1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
56 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
57 use util::errors::APIError;
62 use core::cell::RefCell;
64 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
65 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
66 use core::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
73 use alloc::string::ToString;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
75 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
78 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
79 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
80 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
82 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
83 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
84 use util::logger::Logger;
86 use core::convert::TryInto;
89 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
90 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
91 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
92 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
93 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
94 // retrieve said payment type bits.
95 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
97 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
98 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
101 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
102 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
103 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
104 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
105 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
106 /// registered with LDK.
107 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
114 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
115 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
125 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
127 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
128 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
129 unknown => Err(unknown),
134 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
135 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
137 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
139 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
140 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
141 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
143 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
144 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
145 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
146 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
148 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
149 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
150 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
153 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
154 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
156 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
157 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
158 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
159 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
161 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
162 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
164 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
167 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
168 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
172 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
173 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
174 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
176 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
178 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
179 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
180 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
181 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
182 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
183 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
185 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
186 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
187 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
192 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
193 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
194 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
195 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
197 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
198 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
199 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
201 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
204 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
206 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
207 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
210 /// The metadata is constructed as:
211 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
212 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
214 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
215 /// match what was constructed.
217 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
218 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
219 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
220 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
222 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
223 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
224 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
227 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
228 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
229 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
231 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
233 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
234 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
235 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
236 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
237 where L::Target: Logger
239 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
241 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
242 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
243 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
244 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
245 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
246 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
247 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
249 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
251 let mut payment_preimage = None;
252 match payment_type_res {
253 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
254 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
255 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
256 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
257 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
258 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
262 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
263 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
264 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
265 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
271 Err(unknown_bits) => {
272 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
277 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
278 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
282 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
283 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
290 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
291 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
293 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
294 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
295 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
296 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
297 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
300 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
301 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
303 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
307 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
308 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
309 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
310 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
312 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
313 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
314 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
315 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
318 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
321 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
323 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
324 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
325 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
326 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
327 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
328 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
329 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
331 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
334 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
335 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
337 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
340 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
342 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
345 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
347 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
348 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
350 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
360 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
362 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
363 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
364 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
366 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
367 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
368 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
369 // before we forward it.
371 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
372 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
373 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
374 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
375 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
380 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
381 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
384 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
385 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
388 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
389 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
395 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
396 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
397 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
398 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
399 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
402 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
403 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
404 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
405 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
408 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
409 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
410 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
411 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
412 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
415 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
417 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
419 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
420 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
421 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
423 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
425 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
429 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
433 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
434 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
435 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
436 short_channel_id: u64,
438 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
440 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
441 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
446 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
447 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
448 /// are part of the same payment.
449 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
450 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
451 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
454 struct ClaimableHTLC {
455 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
458 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
461 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
462 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
463 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
464 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
466 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
467 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
472 impl Readable for PaymentId {
473 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
474 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
478 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
481 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
482 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
485 session_priv: SecretKey,
486 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
487 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
488 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
489 payment_id: PaymentId,
490 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
491 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
494 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
495 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
496 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
498 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
500 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
505 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
506 payment_id.hash(hasher);
507 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
508 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
509 payment_params.hash(hasher);
516 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
517 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
519 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
520 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
521 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
522 payment_secret: None,
523 payment_params: None,
528 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
529 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
531 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
539 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
540 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
542 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
547 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
549 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
550 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
551 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
552 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
553 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
555 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
556 err: msgs::LightningError,
557 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
558 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
560 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
562 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
564 err: LightningError {
566 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
567 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
574 shutdown_finish: None,
578 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
585 shutdown_finish: None,
589 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
590 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
593 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
595 err: LightningError {
597 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
598 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
604 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
605 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
609 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
612 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
614 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
615 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
619 log_level: Level::Warn,
622 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
624 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
626 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
635 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
638 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
646 shutdown_finish: None,
651 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
652 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
653 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
654 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
655 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
657 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
658 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
659 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
660 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
661 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
662 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
663 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
665 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
669 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
670 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
671 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
672 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
673 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
674 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
675 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
676 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
677 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
678 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
679 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
680 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
682 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
683 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
684 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
685 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
688 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
689 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
690 /// quite some time lag.
691 enum BackgroundEvent {
692 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
693 /// commitment transaction.
694 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
697 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
698 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
700 latest_features: InitFeatures,
703 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
704 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
706 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
709 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
710 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
711 struct PendingInboundPayment {
712 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
713 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
714 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
715 /// this payment being removed.
717 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
718 user_payment_id: u64,
719 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
720 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
721 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
724 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
725 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
726 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
728 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
731 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
732 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
733 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
734 pending_amt_msat: u64,
735 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
736 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
737 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
739 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
740 starting_block_height: u32,
742 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
743 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
744 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
746 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
747 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
750 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
751 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
752 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
753 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
755 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
757 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
758 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
762 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
763 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
765 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
769 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
771 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
775 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
777 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
781 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
788 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
790 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
797 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
798 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
799 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
801 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
806 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
807 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
810 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
811 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
812 let our_payment_hash;
813 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
814 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
815 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
817 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
818 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
819 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
823 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
827 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
828 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
829 let remove_res = match self {
830 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
831 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
832 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
833 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
834 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
838 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
839 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
840 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
841 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
842 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
843 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
850 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
851 let insert_res = match self {
852 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
853 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
854 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
856 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
857 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
860 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
861 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
862 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
863 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
864 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
871 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
873 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
874 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
875 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
876 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
883 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
884 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
885 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
886 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
887 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
888 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
889 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
890 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
892 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
893 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
894 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
895 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
896 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
897 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
898 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
899 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
900 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
902 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
903 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
905 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
906 /// to individual Channels.
908 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
909 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
910 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
911 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
913 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
914 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
915 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
916 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
917 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
918 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
919 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
921 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
922 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
923 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
924 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
927 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
928 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
929 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
930 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
931 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
933 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
934 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
935 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
936 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
937 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
938 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
939 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
940 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
941 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
945 default_configuration: UserConfig,
946 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
952 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
954 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
955 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
957 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
958 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
959 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
960 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
962 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
963 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
964 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
965 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
966 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
967 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
969 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
970 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
971 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
972 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
973 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
974 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
975 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
976 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
978 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
980 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
981 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
983 our_network_key: SecretKey,
984 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
986 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
988 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
989 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
990 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
992 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
993 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
994 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
995 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
997 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
998 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
999 /// are currently open with that peer.
