1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128 /// may overshoot this in either case)
129 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
149 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
154 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
157 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
165 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173 short_channel_id: u64,
175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
178 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
184 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
186 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
198 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
200 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202 sender_intended_value: u64,
203 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
205 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
257 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271 (2, htlc_id, required),
273 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274 (0, session_priv, required),
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
286 session_priv: SecretKey,
287 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290 payment_id: PaymentId,
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
299 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
301 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
304 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
312 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
330 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
336 struct ReceiveError {
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
351 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370 err: msgs::LightningError,
371 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
388 shutdown_finish: None,
392 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
396 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
398 err: LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
412 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
415 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
422 log_level: Level::Warn,
425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
429 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
459 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
466 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470 (0, amount_msat, required),
471 (2, payment_purpose, required),
472 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484 /// failed/claimed by the user.
486 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
489 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
493 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504 /// commitment transaction.
505 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513 /// event can be generated.
514 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
524 /// State we hold per-peer.
525 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
526 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
528 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
529 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
531 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
532 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
533 latest_features: InitFeatures,
534 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
535 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
536 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
537 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
540 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
541 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
542 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
543 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
545 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
546 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
547 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
548 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
549 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
550 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
551 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
552 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
553 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
554 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
558 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
559 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
560 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
561 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
562 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
563 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
566 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
570 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
571 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
573 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
576 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
577 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
578 struct PendingInboundPayment {
579 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
580 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
581 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
582 /// this payment being removed.
584 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
585 user_payment_id: u64,
586 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
587 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
588 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
591 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
609 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
611 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
616 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
622 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
623 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
624 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
626 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
627 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
629 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
630 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
632 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
633 /// to individual Channels.
635 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
636 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
637 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
638 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
640 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
641 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
642 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
643 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
644 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
645 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
646 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
648 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
649 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
650 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
652 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
653 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
654 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
655 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
656 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
658 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
659 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
660 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
661 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
663 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
664 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
665 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
667 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
668 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
669 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
670 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
671 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
673 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
674 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
675 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
676 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
677 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
678 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
679 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
680 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
683 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
684 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
685 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
686 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
687 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
691 // `total_consistency_lock`
693 // |__`forward_htlcs`
695 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
697 // |__`per_peer_state`
699 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
701 // | |__`claimable_payments`
703 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
709 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
711 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
715 // | |__`pending_events`
717 // | |__`pending_background_events`
719 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
721 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
723 ES::Target: EntropySource,
724 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
725 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
730 default_configuration: UserConfig,
731 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
732 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
738 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
740 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
742 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
743 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
745 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
746 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
747 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
748 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
750 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
751 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
753 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
754 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
755 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
756 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
757 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
758 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
759 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
760 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
762 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
767 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
769 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
770 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
771 /// and via the classic SCID.
773 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
774 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
776 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
778 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
780 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
781 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
782 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
784 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
787 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
788 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
793 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
794 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
795 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
796 /// active channel list on load.
798 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
799 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
801 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
803 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
804 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
805 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
807 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
808 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
809 /// the handling of the events.
811 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
812 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
815 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
816 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
817 /// would break backwards compatability.
818 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
819 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
820 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
822 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
823 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
825 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
827 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
828 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
829 /// confirmation depth.
831 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
832 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
833 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
835 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
837 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
839 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
841 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
843 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
845 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
846 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
847 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
849 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
850 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
852 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
853 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
854 /// keeping additional state.
855 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
857 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
858 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
859 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
860 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
862 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
863 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
865 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
866 /// are currently open with that peer.
868 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
869 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
872 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
874 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
875 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
876 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
877 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
878 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
880 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
881 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
882 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
883 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
884 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
885 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
886 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
887 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
888 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
889 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
890 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
892 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
901 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
903 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
904 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
905 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
906 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
907 pub struct ChainParameters {
908 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
909 pub network: Network,
911 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
913 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
914 pub best_block: BestBlock,
917 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
923 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
924 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
925 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
926 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
927 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
928 /// updates are ready for persistence).
930 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
931 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
932 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
933 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
934 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
936 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
937 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
940 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
941 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
942 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
945 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
946 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
948 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
949 persistence_notifier: notifier,
950 should_persist: persist_check,
951 _read_guard: read_guard,
956 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
958 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
959 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
964 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
965 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
967 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
969 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
970 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
971 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
972 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
973 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
975 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
976 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
978 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
980 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
981 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
982 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
983 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
984 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
985 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
986 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
987 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
988 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
989 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
990 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
991 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
992 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
994 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
995 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
997 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
998 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
999 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1000 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1002 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1003 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1004 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1005 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1006 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1007 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1010 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1012 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1013 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1016 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1018 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1019 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1021 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1022 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1023 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1024 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1026 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1027 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1028 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1029 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1031 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1032 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1033 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1035 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1036 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1037 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1039 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1040 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1041 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1042 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1043 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1044 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1045 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1046 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1047 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1048 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1049 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1052 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1053 /// to better separate parameters.
1054 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1055 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1056 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1057 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1058 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1059 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1060 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1061 pub features: InitFeatures,
1062 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1063 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1064 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1066 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1068 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1069 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1070 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1071 /// payments to us through this channel.
1072 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1073 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1074 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1075 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1076 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1078 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1081 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1082 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1083 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1084 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1085 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1086 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1087 /// lifetime of the channel.
1088 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1089 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1090 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1091 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1092 /// our counterparty already.
1094 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1095 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1096 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1097 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1099 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1100 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1101 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1102 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1104 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1105 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1107 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1108 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1110 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1111 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1112 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1113 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1114 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1115 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1116 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1117 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1118 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1121 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1123 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1124 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1125 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1126 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1127 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1128 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1129 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1131 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1132 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1134 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1135 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1136 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1137 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1138 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1139 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1140 /// this value on chain.
1142 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1144 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1146 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1147 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1148 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1149 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1151 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1152 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1153 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1155 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1156 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1157 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1159 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1161 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1162 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1163 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1164 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1166 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1167 pub balance_msat: u64,
1168 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1169 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1170 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1171 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1173 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1175 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1176 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1177 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1178 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1179 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1180 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1181 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1182 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1184 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1185 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1186 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1187 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1188 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1189 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1190 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1192 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1193 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1194 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1195 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1196 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1197 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1198 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1199 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1200 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1202 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1204 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1205 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1206 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1207 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1208 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1210 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1211 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1212 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1213 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1214 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1215 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1216 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1218 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1219 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1220 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1221 pub is_outbound: bool,
1222 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1223 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1224 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1225 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1226 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1228 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1229 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1230 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1231 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1233 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1234 pub is_usable: bool,
1235 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1236 pub is_public: bool,
1237 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1238 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1239 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1240 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1241 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1242 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1244 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1245 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1248 impl ChannelDetails {
1249 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1250 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1251 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1253 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1254 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1255 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1256 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1259 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1260 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1261 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1263 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1264 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1265 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1266 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1269 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1270 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1272 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1273 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1274 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1276 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1277 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1278 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1279 features: latest_features,
1280 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1281 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1282 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1283 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1284 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1285 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1286 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1287 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1288 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1289 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1291 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1292 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1293 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1294 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1295 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1296 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1297 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1298 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1299 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1300 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1301 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1302 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1303 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1304 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1305 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1306 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1307 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1308 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1309 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1310 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1311 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1312 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1313 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1314 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1315 config: Some(channel.config()),
1320 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1321 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1322 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1323 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1324 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1326 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1328 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1329 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1330 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1333 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1334 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1335 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1337 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1338 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1339 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1341 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1342 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1343 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1345 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1346 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1350 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1352 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1354 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1355 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1356 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1357 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1359 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1360 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1361 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1364 macro_rules! handle_error {
1365 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1368 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1369 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1370 // entering the macro.
