1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
55 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use util::errors::APIError;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
400 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
401 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
402 /// confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
689 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
733 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
734 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
735 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
737 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
738 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
739 /// the handling of the events.
742 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
743 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
744 /// would break backwards compatability.
745 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
746 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
747 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
748 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
750 our_network_key: SecretKey,
751 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
753 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
755 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
756 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
757 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
759 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
760 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
762 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
763 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
764 /// keeping additional state.
765 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
767 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
768 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
769 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
770 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
772 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
773 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
774 /// are currently open with that peer.
775 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
776 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
779 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
780 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
782 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
783 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
784 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
785 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
786 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
787 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
788 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
789 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
790 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
792 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
799 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
801 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
802 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
803 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
804 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
805 pub struct ChainParameters {
806 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
807 pub network: Network,
809 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
811 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
812 pub best_block: BestBlock,
815 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
821 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
822 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
823 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
824 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
825 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
826 /// updates are ready for persistence).
828 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
829 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
830 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
831 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
832 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
834 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
835 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
838 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
839 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
840 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
843 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
844 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
846 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
847 persistence_notifier: notifier,
848 should_persist: persist_check,
849 _read_guard: read_guard,
854 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
856 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
857 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
862 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
863 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
865 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
867 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
868 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
869 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
870 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
871 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
873 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
874 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
876 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
878 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
879 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
880 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
881 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
882 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
883 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
884 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
885 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
886 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
887 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
888 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
889 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
890 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
892 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
893 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
895 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
896 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
897 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
898 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
900 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
901 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
902 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
903 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
904 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
905 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
908 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
910 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
911 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
914 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
916 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
917 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
918 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
920 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
921 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
923 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
924 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
925 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
926 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
927 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
928 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
929 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
930 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
931 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
932 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
933 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
936 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
937 /// to better separate parameters.
938 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
939 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
940 /// The node_id of our counterparty
941 pub node_id: PublicKey,
942 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
943 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
944 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
945 pub features: InitFeatures,
946 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
947 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
948 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
950 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
952 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
953 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
954 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
955 /// payments to us through this channel.
956 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
957 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
958 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
959 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
960 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
961 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
962 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
965 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
966 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
967 pub struct ChannelDetails {
968 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
969 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
970 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
971 /// lifetime of the channel.
972 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
973 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
974 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
975 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
976 /// our counterparty already.
978 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
979 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
980 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
981 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
983 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
984 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
985 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
986 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
988 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
989 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
991 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
992 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
994 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
995 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
996 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
997 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
998 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
999 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1000 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1001 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1002 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1005 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1007 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1008 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1009 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1010 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1011 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1012 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1013 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1015 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1016 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1018 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1019 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1020 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1021 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1022 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1023 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1024 /// this value on chain.
1026 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1028 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1030 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1031 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1032 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1033 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1034 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1035 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1036 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1038 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1039 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1040 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1041 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1043 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1044 pub balance_msat: u64,
1045 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1046 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1047 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1048 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1050 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1052 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1053 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1054 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1055 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1056 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1057 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1058 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1059 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1061 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1062 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1063 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1064 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1065 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1066 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1067 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1069 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1070 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1071 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1072 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1073 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1074 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1075 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1076 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1077 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1079 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1081 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1082 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1083 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1084 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1085 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1086 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1087 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1088 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1089 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1091 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1092 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1093 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1094 pub is_outbound: bool,
1095 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1096 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1097 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1098 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1099 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1101 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1102 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1103 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1104 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1106 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1107 pub is_usable: bool,
1108 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1109 pub is_public: bool,
1110 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1111 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1112 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1113 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1114 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1115 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1117 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1118 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1121 impl ChannelDetails {
1122 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1123 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1124 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1126 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1127 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1128 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1129 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1132 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1133 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1134 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1136 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1137 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1138 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1143 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1144 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1145 /// states for more.
1146 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1147 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1148 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1149 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1150 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1151 ParameterError(APIError),
1152 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1153 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1154 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1155 /// payment in full.
1157 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1159 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1160 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1161 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1162 /// paths than the ones selected).
1163 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1164 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1165 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1166 /// in over-/re-payment.
1168 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1169 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1170 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1172 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1173 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1174 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1175 /// with the latest update_id.
1177 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1178 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1179 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1180 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1181 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1182 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1183 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1184 payment_id: PaymentId,
1188 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1190 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1192 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1193 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1194 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1195 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1197 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1198 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1199 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1202 macro_rules! handle_error {
1203 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1206 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1207 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1209 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1210 // entering the macro.
1211 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1212 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1215 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1217 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1218 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1219 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1220 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1224 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1225 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1226 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1227 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1232 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1233 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1235 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1236 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1237 action: err.action.clone()
1241 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1242 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1245 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1252 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1253 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1254 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1255 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1257 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1258 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1259 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1260 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1261 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1263 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1264 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1266 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1267 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1271 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1272 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1273 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1275 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1276 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1278 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1279 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1281 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1282 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1283 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1284 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1285 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1286 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1292 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1293 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1297 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1299 $entry.remove_entry();
1307 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1308 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1312 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1314 $entry.remove_entry();
1322 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1323 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1325 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1326 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1332 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1333 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1335 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1336 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1337 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1338 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1339 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1340 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1341 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1342 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1343 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1344 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1345 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1346 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1347 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1348 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1351 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1352 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1353 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1354 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1355 match $action_type {
1356 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1357 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1359 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1360 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1362 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1363 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1364 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1365 if !$resend_commitment {
1366 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1369 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1371 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1372 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1376 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1377 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1379 $entry.remove_entry();
1383 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1384 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1385 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1388 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1390 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1391 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1394 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1397 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1401 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1402 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1403 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1405 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1406 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1410 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1411 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1412 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1413 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1414 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1417 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1422 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1423 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1424 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1425 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1426 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1428 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1429 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1430 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1431 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1432 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1433 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1434 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1435 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1436 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1441 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1442 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1443 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1444 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1445 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1447 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1448 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1449 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1451 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1452 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1453 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1454 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1457 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1458 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1459 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1460 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1461 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1462 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1463 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1464 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1465 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1466 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1467 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1468 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1471 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1472 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1473 // before it should be allowed to.