1000 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1001 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1004 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1005 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1007 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1008 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1009 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1010 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1011 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1012 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1013 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1014 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1015 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1017 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1024 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1026 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1027 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1028 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1029 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1030 pub struct ChainParameters {
1031 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1032 pub network: Network,
1034 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1036 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1037 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1040 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1046 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1047 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1048 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1049 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1050 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1051 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1053 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1054 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1055 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1056 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1057 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1059 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1060 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1063 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1064 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1065 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1068 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1069 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1071 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1072 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1073 should_persist: persist_check,
1074 _read_guard: read_guard,
1079 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1080 fn drop(&mut self) {
1081 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1082 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1087 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1088 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1090 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1092 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1093 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1094 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1095 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1096 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1098 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1099 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1101 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1103 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1104 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1105 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1106 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1107 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1108 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1109 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1111 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1112 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1114 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1115 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1116 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1117 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1119 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1120 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1121 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1122 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1123 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1124 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1127 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1129 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1130 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1133 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1135 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1136 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1137 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1139 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1140 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1141 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1142 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1143 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1144 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1145 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1146 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1147 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1148 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1149 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1152 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1153 /// to better separate parameters.
1154 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1155 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1156 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1157 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1158 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1159 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1160 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1161 pub features: InitFeatures,
1162 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1163 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1164 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1166 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1168 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1169 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1170 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1171 /// payments to us through this channel.
1172 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1175 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1176 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1177 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1178 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1179 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1180 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1181 /// lifetime of the channel.
1182 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1183 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1184 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1185 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1186 /// our counterparty already.
1188 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1189 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1190 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1191 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1192 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1193 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1194 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1195 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1196 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1197 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1198 /// this value on chain.
1200 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1202 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1204 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1205 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1206 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1207 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1208 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1209 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1210 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1212 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1213 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1214 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1215 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1217 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1218 pub balance_msat: u64,
1219 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1220 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1221 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1222 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1224 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1226 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1227 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1228 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1229 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1230 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1231 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1232 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1233 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1234 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1236 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1237 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1238 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1239 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1240 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1241 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1242 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1243 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1244 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1246 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1248 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1249 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1250 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1251 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1252 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1253 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1254 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1255 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1256 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1258 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1259 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1260 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1261 pub is_outbound: bool,
1262 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1263 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1264 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1265 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1266 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1268 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1269 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1270 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1271 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1273 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1274 pub is_usable: bool,
1275 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1276 pub is_public: bool,
1279 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1280 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1281 /// states for more.
1282 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1283 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1284 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1285 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1286 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1287 ParameterError(APIError),
1288 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1289 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1290 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1291 /// payment in full.
1293 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1295 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1296 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1297 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1298 /// paths than the ones selected).
1299 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1300 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1301 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1302 /// in over-/re-payment.
1304 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1305 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1306 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1308 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1309 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1310 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1311 /// with the latest update_id.
1313 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1314 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1315 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1316 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1317 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1318 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1319 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1320 payment_id: PaymentId,
1324 macro_rules! handle_error {
1325 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1328 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1329 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1331 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1332 // entering the macro.
1333 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1334 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1337 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1339 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1340 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1341 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1342 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1346 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1347 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1348 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1349 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1354 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1355 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1357 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1358 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1359 action: err.action.clone()
1363 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1364 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1367 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1374 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1375 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1376 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1378 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1379 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1381 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1382 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1384 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1385 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1386 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1387 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1389 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1390 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1391 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1393 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1394 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1395 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1396 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1398 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1399 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1400 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1406 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1407 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1411 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1413 $entry.remove_entry();
1421 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1422 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1426 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1428 $entry.remove_entry();
1436 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1437 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1439 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1440 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1441 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1448 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1449 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1450 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1452 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1454 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1455 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1456 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1457 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1459 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1460 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1461 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1462 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1463 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1464 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1465 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1466 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1467 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1468 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1469 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1472 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1473 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1474 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1475 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1476 match $action_type {
1477 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1478 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1480 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1481 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1483 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1484 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1485 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1486 if !$resend_commitment {
1487 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1490 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1492 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1493 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1497 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1498 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1500 $entry.remove_entry();
1504 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1505 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1509 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1510 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1511 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1514 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1518 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1519 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1520 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1521 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1522 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1525 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1530 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1531 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1532 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1533 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1534 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1535 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1537 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1538 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1540 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1541 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1542 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1543 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1546 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1547 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1548 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1549 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1550 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1551 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1552 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1553 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1554 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1555 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1556 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1557 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1560 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1561 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1562 // before it should be allowed to.
1563 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1564 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1565 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1568 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1570 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1571 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1572 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1577 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1578 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1579 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1580 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1581 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1582 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1583 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1584 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1585 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1586 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1587 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1588 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1589 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1590 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1591 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1592 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1593 let mut order = $order;
1595 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1597 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1601 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1602 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1603 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1604 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1609 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1610 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1611 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1612 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1613 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1618 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1622 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1627 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1628 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1629 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1634 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1635 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1636 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1637 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1638 assert!(res.is_ok());
1641 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1645 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1646 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1647 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1649 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1651 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1652 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1657 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1658 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1659 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1660 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1661 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1664 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1666 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1667 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1669 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1671 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1673 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1674 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1675 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1676 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1677 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1678 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1679 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1680 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1682 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1683 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1684 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1688 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1690 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1691 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1692 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1693 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1694 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1695 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1697 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1698 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1700 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1701 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1704 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1706 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1707 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1709 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1711 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1712 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1713 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1714 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1722 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1723 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1724 &self.default_configuration
1727 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1729 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1730 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1731 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1732 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1733 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1736 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1737 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1739 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1740 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1741 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1743 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1744 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1745 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1746 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1747 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1748 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1750 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1751 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1752 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1753 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1754 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1755 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1760 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1761 Some(peer_state) => {
1762 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1763 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1764 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1765 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1766 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1768 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1771 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1774 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1775 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1777 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1778 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1781 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1784 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1790 node_id: their_network_key,
1793 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1796 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1797 let mut res = Vec::new();
1799 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1800 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1801 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1802 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1803 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1804 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1805 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1806 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1807 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1808 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1809 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1810 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1811 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1812 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1814 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1815 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1816 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1817 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1819 inbound_capacity_msat,
1820 outbound_capacity_msat,
1821 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1822 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1823 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1824 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1825 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1826 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1827 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1832 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1833 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1834 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1840 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1841 /// more information.