1371 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1372 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1374 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1376 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1377 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1378 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1379 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1383 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1384 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1385 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1386 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1391 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1392 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1394 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1395 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1396 action: err.action.clone()
1400 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1401 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1402 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1403 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1404 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1408 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1415 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1416 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1417 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1418 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1419 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1420 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1422 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1423 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1424 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1425 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1426 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1428 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1429 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1431 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1435 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1436 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1437 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1439 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1440 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1442 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1443 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1445 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1446 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1447 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1448 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1449 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1450 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1456 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1457 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1461 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1463 $entry.remove_entry();
1471 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1472 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1476 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1478 $entry.remove_entry();
1486 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1487 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1489 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1490 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1496 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1497 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1498 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1499 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1500 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1502 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1503 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1504 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1505 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1506 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1507 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1508 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1509 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1510 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1511 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1516 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1517 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1518 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1519 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1520 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1521 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1522 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1523 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1524 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1526 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1531 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1532 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1533 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1534 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1535 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1536 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1537 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1538 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1539 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1541 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1546 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1547 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1548 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1549 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1550 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1551 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1552 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1553 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1554 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1555 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1556 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1558 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1559 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1560 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1566 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1567 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1569 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1570 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1571 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1572 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1573 updates.announcement_sigs);
1574 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1575 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1578 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1579 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1580 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1582 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1584 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1585 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1587 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1588 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1589 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1590 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1595 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1596 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1597 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1598 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1599 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1601 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1602 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1603 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1606 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1607 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1608 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1609 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1610 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1611 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1612 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1613 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1617 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1618 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1619 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1620 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1621 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1623 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1629 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1630 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1634 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1636 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1637 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1638 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1639 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1640 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1645 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1647 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1648 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1650 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1652 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1653 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1654 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1657 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1658 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1659 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1660 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1661 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1662 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1663 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1664 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1666 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1667 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1668 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1673 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1675 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1676 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1677 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1678 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1680 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1681 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1682 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1684 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1687 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1688 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1690 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1692 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1694 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1696 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1697 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1698 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1699 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1709 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1710 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1711 &self.default_configuration
1714 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1715 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1716 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1719 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1720 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1722 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1724 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1728 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1733 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1735 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1736 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1737 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1738 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1739 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1741 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1742 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1744 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1745 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1746 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1748 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1749 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1750 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1751 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1752 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1753 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1755 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1756 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1757 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1758 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1759 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1764 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1765 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1770 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1772 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1774 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1775 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1776 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1777 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1778 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1779 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1783 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1788 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1790 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1796 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1803 node_id: their_network_key,
1806 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1809 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1811 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1812 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1813 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1814 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1815 // the same channel.
1816 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1818 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1820 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1821 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1822 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1823 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1824 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1825 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1833 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1834 /// more information.
1835 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1836 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1839 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1840 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1842 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1843 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1845 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1846 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1847 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1848 // really wanted anyway.
1849 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1852 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1853 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1854 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1857 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1860 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1861 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1864 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1870 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1871 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1873 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1874 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1875 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1877 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1878 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1879 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1880 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1881 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1882 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1883 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1884 total_msat: *total_msat,
1887 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1888 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1890 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1891 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1893 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1898 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1899 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1900 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1901 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1902 Some(transaction) => {
1903 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1907 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1908 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1909 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1910 reason: closure_reason
1914 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1917 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1918 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1921 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1922 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1926 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1928 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1929 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1930 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1931 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1932 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1934 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1935 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1936 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1937 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1938 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1942 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1943 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1944 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1945 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1946 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1949 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1950 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1951 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1952 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1956 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1964 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1965 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1966 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1967 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1970 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1974 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1975 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1976 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1978 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1979 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1981 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1982 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1983 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1984 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1986 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1988 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1989 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1990 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1991 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1992 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1993 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1996 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1997 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1998 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2000 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2001 /// the channel being closed or not:
2002 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2003 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2004 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2005 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2006 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2007 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2008 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2010 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2012 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2013 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2014 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2015 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2016 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2017 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2021 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2022 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2023 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2024 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2025 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2026 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2027 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2030 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2031 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2032 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2033 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2034 // ignore the result here.
2035 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2039 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2040 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2041 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2042 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2044 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2045 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2049 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2050 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2051 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2053 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2055 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2057 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2060 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2061 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2062 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2063 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2064 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2069 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2072 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2074 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2075 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2077 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2078 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2080 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2081 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2082 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2083 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2094 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2095 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2096 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2098 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2099 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2100 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2103 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2104 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2105 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2107 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2108 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2109 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2110 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2111 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2114 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2115 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2116 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2117 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2118 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2122 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2123 /// local transaction(s).
2124 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2125 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2126 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2130 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2131 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2133 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2134 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2135 return Err(ReceiveError {
2136 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2138 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2141 // final_expiry_too_soon
2142 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2143 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2145 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2146 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2147 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2148 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2149 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2150 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2151 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2152 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2153 return Err(ReceiveError {
2154 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2155 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2158 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2161 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2162 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2166 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2167 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2168 return Err(ReceiveError {
2169 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2170 err_data: Vec::new(),
2171 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2174 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2175 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2176 return Err(ReceiveError {
2177 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2178 err_data: Vec::new(),
2179 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2181 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2182 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2185 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2186 phantom_shared_secret,
2188 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2189 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2190 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2191 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2192 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2193 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2194 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2195 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2196 return Err(ReceiveError {
2197 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2198 err_data: Vec::new(),
2199 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2203 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2206 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2209 return Err(ReceiveError {
2210 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2211 err_data: Vec::new(),
2212 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2217 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2220 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2221 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2222 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2223 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2227 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2228 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2229 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2231 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2232 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2233 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2234 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2235 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2236 failure_code: $err_code,
2242 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2243 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2246 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2247 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2248 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2250 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2251 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2252 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2253 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2254 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2255 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2256 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2257 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2259 macro_rules! return_err {
2260 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2262 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2263 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2264 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2265 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2266 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2267 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2273 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2275 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2276 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2278 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2279 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2283 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2284 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2286 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2288 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2289 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2290 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2291 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2292 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2294 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2297 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2298 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2299 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2301 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2302 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2303 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2306 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2307 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2308 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2309 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2313 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2314 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2315 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2318 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2319 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2320 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2321 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2322 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2327 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2328 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2329 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2330 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2331 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2332 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2333 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2334 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2335 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2336 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2337 // phantom or an intercept.
2338 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2339 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2340 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2344 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2347 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2349 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2351 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2352 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2353 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2356 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2357 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2359 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2360 // have no consistency guarantees.
2361 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2365 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2366 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2367 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2368 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2369 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2371 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2372 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2373 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2374 // we don't have the channel here.
2375 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2377 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2379 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2380 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2381 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2382 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2383 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2384 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2385 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2387 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2388 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2390 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2391 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2395 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2396 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2397 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2398 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2400 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2407 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2408 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2409 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2410 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2411 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2412 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2414 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2415 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2417 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2418 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2419 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2420 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2421 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2422 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2423 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2424 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2425 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2426 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2432 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2433 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2434 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2435 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2437 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2438 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2440 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2441 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2442 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2444 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2445 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2446 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2447 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2448 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2449 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2450 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2454 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2459 pending_forward_info
2462 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2463 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2464 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2466 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2467 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2468 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2470 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2471 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2472 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2473 if !chan.should_announce() {
2474 return Err(LightningError {
2475 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2479 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2480 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2483 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2486 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2487 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2488 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2489 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2491 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2492 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2493 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2495 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2496 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2497 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2499 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2500 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2504 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2506 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2508 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2510 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2511 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2513 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2514 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2515 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2516 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2517 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2518 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2519 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2520 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2522 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2523 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2524 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2526 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2528 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2535 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2536 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2537 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2540 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2541 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2542 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2545 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2546 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2548 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2549 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2550 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2551 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2552 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2554 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2556 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2557 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2558 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2559 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2562 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2563 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2564 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2567 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2568 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2569 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2571 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2572 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2573 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2575 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2576 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2578 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2579 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2580 Some(monitor_update) => {
2581 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2582 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2583 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2586 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2587 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2588 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2589 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2590 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2591 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2592 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2593 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2599 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2600 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2601 // `channel_by_id` map.