1474 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1475 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1477 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1478 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1479 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1484 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1485 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1486 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1487 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1488 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1489 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1490 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1491 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1492 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1493 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1494 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1495 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1496 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1497 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1498 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1499 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1500 let mut order = $order;
1502 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1504 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1508 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1509 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1510 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1511 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1516 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1517 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1518 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1519 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1520 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1525 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1529 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1534 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1535 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1536 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1541 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1542 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1543 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1544 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1545 assert!(res.is_ok());
1548 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1552 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1553 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1554 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1556 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1558 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1559 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1564 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1565 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1566 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1567 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1568 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1571 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1573 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1574 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1576 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1578 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1579 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1580 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1581 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1582 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1583 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1584 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1585 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1587 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1588 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1589 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1593 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1595 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1596 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1597 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1598 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1599 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1600 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1602 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1603 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1604 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1607 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1608 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1611 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1612 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1614 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1616 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1618 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1620 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1621 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1622 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1623 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1631 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1632 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1633 &self.default_configuration
1636 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1637 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1638 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1641 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1642 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1644 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1646 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1650 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1655 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1657 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1658 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1659 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1660 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1661 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1664 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1665 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1667 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1668 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1669 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1671 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1672 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1673 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1674 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1675 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1676 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1678 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1679 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1680 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1681 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1682 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1688 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1689 Some(peer_state) => {
1690 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1691 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1692 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1693 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1694 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1695 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1696 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1700 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1705 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1708 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1711 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1712 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1714 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1721 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1727 node_id: their_network_key,
1730 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1733 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1734 let mut res = Vec::new();
1736 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1738 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1739 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1740 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1741 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1742 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1743 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1744 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1745 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1746 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1747 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1748 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1749 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1750 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1751 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1752 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1753 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1754 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1755 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1756 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1758 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1759 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1760 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1761 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1762 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1763 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1764 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1765 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1766 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1767 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1768 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1769 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1770 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1771 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1772 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1773 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1774 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1775 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1776 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1777 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1778 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1779 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1780 config: Some(channel.config()),
1784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1785 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1786 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1787 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1793 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1794 /// more information.
1795 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1796 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1799 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1800 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1802 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1803 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1806 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1807 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1808 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1809 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1810 // really wanted anyway.
1811 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1814 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1815 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1816 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1817 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1818 Some(transaction) => {
1819 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1823 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1824 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1825 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1826 reason: closure_reason
1830 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1833 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1834 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1836 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1837 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1839 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1843 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1844 Some(peer_state) => {
1845 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1846 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1847 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1849 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1851 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1853 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1854 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1855 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1856 let (result, is_permanent) =
1857 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1859 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1865 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1866 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1870 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1871 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1872 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1873 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1877 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1885 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1886 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1887 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1890 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1894 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1895 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1896 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1898 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1899 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1901 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1902 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1903 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1904 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1906 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1908 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1909 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1910 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1911 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1912 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1915 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1916 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1917 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1919 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1920 /// the channel being closed or not:
1921 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1922 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1923 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1924 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1925 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1926 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1927 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1929 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1931 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1932 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1933 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1934 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1935 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1939 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1940 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1941 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1942 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1943 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1944 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1947 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1948 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1949 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1950 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1951 // ignore the result here.
1952 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1956 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1957 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1958 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1959 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1963 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1964 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1965 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1967 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1968 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1970 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1972 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1974 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1977 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1978 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1979 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1980 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1986 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1989 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1991 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1992 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1993 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1994 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1995 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1996 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1997 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2007 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2008 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2009 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2011 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2012 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2013 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2016 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2017 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2018 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2020 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2021 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2022 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2023 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2024 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2027 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2028 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2029 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2030 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2031 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2035 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2036 /// local transaction(s).
2037 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2038 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2039 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2043 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2044 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2046 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2047 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2048 return Err(ReceiveError {
2049 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2051 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2054 // final_expiry_too_soon
2055 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2056 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2057 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2058 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2059 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2060 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2061 return Err(ReceiveError {
2063 err_data: Vec::new(),
2064 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2067 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2068 return Err(ReceiveError {
2070 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2071 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2075 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2076 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2077 return Err(ReceiveError {
2078 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2079 err_data: Vec::new(),
2080 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2083 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2084 return Err(ReceiveError {
2085 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2086 err_data: Vec::new(),
2087 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2090 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2091 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2092 return Err(ReceiveError {
2093 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2094 err_data: Vec::new(),
2095 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2097 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2098 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2100 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2101 phantom_shared_secret,
2103 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2104 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2105 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2106 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2107 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2108 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2109 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2110 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2111 return Err(ReceiveError {
2112 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2113 err_data: Vec::new(),
2114 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2118 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2120 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2123 return Err(ReceiveError {
2124 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2125 err_data: Vec::new(),
2126 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2131 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2134 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2135 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2136 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2140 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2141 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2142 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2144 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2145 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2146 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2147 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2148 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2149 failure_code: $err_code,
2155 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2156 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2159 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2161 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2162 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2163 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2164 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2165 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2166 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2167 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2168 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2170 macro_rules! return_err {
2171 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2173 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2174 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2175 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2176 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2177 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2183 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2185 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2186 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2188 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2189 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2193 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2194 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2196 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2198 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2199 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2200 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2201 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2202 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2204 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2207 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2208 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2209 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2211 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2212 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2213 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2216 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2217 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2218 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2219 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2220 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2224 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2225 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2226 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2229 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2230 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2231 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2232 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2237 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2238 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2239 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2240 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2241 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2242 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2243 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2244 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2245 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2246 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2247 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2249 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2252 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2255 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2257 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2258 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2259 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2260 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2261 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2262 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2263 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2265 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2266 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2267 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2268 // we don't have the channel here.
2269 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2271 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2273 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2274 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2275 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2276 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2277 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2278 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2279 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2281 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2282 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2284 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2285 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2289 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2291 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2298 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2299 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2300 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2301 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2302 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2303 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2305 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2306 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2308 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2309 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2310 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2311 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2312 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2313 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2314 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2315 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2316 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2317 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2323 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2324 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2325 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2326 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2328 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2329 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2331 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2332 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2333 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2335 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2336 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2337 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2339 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2344 pending_forward_info
2347 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2348 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2349 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2351 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2352 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2353 if !chan.should_announce() {
2354 return Err(LightningError {
2355 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2359 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2360 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2363 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2366 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2367 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2368 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2369 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2370 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2371 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2373 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2374 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2378 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2380 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2382 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2384 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2385 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2387 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2388 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2389 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2390 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2391 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2392 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2393 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2394 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2397 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2398 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2400 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2406 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2407 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2409 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2410 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2411 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2413 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2414 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2415 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2416 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2417 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2419 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2423 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2424 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2426 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2427 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2428 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2429 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2430 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2431 err: "Payment already completed"
2436 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2437 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2438 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2441 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2443 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2444 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2445 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2446 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2447 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2448 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2449 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2450 total_msat: total_value,
2452 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2456 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2457 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2459 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2460 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2462 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2463 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2465 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2466 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2468 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2469 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2471 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2472 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2473 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2474 channel_state, chan)
2476 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2477 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2478 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2479 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2480 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2481 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2482 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2483 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2484 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2485 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2487 insert_outbound_payment!();
2489 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2490 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2491 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2492 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2493 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2494 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2495 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2496 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2502 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2504 } else { unreachable!(); }
2508 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2509 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2511 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2516 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2518 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2519 /// fields for more info.
