1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use util::crypto::sign;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
163 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
164 /// are part of the same payment.
165 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
166 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
167 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
170 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
171 struct ClaimableHTLC {
172 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
174 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
176 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
178 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
182 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
183 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
184 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
185 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
187 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
188 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
193 impl Readable for PaymentId {
194 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
195 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
199 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
200 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
201 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
202 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
203 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
206 session_priv: SecretKey,
207 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
208 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
209 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
210 payment_id: PaymentId,
211 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
212 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
215 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
216 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
217 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
219 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
221 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
223 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
226 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
227 payment_id.hash(hasher);
228 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
229 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 payment_params.hash(hasher);
235 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
238 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
239 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
241 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
242 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
243 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
244 payment_secret: None,
245 payment_params: None,
250 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
251 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
253 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
261 struct ReceiveError {
267 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
268 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
270 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
275 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
277 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
278 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
279 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
280 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
281 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
283 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
284 err: msgs::LightningError,
285 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
286 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
288 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
290 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
292 err: LightningError {
294 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
295 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
302 shutdown_finish: None,
306 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
308 err: LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
313 shutdown_finish: None,
317 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
318 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
321 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
323 err: LightningError {
325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
326 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
332 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
333 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
337 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
340 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
343 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
347 log_level: Level::Warn,
350 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
354 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
363 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
379 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
380 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
381 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
382 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
383 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
385 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
386 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
387 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
388 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
389 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
391 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
393 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
397 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
398 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
399 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
400 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
401 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
402 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
415 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
416 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
418 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
419 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
420 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
421 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
424 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
425 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
426 /// quite some time lag.
427 enum BackgroundEvent {
428 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
429 /// commitment transaction.
430 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
433 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
434 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
436 latest_features: InitFeatures,
439 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
440 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
442 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
445 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
446 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
447 struct PendingInboundPayment {
448 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
449 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
450 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
451 /// this payment being removed.
453 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
454 user_payment_id: u64,
455 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
456 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
457 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
460 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
461 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
462 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
464 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
467 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
468 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
469 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
470 pending_amt_msat: u64,
471 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
472 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
473 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
475 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
476 starting_block_height: u32,
478 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
479 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
480 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
482 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
483 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
485 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
486 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
487 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
488 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
489 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
491 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
498 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
499 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
501 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
505 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
507 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
511 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
517 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
519 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
524 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
526 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
533 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
534 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
535 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
536 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
542 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
543 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
546 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
547 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
548 let our_payment_hash;
549 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
551 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
555 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
559 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
563 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
564 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
565 let remove_res = match self {
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
570 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
574 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
575 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
576 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
577 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
578 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
579 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
586 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
587 let insert_res = match self {
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
590 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
596 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
597 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
598 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
599 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
600 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
607 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
609 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
610 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
619 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
620 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
621 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
622 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
623 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
624 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
625 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
627 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
628 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
630 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
631 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
632 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
633 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
634 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
635 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
636 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
637 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
639 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
640 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
642 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
643 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
645 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
646 /// to individual Channels.
648 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
649 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
650 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
651 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
653 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
654 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
655 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
656 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
657 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
658 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
659 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
661 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
662 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
663 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
664 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
667 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
668 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
669 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
670 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
671 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
673 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
674 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
675 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
676 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
677 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
678 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
679 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
680 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
681 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
685 default_configuration: UserConfig,
686 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
692 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
694 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
695 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
698 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
699 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
700 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
702 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
703 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
704 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
705 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
706 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
707 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
709 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
710 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
711 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
712 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
713 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
714 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
715 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
716 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
718 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
720 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
721 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
723 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
724 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
725 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
726 /// active channel list on load.
727 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
729 our_network_key: SecretKey,
730 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
732 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
734 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
735 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
736 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
738 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
739 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
741 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
742 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
743 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
745 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
746 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
747 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
748 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
750 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
751 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
752 /// are currently open with that peer.
753 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
754 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
757 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
758 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
760 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
761 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
762 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
763 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
764 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
765 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
766 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
767 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
768 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
770 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
777 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
779 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
780 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
781 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
782 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
783 pub struct ChainParameters {
784 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
785 pub network: Network,
787 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
789 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
790 pub best_block: BestBlock,
793 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
799 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
800 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
801 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
802 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
803 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
804 /// updates are ready for persistence).
806 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
807 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
808 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
809 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
810 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
812 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
813 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
816 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
817 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
818 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
821 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
822 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
824 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
825 persistence_notifier: notifier,
826 should_persist: persist_check,
827 _read_guard: read_guard,
832 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
834 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
835 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
840 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
841 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
843 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
845 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
846 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
847 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
848 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
849 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
851 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
852 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
854 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
856 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
857 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
858 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
859 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
860 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
861 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
862 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
864 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
865 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
867 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
868 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
869 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
870 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
872 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
873 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
874 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
875 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
876 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
877 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
880 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
882 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
883 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
886 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
888 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
889 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
890 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
892 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
893 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
895 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
896 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
897 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
898 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
899 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
900 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
901 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
902 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
903 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
904 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
905 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
908 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
909 /// to better separate parameters.
910 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
911 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
912 /// The node_id of our counterparty
913 pub node_id: PublicKey,
914 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
915 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
916 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
917 pub features: InitFeatures,
918 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
919 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
920 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
922 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
924 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
925 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
926 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
927 /// payments to us through this channel.
928 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
929 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
930 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
931 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
932 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
933 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
934 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
937 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
938 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
939 pub struct ChannelDetails {
940 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
941 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
942 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
943 /// lifetime of the channel.
944 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
945 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
946 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
947 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
948 /// our counterparty already.
950 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
951 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
952 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
953 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
955 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
956 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
957 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
958 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
960 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
961 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
963 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
964 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
965 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
966 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
967 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
968 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
969 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
971 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
972 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
974 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
975 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
976 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
977 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
978 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
979 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
980 /// this value on chain.
982 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
984 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
986 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
987 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
988 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
989 pub user_channel_id: u64,
990 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
991 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
992 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
994 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
995 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
996 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
997 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
999 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1000 pub balance_msat: u64,
1001 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1002 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1003 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1004 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1006 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1008 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1009 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1010 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1011 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1012 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1013 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1014 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1015 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1017 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1018 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1019 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1020 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1021 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1022 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1023 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1025 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1026 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1027 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1028 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1029 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1030 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1031 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1032 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1033 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1035 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1037 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1038 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1039 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1040 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1041 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1042 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1043 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1044 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1045 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1047 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1048 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1049 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1050 pub is_outbound: bool,
1051 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1052 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1053 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1054 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1055 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1057 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1058 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1059 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1060 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1062 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1063 pub is_usable: bool,
1064 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1065 pub is_public: bool,
1066 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1067 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1068 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1069 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1070 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1073 impl ChannelDetails {
1074 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1075 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1076 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1078 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1079 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1080 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1081 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1085 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1086 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1087 /// states for more.
