1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423 /// this payment being removed.
425 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426 user_payment_id: u64,
427 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
439 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
447 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448 starting_block_height: u32,
450 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
454 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
457 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
458 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
459 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
460 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
461 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
463 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
466 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
471 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
473 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
477 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
483 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
485 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
489 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
496 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
498 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
505 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
506 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
507 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
508 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
514 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
515 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
518 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
519 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
520 let our_payment_hash;
521 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
526 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
527 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
531 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
535 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
536 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
537 let remove_res = match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
542 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
546 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
547 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
548 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
549 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
550 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
551 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
558 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
559 let insert_res = match self {
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
562 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
568 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
569 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
570 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
571 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
572 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
579 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
581 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
582 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
583 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
591 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
596 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
597 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
598 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
600 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
601 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
602 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
603 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
604 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
605 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
606 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
607 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
608 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
610 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
611 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
613 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
614 /// to individual Channels.
616 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
617 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
618 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
619 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
621 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
622 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
623 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
624 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
625 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
626 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
627 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
629 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
630 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
631 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
632 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
635 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
636 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
637 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
638 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
639 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
641 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
642 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
643 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
644 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
645 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
646 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
647 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
649 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
650 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
653 default_configuration: UserConfig,
654 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
660 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
662 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
663 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
665 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
666 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
667 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
668 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
670 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
671 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
672 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
673 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
674 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
675 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
677 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
678 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
679 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
680 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
681 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
682 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
683 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
684 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
686 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
688 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
689 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
691 our_network_key: SecretKey,
692 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
694 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
695 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
696 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
698 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
699 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
700 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
701 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
703 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
704 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
705 /// are currently open with that peer.
706 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
707 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
710 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
711 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
713 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
714 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
715 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
716 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
717 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
718 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
719 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
720 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
721 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
723 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
730 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
732 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
733 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
734 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
735 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
736 pub struct ChainParameters {
737 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
738 pub network: Network,
740 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
742 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
743 pub best_block: BestBlock,
746 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
752 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
753 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
754 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
755 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
756 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
757 /// updates are ready for persistence).
759 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
760 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
761 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
762 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
763 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
765 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
766 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
769 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
770 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
774 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
775 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
777 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
778 persistence_notifier: notifier,
779 should_persist: persist_check,
780 _read_guard: read_guard,
785 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
787 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
788 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
793 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
794 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
796 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
798 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
799 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
800 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
801 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
802 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
804 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
805 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
807 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
809 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
810 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
811 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
812 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
813 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
814 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
815 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
817 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
818 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
820 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
821 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
822 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
823 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
825 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
826 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
827 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
828 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
829 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
830 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
833 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
835 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
836 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
839 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
841 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
842 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
843 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
845 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
846 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
847 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
848 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
849 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
850 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
851 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
852 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
853 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
854 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
855 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
858 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
859 /// to better separate parameters.
860 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
861 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
862 /// The node_id of our counterparty
863 pub node_id: PublicKey,
864 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
865 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
866 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
867 pub features: InitFeatures,
868 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
869 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
870 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
872 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
874 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
875 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
876 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
877 /// payments to us through this channel.
878 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
881 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
882 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
883 pub struct ChannelDetails {
884 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
885 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
886 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
887 /// lifetime of the channel.
888 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
889 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
890 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
891 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
892 /// our counterparty already.
894 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
895 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
896 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
897 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
898 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
899 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
900 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
901 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
902 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
903 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
904 /// this value on chain.
906 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
908 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
910 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
911 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
912 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
913 pub user_channel_id: u64,
914 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
915 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
916 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
917 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
919 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
920 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
921 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
922 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
923 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
924 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
925 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
926 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
927 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
929 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
930 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
931 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
932 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
933 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
934 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
935 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
936 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
937 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
939 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
941 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
943 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
944 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
945 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
946 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
947 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
948 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
949 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
951 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
952 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
953 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
954 pub is_outbound: bool,
955 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
956 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
957 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
958 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
959 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
961 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
962 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
963 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
964 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
966 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
968 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
972 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
973 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
975 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
976 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
977 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
978 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
979 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
980 ParameterError(APIError),
981 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
982 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
983 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
986 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
988 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
989 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
990 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
991 /// paths than the ones selected).
992 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
993 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
994 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
995 /// in over-/re-payment.
997 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
998 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
999 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1001 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1002 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1003 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1004 /// with the latest update_id.
1006 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1007 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1008 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1009 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1010 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1011 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1012 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1013 payment_id: PaymentId,
1017 macro_rules! handle_error {
1018 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1021 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1022 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1024 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1025 // entering the macro.
1026 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1027 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1030 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1032 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1033 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1034 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1035 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1039 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1040 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1041 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1042 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1047 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1048 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1050 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1051 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1052 action: err.action.clone()
1056 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1057 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1060 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1067 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1068 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1069 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1071 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1072 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1074 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1076 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1077 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1079 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1080 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1081 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1082 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1084 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1085 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1086 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1088 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1089 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1090 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1091 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1093 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1094 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1095 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1101 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1102 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1106 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1108 $entry.remove_entry();
1116 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1117 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1121 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1123 $entry.remove_entry();
1131 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1132 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1134 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1135 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1136 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1143 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1144 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1145 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1147 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1149 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1150 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1151 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1152 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1154 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1155 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1156 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1157 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1158 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1159 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1160 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1161 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1162 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1163 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1164 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1167 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1168 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1169 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1170 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1171 match $action_type {
1172 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1173 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1175 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1176 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1178 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1179 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1180 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1181 if !$resend_commitment {
1182 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1185 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1187 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1188 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1192 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1193 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1195 $entry.remove_entry();
1199 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1200 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1204 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1205 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1206 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1208 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1209 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1213 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1214 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1215 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1216 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1217 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1220 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1225 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1226 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1227 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1228 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1229 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1230 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1232 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1233 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1235 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1236 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1237 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1238 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1241 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1242 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1243 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1244 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1245 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1246 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1247 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1248 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1249 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1250 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1251 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1252 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1255 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1256 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1257 // before it should be allowed to.
