1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
499 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500 self.chan_id.is_some()
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
518 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
525 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531 (0, amount_msat, required),
532 (2, payment_purpose, required),
533 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547 /// failed/claimed by the user.
549 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
552 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
572 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573 /// are regenerated on startup.
574 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576 /// channel to continue normal operation.
578 /// In general this should be used rather than
579 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
590 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
593 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595 channel_id: ChannelId,
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604 /// event can be generated.
605 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607 /// operation of another channel.
609 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
614 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615 event: events::Event,
616 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628 // downgrades to prior versions.
629 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
654 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656 channel_id: ChannelId,
657 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
680 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
684 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690 latest_features: InitFeatures,
691 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695 /// user but which have not yet completed.
697 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699 /// for a missing channel.
700 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
704 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
709 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
735 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
740 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
745 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755 /// The original OpenChannel message.
756 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777 /// this payment being removed.
779 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780 user_payment_id: u64,
781 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
804 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
806 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
833 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
835 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
842 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
844 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
846 pub trait AChannelManager {
847 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
848 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
849 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
850 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
851 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
852 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
853 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
854 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
855 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
856 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
857 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
858 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
859 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
860 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
861 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
862 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
863 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
864 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
865 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
866 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
867 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
868 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
869 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
870 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
871 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
872 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
873 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
874 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
875 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
876 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
877 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
878 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
879 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
880 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
881 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
882 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
885 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
886 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
888 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
889 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
890 ES::Target: EntropySource,
891 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
892 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
897 type Watch = M::Target;
899 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
901 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
903 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
905 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
906 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
908 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
910 type Router = R::Target;
912 type Logger = L::Target;
914 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
917 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
918 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
920 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
921 /// to individual Channels.
923 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
924 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
925 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
926 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
928 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
929 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
930 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
931 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
932 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
933 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
934 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
935 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
936 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
938 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
939 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
940 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
942 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
943 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
944 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
945 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
946 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
948 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
949 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
950 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
951 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
953 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
954 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
955 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
957 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
958 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
959 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
960 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
961 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
963 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
964 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
965 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
966 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
967 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
968 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
969 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
970 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
973 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
974 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
975 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
976 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
977 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
981 // `total_consistency_lock`
983 // |__`forward_htlcs`
985 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
987 // |__`per_peer_state`
989 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
991 // | |__`claimable_payments`
993 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
999 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
1001 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1003 // | |__`best_block`
1005 // | |__`pending_events`
1007 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1009 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1011 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1012 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1013 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1014 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1015 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1016 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1020 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1021 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1022 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1028 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1030 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1032 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1033 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1035 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1036 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1037 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1038 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1040 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1041 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1043 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1044 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1045 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1046 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1047 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1048 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1049 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1050 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1052 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1054 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1055 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1057 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1059 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1060 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1061 /// and via the classic SCID.
1063 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1064 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1066 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1068 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1070 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1071 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1072 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1074 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1075 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1077 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1078 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1080 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1081 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1083 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1084 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1085 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1086 /// active channel list on load.
1088 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1089 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1091 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1093 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1094 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1095 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1097 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1098 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1099 /// the handling of the events.
1101 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1102 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1105 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1106 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1107 /// would break backwards compatability.
1108 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1109 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1110 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1112 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1113 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1115 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1117 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1118 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1119 /// confirmation depth.
1121 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1122 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1123 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1125 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1127 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1129 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1131 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1133 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1135 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1136 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1137 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1139 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1140 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1142 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1143 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1144 /// keeping additional state.
1145 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1147 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1148 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1149 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1150 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1152 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1153 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1155 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1156 /// are currently open with that peer.
1158 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1159 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1162 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1164 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1165 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1166 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1167 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1168 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1170 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1171 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1172 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1173 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1174 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1176 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1177 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1179 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1180 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1181 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1182 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1183 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1185 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1186 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1188 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1189 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1190 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1191 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1192 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1194 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1196 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1198 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1199 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1200 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1201 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1202 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1203 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1204 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1205 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1206 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1207 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1208 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1210 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1211 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1212 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1214 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1216 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1217 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1221 signer_provider: SP,
1226 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1228 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1229 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1230 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1231 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1232 pub struct ChainParameters {
1233 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1234 pub network: Network,
1236 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1238 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1239 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1242 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1246 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1247 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1250 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1251 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1252 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1253 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1254 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1255 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1257 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1258 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1259 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1260 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1261 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1262 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1264 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1265 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1268 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1269 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1270 /// events to handle.
1272 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1273 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1275 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1276 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1279 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1280 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1281 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1282 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1284 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1285 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1286 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1287 should_persist: move || {
1288 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1289 // processing and return that.
1290 let notify = persist_check();
1291 match (notify, force_notify) {
1292 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1293 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1294 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1295 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1296 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1299 _read_guard: read_guard,
1303 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1304 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1305 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1306 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1307 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1308 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1310 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1311 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1312 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1313 should_persist: persist_check,
1314 _read_guard: read_guard,
1319 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1320 fn drop(&mut self) {
1321 match (self.should_persist)() {
1322 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1323 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1324 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1326 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1327 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1328 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1333 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1334 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1336 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1338 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1339 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1340 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1341 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1342 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1344 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1345 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1347 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1349 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1350 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1351 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1352 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1353 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1354 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1355 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1356 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1357 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1358 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1359 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1360 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1361 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1363 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1364 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1366 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1367 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1368 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1369 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1371 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1372 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1373 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1374 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1375 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1376 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1379 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1381 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1382 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1385 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1387 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1388 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1390 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1391 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1392 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1394 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1395 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1396 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1398 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1399 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1400 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1401 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1403 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1404 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1405 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1407 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1408 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1409 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1411 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1412 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1413 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1414 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1415 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1416 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1417 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1418 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1419 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1420 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1421 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1424 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1425 /// to better separate parameters.
1426 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1427 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1428 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1429 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1430 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1431 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1432 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1433 pub features: InitFeatures,
1434 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1435 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1436 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1438 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1440 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1441 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1442 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1443 /// payments to us through this channel.
1444 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1445 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1446 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1447 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1448 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1449 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1450 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1453 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1455 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1456 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1457 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1458 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1459 /// lifetime of the channel.
1460 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1461 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1462 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1463 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1464 /// our counterparty already.
1466 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1467 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1468 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1469 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1471 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1472 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1473 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1474 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1476 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1477 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1479 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1480 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1482 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1483 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1484 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1485 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1486 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1487 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1488 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1489 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1490 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1493 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1495 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1496 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1497 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1498 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1499 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1500 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1501 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1503 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1504 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1506 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1507 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1508 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1509 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1510 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1511 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1512 /// this value on chain.
1514 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1516 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1518 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1519 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1520 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1521 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1522 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1523 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1524 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1526 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1527 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1528 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1529 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1530 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1531 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1533 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1534 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1535 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1536 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1537 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1539 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1540 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1541 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1542 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1544 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1545 pub balance_msat: u64,
1546 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1547 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1548 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1549 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1551 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1553 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1554 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1555 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1556 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1557 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1558 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1559 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1560 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1562 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1563 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1564 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1565 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1566 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1567 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1568 /// route which is valid.