1088 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1089 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1090 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1091 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1092 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1093 ParameterError(APIError),
1094 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1095 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1096 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1097 /// payment in full.
1099 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1101 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1102 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1103 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1104 /// paths than the ones selected).
1105 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1106 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1107 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1108 /// in over-/re-payment.
1110 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1111 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1112 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1114 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1115 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1116 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1117 /// with the latest update_id.
1119 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1120 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1121 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1122 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1123 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1124 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1125 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1126 payment_id: PaymentId,
1130 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1132 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1134 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1135 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1136 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1137 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1139 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1140 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1141 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1144 macro_rules! handle_error {
1145 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1148 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1149 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1151 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1152 // entering the macro.
1153 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1154 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1157 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1159 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1160 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1161 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1162 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1166 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1167 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1168 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1169 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1174 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1175 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1177 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1178 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1179 action: err.action.clone()
1183 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1184 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1187 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1194 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1195 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1196 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1197 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1199 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1200 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1201 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1202 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1203 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1205 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1206 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1208 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1212 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1213 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1214 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1216 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1217 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1219 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1220 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1222 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1223 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1224 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1225 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1226 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1227 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1229 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1230 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1231 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1232 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1233 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1234 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1240 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1241 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1245 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1247 $entry.remove_entry();
1255 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1256 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1260 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1262 $entry.remove_entry();
1270 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1271 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1273 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1274 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1280 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1281 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1283 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1284 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1285 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1286 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1287 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1288 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1289 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1290 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1291 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1292 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1293 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1294 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1295 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1296 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1299 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1300 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1301 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1302 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1303 match $action_type {
1304 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1305 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1307 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1308 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1310 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1311 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1312 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1313 if !$resend_commitment {
1314 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1317 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1319 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1320 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1324 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1325 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1327 $entry.remove_entry();
1331 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1332 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1333 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1335 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1336 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1338 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1339 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1341 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1342 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1346 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1347 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1348 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1350 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1351 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1355 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1356 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1357 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1358 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1359 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1362 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1367 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1368 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1369 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1370 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1371 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1373 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1374 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1375 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1376 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1377 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1378 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1379 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1380 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1381 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1386 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1387 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1388 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1389 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1390 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1392 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1393 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1394 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1396 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1397 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1398 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1399 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1402 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1403 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1404 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1405 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1406 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1407 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1408 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1409 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1410 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1411 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1412 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1413 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1416 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1417 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1418 // before it should be allowed to.
1419 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1420 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1422 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1423 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1424 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1429 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1430 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1431 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1432 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1433 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1434 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1435 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1436 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1437 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1438 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1439 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1440 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1441 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1442 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1443 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1444 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1445 let mut order = $order;
1447 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1449 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1453 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1454 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1455 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1456 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1461 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1462 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1463 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1464 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1465 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1470 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1474 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1479 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1480 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1481 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1486 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1487 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1488 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1489 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1490 assert!(res.is_ok());
1493 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1497 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1498 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1499 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1501 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1503 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1504 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1509 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1510 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1511 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1512 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1516 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1518 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1519 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1521 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1523 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1524 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1525 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1526 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1527 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1528 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1529 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1530 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1532 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1533 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1534 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1538 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1540 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1541 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1542 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1543 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1544 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1545 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1547 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1548 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1549 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1551 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1552 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1555 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1556 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1558 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1559 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1561 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1563 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1564 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1565 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1566 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1574 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1575 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1576 &self.default_configuration
1579 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1580 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1581 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1584 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1585 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1587 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1589 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1593 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1598 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1600 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1601 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1602 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1603 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1604 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1607 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1608 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1610 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1611 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1612 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1614 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1615 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1616 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1617 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1618 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1619 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1621 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1622 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1623 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1624 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1625 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1626 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1631 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1632 Some(peer_state) => {
1633 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1634 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1635 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1636 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1637 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1638 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1639 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1643 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1648 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1651 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1654 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1655 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1657 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1662 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1664 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1667 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1669 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1670 node_id: their_network_key,
1673 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1676 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1677 let mut res = Vec::new();
1679 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1680 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1681 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1682 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1683 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1684 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1685 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1686 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1687 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1688 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1689 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1690 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1691 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1692 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1693 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1694 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1695 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1696 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1697 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1698 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1699 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1701 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1702 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1703 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1704 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1705 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1706 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1707 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1708 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1709 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1710 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1711 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1712 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1713 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1714 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1715 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1716 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1717 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1718 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1719 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1720 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1721 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1726 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1727 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1728 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1734 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1735 /// more information.
1736 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1737 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1740 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1741 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1743 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1744 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1746 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1747 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1748 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1749 // really wanted anyway.
1750 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1753 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1754 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1755 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1756 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1757 Some(transaction) => {
1758 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1762 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1763 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1764 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1765 reason: closure_reason
1769 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1772 let counterparty_node_id;
1773 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1774 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1779 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1781 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1782 Some(peer_state) => {
1783 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1784 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1785 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1787 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1789 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1791 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1792 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1793 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1794 let (result, is_permanent) =
1795 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1797 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1804 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1808 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1809 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1810 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1811 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1815 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1823 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1824 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1827 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1831 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1832 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1833 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1835 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1836 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1838 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1839 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1840 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1841 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1843 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1845 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1846 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1847 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1848 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1849 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1852 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1853 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1854 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1856 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1857 /// the channel being closed or not:
1858 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1859 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1860 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1861 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1862 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1863 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1864 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1866 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1868 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1869 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1870 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1871 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1872 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1876 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1877 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1878 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1879 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1880 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1882 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1883 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1884 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1885 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1886 // ignore the result here.