2521 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2522 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2523 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2524 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2525 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2526 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2528 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2530 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2531 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2532 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2534 /// In general, a path may raise:
2535 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2536 /// node public key) is specified.
2537 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2538 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2540 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2541 /// relevant updates.
2543 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2544 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2545 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2547 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2548 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2549 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2550 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2552 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2553 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2554 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2555 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2556 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2559 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2560 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2561 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2563 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2564 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2566 let mut total_value = 0;
2567 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2568 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2569 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2570 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2571 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2572 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2573 continue 'path_check;
2575 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2576 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2577 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2578 continue 'path_check;
2581 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2582 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2584 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2585 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2587 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2588 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2589 total_value = amt_msat;
2592 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2593 let mut results = Vec::new();
2594 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2595 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2597 let mut has_ok = false;
2598 let mut has_err = false;
2599 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2600 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2601 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2602 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2603 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2604 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2605 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2609 } else if res.is_err() {
2610 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2611 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2614 if has_err && has_ok {
2615 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2618 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2619 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2620 Some(RouteParameters {
2621 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2622 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2623 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2629 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2630 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2631 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2632 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2638 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2640 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2641 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2642 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2643 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2644 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2646 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2647 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2648 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2649 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2650 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2651 if path.len() == 0 {
2652 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2653 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2658 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2659 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2660 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2662 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2663 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2665 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2666 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2667 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2668 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2671 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2673 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2674 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2675 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2678 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2679 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2680 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2684 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2685 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2690 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2691 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2695 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2698 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2700 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2701 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2702 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2703 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2705 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2706 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2707 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2709 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2710 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2711 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2712 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2715 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2716 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2717 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2718 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2719 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2721 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2729 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2730 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2731 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2732 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2733 /// never reach the recipient.
2735 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2737 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2738 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2740 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2742 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2743 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2744 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2746 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2748 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2749 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2750 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2755 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2756 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2757 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2758 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2759 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2761 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2764 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2765 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2769 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2771 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2772 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2777 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2779 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2780 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2781 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2784 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2785 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2786 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2787 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2788 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2789 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2792 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2793 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2794 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2795 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2796 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2798 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2800 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2802 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2803 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2804 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2805 } else { unreachable!(); })
2808 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2810 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2811 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2814 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2815 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2820 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2822 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2825 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2827 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2830 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2831 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2832 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2841 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2842 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2843 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2847 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2849 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2850 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2852 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2853 /// across the p2p network.
2855 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2856 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2858 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2859 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2860 /// keys per-channel).
2862 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2863 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2864 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2866 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2867 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2868 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2870 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2871 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2872 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2873 /// for more details.
2875 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2876 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2877 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2880 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2881 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2883 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2888 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2889 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2890 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2891 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2892 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2893 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2894 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2895 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2899 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2900 let mut output_index = None;
2901 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2902 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2903 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2904 if output_index.is_some() {
2905 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2906 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2909 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2914 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2917 if output_index.is_none() {
2918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2919 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2922 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2926 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2928 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2929 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2930 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2931 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2933 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2934 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2936 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2937 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2939 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2941 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2942 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2943 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2944 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2945 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2946 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2947 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2948 pub fn update_channel_config(
2949 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2950 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2951 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2953 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2958 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2961 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2963 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2964 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2965 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2966 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2968 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2969 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2971 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2975 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2976 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2977 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2980 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2982 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2983 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2984 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2993 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2995 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2996 /// Will likely generate further events.
2997 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3000 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3001 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3002 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3003 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3008 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3009 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3010 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3011 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3013 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3014 match forward_info {
3015 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3016 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3017 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3018 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3019 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3020 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3022 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3023 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3024 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3025 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3026 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3027 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3030 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3031 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3033 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3036 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3037 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3043 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3044 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3046 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3050 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3051 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3053 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3057 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3058 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3059 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3060 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3061 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3063 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3064 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3065 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3066 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3067 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3069 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3071 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3072 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3076 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3077 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3078 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3079 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3085 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3088 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3091 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3092 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3093 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3094 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3095 // problem, not ours.
3102 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3103 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3104 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3105 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3106 match forward_info {
3107 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3108 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3110 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3111 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3112 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3113 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3114 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3115 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3116 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3117 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3118 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3119 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3121 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3123 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3124 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3126 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3128 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3129 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3130 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3131 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3137 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3139 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3140 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3141 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3142 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3143 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3144 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3145 // this channel currently :/.
3151 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3152 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3154 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3156 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3158 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3161 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3163 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3164 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3165 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3168 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3170 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3171 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3172 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3173 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3174 // messages when we can.
3175 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3176 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3177 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3184 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3185 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3188 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3189 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3190 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3191 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3192 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3193 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3195 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3197 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3198 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3199 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3202 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3206 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3207 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3210 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3211 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3213 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3214 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3215 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3216 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3217 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3218 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3220 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3228 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3229 match forward_info {
3230 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3231 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3232 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3233 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3234 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3235 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3236 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3238 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3239 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3241 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3244 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3245 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3246 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3247 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3248 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3249 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3250 phantom_shared_secret,
3252 value: amt_to_forward,
3254 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3259 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3260 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3261 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3262 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3263 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3265 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3266 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3267 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3268 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3269 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3270 phantom_shared_secret,
3272 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3273 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3278 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3279 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3280 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3282 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3283 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3284 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3287 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3288 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3289 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3290 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3292 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3296 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3297 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3298 total_value += htlc.value;
3299 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3300 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3301 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3302 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3303 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3304 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3306 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3308 _ => unreachable!(),
3311 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3313 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3314 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3315 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3316 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3317 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3320 amount_msat: total_value,
3322 payment_received_generated = true;
3324 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3325 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3327 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3329 payment_received_generated
3333 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3334 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3335 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3336 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3337 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3338 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3339 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3340 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3342 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3343 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3344 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3345 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3346 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3348 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3352 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3354 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3355 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3357 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3358 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3359 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3361 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3374 if payment_data.is_none() {
3375 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3376 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3379 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3380 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3382 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3383 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3385 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3388 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3389 if payment_received_generated {
3390 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3396 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3397 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3405 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3406 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3408 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3410 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3411 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3414 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3415 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3416 events.append(&mut new_events);
3419 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3421 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3422 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3424 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3425 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3426 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3427 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3428 if background_events.is_empty() {
3432 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3434 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3435 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3436 // monitor updating completing.