1569 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1570 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1571 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1572 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1573 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1574 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1576 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1577 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1578 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1579 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1580 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1581 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1582 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1583 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1584 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1586 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1588 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1589 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1590 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1591 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1592 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1594 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1595 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1596 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1597 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1598 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1599 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1600 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1602 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1603 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1604 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1605 pub is_outbound: bool,
1606 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1607 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1608 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1609 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1610 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1612 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1613 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1614 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1615 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1616 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1617 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1618 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1620 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1621 pub is_usable: bool,
1622 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1623 pub is_public: bool,
1624 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1625 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1626 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1627 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1628 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1629 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1631 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1632 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1635 impl ChannelDetails {
1636 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1637 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1638 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1640 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1641 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1642 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1643 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1646 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1647 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1648 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1650 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1651 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1652 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1653 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1656 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1657 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1658 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1661 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1662 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1664 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1665 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1666 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1668 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1669 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1670 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1671 features: latest_features,
1672 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1673 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1674 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1675 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1676 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1677 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1678 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1679 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1680 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1681 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1683 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1684 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1685 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1686 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1687 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1688 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1689 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1690 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1691 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1692 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1693 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1694 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1695 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1696 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1697 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1698 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1699 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1700 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1701 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1702 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1703 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1704 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1705 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1706 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1707 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1708 config: Some(context.config()),
1709 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1714 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1715 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1716 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1717 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1718 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1719 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1720 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1721 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1722 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1724 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1726 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1727 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1729 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1730 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1731 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1732 /// to drop the channel.
1736 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1737 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1738 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1739 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1740 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1742 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1743 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1744 payment_id: PaymentId,
1746 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1748 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1749 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1750 payment_id: PaymentId,
1751 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1753 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1754 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1755 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1758 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1759 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1760 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1762 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1763 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1764 payment_id: PaymentId,
1765 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1766 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1767 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1769 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1770 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1771 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1773 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1774 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1775 payment_id: PaymentId,
1776 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1777 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1781 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1783 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1785 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1786 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1787 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1788 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1790 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1791 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1792 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1795 macro_rules! handle_error {
1796 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1797 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1798 // entering the macro.
1799 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1800 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1804 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1805 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1807 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1808 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1809 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1810 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1814 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1815 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1816 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1817 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1818 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1819 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1824 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1825 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1827 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1828 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1829 action: err.action.clone()
1833 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1834 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1835 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1836 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1837 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1841 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1846 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1849 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1850 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1851 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1857 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1858 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1859 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1860 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1861 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1862 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1864 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1865 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1866 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1867 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1868 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1870 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1871 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1873 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1877 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1878 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1879 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1881 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1882 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1884 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1885 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1887 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1888 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1889 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1890 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1891 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1892 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1894 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1895 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1899 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1900 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1902 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1903 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1905 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1906 match $channel_phase {
1907 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1908 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1910 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1911 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1914 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1920 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1921 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1925 let key = *$entry.key();
1926 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1928 $entry.remove_entry();
1936 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1937 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1941 let key = *$entry.key();
1942 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1944 $entry.remove_entry();
1952 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1953 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1955 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1956 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1962 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1963 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1964 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1965 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1966 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1968 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1969 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1970 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1971 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1972 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1973 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1974 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1975 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1976 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1977 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1982 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1983 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1984 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1985 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1986 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1987 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1988 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1989 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1990 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1992 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1997 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1998 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1999 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2000 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2001 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2002 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2003 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2004 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2005 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2007 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2012 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2013 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2014 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2015 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2016 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2017 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2018 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2019 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2020 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2021 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2022 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2024 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2025 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2026 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2032 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2033 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2035 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2036 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2037 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2038 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2039 updates.announcement_sigs);
2040 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2041 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2044 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2045 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2046 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2047 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2049 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2050 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2051 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2052 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2053 let mut batch_completed = false;
2054 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2055 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2056 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2057 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2059 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2060 channel_state.2 = true;
2062 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2064 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2066 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2069 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2070 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2071 if batch_completed {
2072 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2073 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2074 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2075 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2076 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2077 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2078 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2079 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2080 chan.set_batch_ready();
2081 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2082 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2086 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2087 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2088 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2093 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2095 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2096 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2098 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2099 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2100 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2101 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2106 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2107 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2108 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2110 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2111 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2112 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2113 panic!("{}", err_str);
2115 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2116 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2117 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2120 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2126 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2127 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2128 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2130 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2131 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2132 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2133 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2134 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2135 // filter for uniqueness here.
2136 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2137 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2138 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2139 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2141 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2142 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2144 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2145 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2146 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2152 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2153 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2154 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2155 while !processed_all_events {
2156 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2163 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2164 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2165 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2167 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2168 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2169 result = $self.process_background_events();
2171 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2172 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2173 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2174 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2178 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2179 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2180 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2181 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2184 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2186 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2187 $event_to_handle = event;
2189 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2190 post_event_actions.push(action);
2195 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2196 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2197 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2198 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2199 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2200 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2203 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2204 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2205 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2206 processed_all_events = false;
2210 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2211 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2212 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2214 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2215 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2216 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2222 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2224 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2225 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2226 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2227 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2228 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2233 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2235 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2237 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2238 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2240 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2242 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2243 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2244 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2247 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2248 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2249 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2251 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2252 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2253 current_timestamp: u32,
2255 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2256 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2257 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2258 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2260 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2261 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2262 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2267 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2269 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2270 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2271 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2272 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2273 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2275 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2276 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2278 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2281 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2282 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2284 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2286 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2288 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2290 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2291 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2292 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2293 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2294 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2295 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2296 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2297 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2307 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2308 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2309 &self.default_configuration
2312 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2313 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2314 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2317 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2318 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2320 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2322 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2326 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2331 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2333 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2334 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2335 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2336 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2337 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2339 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2340 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2342 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2343 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2344 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2346 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2347 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2348 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2350 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2351 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2352 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2353 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2354 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2355 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2357 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2358 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2359 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2360 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2361 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2362 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2366 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2367 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2371 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2372 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2374 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2376 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2377 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2378 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2379 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2380 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2381 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2385 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2390 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2392 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2393 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2396 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2398 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2404 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2405 node_id: their_network_key,
2408 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2411 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2412 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2413 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2414 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2415 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2416 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2417 // the same channel.
2418 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2420 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2422 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2423 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2424 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2425 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2426 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2427 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2428 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2432 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2433 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2434 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2442 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2443 /// more information.
2444 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2445 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2446 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2447 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2448 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2449 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2450 // the same channel.
2451 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2453 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2455 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2456 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2457 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2458 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2459 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2460 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2468 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2469 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2471 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2472 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2474 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2475 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2476 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2477 // really wanted anyway.
2478 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2481 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2482 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2483 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2486 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2489 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2490 let context_to_details = |context| {
2491 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2493 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2495 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2496 .map(context_to_details)
2502 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2503 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2505 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2506 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2507 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2509 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2510 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2511 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2512 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2513 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2514 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2516 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2517 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2518 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2520 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2521 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2522 payment_id: *payment_id,
2523 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2524 total_msat: *total_msat,
2527 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2528 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2531 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2533 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2538 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2539 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2540 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2541 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2542 Some(transaction) => {
2543 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2544 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2549 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2550 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2551 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2552 reason: closure_reason,
2553 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2554 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2558 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2561 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2562 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2564 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2566 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2567 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2572 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2574 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2575 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2576 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2577 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2578 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2579 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2580 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2582 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2583 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2584 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2585 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2586 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2590 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2591 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2593 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2594 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2595 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2596 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2600 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2601 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2602 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2603 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2607 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2608 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2615 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2616 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2618 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2619 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2620 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2621 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2626 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2627 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2628 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2632 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2633 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2639 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2640 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2641 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2643 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2644 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2646 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2647 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2648 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2649 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2651 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2653 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2654 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2655 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2658 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2659 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2660 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2661 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2662 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2663 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2666 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2667 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2668 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2670 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2671 /// the channel being closed or not:
2672 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2673 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2674 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2675 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2676 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2677 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2678 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2680 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2681 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2682 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2683 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2685 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2687 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2688 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2689 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2692 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2693 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2694 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2695 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2696 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2699 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2700 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2701 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2702 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2703 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2706 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2707 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2708 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2709 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2710 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2711 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2712 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2714 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2715 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2716 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2717 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2718 // ignore the result here.