1887 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1891 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1892 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1893 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1895 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1896 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1897 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1898 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1899 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1900 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1903 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1904 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1905 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1908 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1910 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1912 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1915 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1916 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1917 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1918 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1924 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1927 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1928 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1929 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1931 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1932 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1933 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1934 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1935 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1936 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1937 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1947 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1948 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1949 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1950 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1951 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1955 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1956 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1958 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1959 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1960 return Err(ReceiveError {
1961 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1963 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
1966 // final_expiry_too_soon
1967 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1968 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1969 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1970 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1971 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1972 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1973 return Err(ReceiveError {
1975 err_data: Vec::new(),
1976 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1979 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1980 return Err(ReceiveError {
1982 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
1983 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1987 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1988 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
1989 return Err(ReceiveError {
1990 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1991 err_data: Vec::new(),
1992 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1995 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1996 return Err(ReceiveError {
1997 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1998 err_data: Vec::new(),
1999 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2002 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2003 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2004 return Err(ReceiveError {
2005 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2006 err_data: Vec::new(),
2007 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2009 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2010 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2012 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2013 phantom_shared_secret,
2015 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2016 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2017 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2018 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2019 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2020 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2021 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2022 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2023 return Err(ReceiveError {
2024 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2025 err_data: Vec::new(),
2026 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2030 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2032 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2035 return Err(ReceiveError {
2036 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2037 err_data: Vec::new(),
2038 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2043 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2046 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2047 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2048 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2052 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2053 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2054 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2056 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2057 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2058 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2059 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2060 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2061 failure_code: $err_code,
2062 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2067 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2068 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2071 let shared_secret = {
2072 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2073 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2077 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2078 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2079 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2080 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2081 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2082 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2083 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2084 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2087 let mut channel_state = None;
2088 macro_rules! return_err {
2089 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2091 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2092 if channel_state.is_none() {
2093 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2095 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2096 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2097 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2098 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2099 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2104 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2106 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2107 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2109 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2110 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2114 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2115 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2117 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2119 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2120 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2121 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2122 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2123 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2125 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2128 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2129 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2131 let blinding_factor = {
2132 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2133 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2134 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2135 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2138 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2140 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2142 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2145 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2146 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2149 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2151 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2152 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2153 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2157 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2158 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2159 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2162 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2163 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2164 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2165 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2170 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2171 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2172 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2173 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2174 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2175 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2176 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2177 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2178 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2179 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2180 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2182 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2185 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2188 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2190 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2191 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2192 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2193 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2194 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2195 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2196 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2198 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2199 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2200 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2201 // we don't have the channel here.
2202 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2204 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2206 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2207 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2208 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2209 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2210 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2211 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2212 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2214 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2215 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2217 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2218 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2219 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2220 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2221 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2223 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2224 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2226 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2227 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2229 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2230 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2231 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2232 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2233 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2234 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2236 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2237 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2239 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2240 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2241 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2242 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2243 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2244 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2245 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2246 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2247 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2248 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2254 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2255 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2256 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2257 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2259 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2260 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2262 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2263 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2264 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2266 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2267 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2269 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2274 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2277 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2278 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2279 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2281 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2282 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2283 if !chan.should_announce() {
2284 return Err(LightningError {
2285 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2286 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2290 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2293 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2294 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2295 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2296 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2297 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2298 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2300 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2301 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2305 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2307 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2308 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2309 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2311 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2312 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2314 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2315 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2316 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2317 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2318 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2319 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2320 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2321 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2324 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2325 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2327 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2333 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2334 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2336 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2337 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2338 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2340 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2341 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2342 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2343 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2344 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2346 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2350 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2351 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2353 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2354 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2355 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2356 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2357 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2358 err: "Payment already completed"
2363 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2364 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2365 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2368 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2370 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2371 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2372 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2373 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2374 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2375 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2376 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2377 total_msat: total_value,
2379 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2383 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2384 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2386 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2387 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2389 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2390 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2392 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2393 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2395 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2396 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2398 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2399 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2400 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2401 channel_state, chan)
2403 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2404 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2405 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2406 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2407 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2408 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2409 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2410 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2411 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2412 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2414 insert_outbound_payment!();
2416 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2417 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2418 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2419 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2420 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2421 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2422 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2423 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2429 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2431 } else { unreachable!(); }
2435 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2436 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2438 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2443 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2445 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2446 /// fields for more info.
2448 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2449 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2450 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2451 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2452 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2453 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2455 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2457 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2458 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2459 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2461 /// In general, a path may raise:
2462 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2463 /// node public key) is specified.
2464 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2465 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2467 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2468 /// relevant updates.
2470 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2471 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2472 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2474 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2475 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2476 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2477 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2479 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2480 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2481 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2482 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2483 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2486 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2487 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2488 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2490 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2491 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2492 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2493 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2494 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2496 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2497 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2499 let mut total_value = 0;
2500 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2501 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2502 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2503 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2504 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2505 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2506 continue 'path_check;
2508 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2509 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2510 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2511 continue 'path_check;
2514 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2515 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2517 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2518 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2520 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2521 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2522 total_value = amt_msat;
2525 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2526 let mut results = Vec::new();
2527 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2528 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2530 let mut has_ok = false;
2531 let mut has_err = false;
2532 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2533 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2534 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2535 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2536 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2537 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2538 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2542 } else if res.is_err() {
2543 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2544 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2547 if has_err && has_ok {
2548 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2551 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2552 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2553 Some(RouteParameters {
2554 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2555 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2556 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2562 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2563 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2564 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2565 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2571 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2573 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2574 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2575 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2576 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2577 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2579 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2580 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2581 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2582 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2583 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2584 if path.len() == 0 {
2585 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2586 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2591 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2592 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2593 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2595 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2596 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2598 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2599 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2600 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2601 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2604 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2606 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2607 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2608 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2611 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2612 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2613 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2616 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2617 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2618 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2623 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2624 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2628 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2631 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2633 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2634 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2635 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2636 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2638 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2639 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2640 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2642 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2643 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2644 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2645 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2648 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2649 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2650 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2651 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2652 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2654 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2662 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2663 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2664 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2665 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2666 /// never reach the recipient.
2668 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2670 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2671 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2673 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2675 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2676 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2677 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2679 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2681 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2682 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2683 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2688 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2689 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2690 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2691 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2693 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2695 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2697 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2698 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2699 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2700 } else { unreachable!(); })
2703 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2705 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2706 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2709 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2710 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2717 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2720 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2722 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2732 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2733 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2734 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2738 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2740 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2741 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2743 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2744 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2746 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2747 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2748 /// keys per-channel).
2750 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2751 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2752 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2754 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2755 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2756 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2758 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2759 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2760 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2763 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2764 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2766 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2770 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2771 let mut output_index = None;
2772 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2773 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2774 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2775 if output_index.is_some() {
2776 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2777 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2780 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2781 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2782 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2785 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2788 if output_index.is_none() {
2789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2790 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2793 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2798 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2799 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2800 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2802 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2805 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2806 // smaller than 500:
2807 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2809 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2810 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2811 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2812 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2813 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2814 /// our network addresses.