1258 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1259 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1260 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1263 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1264 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1265 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1266 msg: announcement_sigs,
1269 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1272 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1273 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1274 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1275 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1276 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1277 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1278 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1279 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1280 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1281 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1282 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1283 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1284 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1285 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1286 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1287 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1288 let mut order = $order;
1290 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1292 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1296 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1297 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1298 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1299 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1304 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1305 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1306 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1307 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1308 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1313 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1317 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1322 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1323 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1324 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1329 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1330 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1331 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1332 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1333 assert!(res.is_ok());
1336 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1340 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1341 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1342 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1344 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1346 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1347 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1352 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1353 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1354 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1355 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1359 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1361 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1362 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1364 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1366 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1368 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1369 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1370 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1371 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1372 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1373 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1376 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1377 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1378 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1382 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1384 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1385 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1386 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1387 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1388 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1389 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1391 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1392 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1394 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1395 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1398 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1399 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1401 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1403 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1404 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1405 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1406 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1414 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1415 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1416 &self.default_configuration
1419 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1421 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1422 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1423 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1424 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1425 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1428 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1429 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1431 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1432 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1433 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1435 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1436 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1437 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1438 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1439 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1440 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1442 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1443 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1444 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1445 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1446 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1452 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1453 Some(peer_state) => {
1454 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1455 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1456 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1457 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1458 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1460 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1463 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1466 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1467 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1469 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1470 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1471 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1473 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1474 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1476 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1482 node_id: their_network_key,
1485 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1488 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1489 let mut res = Vec::new();
1491 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1492 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1493 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1494 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1495 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1496 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1497 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1498 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1499 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1500 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1501 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1502 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1503 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1505 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1506 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1507 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1508 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1509 inbound_capacity_msat,
1510 outbound_capacity_msat,
1511 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1512 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1513 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1514 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1515 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1516 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1517 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1522 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1523 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1524 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1530 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1531 /// more information.
1532 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1533 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1536 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1537 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1539 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1540 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1542 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1543 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1544 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1545 // really wanted anyway.
1546 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1549 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1550 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1551 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1552 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1553 Some(transaction) => {
1554 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1558 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1559 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1560 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1561 reason: closure_reason
1565 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1568 let counterparty_node_id;
1569 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1570 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1571 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1572 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1573 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1575 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1576 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1577 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1578 Some(peer_state) => {
1579 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1580 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1581 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1583 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1585 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1587 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1588 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1589 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1590 let (result, is_permanent) =
1591 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1593 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1600 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1604 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1605 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1606 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1607 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1611 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1619 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1620 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1623 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1627 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1628 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1629 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1631 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1632 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1634 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1635 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1636 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1637 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1639 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1641 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1642 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1643 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1644 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1645 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1648 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1649 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1650 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1652 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1653 /// the channel being closed or not:
1654 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1655 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1656 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1657 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1658 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1659 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1660 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1662 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1664 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1665 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1666 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1667 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1668 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1672 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1673 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1674 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1675 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1676 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1678 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1679 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1680 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1681 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1682 // ignore the result here.
1683 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1687 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1688 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1689 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1691 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1692 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1693 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1694 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1695 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1696 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1699 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1700 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1702 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1703 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1704 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1707 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1709 chan.remove_entry().1
1711 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1714 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1715 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1716 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1717 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1718 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1723 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1726 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1727 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1728 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1730 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1731 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1732 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1733 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1734 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1735 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1736 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1746 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1747 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1748 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1749 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1750 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1754 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1755 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1756 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1758 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1759 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1760 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1761 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1762 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1763 failure_code: $err_code,
1764 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1769 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1770 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1773 let shared_secret = {
1774 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1775 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1778 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1780 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1781 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1782 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1783 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1784 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1785 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1786 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1787 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1790 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1791 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1792 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1793 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1794 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1797 let mut channel_state = None;
1798 macro_rules! return_err {
1799 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1801 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1802 if channel_state.is_none() {
1803 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1805 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1806 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1807 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1808 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1809 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1814 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1815 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1816 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1817 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1819 let error_code = match err {
1820 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1821 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1822 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1823 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1824 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1826 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1829 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1830 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1831 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1838 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1841 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1842 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1843 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1844 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1845 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1846 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1847 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1848 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1849 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1850 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1851 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1852 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1856 // final_expiry_too_soon
1857 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1858 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1859 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1860 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1861 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1862 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1863 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1865 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1866 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1867 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1869 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1870 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1871 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1874 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1875 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1876 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1877 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1878 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1879 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1880 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1881 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1883 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1885 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1886 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1887 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1888 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1889 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1890 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1891 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1892 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1893 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1896 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1898 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1901 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1906 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1907 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1908 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1909 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1911 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1913 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1914 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1915 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1916 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1919 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1920 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1921 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1923 // Check two things:
1924 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1925 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1926 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1928 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1930 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1931 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1932 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1934 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1936 let blinding_factor = {
1937 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1938 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1939 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1940 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1943 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1945 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1947 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1950 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1951 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1954 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1955 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1956 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1957 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1958 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1962 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1963 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1964 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1967 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1968 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1969 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1970 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1974 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1975 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1976 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1977 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1978 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1979 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1980 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1981 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1982 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1983 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1984 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1986 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1989 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1991 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1992 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1993 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1994 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1995 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1998 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1999 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2000 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2001 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2002 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2003 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2004 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2006 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2007 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2009 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2010 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2011 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2012 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2013 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2015 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2016 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2018 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2019 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2020 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2021 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2022 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2023 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2025 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2026 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2028 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2029 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2030 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2031 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2032 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2033 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2034 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2035 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2036 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2037 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2043 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2044 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2045 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2046 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2048 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2049 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2051 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2052 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2053 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2055 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2057 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2062 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2065 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2066 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2067 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2069 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2070 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2071 if !chan.should_announce() {
2072 return Err(LightningError {
2073 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2074 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2077 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2078 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2081 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2082 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2083 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2084 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2085 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2086 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2088 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2089 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2093 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2095 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2096 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2098 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2099 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2100 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2101 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2102 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2103 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2104 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2105 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2108 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2109 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2111 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2117 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2118 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2120 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2121 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2122 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2124 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2125 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2126 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2127 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2128 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2130 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2134 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2135 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2137 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2138 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2139 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2140 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2141 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2142 err: "Payment already completed"
2147 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2148 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2149 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2152 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2154 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2155 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2156 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2157 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2158 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2159 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2160 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2161 total_msat: total_value,
2163 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2167 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2168 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2170 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2171 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2173 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2174 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2176 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2177 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2179 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2180 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2182 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2183 payee: payee.clone(),
2184 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2185 channel_state, chan)
2187 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2188 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2189 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2190 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2191 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2192 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2193 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2194 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2195 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2196 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2198 insert_outbound_payment!();
2200 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2201 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2202 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2203 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2204 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2205 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2206 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2207 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2213 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2215 } else { unreachable!(); }
2219 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2220 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2222 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2227 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2229 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2230 /// fields for more info.