1842 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1843 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1846 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1847 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1849 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1850 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1852 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1853 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1854 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1855 // really wanted anyway.
1856 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1859 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1860 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1861 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1862 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1863 Some(transaction) => {
1864 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1868 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1869 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1870 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1871 reason: closure_reason
1875 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1878 let counterparty_node_id;
1879 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1880 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1883 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1885 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1886 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1887 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1888 Some(peer_state) => {
1889 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1890 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1891 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1893 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1895 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1897 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1898 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1899 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1900 let (result, is_permanent) =
1901 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1903 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1910 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1914 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1915 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1916 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1921 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1929 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1933 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1937 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1938 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1939 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1941 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1942 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1944 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1945 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1946 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1947 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1949 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1951 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1952 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1953 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1954 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1955 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1958 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1959 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1960 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1962 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1963 /// the channel being closed or not:
1964 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1965 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1966 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1967 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1968 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1969 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1970 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1972 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1974 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1975 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1976 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1977 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1978 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1982 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1983 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1984 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1985 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1986 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1988 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1989 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1990 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1991 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1992 // ignore the result here.
1993 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1997 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1998 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1999 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2001 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2002 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2003 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2004 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2005 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2006 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2009 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2010 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2012 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2013 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2014 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2017 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2019 chan.remove_entry().1
2021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2024 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2025 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2026 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2027 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2028 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2033 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2036 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2037 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2038 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2040 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2041 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2042 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2043 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2044 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2045 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2046 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2056 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2057 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2058 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2059 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2060 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2064 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2065 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2066 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2068 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2069 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2070 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2071 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2072 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2073 failure_code: $err_code,
2074 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2079 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2080 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2083 let shared_secret = {
2084 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2085 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2089 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2090 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2091 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2092 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2093 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2094 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2095 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2096 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2099 let mut channel_state = None;
2100 macro_rules! return_err {
2101 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2103 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2104 if channel_state.is_none() {
2105 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2107 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2108 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2109 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2110 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2111 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2116 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2118 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2119 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2121 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2122 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2126 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2127 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2129 // final_expiry_too_soon
2130 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2131 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2132 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2133 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2134 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2135 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2136 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2138 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2139 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2140 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2142 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2143 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2144 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2147 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2148 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2149 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2151 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2152 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2153 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2154 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2156 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2158 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2159 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2160 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2161 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2162 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2163 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2164 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2165 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2166 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2169 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2171 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2174 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2179 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2180 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2181 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2182 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2184 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2186 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2187 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2188 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2189 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2192 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2193 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2195 let blinding_factor = {
2196 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2197 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2198 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2199 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2202 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2204 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2206 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2209 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2210 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2213 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2215 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2216 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2217 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2221 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2222 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2223 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2226 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2227 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2228 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2229 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2234 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2235 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2236 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2237 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2238 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2239 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2240 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2241 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2242 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2243 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2244 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2246 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2249 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2251 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2252 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2253 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2254 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2255 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2258 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2259 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2260 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2261 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2262 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2263 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2264 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2266 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2267 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2269 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2270 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2271 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2272 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2273 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2275 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2276 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2278 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2279 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2280 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2281 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2282 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2283 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2285 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2286 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2288 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2289 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2290 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2291 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2292 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2293 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2294 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2295 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2296 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2297 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2303 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2304 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2305 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2306 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2308 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2309 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2311 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2312 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2313 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2315 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2317 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2322 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2325 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2326 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2327 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2329 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2330 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2331 if !chan.should_announce() {
2332 return Err(LightningError {
2333 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2338 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2341 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2342 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2343 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2344 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2345 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2346 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2348 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2349 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2353 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2355 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2356 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2358 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2359 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2360 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2361 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2362 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2363 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2364 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2365 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2368 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2369 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2371 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2377 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2378 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2380 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2381 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2382 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2384 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2385 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2386 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2387 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2388 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2390 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2392 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2394 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2395 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2397 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2398 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2399 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2400 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2401 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2402 err: "Payment already completed"
2407 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2408 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2409 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2412 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2414 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2415 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2416 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2417 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2418 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2419 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2420 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2421 total_msat: total_value,
2423 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2427 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2428 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2430 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2431 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2433 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2434 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2436 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2437 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2439 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2440 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2442 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2443 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2444 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2445 channel_state, chan)
2447 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2448 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2449 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2450 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2451 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2452 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2453 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2454 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2455 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2456 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2458 insert_outbound_payment!();
2460 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2461 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2462 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2463 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2464 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2465 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2473 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2475 } else { unreachable!(); }
2479 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2480 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2482 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2487 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2489 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2490 /// fields for more info.
2492 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2493 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2494 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2495 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2496 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2497 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2499 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2501 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2502 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2503 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2505 /// In general, a path may raise:
2506 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2507 /// node public key) is specified.
2508 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2509 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2511 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2512 /// relevant updates.
2514 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2515 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2516 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2518 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2519 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2520 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2521 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2523 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2524 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2525 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2526 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2527 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2530 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2531 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2532 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2534 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2535 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2536 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2537 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2538 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2540 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2541 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2543 let mut total_value = 0;
2544 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2545 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2546 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2547 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2548 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2549 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2550 continue 'path_check;
2552 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2553 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2554 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2555 continue 'path_check;
2558 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2559 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2561 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2562 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2564 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2565 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2566 total_value = amt_msat;
2569 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2570 let mut results = Vec::new();
2571 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2572 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2574 let mut has_ok = false;
2575 let mut has_err = false;
2576 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2577 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2578 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2579 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2580 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2581 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2582 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2586 } else if res.is_err() {
2587 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2588 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2591 if has_err && has_ok {
2592 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2595 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2596 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2597 Some(RouteParameters {
2598 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2599 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2600 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2606 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2607 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2608 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2609 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2615 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2617 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2618 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2619 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2620 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2621 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2623 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2624 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2625 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2626 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2627 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2628 if path.len() == 0 {
2629 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2630 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2635 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2636 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2637 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2639 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2640 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2642 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2643 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2644 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2645 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2648 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2650 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2651 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2652 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2655 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2656 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2657 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2660 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2661 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2662 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2667 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2668 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2672 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2675 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2677 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2678 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2679 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2680 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2682 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2683 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2684 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2686 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2687 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2688 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2689 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2692 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2693 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2694 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2695 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2696 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2698 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2706 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2707 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2708 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2709 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2710 /// never reach the recipient.