2816 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2817 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2819 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2820 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2821 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2822 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2824 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2826 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2827 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2830 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2831 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2834 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2835 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2836 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2838 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2839 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2840 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2841 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2842 rgb, alias, addresses,
2843 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2844 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2846 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2847 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2852 let mut announced_chans = false;
2853 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2854 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2857 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2862 announced_chans = true;
2864 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2865 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2866 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2870 if announced_chans {
2871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2872 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2873 signature: node_announce_sig,
2874 contents: announcement
2880 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2882 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2883 /// Will likely generate further events.
2884 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2887 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2888 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2889 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2890 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2892 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2893 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2895 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2896 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2897 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2898 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2900 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2901 match forward_info {
2902 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2903 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2904 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2905 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2906 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2908 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2909 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2910 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2911 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2912 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2913 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2914 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2916 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2917 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2923 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2924 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2925 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2926 let phantom_shared_secret = {
2927 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2928 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
2931 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2933 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2934 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2935 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2936 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2937 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2939 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2941 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2942 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2946 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2947 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2948 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2949 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2955 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2958 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2961 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2962 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2963 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2964 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2965 // problem, not ours.
2972 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2973 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2974 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2975 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2976 match forward_info {
2977 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2978 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2980 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2981 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2983 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2984 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2985 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2986 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2987 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2988 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2989 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2991 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2993 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2996 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2998 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
2999 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3000 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3006 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3008 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3009 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3010 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3011 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3012 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3013 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3014 // this channel currently :/.
3020 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3021 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3023 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3025 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3027 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3030 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3032 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3033 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3034 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3037 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3039 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3040 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3041 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3042 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3043 // messages when we can.
3044 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3045 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3046 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3053 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3054 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3057 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3058 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3059 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3060 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3061 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3062 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3064 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3065 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3066 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3067 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3068 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3070 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3072 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3076 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3077 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3080 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3081 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3082 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3083 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3084 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3085 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3086 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3087 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3088 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3090 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3098 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3099 match forward_info {
3100 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3101 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3102 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3103 let (cltv_expiry, total_msat, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3104 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3105 (incoming_cltv_expiry, payment_data.total_msat, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3106 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3107 (incoming_cltv_expiry, amt_to_forward, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3109 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3112 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3113 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3114 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3115 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3116 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3117 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3118 phantom_shared_secret,
3120 value: amt_to_forward,
3127 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3129 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3130 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3131 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3133 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3134 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3135 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3136 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3137 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3138 phantom_shared_secret,
3140 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3145 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3146 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3147 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3148 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3149 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3150 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3151 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3152 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3153 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3157 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3158 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3159 total_value += htlc.value;
3160 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3161 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3162 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3163 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3164 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3165 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3167 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3169 _ => unreachable!(),
3172 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3174 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3175 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3176 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3177 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3178 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3180 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3181 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3182 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3186 payment_received_generated = true;
3188 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3189 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3191 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3193 payment_received_generated
3197 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3198 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3199 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3200 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3201 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3202 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3203 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3204 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3206 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3207 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3208 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3209 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3211 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3215 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3216 check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3218 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3219 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3221 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3222 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3224 amt: amt_to_forward,
3225 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3230 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3238 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3242 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3245 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3247 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3248 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3250 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3251 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3253 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3254 if payment_received_generated {
3255 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3261 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3262 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3270 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3271 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3273 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3275 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3276 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3279 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3280 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3281 events.append(&mut new_events);
3284 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3286 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3287 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3289 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3290 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3291 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3292 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3293 if background_events.is_empty() {
3297 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3299 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3300 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3301 // monitor updating completing.
3302 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3309 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3310 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3311 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3312 self.process_background_events();
3315 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3316 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3317 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3318 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3320 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3321 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3323 if !chan.is_live() {
3324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3325 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3326 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3329 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3331 let mut retain_channel = true;
3332 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3335 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3336 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3340 let ret_err = match res {
3341 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3342 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3343 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3344 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3348 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3349 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3350 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3351 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3352 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3353 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3354 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3364 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3368 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3369 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3370 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3371 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3372 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3373 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3374 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3376 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3378 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3380 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3381 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3382 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3383 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3384 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3385 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3386 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3388 handle_errors.push(err);
3398 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3400 /// This currently includes:
3401 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3402 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3403 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3406 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3407 /// estimate fetches.
3408 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3409 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3410 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3411 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3413 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3415 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3416 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3418 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3419 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3420 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3421 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3422 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3423 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3424 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3425 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3427 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3429 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3431 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3432 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3433 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3434 if needs_close { return false; }
3437 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3438 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3439 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3440 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3441 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3442 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3443 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3444 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3448 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3449 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3451 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3452 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3453 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3457 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3458 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3466 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3467 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3468 // This should be unreachable
3469 debug_assert!(false);
3472 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3473 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3474 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3475 if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3477 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3478 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3479 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3481 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3489 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3490 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3493 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3494 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3500 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3501 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3502 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3503 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3504 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3505 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3508 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3509 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3510 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3511 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3512 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3513 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3514 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3515 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3516 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3517 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3518 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3524 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3525 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3527 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3529 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3530 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3531 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3532 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3533 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3534 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3535 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3537 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3539 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3540 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3542 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3547 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3548 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3549 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3550 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3551 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3552 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3553 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3554 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3555 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3557 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3558 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3559 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3561 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3562 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3563 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3564 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3565 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3569 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3570 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3571 // be surfaced to the user.
3572 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3573 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3575 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3576 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3577 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3579 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3583 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3584 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3585 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3587 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3588 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3589 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3590 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3591 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3592 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3593 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3594 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3595 Some(RouteParameters {
3596 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3597 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3598 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3602 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3603 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3605 rejected_by_dest: false,
3606 network_update: None,
3607 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3609 short_channel_id: None,
3616 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3617 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3619 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3632 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3633 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3634 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3635 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3636 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3637 /// still-available channels.
3638 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3639 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3640 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3641 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3644 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3645 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3646 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3648 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3649 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3650 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3651 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3652 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3653 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3654 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3655 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3659 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3663 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3664 all_paths_failed = true;
3665 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3666 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3668 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3677 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3678 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3679 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3680 Some(RouteParameters {
3681 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3682 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3683 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3686 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3688 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3689 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3691 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3693 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3694 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3695 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3696 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3697 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3698 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3699 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3700 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3707 error_code: onion_error_code,
3709 error_data: onion_error_data
3712 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3718 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3719 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3720 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3721 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3723 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3724 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3725 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3726 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3727 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3728 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3729 network_update: None,
3732 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3735 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3737 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3741 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3742 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3743 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3745 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3746 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3747 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3748 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3749 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3750 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3751 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3752 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3754 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3755 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3758 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3759 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3760 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3764 let mut forward_event = None;
3765 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3766 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3768 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3770 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3773 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3776 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3777 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3778 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3779 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3780 time_forwardable: time
3787 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3788 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3790 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3791 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3792 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3793 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3795 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3796 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3798 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3799 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3800 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3801 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3802 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3803 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3805 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3807 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3808 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3809 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3810 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3812 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3813 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3814 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3815 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3817 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3818 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3819 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3820 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3821 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3823 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3824 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3825 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3831 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3832 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3833 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3835 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3836 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3837 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3838 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3840 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3841 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3843 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3844 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3845 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3846 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3847 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3848 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3849 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3850 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3852 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3853 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3854 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3855 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3856 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3857 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3859 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3864 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3865 // which were generated.