2602 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2603 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2608 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2609 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2611 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2616 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2618 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2619 /// fields for more info.
2621 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2622 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2624 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2626 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2627 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2628 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2629 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2630 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2632 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2633 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2634 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2635 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2636 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2638 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2639 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2640 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2641 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2643 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2645 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2646 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2647 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2649 /// In general, a path may raise:
2650 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2651 /// node public key) is specified.
2652 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2653 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2655 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2656 /// relevant updates.
2658 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2659 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2660 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2662 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2663 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2664 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2665 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2666 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2667 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2668 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2670 self.pending_outbound_payments
2671 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2672 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2673 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2676 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2677 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2678 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2679 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2681 self.pending_outbound_payments
2682 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2683 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2684 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2685 &self.pending_events,
2686 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2687 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2691 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2692 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2694 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2695 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2696 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2700 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2701 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2702 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2706 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2707 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2711 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2712 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2713 /// retries are exhausted.
2715 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2716 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2718 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2719 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2720 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2722 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2723 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2725 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2726 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2727 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2729 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2732 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2733 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2734 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2735 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2736 /// never reach the recipient.
2738 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2739 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2741 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2742 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2744 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2746 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2747 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2748 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2749 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2750 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2751 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2752 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2753 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2754 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2757 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2758 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2760 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2763 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2764 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2765 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2767 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2768 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2769 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2770 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2771 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2772 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2775 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2776 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2777 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2778 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2779 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2781 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2782 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2783 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2786 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2789 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2790 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2793 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2794 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2795 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2796 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2797 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2799 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2800 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2808 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2810 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2811 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2812 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2813 } else { unreachable!(); })
2816 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2819 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2820 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2823 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2824 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2830 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2833 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2835 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2838 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2839 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2840 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2849 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2850 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2851 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2855 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2857 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2858 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2860 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2861 /// across the p2p network.
2863 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2864 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2866 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2867 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2868 /// keys per-channel).
2870 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2871 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2872 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2874 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2875 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2876 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2878 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2879 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2880 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2881 /// for more details.
2883 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2884 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2885 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2888 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2889 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2891 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2896 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2897 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2898 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2899 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2900 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2906 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2907 let mut output_index = None;
2908 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2909 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2910 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2911 if output_index.is_some() {
2912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2913 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2916 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2918 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2921 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2924 if output_index.is_none() {
2925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2926 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2929 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2933 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2935 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2936 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2937 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2938 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2940 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2941 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2943 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2944 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2946 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2948 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2949 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2950 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2951 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2952 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2953 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2954 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2955 pub fn update_channel_config(
2956 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2957 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2958 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2960 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2965 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2968 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2969 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2972 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2973 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2974 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2975 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2979 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2980 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2981 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2984 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2986 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2988 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2996 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2997 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2999 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3000 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3002 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3003 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3004 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3005 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3006 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3008 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3009 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3011 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3014 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3015 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3016 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3017 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3018 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3021 let next_hop_scid = {
3022 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3023 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3024 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3025 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3027 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3029 if !chan.is_usable() {
3030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3031 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3034 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3036 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3037 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3042 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3043 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3044 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3047 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3048 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3049 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3051 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3053 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3054 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3057 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3058 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3059 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3060 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3061 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3063 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3067 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3068 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3070 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3073 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3074 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3077 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3078 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3079 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3082 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3083 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3084 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3085 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3086 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3087 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3088 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3091 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3092 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3093 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3094 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3099 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3101 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3102 /// Will likely generate further events.
3103 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3106 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3107 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3108 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3110 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3111 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3113 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3114 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3115 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3117 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3118 match forward_info {
3119 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3120 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3121 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3122 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3123 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3126 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3127 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3128 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3130 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3131 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3132 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3133 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3134 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3135 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3138 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3139 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3141 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3144 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3145 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3151 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3152 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3154 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3158 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3159 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3161 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3165 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3166 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3167 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3168 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3169 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3171 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3172 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3173 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3174 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3175 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3177 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3179 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3180 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3184 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3185 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3186 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3187 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3193 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3196 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3199 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3200 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3201 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3202 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3203 // problem, not ours.
3209 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3210 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3212 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3216 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3217 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3218 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3219 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3222 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3223 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3224 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3226 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3230 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3231 match forward_info {
3232 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3233 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3234 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3235 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3236 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3240 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3241 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3242 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3243 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3244 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3245 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3246 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3248 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3249 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3250 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3252 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3255 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3257 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3258 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3259 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3260 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3265 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3266 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3268 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3270 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3271 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3273 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3276 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3278 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3279 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3280 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3289 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3290 match forward_info {
3291 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3292 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3293 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3294 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3297 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3298 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3299 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3301 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3302 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3303 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3305 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3306 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3307 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3308 None, None, onion_fields)
3311 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3314 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3315 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3316 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3317 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3318 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3319 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3320 phantom_shared_secret,
3322 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3323 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3324 // if routing nodes overpay
3325 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3326 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3328 total_value_received: None,
3329 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3334 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3336 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3337 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3338 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3339 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3340 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3341 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3343 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3344 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3345 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3346 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3348 phantom_shared_secret,
3350 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3351 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3353 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3356 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3357 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3358 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3359 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3360 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3363 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3364 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3365 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3367 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3368 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3369 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3372 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3373 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3374 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3376 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3377 .entry(payment_hash)
3378 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3379 .or_insert_with(|| {
3380 committed_to_claimable = true;
3382 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3385 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3386 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3387 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3390 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3392 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3393 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3394 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3396 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3399 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3400 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3401 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3402 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3403 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3404 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3405 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3406 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3407 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3408 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3409 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3411 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3413 _ => unreachable!(),
3416 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3417 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3418 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3419 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3420 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3422 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3423 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3424 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3425 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3426 committed_to_claimable = true;
3428 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3429 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3430 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3431 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3432 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3433 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3437 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3438 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3439 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3440 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3442 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3444 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3445 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3447 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3448 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3449 committed_to_claimable = true;
3452 payment_claimable_generated
3456 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3457 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3458 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3459 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3460 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3461 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3462 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3463 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3465 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3466 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3467 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3468 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3469 Ok(result) => result,
3471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3472 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3475 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3476 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3477 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3478 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3479 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3480 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3483 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3485 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3486 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3487 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3488 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3490 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3492 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3493 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3494 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3495 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3496 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3497 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3498 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3499 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3501 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3502 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3503 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3507 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3508 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3510 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3514 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3515 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3522 if payment_data.is_none() {
3523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3526 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3527 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3529 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3530 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3531 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3532 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3533 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3535 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3536 if payment_claimable_generated {
3537 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3543 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3544 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3552 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3553 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3554 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3555 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3556 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3557 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3559 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3560 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3562 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3564 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3565 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3566 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3568 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3570 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3571 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3572 events.append(&mut new_events);
3575 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3577 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3578 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3580 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3581 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3582 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3583 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3584 if background_events.is_empty() {
3588 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3590 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3591 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3592 // monitor updating completing.