2712 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2714 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2715 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2717 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2719 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2720 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2721 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2723 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2725 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2726 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2727 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2732 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2733 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2734 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2735 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2737 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2739 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2741 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2742 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2743 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2744 } else { unreachable!(); })
2747 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2749 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2750 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2753 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2754 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2759 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2761 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2764 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2766 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2776 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2777 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2778 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2782 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2784 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2785 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2787 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2788 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2790 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2791 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2792 /// keys per-channel).
2794 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2795 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2796 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2798 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2799 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2800 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2802 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2803 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2804 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2807 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2808 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2809 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2810 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2814 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2815 let mut output_index = None;
2816 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2817 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2818 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2819 if output_index.is_some() {
2820 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2821 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2824 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2825 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2826 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2829 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2832 if output_index.is_none() {
2833 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2834 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2837 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2842 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2843 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2844 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2846 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2849 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2850 // smaller than 500:
2851 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2853 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2854 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2855 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2856 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2857 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2858 /// our network addresses.
2860 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2861 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2863 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2864 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2865 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2866 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2868 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2870 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2871 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2874 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2875 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2878 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2879 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2880 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2882 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2883 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2884 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2885 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2886 rgb, alias, addresses,
2887 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2888 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2890 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2891 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2893 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2894 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2896 let mut announced_chans = false;
2897 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2898 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2901 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2906 announced_chans = true;
2908 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2909 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2910 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2914 if announced_chans {
2915 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2916 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2917 signature: node_announce_sig,
2918 contents: announcement
2924 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2926 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2927 /// Will likely generate further events.
2928 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2931 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2932 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2933 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2935 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2936 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2938 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2939 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2940 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2941 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2943 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2944 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2945 match forward_info {
2946 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2947 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2948 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2949 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2950 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2951 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2952 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2954 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2955 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2958 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2959 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2960 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2961 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2962 // problem, not ours.
2969 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2970 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2971 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2972 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2973 match forward_info {
2974 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2975 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2977 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2978 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2979 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2980 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2981 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2982 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2983 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2984 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2986 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2988 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2991 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2993 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2994 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2995 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3001 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3003 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3004 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3005 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3006 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3007 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3008 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3009 // this channel currently :/.
3015 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3016 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3018 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3020 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3022 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3023 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3025 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3027 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3028 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3029 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3032 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3034 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3035 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3036 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3037 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3038 // messages when we can.
3039 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3040 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3041 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3048 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3049 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3052 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3053 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3054 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3055 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3056 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3057 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3059 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3061 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3062 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3063 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3065 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3066 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3068 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3070 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3074 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3075 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3078 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3079 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3081 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3082 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3083 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3084 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3085 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3086 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3088 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3096 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3097 match forward_info {
3098 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3099 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3100 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3101 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
3102 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3103 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3104 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3105 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3107 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3110 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3111 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3112 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3113 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3114 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3115 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3117 value: amt_to_forward,
3122 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3124 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3125 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3126 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3128 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3129 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3130 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3131 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3132 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3134 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3139 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3140 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3141 let mut total_value = 0;
3142 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3143 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3144 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3145 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3146 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3148 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3152 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3153 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3154 total_value += htlc.value;
3155 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3156 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3157 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3159 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3160 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3162 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3164 _ => unreachable!(),
3167 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3169 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3170 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3173 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3174 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3176 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3177 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3178 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3182 payment_received_generated = true;
3184 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3185 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3188 payment_received_generated
3192 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3193 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3194 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3195 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3196 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3197 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3198 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3199 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3201 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3202 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3203 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3204 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3206 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3210 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3211 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3212 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3214 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3215 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3217 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3218 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3220 amt: amt_to_forward,
3221 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3226 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3234 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3238 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3241 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3243 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3244 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3246 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3247 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3249 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3250 if payment_received_generated {
3251 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3257 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3258 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3266 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3267 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3270 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3271 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3274 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3275 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3276 events.append(&mut new_events);
3279 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3281 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3282 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3284 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3285 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3286 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3287 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3288 if background_events.is_empty() {
3292 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3294 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3295 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3296 // monitor updating completing.
3297 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3304 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3305 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3306 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3307 self.process_background_events();
3310 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3311 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3312 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3313 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3315 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3316 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3318 if !chan.is_live() {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3320 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3321 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3324 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3326 let mut retain_channel = true;
3327 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3330 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3331 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3335 let ret_err = match res {
3336 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3337 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3338 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3339 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3343 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3344 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3345 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3346 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3347 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3348 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3349 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3359 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3363 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3364 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3365 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3366 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3367 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3368 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3369 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3371 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3373 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3375 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3376 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3377 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3378 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3379 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3380 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3381 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3383 handle_errors.push(err);
3393 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3395 /// This currently includes:
3396 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3397 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3398 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3401 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3402 /// estimate fetches.
3403 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3404 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3405 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3406 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3408 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3410 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3412 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3414 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3415 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3416 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3417 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3418 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3419 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3421 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3423 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3425 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3426 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3427 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3428 if needs_close { return false; }
3431 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3432 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3433 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3434 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3435 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3436 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3437 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3442 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3443 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3445 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3446 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3451 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3452 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3461 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3462 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3468 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3469 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3470 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3471 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3472 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3473 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3476 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3477 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3478 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3479 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3480 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3481 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3482 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3483 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3484 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3485 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3486 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3492 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3493 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3494 // be surfaced to the user.
3495 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3496 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3498 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3499 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3500 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3501 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3502 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3503 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3505 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3510 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3512 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3514 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3515 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3516 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3517 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3518 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3519 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3520 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3521 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3522 Some(RouteParameters {
3523 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3524 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3525 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3529 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3530 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3532 rejected_by_dest: false,
3533 network_update: None,
3534 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3536 short_channel_id: None,
3543 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3544 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3546 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3552 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3559 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3560 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3561 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3562 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3563 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3564 /// still-available channels.