2719 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2721 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2722 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2723 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2724 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2726 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2727 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2728 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2729 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2730 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2731 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2732 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2733 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2736 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2739 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2740 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2743 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2744 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2748 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2749 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2750 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2751 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2753 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2754 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2755 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2756 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2757 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2758 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2760 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2762 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2763 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2764 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2765 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2766 mem::drop(peer_state);
2767 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2769 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2770 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2771 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2773 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2774 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2775 // Unfunded channel has no update
2776 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2779 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2780 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2781 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2782 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2784 (None, *peer_node_id)
2786 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2789 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2790 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2791 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2793 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2794 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2795 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2796 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2797 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2803 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2806 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2808 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2809 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2811 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2812 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2813 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2814 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2815 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2816 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2817 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2828 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2829 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2830 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2832 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2833 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2834 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2837 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2838 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2839 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2841 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2842 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2843 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2844 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2848 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2849 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2850 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2851 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2852 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2856 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2857 /// local transaction(s).
2858 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2859 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2860 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2864 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2865 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2866 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2867 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2868 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2869 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2870 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2872 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2873 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2877 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2878 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2879 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2880 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2881 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2882 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2883 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2884 err_data: Vec::new(),
2888 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2889 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2890 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2893 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2894 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2895 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2896 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2897 outgoing_cltv_value,
2898 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2902 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2903 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2904 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2905 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2906 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2907 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2908 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2909 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2911 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2912 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2913 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2915 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2916 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2918 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2919 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2920 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2921 err_data: Vec::new(),
2922 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2926 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2927 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2928 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2929 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2931 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2934 // final_expiry_too_soon
2935 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2936 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2938 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2939 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2940 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2941 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2942 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2943 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2944 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2945 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2946 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2947 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2948 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2951 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2952 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2953 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2955 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2957 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2958 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2962 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2963 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2964 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2965 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2966 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2967 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2968 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2969 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2970 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2971 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2972 err_data: Vec::new(),
2973 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2976 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2977 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2978 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2979 err_data: Vec::new(),
2980 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2983 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2987 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2990 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2991 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2994 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2995 phantom_shared_secret,
2999 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3000 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3001 err_data: Vec::new(),
3002 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3005 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3008 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3009 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3010 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3011 outgoing_cltv_value,
3012 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3016 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3017 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3018 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3019 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3020 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3022 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3023 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3024 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3025 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3026 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3027 failure_code: $err_code,
3033 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3034 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3037 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3038 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3039 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3041 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3042 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3043 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3044 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3045 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3046 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3047 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3048 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3050 macro_rules! return_err {
3051 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3053 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3054 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3055 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3056 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3057 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3058 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3064 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3065 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3066 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3069 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3070 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3072 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3073 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3076 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3077 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3078 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3079 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3082 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3083 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3084 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3086 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3087 // inbound channel's state.
3088 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3089 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3090 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3092 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3096 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3097 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3098 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3099 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3100 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3101 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3102 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3103 // phantom or an intercept.
3104 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3105 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3106 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3110 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3115 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3116 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3117 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3118 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3119 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3123 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3124 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3127 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3128 // have no consistency guarantees.
3129 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3133 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3134 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3135 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3136 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3137 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3139 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3140 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3141 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3142 // we don't have the channel here.
3143 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3145 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3147 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3148 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3149 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3150 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3151 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3152 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3153 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3154 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3155 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3156 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3157 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3159 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3162 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3163 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3165 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3166 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3170 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3171 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3172 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3173 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3175 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3182 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3183 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3184 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3185 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3186 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3187 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3189 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3190 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3192 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3193 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3194 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3195 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3196 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3197 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3198 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3199 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3200 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3201 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3207 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3208 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3209 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3210 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3212 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3213 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3215 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3216 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3217 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3219 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3220 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3221 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3222 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3223 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3224 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3225 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3229 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3231 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3234 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3235 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3236 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3237 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3238 macro_rules! return_err {
3239 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3241 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3242 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3243 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3244 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3245 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3246 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3252 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3254 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3255 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3258 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3259 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3260 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3261 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3262 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3264 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3267 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3268 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3269 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3270 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3271 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3277 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3278 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3279 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3281 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3282 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3283 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3285 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3286 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3287 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3288 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3289 return Err(LightningError {
3290 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3291 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3294 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3295 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3298 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3301 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3302 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3303 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3304 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3306 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3307 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3308 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3310 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3311 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3312 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3314 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3315 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3319 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3322 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3324 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3326 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3327 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3328 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3329 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3330 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3333 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3334 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3336 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3337 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3338 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3339 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3340 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3341 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3342 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3343 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3345 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3346 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3347 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3349 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3351 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3358 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3359 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3360 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3361 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3366 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3367 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3368 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3371 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3372 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3374 log_trace!(self.logger,
3375 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3376 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3377 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3378 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3380 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3381 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3382 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3384 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3385 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3387 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3388 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3389 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3390 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3394 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3395 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3398 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3399 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3400 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3401 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3402 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3404 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3405 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3406 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3408 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3409 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3411 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3412 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3413 Some(monitor_update) => {
3414 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3416 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3417 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3418 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3419 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3420 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3421 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3422 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3430 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3433 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3434 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3435 // `channel_by_id` map.
3436 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3442 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3443 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3445 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3450 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3452 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3453 /// fields for more info.
3455 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3456 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3458 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3460 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3461 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3462 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3463 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3464 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3466 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3467 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3468 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3469 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3470 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3472 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3473 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3474 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3475 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3477 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3479 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3480 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3481 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3483 /// In general, a path may raise:
3484 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3485 /// node public key) is specified.
3486 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3487 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3488 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3489 /// relevant updates.
3491 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3492 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3493 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3495 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3496 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3497 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3498 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3499 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3500 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3501 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3503 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3504 self.pending_outbound_payments
3505 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3506 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3507 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3510 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3511 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3512 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3513 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3515 self.pending_outbound_payments
3516 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3517 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3518 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3519 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3523 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3526 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3527 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3528 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3532 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3533 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3534 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3538 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3539 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3543 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3544 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3545 /// retries are exhausted.
3547 /// # Event Generation
3549 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3550 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3552 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3553 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3554 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3556 /// # Restart Behavior
3558 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3559 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3560 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3562 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3565 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3566 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3567 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3568 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3569 /// never reach the recipient.
