767 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8768 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8769 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8770 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8772 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8773 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8774 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8775 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8780 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8781 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8782 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8783 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8788 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8789 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8790 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8791 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8798 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8799 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
8800 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
8803 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
8804 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8805 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8806 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8807 // fails as expected.
8808 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
8809 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
8810 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
8811 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
8812 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
8813 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
8814 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8815 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8816 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
8817 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
8818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
8819 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8820 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8821 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8822 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8824 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8825 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8826 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8828 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8829 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8830 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8831 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8833 let route = find_route(
8834 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8835 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8837 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8838 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8840 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8842 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8843 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8844 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8846 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8847 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8848 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8852 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8853 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8854 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8855 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8856 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8857 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8859 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8860 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8862 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8863 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8865 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8866 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8867 let route = find_route(
8868 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8869 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8871 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8872 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8874 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8875 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8876 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8877 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8878 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8880 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8881 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8882 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8883 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8885 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8887 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8888 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8889 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8891 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8892 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8895 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8896 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8897 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8898 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8899 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8900 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8901 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8902 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8903 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8905 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8906 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8908 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8909 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
8910 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8911 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
8912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8913 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8915 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8916 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8917 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8919 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8920 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8921 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8922 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8924 let route = find_route(
8925 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8926 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8928 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
8929 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8930 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
8931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8932 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8933 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8934 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8935 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8936 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8938 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8942 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8943 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8944 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8945 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8946 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8947 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8950 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8952 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8953 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8957 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8958 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8959 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8965 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8966 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8968 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8969 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8970 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
8971 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8973 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8974 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8975 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8976 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8977 let route = find_route(
8978 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8979 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8982 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8983 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8984 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8985 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8986 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8987 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8990 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8991 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8992 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8993 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8994 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8995 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8996 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8998 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9002 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9003 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9004 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9005 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9006 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9010 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9012 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9013 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9015 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9016 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9017 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9018 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9020 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9021 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9022 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9023 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9024 let route = find_route(
9025 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9026 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9029 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9030 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9031 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9032 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9033 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9034 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9035 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9036 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9039 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9040 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9041 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9042 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9043 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9044 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9045 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9047 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9051 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9055 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9057 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9058 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9059 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9060 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9062 // Marshall an MPP route.
9063 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9064 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9065 route.paths.push(path);
9066 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9067 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9068 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9069 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9070 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9071 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9073 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9074 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9076 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9077 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9079 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9084 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9090 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9092 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9093 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9095 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9096 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9098 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9101 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9102 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9103 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9104 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9105 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9106 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9109 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9112 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9113 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9118 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9119 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9123 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9125 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9126 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9128 total_msat: 100_000,
9131 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9132 // payment verification fails as expected.
9133 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9134 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9135 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9136 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9138 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9142 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9143 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9147 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9148 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9149 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9150 // the channel is successfully closed.
9151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9156 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9157 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9158 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9159 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9160 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9162 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9163 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9165 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9166 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9167 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9168 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9171 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9173 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9174 // as it has the funding transaction.
9175 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9176 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9177 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9180 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9182 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9184 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9186 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9187 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9188 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9190 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9193 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9194 // as it has the funding transaction.
9195 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9196 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9197 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9200 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9201 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9203 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9204 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9205 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9206 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9208 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9209 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9210 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9211 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9213 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9214 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9216 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9217 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9218 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9219 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9220 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9221 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9222 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9226 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9227 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9228 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9229 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9230 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9231 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9232 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9235 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9237 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9238 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9239 // closing transaction).
9240 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9241 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9244 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9245 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9246 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9247 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9248 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9251 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9253 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9255 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9256 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9257 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9259 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9261 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9262 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9265 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9266 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9267 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9270 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9271 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9272 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9275 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9277 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9278 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9280 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9281 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9283 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9284 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9289 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9290 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9291 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9292 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9293 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9294 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9295 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9299 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9300 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9301 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9303 // Test the API functions.
9304 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9306 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9308 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9310 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9312 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9314 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9316 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9320 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9321 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9325 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9327 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9329 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9330 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9332 let mut funding_tx = None;
9333 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9334 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9335 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9338 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9339 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9340 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9341 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9342 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9344 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9346 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9348 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9350 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9352 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9354 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9357 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9358 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9359 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9360 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9361 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9363 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9364 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9366 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9367 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9368 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9369 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9370 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9371 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9372 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9375 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9376 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9377 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9378 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9379 }, true).unwrap_err();
9381 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9382 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9383 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9384 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9385 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9386 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9387 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9389 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9390 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9392 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9393 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9394 }, true).unwrap_err();
9396 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9397 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9398 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9400 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9402 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9403 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9405 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9406 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9407 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9408 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9409 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9411 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9412 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9413 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9415 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9416 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9417 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9419 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9420 // "protected" and can connect again.
9421 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9422 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9423 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9425 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9427 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9429 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9430 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9434 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9435 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9441 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9443 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9444 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9446 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9448 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9449 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9452 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9454 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9455 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9456 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9458 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9459 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9460 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9462 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9463 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9464 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9465 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9469 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9470 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9471 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9474 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9475 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9479 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9481 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9482 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9484 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9485 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9486 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9487 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9488 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9489 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9492 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9493 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9495 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9496 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9500 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9501 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9504 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9505 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9506 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9507 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9508 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9510 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9511 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9513 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9514 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9515 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9516 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9522 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9523 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9525 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9526 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9527 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9529 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9530 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9534 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9539 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9540 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9541 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9542 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9545 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9546 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9547 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9551 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9552 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9553 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9555 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9556 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9558 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9559 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9564 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9565 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9567 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9568 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9570 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9574 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9575 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9576 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9577 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9578 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9580 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9581 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9583 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9584 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9585 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9587 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9588 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9589 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9590 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9593 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9594 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9597 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9598 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9601 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9602 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9603 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9604 ..Default::default()
9606 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9607 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9608 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9610 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9611 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9614 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9615 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9616 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9617 ..Default::default()
9619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9621 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9622 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9624 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9625 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9632 use crate::chain::Listen;
9633 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9634 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9635 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9636 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9637 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9638 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9639 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9640 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9641 use crate::util::test_utils;
9642 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9644 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9645 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9646 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9648 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9650 use criterion::Criterion;
9652 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9653 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9654 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9655 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9656 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9657 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9658 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9660 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9661 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9663 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9664 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9666 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9668 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9671 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9672 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9675 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9676 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9677 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9679 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9681 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9682 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9683 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9684 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9685 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9687 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9688 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9690 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9691 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9692 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9693 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9695 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9697 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9699 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9700 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9701 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9702 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9703 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9705 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9707 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9709 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9710 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9712 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9713 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9715 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9716 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9717 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9720 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9721 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9722 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9724 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9725 } else { panic!(); }
9727 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9728 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9729 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9731 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9732 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9737 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9738 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9739 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9741 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9742 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9747 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9749 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9750 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9751 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9753 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9754 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9755 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9756 match msg_events[0] {
9757 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9758 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9759 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9763 match msg_events[1] {
9764 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9768 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9769 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9771 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9772 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9777 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9778 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9780 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9781 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9786 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9787 macro_rules! send_payment {
9788 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9789 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9790 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9791 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9792 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9794 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9795 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9797 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9798 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9799 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9800 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9801 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9802 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9803 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9804 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9805 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9806 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9807 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9809 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9810 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9811 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9812 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9814 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9815 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9816 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9817 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9818 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9820 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9823 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9824 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9825 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9826 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9828 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9832 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9833 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9834 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);