2232 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2233 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2234 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2235 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2236 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2237 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2239 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2241 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2242 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2243 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2245 /// In general, a path may raise:
2246 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2247 /// node public key) is specified.
2248 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2249 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2251 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2252 /// relevant updates.
2254 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2255 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2256 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2258 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2259 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2260 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2261 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2263 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2264 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2265 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2266 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2267 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2270 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2271 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2272 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2274 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2275 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2276 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2277 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2278 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2280 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2281 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2283 let mut total_value = 0;
2284 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2285 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2286 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2287 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2288 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2289 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2290 continue 'path_check;
2292 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2293 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2294 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2295 continue 'path_check;
2298 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2299 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2301 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2302 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2304 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2305 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2306 total_value = amt_msat;
2309 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2310 let mut results = Vec::new();
2311 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2312 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2314 let mut has_ok = false;
2315 let mut has_err = false;
2316 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2317 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2318 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2319 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2320 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2321 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2322 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2326 } else if res.is_err() {
2327 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2328 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2331 if has_err && has_ok {
2332 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2335 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2336 if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2337 Some(RouteParameters {
2338 payee: payee.clone(),
2339 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2340 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2346 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2347 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2348 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2349 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2355 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2357 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2358 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2359 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2360 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2361 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2363 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2364 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2365 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2366 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2367 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2368 if path.len() == 0 {
2369 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2370 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2375 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2376 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2377 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2379 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2380 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2382 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2383 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2384 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2385 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2388 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2390 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2391 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2392 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2395 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2396 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2397 err: "Payment already completed"
2400 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2401 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2402 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2407 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2408 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2412 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2415 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2417 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2418 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2419 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2420 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2422 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2423 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2424 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2426 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2427 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2428 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2429 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2432 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2433 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2434 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2435 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2436 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2438 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2446 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2447 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2448 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2449 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2450 /// never reach the recipient.
2452 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2454 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2455 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2457 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2459 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2460 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2461 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2463 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2465 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2466 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2467 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2472 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2473 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2474 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2475 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2477 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2479 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2481 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2482 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2483 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2484 } else { unreachable!(); })
2487 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2489 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2490 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2493 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2494 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2499 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2500 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2501 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2504 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2506 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2516 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2517 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2518 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2522 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2524 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2525 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2527 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2528 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2530 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2531 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2532 /// keys per-channel).
2534 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2535 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2536 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2538 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2539 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2540 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2542 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2543 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2544 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2547 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2548 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2549 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2550 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2554 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2555 let mut output_index = None;
2556 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2557 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2558 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2559 if output_index.is_some() {
2560 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2561 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2564 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2566 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2569 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2572 if output_index.is_none() {
2573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2574 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2577 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2581 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2582 if !chan.should_announce() {
2583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2587 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2589 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2591 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2592 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2594 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2595 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2596 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2597 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2598 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2603 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2604 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2605 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2607 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2610 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2611 // smaller than 500:
2612 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2614 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2615 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2616 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2617 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2618 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2619 /// our network addresses.
2621 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2622 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2624 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2625 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2626 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2627 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2629 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2631 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2632 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2635 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2636 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2639 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2640 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2641 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2643 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2644 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2645 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2646 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2647 rgb, alias, addresses,
2648 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2649 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2651 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2652 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2654 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2655 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2657 let mut announced_chans = false;
2658 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2659 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2660 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2662 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2667 announced_chans = true;
2669 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2670 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2671 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2675 if announced_chans {
2676 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2677 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2678 signature: node_announce_sig,
2679 contents: announcement
2685 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2687 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2688 /// Will likely generate further events.
2689 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2692 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2693 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2694 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2696 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2699 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2700 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2701 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2702 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2704 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2705 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2706 match forward_info {
2707 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2708 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2709 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2710 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2711 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2712 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2713 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2715 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2716 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2719 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2720 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2721 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2722 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2723 // problem, not ours.