3571 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3572 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3574 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3575 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3577 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3578 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3579 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3582 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3583 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3586 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3587 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3589 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3592 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3593 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3596 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3597 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3598 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3599 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3602 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3603 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3604 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3605 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3606 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3608 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3609 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3610 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3613 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3616 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3617 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3620 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3621 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3623 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3624 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3625 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3626 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3627 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3628 let payment_params =
3629 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3631 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3633 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3636 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3637 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3639 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3640 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3641 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3642 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3644 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3645 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3646 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3647 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3648 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3649 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3650 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3651 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3652 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3653 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3655 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3656 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3657 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3658 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3662 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3664 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3665 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3668 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3670 let mut res = Vec::new();
3672 for mut path in route.paths {
3673 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3674 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3675 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3676 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3677 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3680 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3683 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3684 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3686 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3688 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3689 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3694 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3697 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3702 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3703 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3704 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3706 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3707 let used_liquidity =
3708 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3710 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3711 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3713 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3716 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3721 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3722 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3723 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3730 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3731 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3732 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3733 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3734 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3735 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3737 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3738 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3742 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3743 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3744 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3746 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3747 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3748 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3749 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3750 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3751 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3752 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3753 } else { unreachable!(); });
3755 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3756 Err((chan, err)) => {
3757 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3758 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3760 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3762 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3768 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3769 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3771 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3772 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3775 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3776 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3777 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3782 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3785 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3787 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3790 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3791 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3792 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3794 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3801 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3802 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3803 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3807 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3809 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3810 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3812 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3813 /// across the p2p network.
3815 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3816 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3818 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3819 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3820 /// keys per-channel).
3822 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3823 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3824 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3826 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3827 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3828 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3830 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3831 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3832 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3833 /// for more details.
3835 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3836 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3837 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3838 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3841 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3843 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3844 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3846 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3847 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3848 /// signature for each channel.
3850 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3851 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3852 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3853 let mut result = Ok(());
3855 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3856 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3857 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3858 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3859 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3864 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3865 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3866 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3870 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3871 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3872 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3873 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3874 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3875 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3876 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3877 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3882 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3883 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3884 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3885 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3889 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3890 match states.entry(txid) {
3891 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3892 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3893 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3897 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3900 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3901 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3902 temporary_channel_id,
3903 counterparty_node_id,
3904 funding_transaction.clone(),
3907 let mut output_index = None;
3908 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3909 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3910 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3911 if output_index.is_some() {
3912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3913 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3916 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3919 if output_index.is_none() {
3920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3921 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3924 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3925 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3926 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3932 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3933 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3934 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3935 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3936 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3937 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3938 .into_iter().flatten()
3939 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3941 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3942 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3944 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3947 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3948 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3949 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3950 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3952 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3953 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3954 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3958 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3959 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3965 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3967 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3968 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3969 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3970 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3972 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3973 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3975 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3976 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3978 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3980 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3981 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3982 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3983 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3984 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3985 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3986 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3987 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3988 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3989 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3990 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3992 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3999 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4002 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4003 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4004 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4005 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4009 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4010 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4011 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4012 config.apply(config_update);
4013 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4016 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4017 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4018 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4019 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4020 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4021 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4028 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4029 debug_assert!(false);
4030 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4032 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4033 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4040 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4042 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4043 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4044 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4045 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4047 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4048 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4050 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4051 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4053 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4055 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4056 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4057 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4058 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4059 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4060 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4061 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4062 pub fn update_channel_config(
4063 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4064 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4065 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4068 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4069 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4071 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4072 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4074 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4075 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4076 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4077 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4078 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4080 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4081 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4082 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4085 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4088 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4089 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4090 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4091 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4092 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4093 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4096 let next_hop_scid = {
4097 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4098 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4099 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4102 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4103 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4104 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4105 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4106 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4109 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4111 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4112 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4113 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4115 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4116 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4117 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4122 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4123 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4124 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4127 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4128 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4129 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4131 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4133 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4134 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4135 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4136 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4137 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4140 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4141 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4142 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4143 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4144 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4146 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4150 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4151 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4153 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4156 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4157 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4160 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4161 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4162 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4165 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4166 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4167 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4168 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4169 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4170 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4172 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4175 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4176 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4177 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4178 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4183 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4185 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4186 /// Will likely generate further events.
4187 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4190 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4191 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4192 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4194 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4195 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4197 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4198 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4199 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4201 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4202 match forward_info {
4203 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4204 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4205 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4206 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4207 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4210 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4211 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4214 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4215 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4216 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4217 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4218 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4219 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4220 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4223 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4224 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4226 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4229 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4230 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4236 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4237 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4239 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4243 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4244 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4246 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4250 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4251 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4252 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4253 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4254 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4255 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4256 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4259 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4260 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4261 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4262 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4263 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4265 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4267 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4268 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4272 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4273 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4274 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4275 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4277 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4278 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4284 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4287 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4290 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4291 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4292 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4293 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4294 // problem, not ours.
4300 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4301 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4303 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4308 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4309 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4310 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4315 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4316 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4317 match forward_info {
4318 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4319 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4320 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4321 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4322 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4325 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4326 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4327 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4328 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4330 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4332 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4333 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4335 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4336 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4337 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4340 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4343 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4345 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4346 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4347 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4348 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4353 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4354 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4356 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4358 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4359 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4361 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4364 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4366 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4367 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4368 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4375 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4379 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4380 match forward_info {
4381 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4382 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4383 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4384 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4385 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4388 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4389 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4390 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4391 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4392 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4393 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4394 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4396 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4397 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4398 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4402 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4403 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4406 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4409 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4410 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4411 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4412 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4413 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4414 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4415 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4416 phantom_shared_secret,
4418 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4419 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4420 // if routing nodes overpay
4421 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4422 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4424 total_value_received: None,
4425 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4428 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4431 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4433 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4434 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4435 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4436 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4437 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4438 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4440 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4441 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4442 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4443 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4444 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4445 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4446 phantom_shared_secret,
4448 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4449 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4451 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4454 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4455 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4456 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4457 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4458 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4461 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4462 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4463 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4464 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4465 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4466 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4468 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4469 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4472 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4473 .entry(payment_hash)
4474 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4475 .or_insert_with(|| {
4476 committed_to_claimable = true;
4478 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4481 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4482 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4484 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4486 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4488 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4490 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4491 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4492 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4495 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4497 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4498 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4499 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4500 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4501 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4502 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4503 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4505 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4506 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4508 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4510 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4511 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4512 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4513 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4514 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4517 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4518 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4519 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4520 committed_to_claimable = true;
4522 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4523 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4524 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4525 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4526 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4527 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4528 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4529 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4530 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4531 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4535 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4536 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4537 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4538 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4539 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4541 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4543 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4544 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4546 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4547 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4548 committed_to_claimable = true;
4551 payment_claimable_generated
4555 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4556 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4557 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4558 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4559 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4560 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4561 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4562 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4564 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4565 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4566 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4567 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4568 Ok(result) => result,
4570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4571 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4574 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4575 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4576 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4578 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4579 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4582 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4583 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4584 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4586 check_total_value!(purpose);
4588 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4589 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4590 check_total_value!(purpose);
4594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4595 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4596 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4597 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4599 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4600 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4601 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4602 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4603 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4605 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4606 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4608 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4609 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4610 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4612 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4613 if payment_claimable_generated {
4614 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4620 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4621 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4629 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4630 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4631 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4632 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4634 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4637 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4639 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4640 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4641 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4643 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4645 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4646 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4647 events.append(&mut new_events);
4650 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4652 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4653 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4654 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4656 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4658 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4659 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4660 if background_events.is_empty() {
4661 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4664 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4666 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4667 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4668 // monitor updating completing.
4669 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4671 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4672 let mut updated_chan = false;
4674 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4675 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4676 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4677 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4680 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4681 updated_chan = true;
4682 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4683 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4685 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4688 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4693 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4694 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4697 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4698 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4699 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4702 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4703 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4705 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4706 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4707 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4708 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4709 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4715 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4718 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4719 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4720 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4721 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4722 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4725 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4726 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4727 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4728 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4729 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4731 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4733 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4735 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4737 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4738 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4741 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4743 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4744 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4748 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4749 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4750 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4751 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4752 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4753 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4754 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4756 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4757 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4760 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4761 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4763 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4764 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4766 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4771 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4772 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4780 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4782 /// This currently includes:
4783 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4784 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4785 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4787 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4788 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4789 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4790 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4792 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4793 /// estimate fetches.