3593 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3600 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3601 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3602 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3603 self.process_background_events();
3606 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3607 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3608 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3609 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3611 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3612 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3614 if !chan.is_live() {
3615 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3616 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3617 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3619 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3620 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3622 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3623 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3627 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3628 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3629 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3630 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3631 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3632 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3633 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3635 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3637 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3638 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3641 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3642 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3643 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3651 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3653 /// This currently includes:
3654 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3655 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3656 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3658 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3659 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3660 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3662 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3663 /// estimate fetches.
3665 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3666 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3667 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3668 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3669 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3670 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3672 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3674 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3675 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3676 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3679 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3682 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3683 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3684 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3685 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3686 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3688 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3689 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3690 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3691 if needs_close { return false; }
3694 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3695 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3696 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3697 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3698 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3699 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3700 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3705 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3706 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3708 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3709 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3714 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3715 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3720 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3724 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3725 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3730 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3731 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3732 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3733 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3734 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3735 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3736 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3737 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3738 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3739 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3740 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3742 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3743 // have no channels to the peer.
3744 let remove_entry = {
3745 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3746 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3749 entry.remove_entry();
3752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3757 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3758 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3759 // This should be unreachable
3760 debug_assert!(false);
3763 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3764 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3765 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3766 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3767 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3768 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3769 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3772 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3773 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3774 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3776 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3777 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3784 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3785 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3786 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3787 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3788 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3791 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3792 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3795 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3797 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3798 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3799 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3800 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3801 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3808 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3809 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3810 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3812 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3813 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3814 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3815 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3817 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3818 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3819 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3820 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3821 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3822 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3825 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3826 /// reason for the failure.
3828 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3829 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3832 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3833 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3834 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3835 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3836 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3837 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3838 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3843 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3844 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3845 match failure_code {
3846 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3847 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3848 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3849 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3850 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3851 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3856 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3857 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3859 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3861 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3862 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3863 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3864 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3865 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3866 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3867 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3869 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3871 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3872 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3874 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3879 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3880 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3881 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3882 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3883 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3884 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3885 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3886 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3887 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3888 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3890 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3891 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3892 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3893 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3895 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3896 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3897 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3898 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3899 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3903 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3904 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3905 // be surfaced to the user.
3906 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3907 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3908 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3910 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3912 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3915 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3917 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3921 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3924 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3925 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3926 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3927 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3931 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3932 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3933 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3934 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3935 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3936 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3937 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3938 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3939 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3942 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3943 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3944 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3947 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3948 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3949 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3951 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3952 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3953 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3954 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3955 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3957 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3959 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3961 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3962 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3963 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3964 push_forward_ev = true;
3966 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3967 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3968 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3970 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3971 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3974 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3975 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3976 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3977 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3978 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3979 failed_next_destination: destination,
3985 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3986 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3988 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3989 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3990 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3991 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3993 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3994 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3995 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3996 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3998 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3999 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4000 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4001 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4002 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4003 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4004 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4005 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4010 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4011 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4012 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4013 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4014 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4015 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4016 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4017 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4022 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4023 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4024 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4026 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4027 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4028 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4029 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4034 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4036 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4037 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4038 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4039 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4040 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4041 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4042 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4043 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4044 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4046 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4047 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4048 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4049 debug_assert!(false);
4053 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4055 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4056 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4057 debug_assert!(false);
4061 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4063 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4064 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4065 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4066 if sources.len() != 1 {
4067 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4068 debug_assert!(false);
4074 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4076 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4077 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4078 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4079 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4082 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4083 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4084 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4085 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4089 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4090 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4091 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4092 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4094 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4095 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4096 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4097 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4098 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4103 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4104 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4105 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4106 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4107 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4108 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4109 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4111 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4114 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4115 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4116 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4117 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4121 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4122 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4123 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4124 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4128 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4129 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4130 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4134 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4135 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4136 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4139 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4142 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4143 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4144 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4146 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4147 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4149 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4150 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4152 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4153 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4154 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4155 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4156 if let Err(e) = res {
4157 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4158 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4159 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4160 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4161 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4168 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4169 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4170 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4174 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4175 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4176 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4177 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4178 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4179 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4180 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4181 // again on restart.
4182 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4183 payment_preimage, update_res);
4185 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4186 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4187 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4188 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4189 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4190 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4194 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4195 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4198 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4200 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4201 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4203 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4204 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4205 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4206 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4207 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4208 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4209 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4212 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4213 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4215 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4217 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4220 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4224 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4225 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4226 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4232 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4233 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4234 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4237 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4238 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4240 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4241 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4242 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4243 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4244 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4248 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4249 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4255 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4256 /// update completion.
4257 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4258 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4259 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4260 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4261 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4262 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4264 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4265 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4266 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4267 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4268 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4269 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4271 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4273 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4274 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4275 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4276 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4279 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4280 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4282 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4283 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4284 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4289 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4290 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4291 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4292 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4297 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4298 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4299 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4300 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4301 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4306 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4310 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4316 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4317 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4318 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4322 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4323 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4324 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4330 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4331 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4333 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4334 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4336 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4337 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4338 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4339 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4340 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4346 let mut peer_state_lock;
4347 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4348 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4349 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4352 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4358 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4359 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4362 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4365 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4367 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4368 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4371 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4372 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4373 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4375 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4376 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4377 /// used to accept such channels.
4379 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4380 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4381 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4382 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4385 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4386 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4388 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4389 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4390 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4392 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4393 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4395 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4396 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4398 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4399 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4401 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4402 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4403 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4404 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4407 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4410 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4412 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4413 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4414 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4415 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4416 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4417 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4419 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4420 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4423 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4424 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4425 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4426 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4428 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4431 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4432 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4433 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4435 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4436 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4437 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4438 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4439 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4440 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4446 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4451 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4452 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4453 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4463 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4464 /// or 0-conf channels.
4466 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4467 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4468 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4469 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4470 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4473 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4474 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4475 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4476 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4477 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4478 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4479 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4483 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4486 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4487 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4489 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4490 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4491 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4492 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4494 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4497 num_unfunded_channels
4500 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4501 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4502 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4505 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4509 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4510 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4511 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4512 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4514 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4515 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4516 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4517 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4522 debug_assert!(false);
4523 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4528 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4529 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4530 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4531 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4532 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4533 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4535 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4536 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4537 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4540 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4541 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4542 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4543 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4544 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4547 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4548 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4549 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4552 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4553 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4557 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4559 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4560 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4563 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4564 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4568 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4569 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4572 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4573 pending_events.push(
4574 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4575 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4576 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4577 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4578 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4579 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4584 entry.insert(channel);
4590 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4591 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4593 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4595 debug_assert!(false);
4596 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4600 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4601 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4602 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4603 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4608 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4609 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4610 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4611 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4612 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4614 user_channel_id: user_id,
4619 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4620 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4625 debug_assert!(false);
4626 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4631 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4632 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4634 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4639 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4641 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4644 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4646 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4647 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4648 funding_msg.channel_id))
4650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4651 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4655 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4656 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4657 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4658 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4659 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4660 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4661 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4665 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4667 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4668 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4669 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4671 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4672 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4673 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4674 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4675 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4676 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4677 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4678 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4686 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4687 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4688 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4689 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4691 debug_assert!(false);
4692 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4697 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4699 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4700 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4701 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4702 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4703 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4704 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4705 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4706 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4707 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4708 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4717 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4721 debug_assert!(false);
4722 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4728 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4729 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4730 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4733 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4734 msg: announcement_sigs,
4736 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4737 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4738 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4739 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4740 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4741 // announcement_signatures.