2730 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2731 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2732 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2733 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2734 match forward_info {
2735 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2736 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2738 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2739 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2741 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2742 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2743 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2744 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2745 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2747 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2749 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2752 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2754 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2755 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2756 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2762 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2764 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2765 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2766 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2767 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2768 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2769 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2770 // this channel currently :/.
2776 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2777 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2779 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2780 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2781 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2783 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2786 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2788 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2789 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2790 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2793 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2795 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2796 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2797 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2798 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2799 // messages when we can.
2800 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2801 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2802 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2809 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2810 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2813 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2814 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2815 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2816 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2817 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2818 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2820 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2821 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2822 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2823 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2824 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2826 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2827 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2829 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2831 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2835 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2836 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2839 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2840 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2842 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2843 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2844 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2845 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2846 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2847 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2849 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2857 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2858 match forward_info {
2859 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2860 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2861 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2862 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2863 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2864 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2865 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2866 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2868 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2871 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2872 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2873 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2874 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2875 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2876 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2878 value: amt_to_forward,
2883 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2885 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2886 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2887 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2889 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2890 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2891 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2892 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2893 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2895 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2900 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2901 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2902 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2903 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2904 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2905 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2906 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2907 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2909 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2910 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2911 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2912 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2914 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2915 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2917 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2918 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2920 amt: amt_to_forward,
2921 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2926 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2934 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2938 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2941 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2943 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2944 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2946 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2947 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2949 let mut total_value = 0;
2950 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2951 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2952 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2953 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2954 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2955 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2959 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2960 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2961 total_value += htlc.value;
2962 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2963 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2964 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2965 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2966 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2967 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2969 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2971 _ => unreachable!(),
2974 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2976 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2977 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2980 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2981 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2983 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2984 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2985 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2989 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2990 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2992 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2994 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2995 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3002 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3003 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3011 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3012 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3015 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3016 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3019 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3020 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3021 events.append(&mut new_events);
3024 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3026 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3027 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3029 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3030 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3031 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3032 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3033 if background_events.is_empty() {
3037 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3039 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3040 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3041 // monitor updating completing.
3042 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3049 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3050 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3051 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3052 self.process_background_events();
3055 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3056 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3057 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3058 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3059 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3060 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3061 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3063 if !chan.is_live() {
3064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3065 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3066 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3069 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3071 let mut retain_channel = true;
3072 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3075 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3076 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3080 let ret_err = match res {
3081 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3082 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3083 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3084 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3087 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3088 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3089 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3090 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3091 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3092 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3093 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3094 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3104 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3108 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3109 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3110 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3111 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3112 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3113 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3114 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3116 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3118 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3120 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3122 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3123 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3124 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3125 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3126 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3128 handle_errors.push(err);
3138 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3140 /// This currently includes:
3141 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3142 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3143 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3146 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3147 /// estimate fetches.
3148 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3149 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3150 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3151 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3153 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3155 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3157 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3158 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3159 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3160 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3161 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3162 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3163 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3164 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3166 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3168 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3170 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3171 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3172 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3173 if needs_close { return false; }
3176 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3177 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3178 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3179 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3180 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3181 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3182 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3183 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3187 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3188 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3190 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3191 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3192 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3196 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3197 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3206 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3207 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3213 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3214 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3215 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3216 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3217 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3218 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3221 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3222 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3223 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3224 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3225 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3226 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3227 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3228 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3229 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3230 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3231 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3237 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3238 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3239 // be surfaced to the user.
3240 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3241 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3243 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3244 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3245 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3247 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3248 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3250 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3255 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3256 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3257 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3259 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3260 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3261 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3262 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3263 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3264 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3265 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3266 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3267 Some(RouteParameters {
3269 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3270 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3273 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3274 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3275 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3277 rejected_by_dest: false,
3278 network_update: None,
3279 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3281 short_channel_id: None,
3288 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3289 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3291 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3304 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3305 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3306 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3307 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3308 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3309 /// still-available channels.
3310 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3311 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3312 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3313 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3316 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3317 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3318 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3320 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3321 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3322 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3323 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3324 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3325 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3326 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3327 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3331 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3335 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3336 all_paths_failed = true;
3337 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3338 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3340 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3346 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3349 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3350 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3351 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3352 Some(RouteParameters {
3353 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3354 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3355 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3360 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3361 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3363 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3365 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3366 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3367 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3368 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3369 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3370 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3371 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3372 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3379 error_code: onion_error_code,
3381 error_data: onion_error_data
3384 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3390 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3391 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3392 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3393 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3395 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3396 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3397 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3398 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3399 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3400 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3401 network_update: None,
3404 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3407 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3409 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3413 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3414 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3415 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3417 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3418 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3419 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3421 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3422 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3424 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3426 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3430 let mut forward_event = None;
3431 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3432 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3434 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3436 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3439 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3442 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3443 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3444 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3445 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3446 time_forwardable: time
3453 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3454 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3456 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3457 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3458 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3459 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3461 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3462 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3464 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3465 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3466 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3467 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3468 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3469 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3473 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3474 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3475 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3476 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3478 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3479 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3480 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3481 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3483 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3484 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3485 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3486 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3487 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3489 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3490 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3491 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3497 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3498 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3499 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3501 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3502 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3503 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3504 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3505 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3506 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3507 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3509 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3510 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3511 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3512 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3513 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3514 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3515 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3516 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3518 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3519 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3520 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3521 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3522 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3523 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3525 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3530 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3531 // which were generated.