4795 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4796 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4797 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4798 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4799 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4801 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4802 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4804 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4805 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4806 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4807 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4809 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4810 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4811 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4812 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4813 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4816 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4817 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4818 log_error!(self.logger,
4819 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4820 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4821 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4822 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4823 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4824 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4825 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4826 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4827 channel_id: *chan_id,
4828 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4840 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4843 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4844 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4845 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4847 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4848 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4853 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4854 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4856 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4857 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4858 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4859 if needs_close { return false; }
4862 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4863 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4864 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4865 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4866 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4867 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4868 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4869 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4871 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4872 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4874 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4878 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4880 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4883 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4885 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4886 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4887 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4888 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4892 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4894 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4900 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4902 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4903 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4904 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4905 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4906 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4907 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4908 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4909 channel_id: *chan_id,
4910 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4919 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4920 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4923 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4924 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4929 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4930 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4931 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4932 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4933 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4934 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4935 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4936 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4942 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4944 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4945 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4950 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4951 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4952 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4953 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4954 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4955 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4956 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4957 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4958 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4959 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4960 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4962 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4963 // have no channels to the peer.
4964 let remove_entry = {
4965 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4966 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4969 entry.remove_entry();
4972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4977 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4978 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4979 // This should be unreachable
4980 debug_assert!(false);
4983 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4984 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4985 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4986 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4987 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4988 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4989 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4992 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4993 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4994 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4996 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4997 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5004 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5005 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5006 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5007 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5008 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5011 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5012 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5015 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5016 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5019 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
5021 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5022 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5023 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5024 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5025 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5032 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5033 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5034 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5036 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5037 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5038 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5039 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5041 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5042 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5043 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5044 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5045 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5046 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5049 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5050 /// reason for the failure.
5052 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5053 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5056 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5057 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5058 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5059 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5060 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5061 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5067 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5068 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5069 match failure_code {
5070 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5071 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5072 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5073 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5074 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5075 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5077 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5078 let fail_data = match data {
5079 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5082 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5087 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5088 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5090 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5092 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5093 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5094 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5095 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5096 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5097 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5098 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5100 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5102 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5103 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5105 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5110 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5111 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5112 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5113 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5114 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5115 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5116 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5117 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5118 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5119 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5121 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5122 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5123 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5124 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5126 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5127 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5128 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5129 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5130 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5134 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5135 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5136 // be surfaced to the user.
5137 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5138 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5139 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5141 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5142 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5143 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5144 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5146 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5148 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5149 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5151 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5152 debug_assert!(false);
5153 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5158 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5161 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5162 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5163 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5164 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5168 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5169 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5170 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5171 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5172 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5173 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5174 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5175 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5176 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5177 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5180 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5181 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5182 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5185 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5186 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5187 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5189 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5190 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5191 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5192 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5193 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5195 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5197 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5199 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5200 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5201 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5202 push_forward_ev = true;
5204 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5206 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5209 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5212 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5213 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5214 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5215 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5216 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5217 failed_next_destination: destination,
5223 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5224 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5226 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5227 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5228 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5229 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5231 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5232 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5233 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5234 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5236 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5237 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5238 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5240 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5241 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5242 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5243 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5244 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5245 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5246 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5247 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5248 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5251 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5252 /// even type numbers.
5256 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5257 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5259 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5260 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5261 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5264 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5265 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5270 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5271 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5272 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5273 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5274 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5275 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5276 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5277 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5282 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5283 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5284 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5285 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5286 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5288 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5289 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5290 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5294 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5295 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5296 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5297 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5298 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5299 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5300 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5301 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5302 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5303 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5313 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5315 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5316 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5317 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5318 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5319 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5320 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5321 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5322 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5323 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5325 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5326 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5327 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5328 debug_assert!(false);
5332 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5334 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5335 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5336 debug_assert!(false);
5340 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5341 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5343 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5344 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5345 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5346 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5349 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5350 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5351 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5352 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5356 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5357 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5358 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5359 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5361 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5362 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5363 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5364 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5365 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5370 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5371 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5372 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5373 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5374 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5375 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5376 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5378 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5381 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5382 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5383 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5384 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5388 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5389 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5390 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5391 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5393 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5394 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5395 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5396 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5400 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5401 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5402 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5406 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5407 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5408 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5411 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5414 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5415 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5416 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5417 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5419 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5420 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5423 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5426 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5427 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5429 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5430 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5431 // monitor update as a background event.
5432 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5433 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5434 counterparty_node_id,
5435 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5436 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5445 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5446 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5447 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5453 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5454 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5455 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5456 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5457 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5458 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5459 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5460 // again on restart.
5461 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5462 payment_preimage, update_res);
5465 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5466 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5468 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5469 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5470 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5471 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5472 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5473 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5474 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5475 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5476 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5477 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5480 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5481 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5482 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5483 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5484 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5485 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5489 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5490 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5493 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5494 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5495 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5498 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5499 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5500 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5501 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5502 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5504 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5505 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5506 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5508 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5509 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5512 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5513 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5514 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5515 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5516 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5517 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5518 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5519 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5522 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5523 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5525 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5526 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5527 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5528 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5530 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5531 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5532 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5534 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5535 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5536 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5537 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5544 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5545 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5546 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5552 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5553 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5554 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5557 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5558 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5560 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5561 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5562 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5564 payment_purpose: purpose,
5567 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5569 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5573 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5575 sender_intended_total_msat,
5579 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5580 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5582 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5583 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5584 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5591 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5592 /// update completion.
5593 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5594 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5595 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5596 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5597 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5598 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5599 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5600 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5601 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5602 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5603 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5604 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5605 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5607 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5609 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5610 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5611 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5612 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5615 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5616 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5618 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5620 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5625 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5626 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5628 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5633 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5634 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5636 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5637 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5642 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5646 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5652 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5653 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5654 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5659 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5660 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5666 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5667 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5669 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5670 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5672 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5673 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5674 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5675 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5676 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5682 let mut peer_state_lock;
5683 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5684 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5685 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5688 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5691 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5692 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5693 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5694 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5695 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5698 let remaining_in_flight =
5699 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5700 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5703 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5704 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5705 remaining_in_flight);
5706 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5709 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5712 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5714 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5715 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5718 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5719 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5720 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5722 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5723 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5724 /// used to accept such channels.
5726 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5727 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5728 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5729 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5732 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5733 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5735 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5736 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5737 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5739 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5740 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5742 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5743 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5745 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5746 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5748 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5750 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5751 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5754 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5757 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5758 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5759 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5760 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5761 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5762 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5763 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5764 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5766 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5767 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5768 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5770 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5771 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5772 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5773 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5774 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5775 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5776 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5778 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5782 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5783 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5784 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5785 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5786 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5787 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5788 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5792 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5794 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5795 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5796 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5797 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5798 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5799 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5800 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5801 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5804 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5809 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5810 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5811 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5813 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5814 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5815 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5818 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5823 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5824 /// or 0-conf channels.
5826 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5827 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5828 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5829 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5830 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5831 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5833 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5834 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5835 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5836 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5837 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5838 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5839 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5843 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5846 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5847 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5849 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5850 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5852 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5853 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5854 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5855 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5856 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5858 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5861 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5862 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5863 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5866 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5867 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5872 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5875 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5876 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5877 // likely to be lost on restart!