3437 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3444 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3445 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3446 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3447 self.process_background_events();
3450 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3451 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3452 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3453 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3455 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3456 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3458 if !chan.is_live() {
3459 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3460 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3461 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3464 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3466 let mut retain_channel = true;
3467 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3470 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3471 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3475 let ret_err = match res {
3476 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3477 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3478 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3479 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3482 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3483 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3484 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3485 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3487 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3488 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3489 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3499 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3503 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3504 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3505 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3506 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3507 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3508 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3509 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3511 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3513 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3515 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3516 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3517 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3518 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3519 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3520 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3521 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3523 handle_errors.push(err);
3533 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3535 /// This currently includes:
3536 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3537 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3538 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3540 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3541 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3543 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3544 /// estimate fetches.
3545 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3546 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3547 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3548 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3550 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3552 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3553 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3555 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3556 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3557 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3558 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3559 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3560 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3561 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3562 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3564 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3566 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3568 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3569 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3570 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3571 if needs_close { return false; }
3574 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3575 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3576 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3578 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3579 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3580 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3581 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3585 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3586 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3588 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3589 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3590 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3594 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3595 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3600 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3605 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3606 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3607 // This should be unreachable
3608 debug_assert!(false);
3611 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3612 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3613 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3614 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3616 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3617 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3618 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3620 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3628 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3629 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3630 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3633 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3634 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3640 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3641 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3642 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3644 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3645 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3646 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3647 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3649 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3650 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3651 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3652 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3653 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3656 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3657 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3658 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3659 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3660 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3661 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3662 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3663 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3664 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3665 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3666 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3667 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3672 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3673 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3675 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3677 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3678 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3679 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3680 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3681 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3682 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3683 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3685 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3687 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3688 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3690 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3695 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3696 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3697 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3698 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3699 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3700 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3701 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3702 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3703 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3704 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3706 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3707 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3708 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3709 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3711 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3712 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3713 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3714 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3715 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3719 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3720 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3721 // be surfaced to the user.
3722 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3723 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3724 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3726 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3727 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3728 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3729 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3731 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3736 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3741 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3742 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3743 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3744 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3745 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3746 /// still-available channels.
3747 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3748 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3749 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3750 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3753 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3754 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3755 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3757 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3758 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3759 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3760 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3761 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3762 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3763 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3764 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3768 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3772 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3773 all_paths_failed = true;
3774 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3775 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3777 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3786 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3787 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3788 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3789 Some(RouteParameters {
3790 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3791 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3792 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3797 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3798 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3800 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3802 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3804 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3805 if !payment_retryable {
3806 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3808 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3812 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3813 payment_id: payment_id,
3814 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3820 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3821 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3822 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3823 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3824 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3826 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3827 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3828 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3829 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3836 error_code: onion_error_code,
3838 error_data: onion_error_data
3842 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3848 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3849 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3850 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3851 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3853 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3854 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3855 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3856 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3858 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3859 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3860 payment_id: payment_id,
3861 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3863 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3866 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3867 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3868 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3869 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3870 network_update: None,
3873 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3876 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3878 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3883 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3884 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3885 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3887 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3888 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3889 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3890 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3891 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3892 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3893 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3894 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3896 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3897 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3900 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3902 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3906 let mut forward_event = None;
3907 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3908 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3910 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3912 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3915 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3918 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3919 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3920 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3921 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3922 time_forwardable: time
3925 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3926 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3927 failed_next_destination: destination
3933 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3934 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3936 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3937 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3938 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3940 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3941 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3942 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3943 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3945 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3946 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3947 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3948 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3949 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3950 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3951 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3952 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3956 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3957 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3958 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3959 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3961 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3962 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3963 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3964 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3966 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3967 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3968 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3969 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3970 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3972 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3973 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3974 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3975 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3976 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3980 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3981 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3982 debug_assert!(false);
3986 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3987 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3988 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3989 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3990 if sources.len() != 1 {
3991 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3992 debug_assert!(false);
3998 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4000 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4001 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4004 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4005 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4006 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4010 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4011 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4012 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4014 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4015 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4016 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4017 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4018 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4019 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4020 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4021 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4023 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4024 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4025 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4026 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4027 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4028 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4029 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4030 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4032 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4033 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4034 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4035 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4036 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4037 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4039 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4044 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4045 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4047 purpose: payment_purpose,
4048 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4052 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4053 // which were generated.
4054 channel_state.take();
4056 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4057 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4058 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4063 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4064 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4065 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4066 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4067 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4069 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4073 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4074 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4075 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4076 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4077 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4078 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4079 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4080 payment_preimage, e);
4081 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4082 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4083 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4084 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4087 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4088 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4089 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4090 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4091 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4092 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4093 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4094 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4095 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4096 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4102 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4104 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4107 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4108 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4109 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4110 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4111 payment_preimage, e);
4113 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4114 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4116 chan.remove_entry();
4118 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4121 } else { unreachable!(); }
4124 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4125 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4126 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4127 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4128 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4129 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4130 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4131 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4132 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4133 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4134 pending_events.push(
4135 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4137 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4142 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4150 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4152 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4153 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4154 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4155 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4156 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4157 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4158 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4159 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4160 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4161 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4162 pending_events.push(
4163 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4164 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4170 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4174 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4175 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4176 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4178 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4179 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4180 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4181 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4182 pending_events.push(
4183 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4191 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4199 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4200 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4201 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4202 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4203 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4204 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4205 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4208 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4209 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4210 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4211 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4212 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4215 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4216 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4217 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4218 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4219 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4220 payment_preimage, e);
4222 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4223 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4224 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4225 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4228 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4229 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4230 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4231 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4235 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4236 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4237 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4241 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4242 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4244 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4246 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4256 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4257 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4258 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4261 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4264 let chan_restoration_res;
4265 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4266 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4267 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4268 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4272 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4276 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4277 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4278 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4279 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4280 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4281 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4282 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4284 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4285 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4286 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4291 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4292 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4296 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4298 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4299 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4300 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4301 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4306 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4308 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4309 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4312 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4313 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4314 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4316 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4317 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4318 /// used to accept such channels.