3532 channel_state.take();
3534 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3535 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3536 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3543 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3544 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3545 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3546 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3547 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3549 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3553 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3554 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3555 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3556 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3557 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3558 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3559 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3560 payment_preimage, e);
3561 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3562 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3563 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3564 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3567 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3568 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3569 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3570 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3571 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3572 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3573 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3574 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3575 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3576 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3582 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3584 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3587 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3588 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3589 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3590 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3591 payment_preimage, e);
3593 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3594 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3596 chan.remove_entry();
3598 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3601 } else { unreachable!(); }
3604 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3605 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3606 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3607 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3608 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3609 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3610 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3611 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3612 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3613 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3614 pending_events.push(
3615 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3617 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3622 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3630 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3632 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3633 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3634 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3635 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3636 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3637 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3638 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3639 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3640 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3641 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3642 pending_events.push(
3643 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3644 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3650 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3654 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3655 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3656 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3658 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3659 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3660 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3661 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3662 pending_events.push(
3663 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3671 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3676 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3679 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3680 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3681 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3682 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3683 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3684 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3685 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3688 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3689 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3690 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3691 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3692 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3695 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3696 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3697 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3698 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3699 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3700 payment_preimage, e);
3702 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3703 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3704 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3705 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3708 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3709 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3710 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3711 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3715 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3716 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3717 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3720 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3721 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3723 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3731 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3732 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3733 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3736 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3739 let chan_restoration_res;
3740 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3741 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3742 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3743 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3747 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3751 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3752 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3753 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3754 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3755 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3756 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3757 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3758 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3759 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3762 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3763 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3764 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3766 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3768 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3769 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3770 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3775 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3776 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3780 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3784 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3785 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
3786 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3788 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3789 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3792 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3793 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3794 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3796 entry.insert(channel);
3802 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3803 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3804 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3806 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3808 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3809 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3811 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3812 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3817 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3818 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3819 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3820 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3822 user_channel_id: user_id,
3827 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3828 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3829 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3830 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3832 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3834 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3835 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3837 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3842 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3843 // lock before watch_channel
3844 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3846 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3847 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3848 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3849 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3850 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3851 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3852 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3853 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3854 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3855 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3858 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3859 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3860 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3861 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3862 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3863 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3867 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3868 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3869 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3871 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3874 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3875 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3884 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3886 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3887 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3888 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3889 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3891 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3894 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3895 Ok(update) => update,
3896 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3898 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3899 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3900 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3901 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3902 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3903 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3904 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3905 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3915 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3916 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3920 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3921 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3925 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3928 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3929 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3931 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3932 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3933 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3934 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3935 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3936 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3937 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3938 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3939 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3940 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3941 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3942 msg: announcement_sigs,
3944 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3945 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3946 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3947 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3956 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3957 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3958 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3959 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3960 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3964 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3968 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3969 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3970 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3971 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3974 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3975 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3977 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3978 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3979 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3980 let (result, is_permanent) =
3981 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3983 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3989 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3991 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4001 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4002 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4005 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4009 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4010 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4015 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4018 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4019 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4021 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4026 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4027 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4028 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4029 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4030 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4031 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4032 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4034 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4035 } else { (tx, None) }
4037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4040 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4041 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4042 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4044 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4046 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4051 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4056 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4057 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4058 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4059 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4061 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4062 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4063 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4064 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4066 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4067 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4069 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4071 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4072 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4075 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4076 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4077 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4078 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4079 match pending_forward_info {
4080 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4081 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4082 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4083 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4084 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4085 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4086 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4087 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4091 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4092 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4093 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4094 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4095 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4096 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4097 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4098 // no problem just calling this
4099 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4100 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4103 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4105 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4106 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4107 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4110 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4112 _ => pending_forward_info
4115 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4122 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4123 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4124 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4125 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4128 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4131 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4136 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4140 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4141 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4143 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4145 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4148 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4155 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4156 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4158 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4159 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4160 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4163 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4164 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4165 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4167 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4174 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4175 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4176 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4177 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4179 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4180 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4182 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4183 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4184 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4185 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4186 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4187 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4188 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4193 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4194 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4196 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4197 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4198 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4200 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4201 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4202 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4203 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4204 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4205 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4206 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4207 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4209 commitment_signed: msg,
4215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4220 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4221 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4222 let mut forward_event = None;
4223 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4224 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4225 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4226 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4228 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4229 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4230 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4231 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4232 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4235 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4236 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4239 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4240 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4245 match forward_event {
4247 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4248 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4249 time_forwardable: time
4257 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4258 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4262 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4264 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4265 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4267 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4268 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4269 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4270 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4271 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4272 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4273 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4274 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4275 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4276 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4277 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4279 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4280 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4281 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4282 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4283 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4285 } else { unreachable!(); }
4288 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4290 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4294 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4295 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4296 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4297 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4298 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4303 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4305 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4306 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4308 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4309 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4311 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4312 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4319 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4320 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4324 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4327 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4334 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4335 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4338 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4339 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4340 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4343 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4344 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4348 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4349 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4350 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4351 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4359 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4360 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4361 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4363 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4364 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4366 // It's not a local channel
4367 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4370 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4372 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4373 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4374 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4375 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4376 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4377 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4379 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4381 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4382 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4383 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4384 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4386 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4391 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4394 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4395 let chan_restoration_res;
4396 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4397 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4398 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4402 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4405 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4406 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4407 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4408 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4409 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4410 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4411 let mut channel_update = None;
4412 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4414 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4417 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4418 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4419 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4420 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4421 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4422 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4423 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4426 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4427 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4428 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4429 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4431 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4436 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4437 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4439 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4440 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4445 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4446 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4447 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4448 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4449 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4450 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4451 match monitor_event {
4452 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4453 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4455 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4458 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4461 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4462 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4463 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4464 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4465 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4466 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4467 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4468 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4469 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4470 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4472 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4474 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4478 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4479 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4481 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4483 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4485 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4487 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4492 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4493 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4498 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4499 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4502 has_pending_monitor_events
4505 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4506 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4507 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4508 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4509 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4510 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4513 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4514 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4515 /// update was applied.