5878 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5882 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5886 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5887 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5888 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5889 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5890 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5895 debug_assert!(false);
5896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5901 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5902 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5903 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5904 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5905 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5906 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5908 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5909 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5910 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5913 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5914 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5916 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5917 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5920 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5921 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5926 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5927 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5928 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5929 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5930 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5931 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5932 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5933 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5934 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5936 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5937 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5938 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5943 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5944 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5945 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5946 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5947 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5948 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5949 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5957 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5958 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5961 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5965 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5966 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5968 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5969 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5970 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5972 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5976 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5977 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5978 // likely to be lost on restart!
5979 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5981 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5983 debug_assert!(false);
5984 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5986 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5988 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5990 match phase.get_mut() {
5991 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5992 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5993 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6003 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6004 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6005 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6006 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6007 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6009 user_channel_id: user_id,
6014 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6015 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6018 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6020 debug_assert!(false);
6021 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6026 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6027 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6028 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6029 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6031 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6032 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6033 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6034 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6035 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6036 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6037 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6039 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6043 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6044 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6046 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6049 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6050 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6051 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6054 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6055 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6057 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6058 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6059 funding_msg.channel_id))
6061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6062 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6063 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6064 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6065 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6067 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6068 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6069 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6070 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6071 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6072 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6076 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6077 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6078 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6080 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6084 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6085 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6086 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6087 funding_msg.channel_id));
6095 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6096 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6100 debug_assert!(false);
6101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6106 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6108 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6109 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6110 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6111 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6112 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6113 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6116 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6128 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6129 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6130 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6131 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6132 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6134 debug_assert!(false);
6135 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6139 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6141 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6142 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6143 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6144 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6146 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6147 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6148 msg: announcement_sigs,
6150 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6151 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6152 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6153 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6154 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6155 // announcement_signatures.
6156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6157 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6158 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6159 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6166 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6167 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6172 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6173 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6177 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6182 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6183 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6184 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6186 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6187 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6189 debug_assert!(false);
6190 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6194 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6195 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6197 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6198 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6199 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6201 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6204 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6205 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6206 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6207 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6209 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6210 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6211 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6212 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6214 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6218 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6219 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6220 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6221 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6224 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6225 let context = phase.context_mut();
6226 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6227 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6228 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6229 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6236 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6237 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6238 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6241 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6242 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6248 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6249 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6250 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6254 debug_assert!(false);
6255 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6257 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6260 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6262 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6263 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6264 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6265 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6266 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6267 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6272 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6273 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6274 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6275 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6276 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6277 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6278 } else { (tx, None) }
6280 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6281 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6287 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6288 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6289 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6291 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6292 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6293 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6294 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6299 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6300 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6302 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6303 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6304 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6309 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6310 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6311 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6312 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6314 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6315 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6316 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6317 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6319 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6320 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6322 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6324 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6326 debug_assert!(false);
6327 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6329 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6330 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6331 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6333 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6334 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6335 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6336 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6337 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6338 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6340 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6341 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6342 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6343 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6344 match pending_forward_info {
6345 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6346 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6347 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6348 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6350 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6351 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6352 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6353 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6354 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6357 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6359 _ => pending_forward_info
6362 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6364 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6365 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6373 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6375 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6377 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6379 debug_assert!(false);
6380 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6384 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6386 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6387 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6388 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6389 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6390 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6391 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6393 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6394 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6395 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6396 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6397 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6398 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6399 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6402 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6403 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6409 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6413 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6414 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6415 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6416 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6417 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6419 debug_assert!(false);
6420 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6424 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6425 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6426 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6427 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6429 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6430 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6433 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6438 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6439 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6440 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6442 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6444 debug_assert!(false);
6445 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6449 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6450 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6451 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6452 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6453 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6455 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6456 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6458 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6459 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6463 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6467 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6471 debug_assert!(false);
6472 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6476 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6478 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6479 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6480 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6481 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6482 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6483 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6487 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6488 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6496 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6497 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6498 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6499 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6500 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6501 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6502 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6503 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6504 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6505 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6506 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6508 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6509 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6511 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6512 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6513 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6515 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6516 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6519 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6520 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6522 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6523 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6524 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6526 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6527 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6528 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6529 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6530 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6533 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6534 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6537 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6538 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6539 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6540 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6541 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6542 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6543 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6544 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6547 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6548 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6549 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6554 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6555 // payments are being processed.
6556 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6557 push_forward_event = true;
6559 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6560 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6567 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6568 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6571 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6572 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6573 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6575 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6579 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6580 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6581 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6582 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6583 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6585 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6586 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6587 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6588 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6589 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6590 // real by taking more time.
6591 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6592 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6593 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6598 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6599 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6600 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6601 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6602 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6603 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6604 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6606 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6607 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6608 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6609 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6610 channel_funding_outpoint,
6611 counterparty_node_id,
6616 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6617 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6618 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6621 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6622 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6623 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6625 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6626 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6627 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6633 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6634 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6636 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6638 debug_assert!(false);
6639 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6640 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6642 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6644 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6645 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6646 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6647 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6648 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6649 *counterparty_node_id)
6651 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6652 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6653 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6654 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6655 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6656 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6657 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6661 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6662 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6668 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6672 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6676 debug_assert!(false);
6677 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6683 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6684 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6686 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6687 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6690 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6695 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6697 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6699 debug_assert!(false);
6700 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6704 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6706 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6707 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6711 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6712 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6713 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6714 msg, &self.default_configuration
6715 ), chan_phase_entry),
6716 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6717 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6718 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6721 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6722 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6730 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6731 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6732 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6733 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6735 // It's not a local channel
6736 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6740 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6741 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6742 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6748 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6749 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6750 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6751 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6752 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6753 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6754 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6758 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6759 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6760 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6761 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6763 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6764 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6765 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6768 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6772 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6773 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6778 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6781 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6783 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6786 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6788 debug_assert!(false);
6789 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6793 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6795 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6796 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6797 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6798 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6799 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6800 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6801 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6802 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6803 let mut channel_update = None;
6804 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6805 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6806 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6809 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6810 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6811 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6812 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6813 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6814 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6815 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6820 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6821 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6822 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6823 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6824 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6825 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6829 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6830 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6837 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6838 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6839 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6840 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6843 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6844 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6849 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6850 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6851 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6853 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6854 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6855 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6856 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6857 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6858 match monitor_event {
6859 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6860 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6862 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6864 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6865 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6866 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6867 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6870 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6871 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6872 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6874 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6875 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6876 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6877 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6880 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6882 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6885 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6886 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6887 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6888 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6889 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6890 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6894 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6895 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6896 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6897 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6898 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6906 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6907 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6913 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6914 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6917 has_pending_monitor_events
6920 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6921 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6922 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6924 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6926 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6929 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6930 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6931 /// update was applied.
6932 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6933 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6934 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6936 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6937 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6938 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6939 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6942 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6945 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6946 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6947 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6949 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6950 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6951 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6952 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6953 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6954 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6956 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6957 has_monitor_update = true;
6959 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6960 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6961 continue 'peer_loop;
6970 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
6971 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6972 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6978 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6979 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6980 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6981 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6982 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6983 let mut has_update = false;
6984 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
6986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6988 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6989 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6990 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6991 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6992 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6994 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6995 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6996 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6997 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6998 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7001 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7004 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7005 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7006 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7007 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7008 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7013 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7015 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7016 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7017 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7018 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7024 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7025 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7030 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7036 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7037 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7040 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7041 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7047 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7048 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7050 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7051 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7052 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7053 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7054 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7055 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7056 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7057 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7058 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7059 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7060 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7061 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7062 assert!(should_broadcast);
7063 } else { unreachable!(); }
7064 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7065 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7066 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7069 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7073 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7076 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7077 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7079 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7080 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7081 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7082 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7084 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7086 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7087 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7091 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7092 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7094 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7096 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7097 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7099 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7100 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7101 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7102 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7103 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7104 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7105 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7106 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7107 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7108 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7109 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7112 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7113 /// stored external to LDK.