3866 channel_state.take();
3868 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3869 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3870 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3877 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3878 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3879 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3880 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3881 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3883 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3887 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3888 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3889 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3890 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3891 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3892 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3893 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3894 payment_preimage, e);
3895 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3896 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3897 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3898 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3901 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3902 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3903 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3904 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3905 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3906 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3907 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3908 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3909 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3910 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3916 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3918 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3921 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3922 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3923 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3924 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3925 payment_preimage, e);
3927 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3928 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3930 chan.remove_entry();
3932 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3935 } else { unreachable!(); }
3938 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3939 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3940 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3941 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3942 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3943 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3944 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3945 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3946 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3947 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3948 pending_events.push(
3949 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3951 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3956 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3964 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3966 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3967 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3968 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3969 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3970 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3971 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3972 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3973 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3974 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3975 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3976 pending_events.push(
3977 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3978 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3984 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3988 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3989 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3990 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3992 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3993 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3994 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3995 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3996 pending_events.push(
3997 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4005 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4013 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4014 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4015 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4016 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4017 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4018 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4019 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4022 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4023 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4024 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4025 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4026 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4029 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4030 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4031 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4032 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4033 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4034 payment_preimage, e);
4036 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4037 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4038 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4039 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4042 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4043 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4044 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4045 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4049 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4050 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4051 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4054 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4056 let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4057 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4060 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4068 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4069 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4070 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4073 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4076 let chan_restoration_res;
4077 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4078 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4079 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4080 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4084 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4088 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4089 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4090 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4091 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4092 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4093 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4095 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4096 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4097 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4102 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4103 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4106 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4108 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4109 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4110 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4111 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4115 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4118 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4120 /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4121 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4122 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
4124 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4125 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4126 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4127 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4129 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4130 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4131 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4133 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4134 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4136 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4137 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4138 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4148 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4149 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4153 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4154 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4157 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4158 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4159 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4160 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4163 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4168 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4172 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4173 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4176 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4177 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4178 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4179 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4182 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4183 pending_events.push(
4184 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4185 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4186 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4187 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4188 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4189 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4194 entry.insert(channel);
4200 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4201 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4202 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4203 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4206 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4209 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4210 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4215 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4216 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4217 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4218 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4220 user_channel_id: user_id,
4225 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4226 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4227 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4228 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4229 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4230 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4232 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4235 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4240 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4241 // lock before watch_channel
4242 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4244 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4245 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4246 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4247 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4248 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4249 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4250 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4251 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4252 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4253 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4256 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4257 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4258 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4259 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4260 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4261 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4265 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4266 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4267 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4272 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4273 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4282 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4284 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4285 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4286 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4287 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4289 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4290 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4292 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4293 Ok(update) => update,
4294 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4296 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4297 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4298 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4299 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4300 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4301 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4302 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4303 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4313 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4314 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4318 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4319 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4320 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4321 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4323 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4326 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4327 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4328 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4331 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4332 msg: announcement_sigs,
4334 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4335 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4336 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4337 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4338 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4339 // announcement_signatures.
4340 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4341 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4343 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4354 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4355 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4356 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4357 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4358 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4360 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4362 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4363 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4366 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4367 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4368 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4369 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4372 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4373 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4375 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4376 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4377 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4378 let (result, is_permanent) =
4379 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4381 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4387 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4389 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4399 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4403 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4407 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4408 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4410 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4411 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4413 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4416 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4417 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4419 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4424 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4425 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4426 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4427 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4428 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4429 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4430 } else { (tx, None) }
4432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4435 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4436 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4437 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4439 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4440 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4441 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4442 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4446 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4451 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4452 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4453 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4454 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4456 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4457 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4458 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4459 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4461 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4462 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4464 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4466 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4470 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4471 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4472 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4473 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4474 match pending_forward_info {
4475 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4476 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4477 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4478 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4480 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4482 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4483 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4484 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4487 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4489 _ => pending_forward_info
4492 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4499 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4500 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4501 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4502 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4503 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4505 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4508 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4513 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4517 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4518 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4520 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4522 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4523 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4525 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4527 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4532 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4533 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4534 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4535 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4537 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4540 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4541 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4542 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4544 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4551 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4552 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4553 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4554 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4556 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4557 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4559 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4560 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4561 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4562 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4563 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4564 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4565 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4570 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4571 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4573 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4574 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4575 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4577 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4579 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4580 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4581 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4582 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4583 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4584 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4586 commitment_signed: msg,
4592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4597 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4598 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4599 let mut forward_event = None;
4600 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4601 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4602 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4603 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4605 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4606 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4607 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4608 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4609 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4612 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4613 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4616 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4617 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4622 match forward_event {
4624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4625 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4626 time_forwardable: time
4634 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4635 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4637 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4638 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4639 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4641 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4642 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4644 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4645 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4646 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4647 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4648 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4649 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4650 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4651 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4652 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4653 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4654 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4656 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4657 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4658 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4659 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4660 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4662 } else { unreachable!(); }
4665 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4667 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4671 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4672 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4673 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4674 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4675 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4680 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4682 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4683 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4685 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4688 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4689 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4696 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4697 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4698 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4699 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4701 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4702 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4704 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4711 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4712 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4713 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4715 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4717 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4718 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4720 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4721 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4724 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4725 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4726 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4727 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4728 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4729 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4737 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4738 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4739 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4740 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4741 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4742 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4744 // It's not a local channel
4745 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4750 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4751 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4752 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4753 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4754 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4755 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4759 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4760 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4761 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4762 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4764 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4769 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4772 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4773 let chan_restoration_res;
4774 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4780 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4781 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4783 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4784 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4785 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4786 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4787 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4788 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4789 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4790 let mut channel_update = None;
4791 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4792 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4793 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4796 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4797 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4798 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4799 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4800 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4801 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4802 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4807 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4808 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4809 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4810 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4811 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4814 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4819 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4820 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4822 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4823 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4828 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4829 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4830 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4831 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4832 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4833 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4834 match monitor_event {
4835 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4836 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4837 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4838 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4840 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4841 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4844 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4845 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4846 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4848 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4849 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4850 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4851 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4852 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4853 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4854 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4858 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4859 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4861 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4863 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4864 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4865 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4866 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4867 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4872 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4873 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4878 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4879 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4882 has_pending_monitor_events
4885 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4886 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4887 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4889 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4890 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4893 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4894 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4895 /// update was applied.