3565 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3566 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3567 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3568 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3571 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3572 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3573 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3575 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3576 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3577 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3578 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3579 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3580 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3581 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3582 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3586 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3587 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3590 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3591 all_paths_failed = true;
3592 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3593 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3595 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3604 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3605 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3606 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3607 Some(RouteParameters {
3608 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3609 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3610 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3613 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3615 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3616 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3618 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3620 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3621 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3622 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3623 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3624 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3625 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3626 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3627 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3634 error_code: onion_error_code,
3636 error_data: onion_error_data
3639 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3645 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3646 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3647 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3648 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3650 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3651 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3652 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3653 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3654 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3655 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3656 network_update: None,
3659 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3662 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3664 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3668 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3669 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3670 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3672 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3673 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3674 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3676 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3677 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3679 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3681 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3685 let mut forward_event = None;
3686 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3687 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3689 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3691 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3694 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3697 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3698 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3699 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3700 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3701 time_forwardable: time
3708 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3709 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3711 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3712 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3713 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3714 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3716 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3717 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3719 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3720 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3721 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3722 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3723 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3724 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3728 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3729 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3730 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3731 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3733 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3734 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3735 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3736 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3738 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3739 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3740 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3741 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3742 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3744 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3745 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3746 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3752 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3753 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3754 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3756 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3757 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3758 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3759 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3760 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3761 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3762 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3764 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3765 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3766 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3767 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3768 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3769 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3770 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3771 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3773 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3774 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3775 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3776 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3777 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3778 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3780 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3785 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3786 // which were generated.
3787 channel_state.take();
3789 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3790 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3791 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3798 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3799 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3800 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3801 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3802 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3804 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3808 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3809 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3810 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3811 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3812 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3813 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3814 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3815 payment_preimage, e);
3816 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3817 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3818 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3819 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3822 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3823 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3824 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3826 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3827 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3828 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3829 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3830 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3831 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3837 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3839 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3842 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3843 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3844 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3845 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3846 payment_preimage, e);
3848 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3849 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3851 chan.remove_entry();
3853 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3856 } else { unreachable!(); }
3859 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3860 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3862 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3863 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3864 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3865 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3866 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3867 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3868 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3869 pending_events.push(
3870 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3872 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3877 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3885 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3887 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3888 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3889 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3890 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3891 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3892 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3893 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3894 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3895 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3896 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3897 pending_events.push(
3898 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3899 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3905 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3909 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3910 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3911 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3913 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3914 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3915 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3916 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3917 pending_events.push(
3918 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3926 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3931 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3934 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3935 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3936 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3937 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3938 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3939 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3940 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3943 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3944 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3945 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3946 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3947 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3950 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3951 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3952 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3953 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3954 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3955 payment_preimage, e);
3957 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3958 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3959 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3960 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3963 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3964 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3965 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3966 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3970 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3971 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3972 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3975 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3976 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3978 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3986 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3987 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3988 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3991 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3994 let chan_restoration_res;
3995 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3996 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3997 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3998 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4002 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4006 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4007 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4008 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4009 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4010 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4011 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4013 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4014 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4015 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4018 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4019 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4022 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4024 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4025 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4026 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4027 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4031 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4034 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4036 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4037 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4044 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4045 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4048 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4049 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4053 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4059 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4060 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4061 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4064 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4065 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4068 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4069 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4070 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4071 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4072 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4073 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4075 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4076 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4077 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4078 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4079 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4082 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4083 pending_events.push(
4084 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4085 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4086 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4087 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4088 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4093 entry.insert(channel);
4099 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4100 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4101 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4102 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4103 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4105 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4108 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4109 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4114 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4115 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4116 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4117 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4119 user_channel_id: user_id,
4124 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4125 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4126 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4127 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4128 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4129 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4131 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4134 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4139 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4140 // lock before watch_channel
4141 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4143 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4144 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4145 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4146 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4147 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4148 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4149 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4150 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4151 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4152 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4155 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4156 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4157 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4158 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4159 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4160 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4164 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4165 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4166 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4171 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4172 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4181 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4183 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4184 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4185 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4186 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4188 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4189 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4191 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4192 Ok(update) => update,
4193 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4195 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4196 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4197 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4198 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4199 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4200 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4201 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4202 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4212 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4213 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4217 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4218 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4222 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4225 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4226 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4227 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4229 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4230 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4231 msg: announcement_sigs,
4233 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4234 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4235 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4236 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4237 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4238 // announcement_signatures.
4239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4240 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4241 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4242 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4251 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4252 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4253 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4254 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4255 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4257 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4259 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4263 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4264 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4265 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4266 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4269 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4270 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4272 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4273 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4274 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4275 let (result, is_permanent) =
4276 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4278 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4284 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4285 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4286 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4296 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4297 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4300 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4304 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4305 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4306 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4307 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4308 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4310 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4311 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4313 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4314 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4315 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4316 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4321 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4322 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4323 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4324 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4325 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4326 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4327 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4329 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4330 } else { (tx, None) }
4332 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4335 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4336 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4337 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4339 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4340 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4341 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4346 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4351 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4352 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4353 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4354 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4356 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4357 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4358 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4359 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4361 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4364 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4366 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4370 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4371 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4372 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4373 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4374 match pending_forward_info {
4375 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4376 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4377 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4378 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4379 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4380 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4381 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4382 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4386 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4387 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4388 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4389 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4390 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4391 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4392 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4393 // no problem just calling this
4394 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4395 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4398 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4400 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4401 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4402 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4405 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4407 _ => pending_forward_info
4410 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4417 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4418 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4419 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4420 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4421 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4423 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4424 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4426 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4431 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4435 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4436 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4437 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4438 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4439 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4440 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4443 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4450 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4451 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4453 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4455 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4458 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4459 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4460 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4462 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4469 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4470 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4471 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4472 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4474 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4477 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4478 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4479 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4480 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4481 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4482 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4483 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4488 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4489 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4492 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4493 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4495 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4496 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4497 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4498 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4499 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4500 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4501 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4502 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4504 commitment_signed: msg,
4510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4515 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4516 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4517 let mut forward_event = None;
4518 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4519 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4520 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4521 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4523 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4524 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4525 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4526 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4527 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4529 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4530 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4531 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4534 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4535 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4540 match forward_event {
4542 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4543 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4544 time_forwardable: time
4552 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4553 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4555 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4556 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4557 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4559 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4560 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4562 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4563 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4564 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4565 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4566 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4567 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4568 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4569 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4570 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4571 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4572 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4574 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4575 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4576 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4577 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4578 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4580 } else { unreachable!(); }
4583 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4584 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4585 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4589 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4590 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4591 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4592 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4593 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4598 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4600 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4601 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4603 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4604 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4606 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4607 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4614 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4615 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4616 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4617 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4619 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4622 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4629 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4630 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4631 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4633 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4635 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4636 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4638 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4639 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4642 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4643 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4644 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4645 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4646 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4647 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4655 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4656 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4657 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4659 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4660 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4662 // It's not a local channel
4663 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4666 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4668 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4669 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4670 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4671 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4672 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4673 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4677 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4678 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4679 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4680 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4682 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4687 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4690 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4691 let chan_restoration_res;
4692 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4694 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4696 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4698 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4699 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4701 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4702 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4703 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4704 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4705 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4706 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4707 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4708 let mut channel_update = None;
4709 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4711 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4714 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4715 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4716 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4717 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4718 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4719 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4720 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4723 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4724 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4725 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4726 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4727 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4730 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4735 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4736 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4738 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4739 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4744 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4745 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4746 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4747 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4748 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4749 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4750 match monitor_event {
4751 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4752 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4754 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4757 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4760 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4761 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4762 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4763 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4764 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4765 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4766 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4767 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4768 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4769 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4771 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4772 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4777 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4778 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4780 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4782 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4783 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4784 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4785 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4786 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4791 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4792 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4797 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4798 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4801 has_pending_monitor_events
4804 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4805 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4806 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4807 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4808 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4809 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4812 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4813 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4814 /// update was applied.