7115 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7116 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7117 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7119 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7120 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7123 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7124 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7125 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7126 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7128 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7129 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7130 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7131 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7132 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7134 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7135 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7136 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7137 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7138 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7140 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7141 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7143 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7144 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7148 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7149 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7151 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7153 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7154 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7156 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7157 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7158 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7159 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7160 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7161 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7162 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7165 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7166 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7168 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7169 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7170 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7173 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7174 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7176 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7177 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7178 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7179 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7181 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7182 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7183 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7184 Some(_) => continue,
7185 None => return scid_candidate
7190 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7192 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7193 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7195 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7196 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7197 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7201 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7202 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7203 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7205 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7206 /// times to get a unique scid.
7207 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7208 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7209 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7211 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7212 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7213 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7214 return scid_candidate
7218 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7219 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7220 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7221 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7224 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7227 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7228 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7230 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7231 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7232 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7241 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7242 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7243 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7244 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7245 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7249 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7250 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7251 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7252 events.push_back((event, None));
7256 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7257 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7258 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7262 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7263 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7267 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7268 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7271 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7272 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7273 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7274 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7275 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7278 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7279 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7280 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7282 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7283 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7284 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7285 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7287 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7291 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7292 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7293 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7294 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7295 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7297 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7301 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7302 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7303 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7304 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7305 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7306 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7307 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7308 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7309 if further_update_exists {
7310 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7316 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7321 log_debug!(self.logger,
7322 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7323 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7329 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7330 for action in actions {
7332 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7333 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7335 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7341 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7342 /// using the given event handler.
7344 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7345 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7349 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7353 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7355 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7356 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7357 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7358 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7359 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7360 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7364 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7365 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7366 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7367 /// is always placed next to each other.
7369 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7370 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7371 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7372 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7374 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7375 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7376 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7377 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7378 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7379 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7380 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7382 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7383 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7384 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7385 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7388 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7389 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7391 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7392 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7395 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7397 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7398 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7399 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7400 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7401 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7405 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7406 events.replace(pending_events);
7415 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7417 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7419 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7420 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7421 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7426 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7428 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7429 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7430 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7432 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7436 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7438 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7439 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7440 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7441 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7442 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7443 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7447 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7449 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7450 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7451 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7452 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7453 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7456 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7457 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7460 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7461 let _persistence_guard =
7462 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7463 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7464 let new_height = height - 1;
7466 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7467 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7468 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7469 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7470 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7471 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7474 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7478 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7480 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7481 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7482 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7483 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7484 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7485 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7489 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7490 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7491 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7492 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7494 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7495 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7497 let _persistence_guard =
7498 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7499 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7500 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7501 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7503 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7504 if height < last_best_block_height {
7505 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7506 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7510 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7511 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7512 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7513 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7515 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7516 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7518 let _persistence_guard =
7519 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7520 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7521 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7523 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7525 macro_rules! max_time {
7526 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7528 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7529 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7530 // having an explicit local time source.
7531 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7532 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7533 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7534 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7535 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7541 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7542 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7543 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7544 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7548 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7549 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7550 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7553 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7554 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7555 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7562 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7563 let _persistence_guard =
7564 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7565 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7566 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7567 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7568 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7569 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7570 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7571 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7576 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7578 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7579 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7580 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7581 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7582 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7583 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7587 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7588 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7590 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7591 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7592 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7593 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7594 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7596 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7597 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7600 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7603 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7604 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7606 // Retain unfunded channels.
7607 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7608 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7609 let res = f(channel);
7610 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7611 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7612 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7613 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7614 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7616 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7617 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7618 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7619 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7620 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7621 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7622 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7632 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7633 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7636 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7638 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7639 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7640 msg: announcement_sigs,
7642 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7643 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7644 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7646 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7647 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7648 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7653 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7654 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7655 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7656 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7657 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7658 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7659 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7660 // is always consistent.
7661 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7662 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7663 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7664 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7665 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7668 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7669 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7670 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7671 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7672 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7673 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7678 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7679 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7681 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7682 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7683 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7684 data: reason_message,
7696 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7697 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7698 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7699 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7700 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7701 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7702 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7703 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7704 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7705 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7707 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7708 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7709 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7713 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7716 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7717 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7718 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7719 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7720 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7721 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7722 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7723 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7724 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7725 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7728 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7729 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7730 _ => unreachable!(),
7732 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7733 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7734 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7741 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7743 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7744 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7748 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7749 /// may have events that need processing.
7751 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7752 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7754 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7755 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7756 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7757 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7760 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7761 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7762 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7765 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7766 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7767 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7770 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7771 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7772 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7773 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7776 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7777 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7778 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7779 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7782 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7783 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7785 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7786 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7787 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7788 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7789 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7792 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7793 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7794 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7795 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7798 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7799 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7800 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7801 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7804 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7805 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7806 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7807 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7811 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7812 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7823 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7824 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7825 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7826 // change to the contents.
7827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7828 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7829 let persist = match &res {
7830 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7831 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7832 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7834 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7836 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7841 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7842 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7843 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7844 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7847 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7848 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7849 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7850 // change to the contents.
7851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7852 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7853 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7857 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7858 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7859 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7860 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7863 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7865 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7868 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7870 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7873 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7874 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7875 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7876 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7877 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7879 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7880 let persist = match &res {
7881 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7882 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7884 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7889 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7891 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7894 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7896 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7899 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7900 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7901 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7902 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7904 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7905 let persist = match &res {
7906 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7907 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7908 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7910 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7915 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7920 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7921 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7922 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7923 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7924 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7925 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7926 let persist = match &res {
7927 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7928 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7929 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7931 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7936 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7937 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7938 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7939 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7941 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7942 let persist = match &res {
7943 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7944 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7945 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7947 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7952 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7954 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7957 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7959 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7962 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7963 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7964 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7965 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7967 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7968 let persist = match &res {
7969 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7970 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7971 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7973 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7978 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7980 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7983 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7984 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7985 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7988 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7993 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7995 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7996 let persist = match &res {
7997 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7998 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7999 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8001 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8006 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8008 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8009 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8010 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8012 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8013 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8014 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8017 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8018 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8019 let context = match phase {
8020 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8021 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8022 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8027 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8028 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8031 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8035 // Clean up for removal.
8036 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8037 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8038 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8041 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8042 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8043 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8044 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8046 // V1 Channel Establishment
8047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8048 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8049 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8050 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8051 // V2 Channel Establishment
8052 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8054 // Common Channel Establishment
8055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8056 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8057 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8058 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8059 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8060 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8061 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8062 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8063 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8064 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8065 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8066 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8067 // Channel Operations
8068 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8069 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8070 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8073 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8075 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8076 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8077 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8078 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8080 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8082 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8083 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8086 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8087 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8088 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8089 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8092 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8094 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8096 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8097 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8101 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8102 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8103 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8107 let mut res = Ok(());
8109 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8110 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8111 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8112 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8113 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8114 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8115 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8118 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8119 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8121 if inbound_peer_limited {
8123 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8125 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8126 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8127 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8128 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8129 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8130 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8131 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8132 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8137 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8138 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8140 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8141 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8142 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8143 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8146 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8149 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8150 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8155 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8158 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8161 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8163 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8164 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8165 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8166 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8167 // worry about closing and removing them.