4517 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4518 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4519 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4520 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4521 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4522 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4523 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4524 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4526 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4527 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4528 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4529 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4530 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4532 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4533 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4534 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4535 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4536 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4538 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4539 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4540 has_monitor_update = true;
4541 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4542 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4543 if close_channel { return false; }
4545 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4546 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4547 updates: commitment_update,
4554 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4555 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4556 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4563 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4564 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4565 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4568 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4569 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4575 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4576 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4577 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4578 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4579 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4580 let mut has_update = false;
4582 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4583 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4584 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4585 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4586 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4588 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4589 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4590 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4591 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4594 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4597 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4598 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4599 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4600 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4601 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4604 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4610 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4612 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4613 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4619 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4620 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4627 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4628 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4634 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4635 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4637 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4638 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4639 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4640 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4641 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4642 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4643 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4644 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4645 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4646 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4647 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4648 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4649 assert!(should_broadcast);
4650 } else { unreachable!(); }
4651 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4653 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4657 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4658 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4660 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4663 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4664 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4666 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4667 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4668 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4669 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4670 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4671 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4672 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4673 // never fail a payment too early.
4674 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4676 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4684 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4687 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4688 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4690 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4691 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4692 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4694 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4696 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4697 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4698 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4699 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4700 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4701 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4702 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4705 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4706 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4709 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4710 /// stored external to LDK.
4712 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4713 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4714 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4716 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4717 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4719 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4720 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4721 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4722 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4724 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4725 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4726 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4727 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4728 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4730 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4731 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4732 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4733 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4734 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4736 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4737 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4738 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4740 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4742 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4743 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4745 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4746 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4747 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4748 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4751 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4752 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4753 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4754 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4755 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4760 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4761 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4765 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4766 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4770 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4771 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4772 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4773 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4774 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4777 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4778 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4779 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4780 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4782 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4783 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4784 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4785 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4788 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4789 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4791 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4792 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4795 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4796 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4797 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4799 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4800 events.replace(pending_events);
4809 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4811 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4812 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4813 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4814 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4817 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4819 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4820 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4822 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4823 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4824 /// restarting from an old state.
4825 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4827 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4829 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4830 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4831 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4832 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4835 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4836 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4837 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4840 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4841 handler.handle_event(&event);
4849 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4851 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4853 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4854 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4857 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4859 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4860 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4861 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4862 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4863 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4866 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4867 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4868 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4871 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4873 let new_height = height - 1;
4875 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4876 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4877 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4878 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4879 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4880 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4883 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4887 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4889 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4891 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4892 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4895 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4896 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4897 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4898 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4900 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4901 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4904 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4907 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4908 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4909 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4910 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4912 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4913 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4917 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4919 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4921 macro_rules! max_time {
4922 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4924 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4925 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4926 // having an explicit local time source.
4927 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4928 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4929 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4930 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4931 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4937 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4938 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4939 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4940 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4941 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4944 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4945 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4946 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
4947 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4948 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
4949 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
4950 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4951 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4952 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
4960 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4961 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4962 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4963 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4964 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4965 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4971 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4973 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4974 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4975 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4976 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4977 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4978 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4983 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4985 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4986 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4987 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4988 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4991 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4992 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4994 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4995 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4996 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4997 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4998 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5000 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5001 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5003 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5005 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5006 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5007 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5008 let res = f(channel);
5009 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5010 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5011 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5012 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5013 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5017 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5018 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5019 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5020 msg: funding_locked,
5022 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5024 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5025 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5026 msg: announcement_sigs,
5028 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5029 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5031 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5032 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5037 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5039 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5040 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5041 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5043 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5044 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5045 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5046 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5047 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5051 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5052 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5053 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5054 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5055 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5056 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5057 data: reason_message,
5065 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5066 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5067 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5068 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5069 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5070 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5071 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5072 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5073 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5074 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5075 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5076 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5077 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5082 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5087 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5089 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5094 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5095 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5096 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5098 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
5099 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5100 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5101 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5104 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5105 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5107 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5108 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5111 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5112 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5113 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5114 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5115 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5119 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5120 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5121 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5122 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5126 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5127 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5128 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5129 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5130 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5131 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5134 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5136 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5139 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5141 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5144 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5146 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5149 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5151 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5154 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5156 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5159 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5161 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5164 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5169 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5171 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5174 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5176 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5179 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5181 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5184 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5186 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5189 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5191 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5194 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5196 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5199 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5201 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5204 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5206 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5209 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5210 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5211 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5214 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5219 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5224 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5226 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5227 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5229 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5230 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5231 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5232 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5233 if no_connection_possible {
5234 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5235 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5236 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5237 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5238 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5240 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5241 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5242 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5246 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5253 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5254 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5255 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5256 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5257 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5258 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5259 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5261 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5264 no_channels_remain = false;
5270 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5273 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5276 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5278 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5283 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5284 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5285 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5287 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5294 if no_channels_remain {
5295 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5298 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5299 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5303 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5304 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5310 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5312 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5313 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5317 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5322 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5323 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5324 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5325 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5326 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5327 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5328 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5329 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5330 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5335 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5336 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5342 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5345 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5348 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5349 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5350 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5351 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5352 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5356 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5357 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5362 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5363 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5364 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5365 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5366 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5367 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5370 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5373 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5379 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5380 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5385 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5386 let result = *guard;
5394 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5395 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5396 let current_time = Instant::now();
5398 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5399 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5404 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5405 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5406 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5407 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5408 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5410 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5411 let result = *guard;
5412 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5416 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5417 None => return result,
5423 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5425 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5426 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5427 *persistence_lock = true;
5428 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5433 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5434 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5438 (0, onion_packet, required),
5439 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5442 (0, payment_data, required),
5443 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5445 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5446 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5447 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5451 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5452 (0, routing, required),
5453 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5454 (4, payment_hash, required),
5455 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5456 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5460 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5461 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5463 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5465 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5466 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5467 reason.write(writer)?;
5469 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5470 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5473 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5474 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5475 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5476 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5483 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5484 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5485 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5488 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5489 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5490 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5491 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5495 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5496 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5497 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5498 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5499 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5502 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5503 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5504 // messages contained in the variants.