4897 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4898 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4899 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4900 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4901 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4902 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4903 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4904 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4906 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4907 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4908 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4909 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4910 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4912 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4913 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4914 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4915 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4916 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4918 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4919 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4920 has_monitor_update = true;
4921 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4922 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4923 if close_channel { return false; }
4925 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4926 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4927 updates: commitment_update,
4934 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4935 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4936 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4943 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4944 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4945 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4948 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4949 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4955 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4956 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4957 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4958 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4959 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4960 let mut has_update = false;
4962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4964 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4965 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4966 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4968 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4969 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4970 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4971 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4973 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4974 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4977 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4978 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4979 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4980 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4981 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4986 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4988 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4989 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4990 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
4996 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4997 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5004 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5005 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5011 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5012 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5014 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5015 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5016 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5017 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5018 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5019 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5020 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5021 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5022 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5023 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5024 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5025 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5026 assert!(should_broadcast);
5027 } else { unreachable!(); }
5028 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5030 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5034 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5035 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5037 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5038 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5041 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5044 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5045 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5047 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5048 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5049 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5050 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5051 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5052 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5053 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5054 // never fail a payment too early.
5055 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5057 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5065 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5068 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5069 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5071 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5072 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5073 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5075 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5077 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5078 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5082 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5083 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5085 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5087 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5088 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5089 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5090 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5091 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5092 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5095 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5096 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5098 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5101 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5103 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5105 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5106 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5107 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5108 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5109 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5112 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5113 /// stored external to LDK.
5115 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5116 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5117 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5119 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5120 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5123 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5124 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5125 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5126 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5128 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5129 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5130 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5131 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5132 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5134 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5135 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5136 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5137 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5138 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5140 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5141 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5143 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5144 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5148 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5149 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5151 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5153 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5154 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5155 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5156 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5159 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5160 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5162 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5165 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5167 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5169 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5170 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5173 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5174 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5176 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5177 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5178 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5181 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5182 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5184 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5185 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5186 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5187 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5189 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5190 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5191 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5192 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5198 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5200 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5201 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5203 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5204 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5205 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5210 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5211 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5212 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5213 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5218 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5219 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5223 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5224 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5228 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5229 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5230 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5231 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5235 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5236 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5237 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5238 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5240 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5241 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5242 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5243 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5246 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5247 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5249 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5250 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5253 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5254 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5255 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5257 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5258 events.replace(pending_events);
5267 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5269 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5270 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5271 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5272 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5275 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5277 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5278 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5280 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5281 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5282 /// restarting from an old state.
5283 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5284 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5285 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5287 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5288 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5289 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5290 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5293 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5294 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5295 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5298 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5299 handler.handle_event(&event);
5307 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5309 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5310 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5311 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5315 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5317 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5318 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5319 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5320 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5321 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5324 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5325 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5328 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5330 let new_height = height - 1;
5332 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5333 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5334 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5335 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5336 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5337 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5340 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5344 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5346 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5347 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5348 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5352 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5353 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5354 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5355 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5357 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5358 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5361 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5362 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5364 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5365 if height < last_best_block_height {
5366 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5367 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5371 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5372 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5373 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5374 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5376 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5377 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5381 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5383 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5385 macro_rules! max_time {
5386 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5388 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5389 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5390 // having an explicit local time source.
5391 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5392 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5393 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5394 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5395 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5401 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5402 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5403 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5404 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5405 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5408 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5409 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5410 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5411 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5412 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5413 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5414 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5415 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5416 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5424 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5425 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5426 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5427 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5428 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5429 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5435 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5437 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5438 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5439 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5440 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5441 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5442 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5447 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5449 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5450 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5451 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5455 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5456 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5458 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5459 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5460 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5461 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5462 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5464 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5465 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5467 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5469 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5470 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5471 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5472 let res = f(channel);
5473 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5474 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5475 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5476 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5480 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5481 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5482 if channel.is_usable() {
5483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5484 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5485 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5486 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5494 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5496 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5497 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5498 msg: announcement_sigs,
5500 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5501 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5504 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5505 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5506 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5511 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5513 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5514 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5515 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5516 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5517 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5521 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5522 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5523 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5524 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5525 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5526 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5527 data: reason_message,
5535 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5536 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5537 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5538 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5539 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5540 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5541 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5542 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5543 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5544 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5545 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5546 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5547 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5552 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5557 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5559 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5560 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5564 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5565 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5566 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5569 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5570 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5571 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5572 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5575 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5576 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5578 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5579 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5582 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5583 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5584 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5585 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5586 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5590 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5591 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5592 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5593 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5597 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5598 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5599 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5600 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5601 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5602 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5605 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5607 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5610 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5612 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5615 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5617 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5620 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5622 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5625 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5627 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5630 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5632 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5635 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5637 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5640 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5642 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5645 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5647 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5650 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5652 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5655 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5657 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5660 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5662 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5665 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5670 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5672 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5675 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5680 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5681 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5682 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5685 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5690 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5695 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5697 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5698 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5701 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5702 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5703 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5704 if no_connection_possible {
5705 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5706 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5707 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5708 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5709 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5710 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5715 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5722 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5723 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5724 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5725 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5726 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5727 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5728 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5731 no_channels_remain = false;
5737 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5741 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5742 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5744 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5745 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5747 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5750 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5751 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5752 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5754 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5762 if no_channels_remain {
5763 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5766 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5767 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5771 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5772 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5777 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5778 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5780 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5781 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5785 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5791 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5792 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5793 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5794 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5795 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5796 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5797 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5798 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5803 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5804 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5810 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5813 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5816 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5817 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5818 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5819 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5820 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5825 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5826 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5827 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5828 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5831 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5832 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5833 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5841 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5842 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5847 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5848 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5849 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5850 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5851 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5852 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5855 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5858 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5864 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5865 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5870 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5871 let result = *guard;
5879 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5880 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5881 let current_time = Instant::now();
5883 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5884 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5889 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5890 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5891 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5892 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5893 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5895 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5896 let result = *guard;
5897 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5901 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5902 None => return result,
5908 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5910 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5911 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5912 *persistence_lock = true;
5913 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5918 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5919 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5921 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5922 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5923 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5924 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5927 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5928 (2, node_id, required),
5929 (4, features, required),
5930 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5931 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5932 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5933 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5936 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5937 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
5938 (2, channel_id, required),
5939 (3, channel_type, option),
5940 (4, counterparty, required),
5941 (6, funding_txo, option),
5942 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5943 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5944 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5945 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5946 (16, balance_msat, required),
5947 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5948 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
5949 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
5950 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
5951 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5952 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5953 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5954 (26, is_outbound, required),
5955 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5956 (30, is_usable, required),
5957 (32, is_public, required),
5958 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5959 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5962 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5963 (2, channels, vec_type),
5964 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5965 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5968 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5970 (0, onion_packet, required),
5971 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5974 (0, payment_data, required),
5975 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5976 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5978 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5979 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5980 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5984 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5985 (0, routing, required),
5986 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5987 (4, payment_hash, required),
5988 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5989 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5993 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5994 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5996 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5998 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5999 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6000 reason.write(writer)?;
6002 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6003 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6006 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6007 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6008 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6009 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6016 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6017 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6018 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6021 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6022 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6023 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6024 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6028 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6029 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6030 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6031 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6032 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6035 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6036 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6037 // messages contained in the variants.