4320 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4321 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4322 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4323 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4326 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4327 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4329 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4330 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4331 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4333 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4334 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4336 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4337 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4339 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4340 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4342 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4343 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4344 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4345 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4348 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4349 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4352 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4355 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4356 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4358 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4359 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4362 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4363 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4364 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4365 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4370 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4371 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4372 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4375 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4376 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4377 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4381 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4387 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4388 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4392 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4393 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4396 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4397 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4398 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4399 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4402 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4407 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4408 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4409 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4411 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4412 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4415 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4416 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4420 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4421 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4424 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4425 pending_events.push(
4426 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4427 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4428 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4429 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4430 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4431 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4436 entry.insert(channel);
4442 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4443 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4444 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4445 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4446 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4448 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4451 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4452 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4457 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4458 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4459 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4460 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4461 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4463 user_channel_id: user_id,
4468 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4469 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4470 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4471 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4473 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4475 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4478 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4480 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4483 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4484 // lock before watch_channel
4485 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4487 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4488 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4489 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4490 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4491 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4492 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4493 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4494 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4495 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4496 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4497 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4499 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4500 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4501 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4502 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4503 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4504 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4505 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4509 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4510 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4513 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4516 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4517 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4519 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4520 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4521 funding_msg.channel_id))
4523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4524 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4528 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4531 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4532 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4540 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4542 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4543 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4547 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4550 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4551 Ok(update) => update,
4552 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4554 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4555 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4556 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4557 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4558 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4559 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4560 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4561 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4566 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4567 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4574 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4575 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4579 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4580 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4581 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4582 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4584 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4585 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4587 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4588 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4589 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4590 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4591 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4592 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4593 msg: announcement_sigs,
4595 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4596 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4597 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4598 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4599 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4600 // announcement_signatures.
4601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4602 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4603 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4604 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4615 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4616 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4617 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4618 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4619 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4621 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4623 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4627 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4628 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4629 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4630 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4633 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4634 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4636 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4637 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4638 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4639 let (result, is_permanent) =
4640 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4642 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4648 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4650 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4660 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4661 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4662 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4665 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4669 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4670 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4673 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4675 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4676 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4678 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4679 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4681 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4686 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4687 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4688 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4689 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4690 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4691 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4692 } else { (tx, None) }
4694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4697 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4698 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4699 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4701 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4702 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4703 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4704 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4708 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4713 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4714 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4715 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4716 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4718 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4719 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4720 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4721 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4723 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4724 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4725 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4729 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4733 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4734 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4735 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4736 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4737 match pending_forward_info {
4738 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4739 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4740 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4741 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4743 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4745 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4746 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4747 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4750 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4752 _ => pending_forward_info
4755 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4762 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4763 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4764 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4765 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4766 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4768 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4771 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4776 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4780 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4781 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4782 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4785 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4788 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4795 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4796 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4797 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4798 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4800 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4803 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4804 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4805 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4807 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4814 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4816 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4819 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4820 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4822 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4823 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4824 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4825 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4826 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4827 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4828 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4833 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4834 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4837 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4838 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4840 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4842 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4843 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4844 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4845 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4846 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4847 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4849 commitment_signed: msg,
4855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4860 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4861 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4862 let mut forward_event = None;
4863 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4864 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4865 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4866 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4868 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4869 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4870 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4871 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4872 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4875 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4876 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4879 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4880 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4885 match forward_event {
4887 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4888 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4889 time_forwardable: time
4897 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4898 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4900 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4902 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4904 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4905 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4907 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4908 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4909 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4910 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4911 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4912 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4913 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4914 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4915 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4916 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4917 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4919 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4920 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4921 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4922 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4923 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4925 } else { unreachable!(); }
4928 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4930 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4934 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4935 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4936 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4937 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4938 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4943 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4945 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4946 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4948 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4952 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4953 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4960 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4961 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4962 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4963 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4965 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4966 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4968 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4975 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4976 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4977 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4979 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4981 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4982 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4984 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4985 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4988 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4989 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4990 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4991 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4992 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4993 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4996 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5001 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5002 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5005 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5006 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5008 // It's not a local channel
5009 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5014 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5015 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5016 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5017 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5018 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5019 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5021 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5023 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5024 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5025 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5026 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5028 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5029 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5034 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5037 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5038 let chan_restoration_res;
5039 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5043 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5045 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5046 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5048 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5049 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5050 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5051 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5052 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5053 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5054 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5055 let mut channel_update = None;
5056 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5057 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5058 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5061 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5062 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5063 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5064 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5065 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5066 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5067 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5072 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5073 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5074 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5075 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5076 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5077 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5079 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5084 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5085 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5087 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5088 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5093 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5094 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5095 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5096 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5097 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5098 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5099 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5100 match monitor_event {
5101 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5102 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5103 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5104 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5107 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5108 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5111 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5112 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5113 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5114 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5115 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5116 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5117 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5118 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5119 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5120 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5125 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5126 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5128 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5130 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5132 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5133 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5134 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5139 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5140 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5146 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5147 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5150 has_pending_monitor_events
5153 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5154 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5155 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5157 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5158 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5161 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5162 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5163 /// update was applied.
5165 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5166 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5167 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5168 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5169 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5170 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5171 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5172 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5174 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5175 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5176 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5177 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5178 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5180 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5181 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5182 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5183 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5185 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5187 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5190 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5191 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5192 has_monitor_update = true;
5193 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5194 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5195 if close_channel { return false; }
5197 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5198 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5199 updates: commitment_update,
5206 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5207 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5208 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5215 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5216 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5217 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5220 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5221 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5227 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5228 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5229 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5230 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5231 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5232 let mut has_update = false;
5234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5236 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5237 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5238 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5240 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5241 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5242 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5243 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5246 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5249 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5250 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5251 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5252 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5258 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5260 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5261 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5262 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5268 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5269 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5276 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5277 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5283 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5284 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5286 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5287 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5288 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5289 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5290 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5291 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5292 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5293 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5294 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5295 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5296 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5297 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5298 assert!(should_broadcast);
5299 } else { unreachable!(); }
5300 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5302 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5306 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5307 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5309 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5310 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5313 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5316 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5317 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5319 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5320 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5321 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5322 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5323 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5324 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5325 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5326 // never fail a payment too early.