4742 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4743 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4744 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4745 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4752 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4753 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4762 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4763 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4764 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4768 debug_assert!(false);
4769 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4773 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4776 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4777 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4778 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4779 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4782 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4783 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4784 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4785 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4787 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4788 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4789 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4790 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4792 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4797 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4798 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4799 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4800 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4801 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4808 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4809 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4810 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4817 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4819 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4821 debug_assert!(false);
4822 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4824 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4829 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4830 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4831 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4832 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4837 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4838 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4839 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4840 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4841 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4842 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4843 } else { (tx, None) }
4845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4848 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4849 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4850 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4852 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4853 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4856 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4860 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4865 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4866 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4867 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4868 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4870 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4871 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4872 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4873 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4875 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4877 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4879 debug_assert!(false);
4880 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4884 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4887 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4888 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4889 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4890 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4891 match pending_forward_info {
4892 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4893 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4894 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4895 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4897 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4898 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4899 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4900 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4901 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4904 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4906 _ => pending_forward_info
4909 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4916 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4917 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4919 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4921 debug_assert!(false);
4922 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4926 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4928 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4933 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4937 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4939 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4941 debug_assert!(false);
4942 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4946 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4948 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4955 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4957 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4959 debug_assert!(false);
4960 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4964 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4966 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4967 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4968 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4970 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4977 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4981 debug_assert!(false);
4982 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4986 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4988 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4989 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4990 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4991 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4992 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4993 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5000 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5001 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5002 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5003 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5004 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5005 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5006 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5007 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5008 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5009 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5010 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5012 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5013 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5015 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5016 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5017 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5019 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5020 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5023 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5024 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5026 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5027 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5028 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5030 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5031 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5032 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5033 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5034 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5037 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5038 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5041 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5042 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5043 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5044 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5045 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5046 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5047 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5050 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5051 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5052 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5057 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5058 // payments are being processed.
5059 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5060 push_forward_event = true;
5062 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5063 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5070 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5071 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5074 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5075 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5076 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5078 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5082 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5083 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5084 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5085 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5086 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5088 if !forward_ev_exists {
5089 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5091 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5096 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5099 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5101 debug_assert!(false);
5102 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5107 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5108 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5109 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5110 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5111 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5112 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5113 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5115 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5118 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5122 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5124 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5126 debug_assert!(false);
5127 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5131 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5133 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5140 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5142 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5144 debug_assert!(false);
5145 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5149 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5151 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5155 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5156 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5157 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5158 msg, &self.default_configuration
5160 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5161 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5162 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5170 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5171 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5172 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5173 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5175 // It's not a local channel
5176 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5179 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5181 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5182 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5186 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5188 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5189 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5190 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5191 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5192 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5193 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5195 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5197 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5198 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5199 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5200 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5202 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5203 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5206 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5208 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5211 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5213 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5216 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5218 debug_assert!(false);
5219 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5225 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5226 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5227 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5228 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5229 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5230 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5231 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5232 let mut channel_update = None;
5233 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5234 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5235 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5238 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5239 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5240 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5241 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5242 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5243 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5244 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5249 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5250 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5251 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5252 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5253 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5254 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5262 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5263 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5266 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5267 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5272 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5273 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5274 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5276 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5277 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5278 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5279 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5280 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5281 match monitor_event {
5282 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5283 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5285 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5288 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5289 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5290 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5293 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5294 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5295 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5296 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5298 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5299 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5300 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5301 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5304 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5306 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5307 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5308 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5309 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5310 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5311 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5312 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5313 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5314 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5318 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5319 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5321 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5323 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5325 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5326 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5327 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5334 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5335 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5341 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5342 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5345 has_pending_monitor_events
5348 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5349 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5350 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5352 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5353 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5354 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5355 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5357 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5362 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5363 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5364 /// update was applied.
5365 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5366 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5367 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5368 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5370 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5371 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5372 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5373 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5376 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5379 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5380 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5381 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5382 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5383 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5384 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5385 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5386 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5388 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5389 has_monitor_update = true;
5391 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5392 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5393 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5394 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5395 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5396 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5397 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5399 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5401 continue 'peer_loop;
5410 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5411 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5412 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5415 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5416 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5422 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5423 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5424 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5425 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5426 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5427 let mut has_update = false;
5429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5431 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5432 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5433 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5434 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5435 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5436 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5437 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5438 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5441 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5444 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5445 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5446 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5447 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5453 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5455 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5456 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5457 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5463 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5464 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5472 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5473 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5479 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5480 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5482 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5483 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5484 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5485 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5486 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5487 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5488 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5489 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5490 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5491 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5492 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5493 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5494 assert!(should_broadcast);
5495 } else { unreachable!(); }
5496 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5498 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5502 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5503 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5505 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5506 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5509 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5512 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5513 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5515 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5516 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5517 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5518 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5519 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5520 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5521 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5522 // never fail a payment too early.
5523 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5525 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5533 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5536 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5537 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5539 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5540 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5541 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5542 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5544 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5546 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5547 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5551 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5552 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5554 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5556 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5557 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5559 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5560 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5561 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5562 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5563 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5564 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5565 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5566 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5567 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5568 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5569 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5572 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5573 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5575 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5578 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5580 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5582 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5583 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5584 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5585 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5586 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5589 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5590 /// stored external to LDK.
5592 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5593 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5594 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5596 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5597 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5600 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5601 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5602 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5603 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5605 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5606 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5607 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5608 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5609 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5611 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5612 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5613 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5614 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5615 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5617 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5618 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5620 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5621 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5625 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5626 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5628 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5630 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5631 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5633 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5634 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5635 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5636 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5637 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5638 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5639 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5642 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5643 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5645 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5648 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5650 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5652 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5653 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5656 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5657 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5659 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5660 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5661 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5664 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5665 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5667 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5668 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5670 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5672 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5673 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5674 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5675 Some(_) => continue,
5676 None => return scid_candidate
5681 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5683 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5684 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5686 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5687 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5688 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5692 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5693 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5694 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5696 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5697 /// times to get a unique scid.
5698 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5700 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5702 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5703 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5704 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5705 return scid_candidate
5709 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5710 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5711 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5712 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5715 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5718 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5719 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5720 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5721 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5730 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5731 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5732 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5733 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5734 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5738 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5739 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5740 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5745 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5746 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5747 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5751 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5752 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5756 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5757 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5760 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5761 /// using the given event handler.
5763 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5764 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5767 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5768 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5769 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5771 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5773 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5774 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5775 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5779 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5780 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5781 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5784 for event in pending_events {
5785 handler(event).await;
5788 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5789 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5794 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5796 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5798 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5799 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5800 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5801 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5805 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5806 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5807 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5808 /// is always placed next to each other.
5810 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5811 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5812 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5813 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5815 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5816 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5817 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5818 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5819 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5820 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5821 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5823 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5824 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5825 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5826 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5829 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5830 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5832 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5833 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5836 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5838 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5841 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5842 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5846 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5847 events.replace(pending_events);
5856 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5858 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5859 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5860 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5861 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5862 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5863 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5867 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5869 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5870 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5871 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5872 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5873 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5875 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5876 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5877 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5878 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5881 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5882 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5883 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5886 for event in pending_events {
5887 handler.handle_event(event);
5895 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5897 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5906 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5908 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5909 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5910 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5911 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5912 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5915 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5916 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5919 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5921 let new_height = height - 1;
5923 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5924 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5925 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5926 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5927 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5928 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5931 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5935 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5937 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5939 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5940 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5941 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5946 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5947 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5948 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5949 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5951 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5952 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5955 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5956 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5958 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5959 if height < last_best_block_height {
5960 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5961 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5965 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5966 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5967 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5968 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5970 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5971 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5975 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5977 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5979 macro_rules! max_time {
5980 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5982 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5983 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5984 // having an explicit local time source.