6038 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6039 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6040 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6042 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6043 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6044 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6045 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6046 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6049 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6050 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6051 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6052 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6053 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6055 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6060 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6065 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6066 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6067 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6068 (2, outpoint, required),
6069 (4, htlc_id, required),
6070 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6073 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6074 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6075 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6076 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6079 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6080 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6081 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6083 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6084 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6085 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6086 (2, self.value, required),
6087 (4, payment_data, option),
6088 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6089 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6095 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6096 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6097 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6099 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6100 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6101 let mut total_msat = None;
6102 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6103 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6104 (0, prev_hop, required),
6105 (1, total_msat, option),
6106 (2, value, required),
6107 (4, payment_data, option),
6108 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6109 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6111 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6113 if payment_data.is_some() {
6114 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6116 if total_msat.is_none() {
6117 total_msat = Some(value);
6119 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6122 if payment_data.is_none() {
6123 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6125 if total_msat.is_none() {
6126 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6128 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6132 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6135 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6142 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6143 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6144 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6147 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6148 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6149 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6150 let mut payment_id = None;
6151 let mut payment_secret = None;
6152 let mut payment_params = None;
6153 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6154 (0, session_priv, required),
6155 (1, payment_id, option),
6156 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6157 (3, payment_secret, option),
6158 (4, path, vec_type),
6159 (5, payment_params, option),
6161 if payment_id.is_none() {
6162 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6164 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6166 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6167 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6168 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6169 path: path.unwrap(),
6170 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6175 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6176 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6181 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6182 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6184 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6186 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6187 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6188 (0, session_priv, required),
6189 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6190 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6191 (3, payment_secret, option),
6192 (4, path, vec_type),
6193 (5, payment_params, option),
6196 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6198 field.write(writer)?;
6205 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6206 (0, LightningError) => {
6210 (0, failure_code, required),
6211 (2, data, vec_type),
6215 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6217 (0, forward_info, required),
6218 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6219 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6220 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6223 (0, htlc_id, required),
6224 (2, err_packet, required),
6228 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6229 (0, payment_secret, required),
6230 (2, expiry_time, required),
6231 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6232 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6233 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6236 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6238 (0, session_privs, required),
6241 (0, session_privs, required),
6242 (1, payment_hash, option),
6245 (0, session_privs, required),
6246 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6247 (2, payment_hash, required),
6248 (4, payment_secret, option),
6249 (6, total_msat, required),
6250 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6251 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6254 (0, session_privs, required),
6255 (2, payment_hash, required),
6259 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6260 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6261 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6262 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6263 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6266 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6267 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6269 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6271 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6273 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6274 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6275 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6278 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6279 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6280 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6281 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6282 unfunded_channels += 1;
6285 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6286 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6287 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6288 channel.write(writer)?;
6292 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6293 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6294 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6295 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6296 for forward in pending_forwards {
6297 forward.write(writer)?;
6301 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6302 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6303 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6304 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6305 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6306 htlc.write(writer)?;
6310 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6311 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6312 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6313 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6314 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6315 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6318 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6319 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6320 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6321 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6322 for event in events.iter() {
6323 event.write(writer)?;
6326 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6327 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6328 for event in background_events.iter() {
6330 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6332 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6333 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6338 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6339 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6341 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6342 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6343 hash.write(writer)?;
6344 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6347 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6348 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6349 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6350 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6351 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6354 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6355 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6357 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6358 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6359 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6360 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6363 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6364 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6368 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6369 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6370 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6372 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6373 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6374 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6379 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6380 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6381 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6382 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6383 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6390 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6392 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6394 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6395 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6396 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6397 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6398 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6399 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6400 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6401 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6402 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6403 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6404 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6405 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6406 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6408 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6409 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6411 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6412 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6414 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6415 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6416 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6417 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6418 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6419 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6421 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6422 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6423 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6424 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6425 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6426 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6429 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6430 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6432 pub keys_manager: K,
6434 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6436 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6437 pub fee_estimator: F,
6438 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6440 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6441 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6442 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6443 pub chain_monitor: M,
6445 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6446 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6447 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6448 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6449 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6450 /// deserialization.