4816 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4817 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4818 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4819 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4820 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4821 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4822 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4823 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4827 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4828 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4829 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4831 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4832 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4833 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4834 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4835 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4837 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4838 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4839 has_monitor_update = true;
4840 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4841 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4842 if close_channel { return false; }
4844 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4845 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4846 updates: commitment_update,
4853 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4854 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4855 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4862 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4863 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4864 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4867 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4868 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4874 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4875 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4876 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4877 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4878 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4879 let mut has_update = false;
4881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4883 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4884 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4885 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4887 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4888 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4889 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4890 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4892 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4893 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4896 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4897 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4898 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4899 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4900 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4903 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4904 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4909 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4911 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4912 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4918 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4919 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4926 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4927 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4933 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4934 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4936 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4937 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4938 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4939 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4940 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4941 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4942 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4943 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4944 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4945 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4946 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4947 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4948 assert!(should_broadcast);
4949 } else { unreachable!(); }
4950 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4952 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4956 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4957 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4959 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4960 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4963 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4966 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4967 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4969 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4970 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4971 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4972 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4973 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4974 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4975 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4976 // never fail a payment too early.
4977 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4979 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4987 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4990 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4991 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
4993 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4994 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4995 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4997 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4999 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5000 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5004 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5005 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5007 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5009 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5010 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5011 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5012 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5013 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5014 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5017 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5018 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5021 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5023 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5025 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5026 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5027 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5028 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5029 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5032 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5033 /// stored external to LDK.
5035 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5036 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5037 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5039 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5040 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5043 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5044 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5045 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5046 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5048 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5049 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5050 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5051 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5052 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5054 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5055 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5056 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5057 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5058 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5060 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5062 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5063 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5065 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5066 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5070 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5071 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5073 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5075 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5076 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5077 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5078 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5081 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5082 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5085 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5087 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5089 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5090 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5093 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5094 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5096 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5097 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5098 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5101 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5102 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5103 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5104 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5105 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5110 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5111 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5115 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5116 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5120 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5121 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5122 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5123 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5127 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5128 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5129 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5130 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5132 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5133 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5134 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5135 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5138 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5139 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5141 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5142 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5145 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5146 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5147 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5149 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5150 events.replace(pending_events);
5159 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5161 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5162 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5163 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5167 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5169 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5170 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5172 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5173 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5174 /// restarting from an old state.
5175 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5176 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5177 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5179 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5180 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5181 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5182 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5185 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5186 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5187 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5190 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5191 handler.handle_event(&event);
5199 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5201 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5202 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5203 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5207 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5209 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5210 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5211 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5212 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5213 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5216 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5217 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5218 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5221 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5223 let new_height = height - 1;
5225 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5226 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5227 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5228 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5229 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5230 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5233 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5237 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5239 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5240 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5241 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5245 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5246 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5247 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5248 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5250 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5251 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5254 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5255 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5258 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5259 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5260 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5261 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5263 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5264 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5268 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5270 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5272 macro_rules! max_time {
5273 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5275 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5276 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5277 // having an explicit local time source.
5278 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5279 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5280 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5281 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5282 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5288 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5289 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5290 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5291 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5292 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5295 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5296 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5297 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5298 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5299 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5300 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5301 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5302 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5303 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5311 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5312 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5313 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5314 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5315 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5316 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5322 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5324 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5325 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5326 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5327 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5328 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5329 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5334 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5336 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5337 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5338 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5339 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5342 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5343 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5345 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5346 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5347 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5348 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5349 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5351 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5352 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5354 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5355 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5356 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5357 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5358 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5359 let res = f(channel);
5360 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5361 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5362 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5363 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5364 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5368 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5370 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5371 msg: funding_locked,
5373 if channel.is_usable() {
5374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5376 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5377 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5382 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5384 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5386 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5387 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5388 msg: announcement_sigs,
5390 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5391 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5392 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5394 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5395 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5396 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5401 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5402 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5403 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5405 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5406 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5407 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5408 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5413 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5414 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5415 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5416 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5418 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5419 data: reason_message,
5427 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5428 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5429 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5430 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5431 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5432 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5433 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5434 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5435 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5436 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5437 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5438 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5439 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5444 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5449 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5451 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5452 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5456 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5457 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5458 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5461 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5462 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5463 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5464 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5467 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5468 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5470 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5471 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5474 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5475 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5476 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5477 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5478 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5482 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5483 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5484 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5485 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5489 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5490 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5491 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5492 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5493 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5494 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5497 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5499 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5502 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5504 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5507 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5509 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5512 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5514 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5517 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5519 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5522 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5524 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5527 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5532 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5537 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5542 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5544 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5547 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5552 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5557 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5559 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5562 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5567 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5572 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5573 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5574 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5577 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5582 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5584 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5587 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5589 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5590 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5592 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5593 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5594 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5595 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5596 if no_connection_possible {
5597 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5598 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5599 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5600 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5601 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5603 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5604 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5609 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5616 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5617 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5618 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5619 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5620 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5621 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5622 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5624 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5627 no_channels_remain = false;
5633 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5641 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5646 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5647 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5648 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5650 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5651 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5657 if no_channels_remain {
5658 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5661 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5662 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5666 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5667 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5672 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5673 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5675 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5676 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5680 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5685 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5686 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5687 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5688 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5689 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5690 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5691 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5692 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5693 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5697 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5698 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5699 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5705 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5708 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5711 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5712 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5713 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5714 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5715 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5719 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5720 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5725 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5726 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5727 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5728 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5729 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5730 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5733 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5736 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5742 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5743 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5748 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5749 let result = *guard;
5757 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5758 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5759 let current_time = Instant::now();
5761 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5762 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5767 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5768 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5769 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5770 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5771 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5773 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5774 let result = *guard;
5775 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5779 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5780 None => return result,
5786 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5788 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5789 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5790 *persistence_lock = true;
5791 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5796 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5797 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5799 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5800 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5801 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5802 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5805 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5806 (2, node_id, required),
5807 (4, features, required),
5808 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5809 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5812 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5813 (2, channel_id, required),
5814 (4, counterparty, required),
5815 (6, funding_txo, option),
5816 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5817 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5818 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5819 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5820 (16, balance_msat, required),
5821 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5822 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5823 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5824 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5825 (26, is_outbound, required),
5826 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5827 (30, is_usable, required),
5828 (32, is_public, required),
5831 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5833 (0, onion_packet, required),
5834 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5837 (0, payment_data, required),
5838 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5840 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5841 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5842 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5846 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5847 (0, routing, required),
5848 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5849 (4, payment_hash, required),
5850 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5851 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5855 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5856 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5858 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5860 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5861 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5862 reason.write(writer)?;
5864 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5865 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5868 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5869 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5870 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5871 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5878 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5879 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5880 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5883 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5884 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5885 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5886 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5890 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5891 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5892 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5893 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5894 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5897 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5898 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5899 // messages contained in the variants.