5985 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5986 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5987 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5988 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5989 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5995 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5996 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5997 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5998 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6002 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6003 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6004 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6007 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6008 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6009 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6016 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6018 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6019 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6020 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6021 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6022 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6023 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6028 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6030 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6031 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6032 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6033 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6034 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6035 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6039 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6040 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6042 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6043 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6044 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6045 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6046 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6048 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6049 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6051 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6052 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6055 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6056 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6057 let res = f(channel);
6058 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6059 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6060 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6061 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6062 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6064 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6065 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6066 if channel.is_usable() {
6067 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6068 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6069 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6070 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6075 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6080 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6081 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6084 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6086 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6087 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6088 msg: announcement_sigs,
6090 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6091 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6092 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6094 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6095 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6096 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6101 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6102 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6103 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6104 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6105 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6106 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6107 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6108 // is always consistent.
6109 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6110 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6111 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6112 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6113 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6116 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6117 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6118 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6119 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6120 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6121 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6122 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6126 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6127 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6128 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6129 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6130 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6131 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6132 data: reason_message,
6142 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6143 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6144 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6145 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6146 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6147 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6148 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6149 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6150 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6151 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6153 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6154 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6155 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6159 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6162 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6163 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6164 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6165 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6166 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6167 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6168 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6169 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6170 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6173 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6174 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6175 _ => unreachable!(),
6177 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6178 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6179 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6180 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6186 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6188 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6189 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6193 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6195 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6196 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6198 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6199 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6202 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6203 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6204 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6207 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6208 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6209 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6210 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6213 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6214 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6215 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6216 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6219 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6220 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6222 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6223 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6224 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6225 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6226 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6229 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6230 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6231 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6232 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6235 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6236 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6237 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6238 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6241 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6242 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6243 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6244 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6248 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6249 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6251 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6252 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6253 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6254 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6255 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6256 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6260 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6262 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6265 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6270 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6275 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6280 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6282 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6285 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6287 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6290 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6295 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6297 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6300 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6302 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6305 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6310 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6315 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6320 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6325 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6330 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6332 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6335 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6336 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6337 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6340 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6345 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6347 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6350 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6352 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6353 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6355 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6356 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6357 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6360 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6361 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6362 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6363 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6364 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6365 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6370 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6373 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6375 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6376 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6377 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6378 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6379 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6380 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6381 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6383 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6384 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6385 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6386 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6387 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6388 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6389 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6390 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6391 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6395 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6396 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6397 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6398 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6401 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6403 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6405 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6406 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6410 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6411 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6412 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6418 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6419 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6420 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6421 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6422 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6423 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6426 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6427 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6429 if inbound_peer_limited {
6432 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6433 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6434 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6435 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6436 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6441 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6442 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6444 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6445 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6446 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6447 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6452 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6453 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6458 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6461 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6464 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6465 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6466 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6467 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6468 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6469 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6470 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6474 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6475 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6476 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6481 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6482 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6483 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6485 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6494 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6498 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6501 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6502 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6503 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6505 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6508 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6510 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6511 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6512 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6516 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6518 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6519 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6522 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6523 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6524 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6525 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6533 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6534 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6538 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6539 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6542 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6543 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6547 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6548 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6549 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6550 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6553 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6554 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6556 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6557 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6558 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6559 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6560 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6563 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6564 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6565 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6566 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6569 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6570 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6571 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6572 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6575 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6576 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6577 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6578 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6579 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6580 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6581 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6582 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6583 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6584 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6585 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6586 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6587 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6588 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6589 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6590 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6591 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6592 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6594 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6595 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6596 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6602 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6603 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6605 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6606 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6607 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6608 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6611 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6612 (2, node_id, required),
6613 (4, features, required),
6614 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6615 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6616 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6617 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6620 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6621 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6622 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6623 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6624 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6625 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6626 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6627 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6628 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6629 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6630 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6631 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6632 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6633 (7, self.config, option),
6634 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6635 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6636 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6637 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6638 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6639 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6640 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6641 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6642 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6643 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6644 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6645 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6646 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6647 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6648 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6649 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6650 (32, self.is_public, required),
6651 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6652 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6653 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6654 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6660 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6661 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6662 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6663 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6664 (2, channel_id, required),
6665 (3, channel_type, option),
6666 (4, counterparty, required),
6667 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6668 (6, funding_txo, option),
6669 (7, config, option),
6670 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6671 (9, confirmations, option),
6672 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6673 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6674 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6675 (16, balance_msat, required),
6676 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6677 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6678 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6679 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6680 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6681 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6682 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6683 (26, is_outbound, required),
6684 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6685 (30, is_usable, required),
6686 (32, is_public, required),
6687 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6688 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6689 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6690 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6693 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6694 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6695 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6696 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6697 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6701 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6703 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6704 outbound_scid_alias,
6708 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6709 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6711 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6712 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6713 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6714 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6715 confirmations_required,
6717 force_close_spend_delay,
6718 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6719 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6720 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6721 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6722 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6723 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6724 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6729 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6730 (2, channels, vec_type),
6731 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6732 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6735 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6737 (0, onion_packet, required),
6738 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6741 (0, payment_data, required),
6742 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6743 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6744 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6746 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6747 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6748 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6749 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6753 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6754 (0, routing, required),
6755 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6756 (4, payment_hash, required),
6757 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6758 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6759 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6763 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6764 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6766 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6768 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6769 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6770 reason.write(writer)?;
6772 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6773 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6776 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6777 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6778 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6779 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6786 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6787 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6788 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6791 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6792 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6793 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6794 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6798 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6799 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6800 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6801 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6802 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6805 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6806 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6807 // messages contained in the variants.
6808 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6809 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6810 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6812 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6813 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6814 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6815 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6816 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6819 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6821 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6822 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6823 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6825 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6830 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6835 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6836 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6837 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6838 (2, outpoint, required),
6839 (4, htlc_id, required),
6840 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6843 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6844 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6845 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6846 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6847 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6849 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6850 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6851 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6852 (2, self.value, required),
6853 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6854 (4, payment_data, option),
6855 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6856 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6857 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6863 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6864 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6865 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6867 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6868 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6869 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6870 let mut total_value_received = None;
6871 let mut total_msat = None;
6872 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6873 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6874 (0, prev_hop, required),
6875 (1, total_msat, option),
6876 (2, value, required),
6877 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6878 (4, payment_data, option),
6879 (5, total_value_received, option),
6880 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6881 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6883 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6885 if payment_data.is_some() {
6886 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6888 if total_msat.is_none() {
6889 total_msat = Some(value);
6891 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6894 if total_msat.is_none() {
6895 if payment_data.is_none() {
6896 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6898 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6900 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6904 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6907 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6908 total_value_received,
6909 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6916 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6917 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6918 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6922 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6923 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6924 let mut payment_id = None;
6925 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6926 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6927 (0, session_priv, required),
6928 (1, payment_id, option),
6929 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6930 (4, path, vec_type),
6931 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6933 if payment_id.is_none() {
6934 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6936 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6938 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6939 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6941 let path = path.unwrap();
6942 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6943 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6944 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6947 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6948 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6949 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6951 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6954 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6955 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6960 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6961 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6963 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6965 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6966 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6967 (0, session_priv, required),
6968 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6969 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6970 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6971 (4, *path, vec_type),
6972 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6975 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6977 field.write(writer)?;
6984 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6985 (0, forward_info, required),
6986 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6987 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6988 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6989 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6992 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6994 (0, htlc_id, required),
6995 (2, err_packet, required),
7000 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7001 (0, payment_secret, required),
7002 (2, expiry_time, required),
7003 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7004 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7005 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7008 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7010 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7011 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7012 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7013 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7014 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7015 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7019 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7020 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7022 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7024 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7026 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7027 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7028 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7031 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7034 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7035 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7036 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7039 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7040 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7042 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7043 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7044 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7045 unfunded_channels += 1;
7050 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7052 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7055 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7056 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7057 channel.write(writer)?;
7064 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7065 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7066 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7067 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7068 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7069 for forward in pending_forwards {
7070 forward.write(writer)?;
7075 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7077 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7078 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7079 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7081 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7082 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7083 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7084 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7085 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7086 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7087 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7088 htlc.write(writer)?;
7090 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7091 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7094 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7095 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7096 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7097 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7098 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7099 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7100 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7103 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7104 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7105 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7106 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7107 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7109 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7110 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7111 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7112 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7113 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7114 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7115 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7120 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7121 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7122 for event in events.iter() {
7123 event.write(writer)?;
7126 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7127 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7128 for event in background_events.iter() {
7130 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7132 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7133 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7138 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7139 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7140 // likely to be identical.