5505 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5506 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5507 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5509 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5510 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5511 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5512 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5513 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5516 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5517 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5518 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5519 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5520 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5522 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5527 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5532 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5533 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5534 (2, outpoint, required),
5535 (4, htlc_id, required),
5536 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5539 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5541 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5542 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5545 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5546 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5547 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5552 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5553 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5554 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5560 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5561 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5562 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5564 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5565 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5566 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5570 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5571 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5572 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5574 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5576 if payment_data.is_some() {
5577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5579 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5582 if payment_data.is_none() {
5583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5585 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5589 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5597 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5598 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5599 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5602 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5603 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5604 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5605 let mut payment_id = None;
5606 let mut payment_secret = None;
5607 let mut payee = None;
5608 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5609 (0, session_priv, required),
5610 (1, payment_id, option),
5611 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5612 (3, payment_secret, option),
5613 (4, path, vec_type),
5616 if payment_id.is_none() {
5617 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5619 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5621 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5622 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5623 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5624 path: path.unwrap(),
5625 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5630 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5631 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5636 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5637 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5639 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5641 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5642 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5643 (0, session_priv, required),
5644 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5645 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5646 (3, payment_secret, option),
5647 (4, path, vec_type),
5651 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5653 field.write(writer)?;
5660 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5661 (0, LightningError) => {
5665 (0, failure_code, required),
5666 (2, data, vec_type),
5670 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5672 (0, forward_info, required),
5673 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5674 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5675 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5678 (0, htlc_id, required),
5679 (2, err_packet, required),
5683 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5684 (0, payment_secret, required),
5685 (2, expiry_time, required),
5686 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5687 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5688 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5691 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5693 (0, session_privs, required),
5696 (0, session_privs, required),
5697 (1, payment_hash, option),
5700 (0, session_privs, required),
5701 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5702 (2, payment_hash, required),
5703 (4, payment_secret, option),
5704 (6, total_msat, required),
5705 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5706 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5709 (0, session_privs, required),
5710 (2, payment_hash, required),
5714 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5715 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5717 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5721 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5722 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5724 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5726 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5728 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5729 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5730 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5733 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5734 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5735 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5736 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5737 unfunded_channels += 1;
5740 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5741 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5742 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5743 channel.write(writer)?;
5747 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5748 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5749 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5750 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5751 for forward in pending_forwards {
5752 forward.write(writer)?;
5756 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5757 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5758 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5759 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5760 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5761 htlc.write(writer)?;
5765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5766 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5767 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5768 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5769 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5770 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5773 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5774 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5775 for event in events.iter() {
5776 event.write(writer)?;
5779 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5780 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5781 for event in background_events.iter() {
5783 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5785 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5786 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5791 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5792 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5794 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5795 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5796 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5797 hash.write(writer)?;
5798 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5801 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5802 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5803 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5804 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5805 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
5806 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5809 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5810 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5812 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5813 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5814 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5815 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5818 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5819 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
5823 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5824 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5825 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5827 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5828 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5829 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5834 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5835 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5836 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5843 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5845 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5847 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5848 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5849 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5850 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5851 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5852 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5853 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5854 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5855 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5856 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5857 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5858 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5859 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5861 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5862 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5864 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5865 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5867 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5868 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5869 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5870 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5871 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5872 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5874 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5875 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5876 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5878 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5882 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5883 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5885 pub keys_manager: K,
5887 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5889 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5890 pub fee_estimator: F,
5891 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5893 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5894 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5895 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5896 pub chain_monitor: M,
5898 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5899 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5900 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5901 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5902 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5903 /// deserialization.
5905 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5906 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5907 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5909 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5910 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5912 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5913 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5914 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5915 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5917 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5920 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5921 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5924 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5925 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5926 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5927 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5928 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5932 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5933 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5934 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5935 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5936 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5938 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5939 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5944 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5945 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5946 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5947 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5948 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5949 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5950 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5954 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5955 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5956 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5960 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5961 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5962 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5963 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5964 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5968 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5969 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5971 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5972 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5973 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5975 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5977 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5978 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5979 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5980 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5981 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5982 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5983 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5984 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5985 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5986 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5987 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5988 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5989 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5990 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5991 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5992 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5993 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5994 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5995 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5996 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5997 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5998 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5999 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6000 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6001 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6002 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6003 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6004 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6005 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6006 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6007 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6008 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6009 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6010 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6011 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6012 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6013 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6014 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6015 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6018 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6019 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6020 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6022 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6025 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6026 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6027 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6028 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6029 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
6030 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6034 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6035 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6036 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6037 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6041 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6042 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6043 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6044 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6045 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6046 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6047 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6048 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6049 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6051 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6054 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6055 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6056 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6057 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6058 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6059 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6060 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6061 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6063 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6066 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6067 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6068 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6069 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6070 let peer_state = PeerState {
6071 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6073 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6076 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6077 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6078 for _ in 0..event_count {
6079 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6080 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6084 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6085 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6086 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6087 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6088 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6089 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6090 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6091 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6095 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6096 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6097 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6098 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6099 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6100 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6104 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6105 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6107 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6108 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6109 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6110 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6111 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6115 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6116 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6117 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6118 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6119 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6120 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6121 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6123 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6128 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6129 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6130 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6131 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6132 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6133 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6135 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6136 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6137 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6138 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6139 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6140 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6142 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6144 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6145 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6146 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6147 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6148 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6149 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6150 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6152 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6153 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6154 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6155 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6156 if path.is_empty() {
6157 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6158 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6160 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6161 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6162 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6163 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6165 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6166 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6167 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6170 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6171 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6172 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6173 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6175 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6176 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6177 total_msat: path_amt,
6178 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6180 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6181 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6190 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6191 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6193 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6194 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6197 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6199 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6200 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6201 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6203 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6205 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6210 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6212 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6213 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6215 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6216 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6219 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6220 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6222 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6224 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6225 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6226 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6227 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6229 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6230 logger: args.logger,
6231 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6234 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6235 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6238 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6239 //connection or two.