5900 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5901 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5902 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5904 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5905 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5906 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5907 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5908 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5911 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5912 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5913 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5914 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5915 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5917 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5922 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5927 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5928 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5929 (2, outpoint, required),
5930 (4, htlc_id, required),
5931 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5934 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5936 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5937 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5940 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5941 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5942 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5947 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5948 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5949 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5955 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5956 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5957 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5959 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5960 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5961 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5965 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5966 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5967 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5969 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5971 if payment_data.is_some() {
5972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5974 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5977 if payment_data.is_none() {
5978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5980 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5984 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5992 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5993 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5994 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5997 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5998 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5999 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6000 let mut payment_id = None;
6001 let mut payment_secret = None;
6002 let mut payment_params = None;
6003 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6004 (0, session_priv, required),
6005 (1, payment_id, option),
6006 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6007 (3, payment_secret, option),
6008 (4, path, vec_type),
6009 (5, payment_params, option),
6011 if payment_id.is_none() {
6012 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6014 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6016 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6017 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6018 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6019 path: path.unwrap(),
6020 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6025 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6026 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6031 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6032 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6034 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6036 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6037 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6038 (0, session_priv, required),
6039 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6040 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6041 (3, payment_secret, option),
6042 (4, path, vec_type),
6043 (5, payment_params, option),
6046 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6048 field.write(writer)?;
6055 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6056 (0, LightningError) => {
6060 (0, failure_code, required),
6061 (2, data, vec_type),
6065 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6067 (0, forward_info, required),
6068 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6069 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6070 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6073 (0, htlc_id, required),
6074 (2, err_packet, required),
6078 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6079 (0, payment_secret, required),
6080 (2, expiry_time, required),
6081 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6082 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6083 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6086 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6088 (0, session_privs, required),
6091 (0, session_privs, required),
6092 (1, payment_hash, option),
6095 (0, session_privs, required),
6096 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6097 (2, payment_hash, required),
6098 (4, payment_secret, option),
6099 (6, total_msat, required),
6100 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6101 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6104 (0, session_privs, required),
6105 (2, payment_hash, required),
6109 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6110 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6111 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6112 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6113 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6116 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6117 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6119 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6121 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6123 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6124 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6125 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6128 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6129 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6130 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6131 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6132 unfunded_channels += 1;
6135 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6136 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6137 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6138 channel.write(writer)?;
6142 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6143 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6144 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6145 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6146 for forward in pending_forwards {
6147 forward.write(writer)?;
6151 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6152 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6153 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6154 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6155 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6156 htlc.write(writer)?;
6160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6161 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6162 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6163 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6164 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6165 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6168 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6169 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6170 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6171 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6172 for event in events.iter() {
6173 event.write(writer)?;
6176 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6177 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6178 for event in background_events.iter() {
6180 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6182 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6183 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6188 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6189 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6191 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6192 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6193 hash.write(writer)?;
6194 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6197 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6198 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6199 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6200 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6201 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6204 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6205 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6207 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6208 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6209 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6210 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6213 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6214 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6218 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6219 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6220 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6222 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6223 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6224 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6229 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6230 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6231 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6232 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
6239 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6241 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6243 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6244 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6245 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6246 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6247 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6248 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6249 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6250 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6251 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6252 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6253 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6254 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6255 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6257 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6258 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6260 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6261 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6263 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6264 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6265 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6266 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6267 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6268 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6270 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6271 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6272 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6274 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6278 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6279 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6281 pub keys_manager: K,
6283 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6285 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6286 pub fee_estimator: F,
6287 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6289 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6290 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6291 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6292 pub chain_monitor: M,
6294 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6295 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6296 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6297 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6298 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6299 /// deserialization.