5327 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5329 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5337 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5340 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5341 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5343 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5344 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5345 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5347 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5349 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5350 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5354 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5355 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5357 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5359 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5360 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5361 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5362 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5363 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5364 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5367 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5368 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5370 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5373 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5375 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5377 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5378 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5379 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5380 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5381 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5384 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5385 /// stored external to LDK.
5387 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5388 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5389 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5391 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5392 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5395 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5396 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5397 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5398 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5400 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5401 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5402 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5403 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5404 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5406 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5407 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5408 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5409 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5410 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5412 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5413 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5415 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5416 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5420 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5421 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5423 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5425 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5426 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5427 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5428 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5431 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5432 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5434 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5437 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5439 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5441 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5442 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5445 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5446 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5448 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5449 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5450 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5453 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5454 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5456 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5457 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5458 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5459 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5461 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5462 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5463 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5470 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5472 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5473 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5475 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5476 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5477 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5481 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5482 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5483 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5484 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5485 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5490 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5491 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5495 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5496 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5500 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5501 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5502 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5503 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5504 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5507 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5508 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5509 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5510 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5512 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5513 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5514 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5515 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5518 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5519 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5521 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5522 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5525 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5526 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5527 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5529 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5530 events.replace(pending_events);
5539 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5541 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5542 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5543 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5544 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5547 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5549 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5550 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5551 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5552 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5553 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5555 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5556 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5557 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5558 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5561 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5562 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5563 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5566 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5567 handler.handle_event(&event);
5575 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5577 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5578 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5579 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5580 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5583 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5585 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5586 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5587 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5588 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5589 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5592 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5593 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5596 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5598 let new_height = height - 1;
5600 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5601 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5602 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5603 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5604 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5605 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5608 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5612 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5614 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5615 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5616 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5617 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5620 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5621 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5622 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5623 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5625 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5626 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5629 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5630 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5632 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5633 if height < last_best_block_height {
5634 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5635 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5639 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5640 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5641 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5642 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5644 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5645 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5649 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5651 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5653 macro_rules! max_time {
5654 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5656 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5657 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5658 // having an explicit local time source.
5659 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5660 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5661 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5662 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5663 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5669 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5670 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5671 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5672 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5675 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5676 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5677 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5678 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5679 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5680 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5681 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5682 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5683 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5691 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5692 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5693 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5694 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5695 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5696 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5702 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5704 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5705 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5706 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5707 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5708 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5709 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5714 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5716 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5717 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5718 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5719 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5722 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5723 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5725 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5726 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5727 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5728 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5729 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5731 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5732 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5734 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5735 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5736 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5737 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5738 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5739 let res = f(channel);
5740 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5741 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5742 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5743 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5745 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5747 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5748 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5749 if channel.is_usable() {
5750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5751 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5753 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5761 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5763 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5764 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5765 msg: announcement_sigs,
5767 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5768 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5769 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5771 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5772 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5773 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5778 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5779 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5780 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5781 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5782 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5783 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5784 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5785 // is always consistent.
5786 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5787 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5788 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5789 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5792 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5793 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5794 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5795 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5796 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5797 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5798 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5802 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5803 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5805 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5806 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5807 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5808 data: reason_message,
5816 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5817 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5818 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5819 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5820 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5821 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5822 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5823 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5824 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5825 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5827 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5828 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5829 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5830 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5834 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5839 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5841 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5846 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5847 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5848 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5851 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5852 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5853 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5854 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5857 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5858 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5860 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5861 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5864 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5865 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5866 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5867 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5868 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5871 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5872 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5873 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5876 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5877 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5878 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5879 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5883 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5884 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5885 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5886 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5887 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5888 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5891 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5893 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5896 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5897 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5898 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5901 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5903 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5906 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5908 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5911 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5913 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5916 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5918 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5921 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5923 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5926 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5928 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5931 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5933 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5936 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5938 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5941 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5943 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5946 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5948 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5951 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5953 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5956 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5961 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5966 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5967 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5968 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5971 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5976 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5978 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5981 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5983 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5984 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5986 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5987 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5988 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5989 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5990 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5991 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5992 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5993 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5994 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5995 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5996 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5997 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6000 no_channels_remain = false;
6005 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6007 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6012 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6013 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6014 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6017 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6018 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6019 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6020 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6022 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6030 if no_channels_remain {
6031 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6034 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6035 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6039 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6040 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6041 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6045 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6050 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6051 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6053 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6054 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6058 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6063 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6064 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6065 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6066 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6067 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6068 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6069 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6070 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6071 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6075 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6076 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6077 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6082 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6083 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6084 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6086 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6094 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6098 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6101 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6102 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6103 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6104 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6105 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6110 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6111 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6112 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6113 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6116 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6118 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6126 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6127 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6131 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6132 provided_node_features()
6135 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6136 provided_init_features()
6140 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6141 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6142 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6143 provided_init_features().to_context()
6146 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6147 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6149 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6150 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6151 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6152 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6153 provided_init_features().to_context()
6156 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6157 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6158 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6159 provided_init_features().to_context()
6162 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6163 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6164 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6165 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6166 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6167 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6168 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6169 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6170 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6171 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6172 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6173 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6174 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6175 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6176 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6177 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6178 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6179 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6183 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6184 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6186 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6187 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6188 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6189 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6192 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6193 (2, node_id, required),
6194 (4, features, required),
6195 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6196 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6197 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6198 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6201 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6202 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6203 (2, channel_id, required),
6204 (3, channel_type, option),
6205 (4, counterparty, required),
6206 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6207 (6, funding_txo, option),
6208 (7, config, option),
6209 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6210 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6211 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6212 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6213 (16, balance_msat, required),
6214 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6215 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6216 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6217 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6218 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6219 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6220 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6221 (26, is_outbound, required),
6222 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6223 (30, is_usable, required),
6224 (32, is_public, required),
6225 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6226 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6229 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6230 (2, channels, vec_type),
6231 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6232 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6237 (0, onion_packet, required),
6238 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6241 (0, payment_data, required),
6242 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6243 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6245 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6246 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6247 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6251 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6252 (0, routing, required),
6253 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6254 (4, payment_hash, required),
6255 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6256 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6260 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6261 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6263 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6265 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6266 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6267 reason.write(writer)?;
6269 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6270 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6273 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6274 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6275 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6276 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6283 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6284 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6285 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6288 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6289 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6290 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6291 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6295 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6296 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6297 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6298 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6299 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6302 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6303 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6304 // messages contained in the variants.