7141 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7142 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7144 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7145 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7146 hash.write(writer)?;
7147 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7150 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7151 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7152 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7153 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7154 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7157 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7158 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7160 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7161 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7162 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7163 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7166 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7167 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7171 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7172 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7173 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7175 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7176 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7177 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7183 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7184 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7185 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7186 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7189 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7190 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7191 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7192 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7193 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7196 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7197 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7198 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7199 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7200 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7201 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7202 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7203 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7204 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7205 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7206 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7213 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7215 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7217 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7218 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7219 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7220 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7221 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7222 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7223 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7224 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7225 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7226 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7227 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7228 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7229 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7231 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7232 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7234 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7235 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7237 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7238 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7239 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7240 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7241 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7242 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7244 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7245 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7247 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7249 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7250 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7251 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7252 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7256 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7257 pub entropy_source: ES,
7259 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7260 pub node_signer: NS,
7262 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7263 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7265 pub signer_provider: SP,
7267 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7269 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7270 pub fee_estimator: F,
7271 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7273 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7274 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7275 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7276 pub chain_monitor: M,
7278 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7279 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7280 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7281 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7282 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7283 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7285 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7287 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7288 /// deserialization.
7290 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7291 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7292 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7294 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7295 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7297 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7298 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7299 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7300 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7302 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7305 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7306 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7309 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7310 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7312 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7314 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7315 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7316 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7317 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7321 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7322 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7323 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7324 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7325 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7327 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7328 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7333 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7334 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7335 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7336 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7338 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7339 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7340 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7341 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7342 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7343 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7347 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7348 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7349 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7353 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7354 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7356 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7357 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7358 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7359 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7360 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7361 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7365 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7366 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7368 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7369 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7372 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7374 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7375 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7376 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7377 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7378 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7379 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7380 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7381 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7382 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7383 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7385 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7386 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7387 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7388 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7389 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7390 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7391 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7392 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7393 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7394 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7395 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7396 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7397 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7398 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7399 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7400 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7401 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7402 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7403 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7404 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7405 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7406 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7407 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7408 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7409 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7410 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7411 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7412 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7414 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7415 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7416 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7417 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7418 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7420 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7421 let mut found_htlc = false;
7422 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7423 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7426 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7427 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7428 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7429 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7430 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7431 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7432 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7433 log_info!(args.logger,
7434 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7435 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7436 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7440 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7441 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7442 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7444 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7445 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7447 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7448 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7449 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7450 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7453 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7454 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7455 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7459 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7460 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7461 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7462 // safely discard the channel.
7463 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7464 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7465 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7466 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7467 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7470 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7471 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7472 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7473 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7474 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7479 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7480 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7481 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7482 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7483 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7485 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7489 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7490 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7491 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7492 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7493 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7496 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7497 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7499 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7502 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7504 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7505 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7506 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7508 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7509 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7511 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7514 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7516 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7517 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7518 let peer_state = PeerState {
7519 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7520 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7521 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7522 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7523 is_connected: false,
7525 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7528 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7529 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7530 for _ in 0..event_count {
7531 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7532 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7537 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7538 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7539 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7541 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7542 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7543 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7544 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7546 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7549 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7553 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7554 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7556 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7557 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7558 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7559 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7560 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7564 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7565 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7566 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7567 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7568 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7569 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7570 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7572 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7573 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7577 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7578 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7579 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7580 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7581 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7582 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7583 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7584 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7585 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7586 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7587 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7588 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7589 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7590 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7591 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7592 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7593 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7594 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7595 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7596 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7597 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7598 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7600 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7601 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7604 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7605 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7608 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7609 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7612 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7613 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7614 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7615 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7616 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7617 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7619 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7621 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7622 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7623 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7627 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7628 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7629 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7630 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7631 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7632 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7633 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7635 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7636 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7637 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7638 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7639 if path.is_empty() {
7640 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7644 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7645 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7646 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7647 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7649 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7650 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7651 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7654 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7655 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7656 retry_strategy: None,
7657 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7658 payment_params: None,
7659 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7660 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7661 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7662 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7663 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7664 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7665 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7666 total_msat: path_amt,
7667 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7669 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7670 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7675 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7677 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7678 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7679 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7680 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7682 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7683 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7684 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7685 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7686 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7687 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7688 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7689 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7690 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7691 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7692 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7697 !forwards.is_empty()
7699 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7700 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7701 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7702 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7703 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7704 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7705 intercepted_id != ev_id
7712 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7713 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7714 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7715 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7716 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7717 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7718 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7719 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7720 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7721 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7722 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7723 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7724 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7733 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7734 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7735 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7736 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7737 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7738 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7739 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7740 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7744 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7745 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7747 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7748 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7749 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7750 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7752 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7753 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7754 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7756 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7757 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7759 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7760 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7762 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7765 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7766 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7767 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7769 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7773 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7774 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7775 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7776 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7777 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7779 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7780 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7781 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7782 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7783 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7784 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7785 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7786 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7788 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7789 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7793 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7795 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7797 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7798 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7800 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7801 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7806 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7807 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7809 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7811 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7813 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7814 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7815 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7816 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7820 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7821 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7824 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7825 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7826 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7828 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7829 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7830 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7832 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7833 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7834 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7835 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7836 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7839 if chan.is_usable() {
7840 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7841 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7842 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7843 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7844 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7850 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7852 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7853 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7854 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7855 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7856 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7857 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7858 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7859 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7860 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7861 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7862 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7864 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7865 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7867 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7868 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7869 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7870 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7872 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7873 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7874 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7875 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7877 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7878 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7879 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7880 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7882 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7883 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7887 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7888 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7891 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7892 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7895 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7898 purpose: payment.purpose,
7899 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7905 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7906 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7907 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7909 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7914 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7916 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7917 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7918 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7919 router: args.router,
7921 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7923 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7924 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7925 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7926 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7928 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7929 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7930 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7931 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7932 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7933 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7935 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7940 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7942 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7944 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7945 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7946 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7947 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7949 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7950 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7951 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7953 logger: args.logger,
7954 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7957 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7958 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7959 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7960 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7961 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7964 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7965 //connection or two.
7967 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7973 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7974 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7975 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7976 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7977 use core::time::Duration;
7978 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7979 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7980 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7981 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7982 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7983 use crate::ln::msgs;
7984 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7985 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7986 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7987 use crate::util::test_utils;
7988 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7989 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7992 fn test_notify_limits() {
7993 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7994 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7998 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8000 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8001 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8002 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8003 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8004 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8006 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8008 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8009 // to connect messages with new values
8010 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8011 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8012 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8013 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8014 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8015 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8017 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8018 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8019 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8020 // ... but the last node should not.