6301 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6302 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6303 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6305 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6306 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6308 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6309 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6310 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6311 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6313 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6316 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6317 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6320 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6321 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6322 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6323 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6324 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6328 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6329 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6330 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6331 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6332 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6334 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6335 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6340 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6341 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6342 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6343 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6344 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6345 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6346 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6347 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6350 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6351 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6352 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6356 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6357 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6358 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6359 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6360 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6361 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6364 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6365 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6367 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6368 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6369 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6371 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6373 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6374 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6375 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6376 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6377 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6378 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6379 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6380 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6381 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6382 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6383 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6384 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6385 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6386 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6387 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6388 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6389 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6390 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6391 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6392 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6393 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6394 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6395 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6396 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6397 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6398 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6399 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6400 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6401 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6402 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6403 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6404 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6405 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6406 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6407 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6408 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6409 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6410 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6411 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6414 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6415 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6416 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6418 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6421 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6422 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6423 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6424 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6425 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6430 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6431 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6432 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6433 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6437 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6438 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6439 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6440 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6441 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6443 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6444 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6445 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6447 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6450 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6451 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6452 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6453 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6455 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6456 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6457 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6459 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6462 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6464 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6465 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let peer_state = PeerState {
6467 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6469 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6472 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6474 for _ in 0..event_count {
6475 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6476 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6480 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6481 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6482 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6483 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6484 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6485 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6486 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6487 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6491 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6493 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6494 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6495 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6496 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6500 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6505 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6506 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6511 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6513 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6514 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6515 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6517 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6519 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6520 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6524 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6525 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6526 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6527 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6528 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6529 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6530 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6531 (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
6534 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6535 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6536 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6537 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6538 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6539 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6541 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6543 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6544 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6545 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6546 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6547 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6548 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6549 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6551 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6552 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6553 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6554 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6555 if path.is_empty() {
6556 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6559 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6560 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6561 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6562 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6564 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6565 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6566 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6569 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6570 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6571 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6572 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6574 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6575 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6576 total_msat: path_amt,
6577 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6579 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6580 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6589 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6590 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6592 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6593 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6596 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret());
6597 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6598 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6599 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6600 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6604 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6605 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6606 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6608 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6609 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6610 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6612 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6614 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6619 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6621 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6622 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6623 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6625 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6629 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6630 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6632 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6634 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6635 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6636 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6637 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6639 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6640 logger: args.logger,
6641 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6644 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6645 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6648 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6649 //connection or two.
6651 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6657 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6658 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6659 use core::time::Duration;
6660 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6661 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6662 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6663 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6664 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6665 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6667 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6668 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6669 use util::errors::APIError;
6670 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6671 use util::test_utils;
6673 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6675 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6676 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6678 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6681 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6682 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6684 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6685 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6686 thread::spawn(move || {
6688 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6689 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6690 *persistence_lock = true;
6693 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6699 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6700 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6702 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6705 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6710 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6712 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6715 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6722 fn test_notify_limits() {
6723 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6724 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6728 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6730 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6731 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6732 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6733 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6734 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6736 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6738 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6739 // to connect messages with new values
6740 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6741 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6742 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6743 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6745 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6746 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6747 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6748 // ... but the last node should not.
6749 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6750 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6751 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6752 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6754 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6755 // about the channel.
6756 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6757 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6758 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6760 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6762 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6763 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6764 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6765 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6766 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6767 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6769 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6770 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6771 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6773 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6774 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6775 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6776 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6777 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6778 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6780 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6781 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6782 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6783 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6784 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6785 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6787 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6789 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6790 // the channel info has updated.
6791 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6792 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6793 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6794 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6795 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6796 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6800 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6801 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6803 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6804 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6805 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6806 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6807 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6809 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6810 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6811 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6812 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6813 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6814 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6815 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6819 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6821 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6822 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6824 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6826 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6827 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6828 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6830 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6835 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6836 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6837 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6838 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6839 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6840 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6842 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6844 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6845 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6847 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6848 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6849 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6851 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6852 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6853 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6854 // lightning messages manually.
6855 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6857 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6859 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6862 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6864 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6865 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6867 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6868 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6869 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6871 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6873 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6875 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6877 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6879 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6880 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6883 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6884 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6885 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6888 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6889 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6890 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6891 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6893 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6896 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6897 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6898 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6899 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6904 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6905 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6906 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6907 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6914 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6915 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6916 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6917 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6918 // fails as expected.
6919 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6920 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6921 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6922 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6923 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6924 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6926 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6927 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6928 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6930 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6931 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6932 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6933 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6934 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6936 let route = find_route(
6937 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6938 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6940 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6942 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6943 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6944 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6945 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6946 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6948 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6950 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6952 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6953 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6954 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6955 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6956 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6957 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6958 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6960 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6962 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6965 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6966 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6967 let route = find_route(
6968 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6969 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6971 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6973 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6975 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6976 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6977 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6979 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6980 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6981 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6983 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6985 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6986 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6987 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6989 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6993 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6994 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6995 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6996 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6997 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6998 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7001 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7003 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7008 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7009 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7010 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7014 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7016 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7017 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7018 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7019 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7021 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7022 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7023 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7024 final_value_msat: 10000,
7025 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7027 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7028 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7029 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7030 let route = find_route(
7031 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7032 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7035 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7036 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7037 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7040 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7041 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7042 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7043 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7044 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7045 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7046 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7048 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7052 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7053 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7054 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7059 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7060 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7061 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7062 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7064 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7065 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7066 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7067 final_value_msat: 10000,
7068 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7070 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7071 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7072 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7073 let route = find_route(
7074 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7075 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7078 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7079 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7080 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7081 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7084 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7085 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7086 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7087 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7088 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7089 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7090 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7092 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7096 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7100 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7102 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7103 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7104 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7105 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7107 // Marshall an MPP route.
7108 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7109 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7110 route.paths.push(path);
7111 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7112 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7113 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7114 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7115 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7116 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7118 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7119 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7120 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7121 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7126 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7127 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7128 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7129 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7130 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7131 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7133 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7134 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7136 total_msat: 100_000,
7139 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7140 // payment verification fails as expected.
7141 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7142 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7143 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7144 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7146 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7150 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7151 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7155 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7158 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7159 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7160 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7161 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7162 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7163 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7164 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7165 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7166 use util::test_utils;
7167 use util::config::UserConfig;
7168 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7170 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7171 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7172 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7174 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7178 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7179 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7180 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7181 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7182 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7183 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7184 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7189 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7190 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7193 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7194 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7195 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7197 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7198 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7200 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7201 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7203 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7204 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7206 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7207 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7208 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7209 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7210 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7212 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7214 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7216 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7217 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7218 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7219 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7220 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7222 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7224 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7226 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7227 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7228 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7229 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7230 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7233 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7234 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7235 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7237 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7238 } else { panic!(); }
7240 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7241 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7243 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7246 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7249 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7250 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7252 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7253 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7254 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7255 match msg_events[0] {
7256 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7257 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7258 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7262 match msg_events[1] {
7263 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7267 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7269 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7270 macro_rules! send_payment {
7271 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7272 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7273 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7274 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7275 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7276 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7277 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7279 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7280 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7282 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7283 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7285 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7286 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7287 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7288 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7289 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7290 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7291 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7292 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7294 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7295 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7296 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7298 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7299 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7300 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7301 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7302 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7304 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7307 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7308 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7309 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7310 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7312 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7317 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7318 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);