6241 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6247 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6248 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6249 use core::time::Duration;
6250 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6251 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6252 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6253 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6255 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6256 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6257 use util::errors::APIError;
6258 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6259 use util::test_utils;
6261 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6263 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6264 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6266 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6269 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6270 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6272 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6273 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6274 thread::spawn(move || {
6276 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6277 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6278 *persistence_lock = true;
6281 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6287 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6288 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6290 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6293 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6298 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6300 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6303 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6310 fn test_notify_limits() {
6311 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6312 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6313 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6314 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6316 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6318 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6319 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6320 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6321 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6322 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6324 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6326 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6327 // to connect messages with new values
6328 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6329 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6330 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6331 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6333 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6334 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6335 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6336 // ... but the last node should not.
6337 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6338 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6339 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6340 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6342 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6343 // about the channel.
6344 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6345 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6346 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6348 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6350 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6351 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6352 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6353 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6354 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6355 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6357 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6359 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6361 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6362 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6363 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6364 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6365 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6366 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6368 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6369 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6370 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6371 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6372 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6373 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6375 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6377 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6378 // the channel info has updated.
6379 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6380 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6381 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6382 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6383 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6384 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6388 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6389 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6397 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6398 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6399 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6400 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6401 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6402 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6403 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6405 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6406 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6407 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6409 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6410 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6412 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6414 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6415 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6418 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6419 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6420 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6422 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6423 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6424 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6425 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6426 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6427 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6428 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6429 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6430 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6432 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6433 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6435 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6437 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6439 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6440 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6441 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6442 // lightning messages manually.
6443 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6445 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6446 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6447 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6449 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6450 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6452 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6453 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6455 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6456 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6457 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6459 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6460 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6461 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6465 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6467 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6468 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6471 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6472 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6473 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6476 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6477 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6478 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6479 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6484 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6485 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6486 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6487 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6492 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6493 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6494 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6495 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6502 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6503 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6504 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6505 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6506 // fails as expected.
6507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6510 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6511 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6512 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6514 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6515 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6516 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6518 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6519 let params = RouteParameters {
6520 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6521 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6522 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6524 let route = find_route(
6525 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6526 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6528 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6530 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6532 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6533 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6534 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6536 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6537 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6538 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6540 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6541 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6542 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6543 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6544 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6545 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6546 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6547 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6548 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6550 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6551 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6553 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6554 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6555 let route = find_route(
6556 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6557 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6559 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6563 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6564 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6565 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6567 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6568 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6569 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6571 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6572 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6573 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6574 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6575 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6577 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6578 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6579 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6581 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6582 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6583 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6584 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6585 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6586 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6587 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6588 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6589 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6591 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6592 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6596 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6597 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6598 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6604 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6605 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6606 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6607 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6609 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6610 let params = RouteParameters {
6611 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6612 final_value_msat: 10000,
6613 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6615 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6616 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6617 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6618 let route = find_route(
6619 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6620 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6623 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6624 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6625 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6628 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6629 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6630 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6631 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6632 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6633 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6634 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6636 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6640 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6641 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6648 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6649 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6650 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6652 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6653 let params = RouteParameters {
6654 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6655 final_value_msat: 10000,
6656 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6658 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6659 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6660 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6661 let route = find_route(
6662 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6663 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6666 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6667 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6668 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6669 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6672 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6673 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6674 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6675 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6676 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6677 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6678 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6680 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6684 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6688 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6690 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6691 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6692 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6693 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6695 // Marshall an MPP route.
6696 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6697 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6698 route.paths.push(path);
6699 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6700 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6701 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6702 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6703 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6704 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6706 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6707 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6708 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6709 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6714 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6717 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6718 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6719 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6720 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6721 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6722 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6723 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6724 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6725 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6726 use util::test_utils;
6727 use util::config::UserConfig;
6728 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6730 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6731 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6732 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6734 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6738 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6739 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6740 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6741 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6742 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6743 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6744 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6749 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6750 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6753 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6754 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6755 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6757 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6758 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6760 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6761 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6763 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6764 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6766 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6767 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6768 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6769 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6770 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6772 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6774 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6776 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6777 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6778 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6779 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6780 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6782 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6784 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6786 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6787 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6788 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6789 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6790 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6793 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6794 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6795 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6797 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6798 } else { panic!(); }
6800 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6801 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6803 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6806 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6809 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6810 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6812 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6813 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6814 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6815 match msg_events[0] {
6816 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6817 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6818 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6822 match msg_events[1] {
6823 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6827 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6829 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6830 macro_rules! send_payment {
6831 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6832 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6833 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6834 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6835 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6836 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6837 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6839 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6840 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6842 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6843 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6845 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6846 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6847 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6848 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6849 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6850 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6851 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6852 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6854 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6855 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6856 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6858 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6859 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6860 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6861 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6862 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6864 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6867 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6868 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6869 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6870 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6872 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6877 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6878 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);