8021 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8022 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8023 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8024 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8026 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8027 // about the channel.
8028 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8029 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8030 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8032 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8034 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8035 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8036 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8037 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8038 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8039 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8041 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8043 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8045 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8046 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8047 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8048 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8049 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8050 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8052 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8053 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8054 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8055 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8056 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8057 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8058 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8059 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8061 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8062 // the channel info has updated.
8063 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8064 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8065 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8066 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8067 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8068 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8072 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8073 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8078 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8079 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8081 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8082 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8083 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8084 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8086 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8087 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8088 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8089 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8090 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8091 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8092 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8093 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8095 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8097 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8099 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8100 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8101 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8103 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8105 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8106 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8107 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8113 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8114 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8115 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8117 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8118 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8119 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8120 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8121 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8123 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8124 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8125 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8127 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8129 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8131 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8132 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8133 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8134 // lightning messages manually.
8135 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8136 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8139 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8140 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8141 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8143 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8144 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8146 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8149 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8151 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8154 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8155 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8157 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8161 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8162 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8165 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8166 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8167 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8170 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8171 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8172 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8173 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8178 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8179 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8180 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8181 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8186 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8187 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8188 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8189 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8196 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8197 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8198 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8199 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8200 // fails as expected.
8201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8204 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8206 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8207 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8209 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8210 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8211 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8213 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8214 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8215 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8216 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8218 let route = find_route(
8219 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8220 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8222 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8223 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8227 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8228 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8232 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8233 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8235 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8237 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8238 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8239 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8240 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8241 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8242 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8243 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8244 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8245 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8247 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8248 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8250 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8251 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8252 let route = find_route(
8253 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8254 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8256 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8257 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8259 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8261 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8262 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8263 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8265 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8266 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8267 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8268 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8270 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8271 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8272 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8273 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8274 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8276 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8277 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8278 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8280 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8282 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8283 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8284 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8285 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8286 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8287 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8288 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8290 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8291 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8295 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8296 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8297 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8301 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8303 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8304 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8306 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8307 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8308 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8309 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8311 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8312 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8313 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8314 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8315 let route = find_route(
8316 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8317 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8320 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8321 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8322 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8323 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8324 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8325 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8328 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8329 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8330 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8331 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8332 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8333 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8334 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8336 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8340 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8341 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8342 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8343 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8344 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8345 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8347 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8348 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8350 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8351 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8352 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8353 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8355 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8356 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8357 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8358 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8359 let route = find_route(
8360 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8361 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8364 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8365 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8366 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8367 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8368 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8369 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8370 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8371 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8374 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8375 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8376 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8377 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8378 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8379 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8380 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8382 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8386 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8390 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8392 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8393 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8394 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8395 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8397 // Marshall an MPP route.
8398 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8399 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8400 route.paths.push(path);
8401 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8402 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8403 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8404 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8405 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8406 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8408 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8409 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8411 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8412 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8414 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8419 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8423 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8425 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8427 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8431 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8433 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8436 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8437 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8438 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8439 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8440 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8441 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8444 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8447 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8448 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8453 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8454 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8455 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8456 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8458 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8460 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8461 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8463 total_msat: 100_000,
8466 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8467 // payment verification fails as expected.
8468 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8469 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8470 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8471 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8473 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8477 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8478 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8482 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8483 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8484 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8485 // the channel is successfully closed.
8486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8489 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8491 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8492 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8493 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8494 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8495 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8497 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8498 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8500 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8501 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8502 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8503 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8506 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8508 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8509 // as it has the funding transaction.
8510 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8511 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8512 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8515 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8517 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8519 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8521 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8522 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8523 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8525 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8528 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8529 // as it has the funding transaction.
8530 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8531 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8532 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8535 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8536 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8538 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8539 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8540 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8541 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8543 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8544 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8545 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8546 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8548 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8549 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8551 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8552 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8553 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8554 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8555 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8556 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8557 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8561 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8562 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8563 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8564 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8565 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8566 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8567 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8570 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8572 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8573 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8574 // closing transaction).
8575 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8576 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8577 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8579 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8580 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8581 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8582 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8583 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8586 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8588 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8590 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8591 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8592 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8594 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8596 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8597 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8600 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8601 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8602 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8605 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8606 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8607 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8610 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8612 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8613 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8615 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8616 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8618 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8619 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8624 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8625 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8626 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8627 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8628 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8629 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8630 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8634 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8635 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8636 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8638 // Test the API functions.
8639 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8641 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8643 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8645 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8647 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8649 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8651 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8655 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8656 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8660 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8662 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8664 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8665 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8667 let mut funding_tx = None;
8668 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8669 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8670 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8673 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8674 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8675 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8676 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8677 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8679 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8681 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8683 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8685 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8687 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8689 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8692 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8693 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8694 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8695 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8696 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8698 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8699 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8701 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8702 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8703 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8704 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8705 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8706 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8707 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8709 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8710 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8711 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8712 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8714 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8715 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8716 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8717 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8718 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8719 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8720 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8722 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8723 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8724 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8725 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8727 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8728 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8729 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8730 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8732 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8733 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8735 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8736 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8737 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8738 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8739 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8741 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8742 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8743 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8745 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8746 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8747 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8749 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8750 // "protected" and can connect again.
8751 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8752 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8753 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8754 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8756 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8758 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8759 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8763 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8764 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8770 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8772 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8773 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8775 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8776 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8777 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8778 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8781 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8784 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8785 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8787 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8788 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8789 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8791 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8792 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8793 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8794 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8798 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8799 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8800 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8803 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8804 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8805 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8806 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8808 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8810 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8811 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8813 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8814 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8815 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8816 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8817 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8818 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8820 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8821 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8823 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8824 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8828 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8829 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8832 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8833 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8834 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8835 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8836 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8837 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8840 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8841 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8842 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8843 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8849 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8850 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8852 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8853 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8854 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8856 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8857 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8861 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8866 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8867 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8868 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8869 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8872 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8873 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8874 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8876 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8878 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8879 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8880 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8882 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8883 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8885 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8886 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8891 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8892 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8894 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8895 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8897 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8901 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8903 use crate::chain::Listen;
8904 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8905 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8906 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8907 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8908 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8909 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8910 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8911 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8912 use crate::util::test_utils;
8913 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8915 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8916 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8917 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8919 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8923 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8924 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8925 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8926 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8927 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8928 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8929 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8930 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8935 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8936 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8939 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8940 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8941 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8943 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8945 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8946 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8947 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8948 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8949 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8951 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8952 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8954 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8955 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8956 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8957 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8959 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8961 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8963 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8964 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8965 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8966 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8967 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8969 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8971 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8973 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8974 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8975 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8976 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8977 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8980 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8981 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8982 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8984 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8985 } else { panic!(); }
8987 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8988 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8989 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8991 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8992 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8997 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8998 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8999 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9001 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9002 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9007 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9010 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9013 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9014 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9016 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9017 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9018 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9019 match msg_events[0] {
9020 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9021 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9022 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9026 match msg_events[1] {
9027 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9031 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9032 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9034 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9035 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9040 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9041 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9043 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9044 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9049 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9050 macro_rules! send_payment {
9051 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9052 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9053 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9054 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9055 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9057 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9058 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9060 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9061 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9062 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9063 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9064 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9065 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9066 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9067 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9068 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9069 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9070 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9072 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9073 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9074 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9075 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9077 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9078 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9079 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9080 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9081 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9083 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9086 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9087 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9088 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9089 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9091 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9096 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9097 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);