6305 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6306 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6307 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6309 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6310 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6311 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6312 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6313 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6316 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6317 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6318 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6319 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6320 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6322 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6327 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6332 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6333 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6334 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6335 (2, outpoint, required),
6336 (4, htlc_id, required),
6337 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6340 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6341 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6342 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6343 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6344 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6346 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6347 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6348 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6349 (2, self.value, required),
6350 (4, payment_data, option),
6351 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6352 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6358 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6359 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6360 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6362 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6363 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6364 let mut total_msat = None;
6365 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6366 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6367 (0, prev_hop, required),
6368 (1, total_msat, option),
6369 (2, value, required),
6370 (4, payment_data, option),
6371 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6372 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6374 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6376 if payment_data.is_some() {
6377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6379 if total_msat.is_none() {
6380 total_msat = Some(value);
6382 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6385 if total_msat.is_none() {
6386 if payment_data.is_none() {
6387 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6389 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6391 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6395 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6398 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6405 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6406 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6407 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6410 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6411 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6412 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6413 let mut payment_id = None;
6414 let mut payment_secret = None;
6415 let mut payment_params = None;
6416 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6417 (0, session_priv, required),
6418 (1, payment_id, option),
6419 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6420 (3, payment_secret, option),
6421 (4, path, vec_type),
6422 (5, payment_params, option),
6424 if payment_id.is_none() {
6425 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6427 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6429 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6430 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6431 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6432 path: path.unwrap(),
6433 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6438 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6439 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6444 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6445 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6447 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6449 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6450 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6451 (0, session_priv, required),
6452 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6453 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6454 (3, payment_secret, option),
6455 (4, path, vec_type),
6456 (5, payment_params, option),
6459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6461 field.write(writer)?;
6468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6469 (0, LightningError) => {
6473 (0, failure_code, required),
6474 (2, data, vec_type),
6478 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6480 (0, forward_info, required),
6481 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6482 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6483 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6486 (0, htlc_id, required),
6487 (2, err_packet, required),
6491 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6492 (0, payment_secret, required),
6493 (2, expiry_time, required),
6494 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6495 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6496 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6499 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6501 (0, session_privs, required),
6504 (0, session_privs, required),
6505 (1, payment_hash, option),
6508 (0, session_privs, required),
6509 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6510 (2, payment_hash, required),
6511 (4, payment_secret, option),
6512 (6, total_msat, required),
6513 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6514 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6517 (0, session_privs, required),
6518 (2, payment_hash, required),
6522 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6523 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6524 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6525 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6526 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6529 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6530 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6532 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6534 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6536 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6537 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6538 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6541 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6542 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6543 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6544 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6545 unfunded_channels += 1;
6548 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6549 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6550 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6551 channel.write(writer)?;
6555 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6556 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6557 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6558 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6559 for forward in pending_forwards {
6560 forward.write(writer)?;
6564 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6565 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6566 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6567 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6568 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6569 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6570 htlc.write(writer)?;
6572 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6576 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6577 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6578 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6579 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6580 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6583 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6584 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6585 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6586 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6587 for event in events.iter() {
6588 event.write(writer)?;
6591 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6592 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6593 for event in background_events.iter() {
6595 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6597 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6598 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6603 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6604 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6605 // likely to be identical.
6606 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6607 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6609 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6610 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6611 hash.write(writer)?;
6612 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6615 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6616 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6617 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6618 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6619 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6622 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6623 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6625 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6626 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6627 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6628 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6631 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6632 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6636 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6637 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6638 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6640 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6641 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6642 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6647 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6648 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6649 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6650 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6651 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6652 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6653 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6660 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6662 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6664 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6665 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6666 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6667 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6668 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6669 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6670 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6671 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6672 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6673 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6674 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6675 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6676 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6678 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6679 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6681 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6682 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6684 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6685 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6686 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6687 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6688 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6689 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6691 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6692 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6693 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6695 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6699 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6700 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6702 pub keys_manager: K,
6704 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6706 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6707 pub fee_estimator: F,
6708 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6710 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6711 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6712 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6713 pub chain_monitor: M,
6715 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6716 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6717 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6718 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6719 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6720 /// deserialization.
6722 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6723 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6724 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6726 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6727 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6729 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6730 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6731 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6732 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6734 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6737 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6738 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6741 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6742 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6743 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6744 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6745 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6746 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6749 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6750 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6751 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6752 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6753 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6755 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6756 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6761 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6762 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6763 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6764 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6765 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6766 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6767 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6768 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6771 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6772 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6773 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6777 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6778 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6779 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6780 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6781 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6782 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6785 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6786 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6788 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6789 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6792 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6794 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6795 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6796 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6797 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6798 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6799 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6800 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6801 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6802 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6803 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6804 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6805 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6806 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6807 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6808 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6809 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6810 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6811 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6812 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6813 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6814 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6815 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6816 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6817 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6818 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6819 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6820 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6821 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6822 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6823 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6824 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6825 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6826 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6827 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6828 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6829 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6830 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6831 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6832 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6833 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6836 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6837 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6838 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6840 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6841 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6843 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6846 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6847 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6848 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6849 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6850 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6851 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6855 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6856 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6857 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6858 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6862 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6863 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6865 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6866 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6869 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6870 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6872 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6875 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6877 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6878 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6881 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6882 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6884 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6887 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6889 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6890 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let peer_state = PeerState {
6892 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6894 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6897 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6899 for _ in 0..event_count {
6900 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6901 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6905 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6906 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6907 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6908 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6909 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6910 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6911 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6912 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6916 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6918 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6919 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6920 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6921 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6925 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
6926 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6930 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6931 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6932 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6936 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6938 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6939 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6940 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6942 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6944 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6945 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6949 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6950 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6951 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6952 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6953 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6954 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6955 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6956 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6957 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6958 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6959 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6960 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6961 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6962 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
6964 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6965 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6968 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
6969 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6972 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6973 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6974 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6975 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6976 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6977 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6979 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6981 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6982 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6983 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6984 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6985 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6986 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6987 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6989 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6990 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6991 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6992 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6993 if path.is_empty() {
6994 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6995 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6997 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6998 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6999 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7000 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7002 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7003 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7004 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7007 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7008 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7009 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7010 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7012 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7013 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7014 total_msat: path_amt,
7015 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7017 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7018 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7027 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7028 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7030 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7031 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7032 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7035 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7036 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7039 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7040 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7041 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7042 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7043 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7045 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7046 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7047 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7048 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7049 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7050 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7051 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7052 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7054 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7055 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7059 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7061 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7063 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7064 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7066 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7070 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7071 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7073 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7074 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7077 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7079 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7081 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7082 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7083 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7084 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7085 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7089 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7090 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7091 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7092 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7094 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7095 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7096 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7098 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7099 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7100 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7101 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7102 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7103 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7105 if chan.is_usable() {
7106 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7107 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7108 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7109 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7110 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7115 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7117 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7118 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7119 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7120 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7121 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7122 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7123 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7125 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7126 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7127 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7128 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7130 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7131 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7132 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7133 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7135 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7136 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7137 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7138 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7140 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7141 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7142 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7144 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7145 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7148 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7150 purpose: payment_purpose,
7151 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7157 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7159 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7160 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7161 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7163 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7165 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7170 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7172 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7173 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7174 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7176 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7177 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7178 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7180 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7186 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7188 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7190 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7191 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7192 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7193 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7195 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7196 logger: args.logger,
7197 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7200 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7201 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7202 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7203 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7206 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7207 //connection or two.