6452 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6453 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6454 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6456 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6457 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6459 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6460 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6461 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6462 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6464 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6467 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6468 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6471 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6472 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6473 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6475 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6479 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6480 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6481 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6482 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6483 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6485 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6486 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6491 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6492 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6493 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6494 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6495 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6496 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6497 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6498 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6501 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6502 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6503 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6507 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6508 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6509 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6510 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6511 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6512 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6515 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6516 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6518 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6524 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6525 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6526 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6527 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6528 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6529 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6530 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6531 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6532 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6533 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6534 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6535 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6536 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6537 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6538 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6539 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6540 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6541 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6542 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6543 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6544 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6545 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6547 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6548 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6549 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6550 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6551 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6552 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6553 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6554 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6555 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6556 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6557 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6558 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6559 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6560 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6561 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6562 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6565 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6566 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6567 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6569 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6572 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6573 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6574 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6575 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6576 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6581 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6582 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6583 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6584 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6588 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6589 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6590 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6591 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6592 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6593 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6594 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6595 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6596 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6598 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6601 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6602 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6603 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6604 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6607 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6608 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6610 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6613 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6615 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6616 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6617 let peer_state = PeerState {
6618 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6620 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6623 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6624 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6625 for _ in 0..event_count {
6626 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6627 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6631 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6632 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6633 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6634 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6635 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6636 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6637 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6638 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6642 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6643 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6644 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6645 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6646 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6647 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6651 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6652 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6656 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6657 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6658 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6662 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6664 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6665 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6666 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6668 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6670 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6675 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6676 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6677 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6678 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6679 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6680 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6681 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6682 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6683 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6684 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6686 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6687 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6690 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6691 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6692 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6693 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6694 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6695 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6697 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6699 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6700 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6701 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6702 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6703 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6704 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6705 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6707 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6708 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6709 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6710 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6711 if path.is_empty() {
6712 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6715 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6716 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6717 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6718 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6720 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6721 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6722 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6725 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6726 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6727 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6728 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6730 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6731 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6732 total_msat: path_amt,
6733 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6735 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6736 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6745 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6746 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6748 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6749 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6752 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6754 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6756 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6757 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6758 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6759 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6760 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6764 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6765 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6766 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6767 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6769 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6770 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6771 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6773 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6774 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6775 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6776 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6777 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6778 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6780 if chan.is_usable() {
6781 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6782 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6783 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6784 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6785 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6790 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6791 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6792 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6794 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6795 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6796 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6798 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6800 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6805 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6807 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6808 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6809 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6811 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6812 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6818 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6819 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6821 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6823 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6824 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6825 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6826 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6828 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6829 logger: args.logger,
6830 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6833 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6834 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6837 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6838 //connection or two.
6840 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6846 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6847 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6848 use core::time::Duration;
6849 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6850 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6851 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6852 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6853 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6854 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6856 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6857 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6858 use util::errors::APIError;
6859 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6860 use util::test_utils;
6861 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6863 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6865 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6866 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6868 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6871 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6872 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6874 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6875 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6876 thread::spawn(move || {
6878 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6879 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6880 *persistence_lock = true;
6883 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6889 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6890 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6892 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6895 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6900 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6902 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6905 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6912 fn test_notify_limits() {
6913 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6914 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6915 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6916 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6917 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6918 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6920 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6921 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6922 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6923 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6924 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6926 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6928 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6929 // to connect messages with new values
6930 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6931 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6932 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6933 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6935 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6936 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6937 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6938 // ... but the last node should not.
6939 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6940 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6941 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6942 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6944 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6945 // about the channel.
6946 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6947 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6948 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6950 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6952 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6953 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6954 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6955 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6956 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6957 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6959 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6960 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6961 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6963 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6964 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6965 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6966 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6967 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6968 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6970 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6971 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6972 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6973 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6974 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6975 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6977 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6979 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6980 // the channel info has updated.
6981 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6982 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6983 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6984 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6985 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6986 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6990 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6991 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6996 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6997 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6999 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7000 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7001 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7002 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7003 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7004 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7005 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7007 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7008 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7009 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7011 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7012 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7014 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7016 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7017 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7018 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7020 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7021 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7022 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7024 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7025 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7026 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7027 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7028 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7029 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7030 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7031 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7032 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7034 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7035 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7037 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7039 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7041 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7042 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7043 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7044 // lightning messages manually.
7045 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7047 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7048 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7049 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7051 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7052 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7054 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7055 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7057 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7058 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7059 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7061 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7062 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7063 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7065 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7067 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7069 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7070 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7073 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7074 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7075 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7078 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7079 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7080 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7081 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7086 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7087 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7088 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7089 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7094 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7095 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7096 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7097 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7104 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7105 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7106 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7107 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7108 // fails as expected.
7109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7114 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7115 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7117 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7118 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7119 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7121 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7122 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7123 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7124 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7125 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7127 let route = find_route(
7128 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7129 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7131 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7133 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7135 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7136 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7143 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7144 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7145 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7146 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7147 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7148 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7149 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7150 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7151 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7153 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7154 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7156 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7157 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7158 let route = find_route(
7159 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7160 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7162 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7164 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7166 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7167 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7168 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7170 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7171 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7172 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7174 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7175 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7176 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7177 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7178 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7180 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7181 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7184 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7185 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7186 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7187 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7188 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7189 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7190 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7191 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7192 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7194 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7195 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7199 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7200 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7201 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7205 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7207 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7208 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7209 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7210 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7212 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7213 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7214 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7215 final_value_msat: 10000,
7216 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7218 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7219 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7220 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7221 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7222 let route = find_route(
7223 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7224 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7227 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7228 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7229 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7232 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7233 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7234 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7235 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7236 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7237 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7238 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7240 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7244 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7245 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7251 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7252 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7253 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7254 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7256 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7257 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7258 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7259 final_value_msat: 10000,
7260 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7262 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7263 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7264 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7265 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7266 let route = find_route(
7267 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7268 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7271 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7272 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7273 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7274 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7277 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7278 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7279 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7280 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7281 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7282 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7283 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7285 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7289 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7293 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7295 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7296 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7297 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7298 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7300 // Marshall an MPP route.
7301 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7302 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7303 route.paths.push(path);
7304 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7305 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7306 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7307 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7308 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7309 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7311 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7312 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7313 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7314 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7319 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7320 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7324 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7326 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7327 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7329 total_msat: 100_000,
7332 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7333 // payment verification fails as expected.
7334 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7335 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7336 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7337 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7339 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7343 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7344 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7348 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7351 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7352 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7353 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7354 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7355 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7356 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7357 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7358 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7359 use util::test_utils;
7360 use util::config::UserConfig;
7361 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7363 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7364 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7365 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7367 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7371 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7372 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7373 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7374 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7375 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7376 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7377 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7382 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7383 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7386 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7387 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7388 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7390 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7391 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7393 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7394 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7396 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7397 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7399 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7400 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7401 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7402 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7403 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7405 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7407 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7409 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7410 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7411 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7412 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7413 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7415 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7417 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7419 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7420 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7421 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7422 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7423 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7426 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7427 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7428 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7430 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7431 } else { panic!(); }
7433 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7434 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7436 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7439 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7442 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7443 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7445 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7446 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7447 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7448 match msg_events[0] {
7449 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7450 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7451 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7455 match msg_events[1] {
7456 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7460 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7462 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7463 macro_rules! send_payment {
7464 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7465 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7466 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7467 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7468 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7469 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7470 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7471 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7472 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7473 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7475 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7476 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7478 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7479 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7481 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7482 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7483 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7484 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7485 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7486 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7487 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7488 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7490 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7491 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7492 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7494 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7495 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7496 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7497 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7498 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7500 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7503 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7504 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7505 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7506 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7508 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7513 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7514 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);