7209 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7215 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7216 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7217 use core::time::Duration;
7218 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7219 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7220 use ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7221 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7223 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7224 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7225 use util::errors::APIError;
7226 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7227 use util::test_utils;
7228 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7231 fn test_notify_limits() {
7232 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7233 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7237 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7239 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7240 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7241 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7242 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7243 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7245 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7247 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7248 // to connect messages with new values
7249 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7250 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7251 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7252 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7254 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7255 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7256 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7257 // ... but the last node should not.
7258 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7259 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7260 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7261 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7263 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7264 // about the channel.
7265 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7266 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7267 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7269 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7271 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7272 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7273 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7274 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7275 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7276 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7278 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7279 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7280 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7282 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7283 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7284 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7285 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7286 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7287 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7289 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7290 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7291 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7292 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7293 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7294 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7295 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7296 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7298 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7299 // the channel info has updated.
7300 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7301 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7302 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7303 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7304 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7305 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7309 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7310 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7318 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7319 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7320 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7321 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7322 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7323 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7324 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7326 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7328 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7330 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7331 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7333 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7335 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7336 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7337 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7339 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7340 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7341 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7343 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7344 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7345 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7346 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7347 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7348 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7349 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7350 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7351 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7353 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7354 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7356 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7358 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7360 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7361 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7362 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7363 // lightning messages manually.
7364 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7365 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7368 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7369 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7372 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7375 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7376 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7378 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7380 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7382 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7383 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7384 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7388 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7390 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7391 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7394 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7395 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7396 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7399 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7400 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7401 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7402 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7407 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7408 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7409 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7410 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7415 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7416 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7417 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7418 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7425 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7426 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7427 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7428 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7429 // fails as expected.
7430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7433 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7434 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7435 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7436 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7438 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7439 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7440 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7442 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7443 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7444 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7445 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7446 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7448 let route = find_route(
7449 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7450 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7452 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7454 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7455 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7456 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7457 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7458 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7460 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7461 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7462 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7463 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7464 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7466 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7467 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7468 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7469 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7470 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7471 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7473 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7474 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7476 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7477 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7479 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7480 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7481 let route = find_route(
7482 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7483 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7485 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7487 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7489 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7490 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7491 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7493 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7494 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7495 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7497 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7499 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7500 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7501 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7503 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7504 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7505 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7507 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7508 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7509 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7510 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7511 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7512 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7513 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7514 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7515 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7517 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7518 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7522 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7523 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7524 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7528 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7530 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7531 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7532 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7535 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7536 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7537 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7538 final_value_msat: 10000,
7539 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7541 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7542 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7543 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7544 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7545 let route = find_route(
7546 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7547 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7550 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7551 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7552 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7555 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7556 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7557 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7558 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7559 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7560 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7563 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7567 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7568 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7572 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7574 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7575 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7576 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7577 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7579 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7580 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7581 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7582 final_value_msat: 10000,
7583 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7585 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7586 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7587 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7588 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7589 let route = find_route(
7590 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7591 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7594 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7595 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7596 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7597 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7600 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7601 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7602 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7603 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7604 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7605 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7606 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7608 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7612 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7616 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7618 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7619 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7620 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7621 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7623 // Marshall an MPP route.
7624 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7625 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7626 route.paths.push(path);
7627 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7628 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7629 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7630 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7631 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7632 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7634 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7635 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7636 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7637 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7642 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7643 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7649 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7650 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7652 total_msat: 100_000,
7655 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7656 // payment verification fails as expected.
7657 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7658 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7659 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7660 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7662 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7666 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7667 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7671 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7672 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7673 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7674 // the channel is successfully closed.
7675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7680 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7681 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7682 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7683 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7684 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7686 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7687 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7689 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7690 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7691 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7692 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7695 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7697 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7698 // as it has the funding transaction.
7699 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7700 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7701 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7703 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7706 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7708 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7710 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7711 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7712 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7714 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7715 // as it has the funding transaction.
7716 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7717 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7718 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7721 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7722 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7724 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7725 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7726 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7728 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7729 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7730 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7731 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7733 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7734 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7736 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7737 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7738 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7739 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7740 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7741 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7742 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7744 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7745 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7746 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7747 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7748 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7749 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7750 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7753 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7755 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7756 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7757 // closing transaction).
7758 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7759 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7762 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7763 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7764 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7765 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7766 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7769 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7771 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7773 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7774 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7775 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7777 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7779 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7780 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7784 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7787 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7788 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7789 use ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7790 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7791 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7792 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7793 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7794 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7795 use util::test_utils;
7796 use util::config::UserConfig;
7797 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7799 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7800 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7801 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7803 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7807 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7808 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7809 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7810 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7811 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7812 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7813 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7818 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7819 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7822 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7823 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7824 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7826 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7827 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7829 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7830 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7832 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7833 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7835 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7836 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7837 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7838 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7839 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7841 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7843 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7845 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7846 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7847 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7848 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7849 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7851 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7853 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7855 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7856 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7857 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7858 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7859 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7862 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7863 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7864 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7866 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7867 } else { panic!(); }
7869 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7870 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7872 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7875 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7878 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7879 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7881 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7882 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7883 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7884 match msg_events[0] {
7885 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7886 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7887 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7891 match msg_events[1] {
7892 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7896 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7898 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7899 macro_rules! send_payment {
7900 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7901 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7902 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7903 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7904 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7905 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7906 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7907 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7908 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7909 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7911 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7912 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7914 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7915 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7917 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7918 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7919 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7920 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7921 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7922 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7923 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7924 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7926 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7927 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7928 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7929 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7931 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7932 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7933 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7934 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7935 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7937 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7940 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7941 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7942 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7943 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7945 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7950 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7951 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);