8168 debug_assert!(false);
8172 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8173 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8174 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8179 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8180 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8185 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8188 match &msg.data as &str {
8189 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8190 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8192 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8193 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8194 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8195 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8196 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8197 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8198 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8199 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8200 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8201 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8202 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8203 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8204 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8205 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8206 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8207 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8212 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8213 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8214 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8215 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8216 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8218 log_level: Level::Trace,
8228 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8229 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8231 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8232 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8235 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8236 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8237 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8238 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8240 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8241 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8242 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8246 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8248 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8249 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8252 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8253 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8254 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8255 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8263 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8264 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8268 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8269 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8272 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8273 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8276 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8277 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8280 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8281 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8282 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8283 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8286 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8287 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8288 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8289 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8292 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8293 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8294 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8295 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8298 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8299 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8300 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8301 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8304 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8305 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8306 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8307 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8310 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8311 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8312 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8313 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8316 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8317 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8318 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8319 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8322 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8323 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8324 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8325 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8328 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8329 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8330 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8331 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8335 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8336 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8337 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8338 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8339 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8343 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8344 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8346 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8347 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8348 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8349 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8350 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8353 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8354 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8355 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8356 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8359 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8360 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8361 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8362 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8365 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8366 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8367 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8368 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8369 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8370 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8371 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8372 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8373 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8374 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8375 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8376 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8377 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8378 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8379 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8380 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8381 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8382 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8383 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8384 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8389 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8390 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8392 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8393 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8394 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8395 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8398 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8399 (2, node_id, required),
8400 (4, features, required),
8401 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8402 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8403 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8404 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8407 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8408 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8409 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8410 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8411 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8412 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8413 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8414 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8415 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8416 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8417 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8418 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8419 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8420 (7, self.config, option),
8421 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8422 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8423 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8424 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8425 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8426 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8427 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8428 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8429 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8430 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8431 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8432 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8433 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8434 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8435 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8436 (32, self.is_public, required),
8437 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8438 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8439 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8440 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8441 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8447 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8448 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8449 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8450 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8451 (2, channel_id, required),
8452 (3, channel_type, option),
8453 (4, counterparty, required),
8454 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8455 (6, funding_txo, option),
8456 (7, config, option),
8457 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8458 (9, confirmations, option),
8459 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8460 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8461 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8462 (16, balance_msat, required),
8463 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8464 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8465 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8466 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8467 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8468 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8469 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8470 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8471 (26, is_outbound, required),
8472 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8473 (30, is_usable, required),
8474 (32, is_public, required),
8475 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8476 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8477 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8478 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8479 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8482 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8483 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8484 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8485 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8486 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8490 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8492 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8493 outbound_scid_alias,
8497 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8498 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8500 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8501 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8502 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8503 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8504 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8505 confirmations_required,
8507 force_close_spend_delay,
8508 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8509 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8510 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8511 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8512 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8513 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8514 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8515 channel_shutdown_state,
8520 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8521 (2, channels, required_vec),
8522 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8523 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8526 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8528 (0, onion_packet, required),
8529 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8532 (0, payment_data, required),
8533 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8534 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8535 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8536 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8538 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8539 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8540 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8541 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8542 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8543 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8548 (0, routing, required),
8549 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8550 (4, payment_hash, required),
8551 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8552 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8553 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8554 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8558 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8559 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8561 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8563 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8564 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8565 reason.write(writer)?;
8567 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8568 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8571 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8572 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8573 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8574 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8581 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8582 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8583 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8586 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8587 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8588 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8589 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8593 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8594 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8595 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8596 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8597 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8600 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8601 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8602 // messages contained in the variants.
8603 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8604 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8605 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8607 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8608 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8609 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8610 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8611 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8614 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8615 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8616 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8617 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8618 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8620 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8625 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8630 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8631 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8632 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8633 (2, outpoint, required),
8634 (4, htlc_id, required),
8635 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8636 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8639 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8640 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8641 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8642 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8643 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8645 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8646 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8647 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8648 (2, self.value, required),
8649 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8650 (4, payment_data, option),
8651 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8652 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8653 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8654 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8660 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8661 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8662 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8663 (0, prev_hop, required),
8664 (1, total_msat, option),
8665 (2, value_ser, required),
8666 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8667 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8668 (5, total_value_received, option),
8669 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8670 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8671 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8673 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8674 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8675 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8677 if payment_data.is_some() {
8678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8680 if total_msat.is_none() {
8681 total_msat = Some(value);
8683 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8686 if total_msat.is_none() {
8687 if payment_data.is_none() {
8688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8690 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8692 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8696 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8699 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8700 total_value_received,
8701 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8703 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8704 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8709 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8710 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8711 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8714 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8715 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8716 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8717 let mut payment_id = None;
8718 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8719 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8720 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8721 (0, session_priv, required),
8722 (1, payment_id, option),
8723 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8724 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8725 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8726 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8728 if payment_id.is_none() {
8729 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8731 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8733 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8734 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8737 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8738 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8739 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8740 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8744 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8745 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8746 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8748 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8751 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8752 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8757 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8758 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8760 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8762 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8763 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8764 (0, session_priv, required),
8765 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8766 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8767 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8768 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8769 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8770 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8773 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8775 field.write(writer)?;
8782 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8783 (0, forward_info, required),
8784 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8785 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8786 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8787 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8790 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8792 (0, htlc_id, required),
8793 (2, err_packet, required),
8798 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8799 (0, payment_secret, required),
8800 (2, expiry_time, required),
8801 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8802 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8803 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8806 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8808 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8809 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8810 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8811 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8812 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8813 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8817 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8818 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8820 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8822 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8824 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8825 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8826 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8829 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8832 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8833 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8836 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8837 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8840 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8841 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8845 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8847 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8848 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8849 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8850 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8851 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8852 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8855 channel.write(writer)?;
8861 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8862 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8863 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8864 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8865 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8866 for forward in pending_forwards {
8867 forward.write(writer)?;
8872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8874 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8875 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8876 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8878 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8879 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8880 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8881 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8882 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8883 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8884 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8885 htlc.write(writer)?;
8887 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8888 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8891 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8892 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8893 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8894 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8895 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8896 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8897 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8900 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8901 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8902 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8903 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8904 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8906 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8907 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8908 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8909 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8910 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8911 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8912 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8917 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8918 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8919 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8920 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8921 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8922 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8923 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8924 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8925 0u64.write(writer)?;
8927 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8928 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8929 event.write(writer)?;
8933 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8934 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8935 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8936 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8937 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8938 0u64.write(writer)?;
8940 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8941 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8942 // likely to be identical.
8943 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8944 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8946 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8947 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8948 hash.write(writer)?;
8949 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8952 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8953 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8954 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8955 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8956 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8959 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8960 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8962 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8963 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8964 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8965 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8968 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8969 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8970 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8971 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8975 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8976 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8977 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8979 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8980 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8981 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8987 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8988 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8989 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8990 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8993 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8994 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8995 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8996 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8997 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9000 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9001 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9002 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9003 if !updates.is_empty() {
9004 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9005 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9010 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9011 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9012 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9013 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9014 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9015 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9016 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9017 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9018 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9019 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9020 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9021 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9022 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9029 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9030 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9031 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9032 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9035 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9036 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9037 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9038 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9039 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9040 // check that the event is sane here.
9041 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9042 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9043 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9044 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9050 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9051 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9052 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9053 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9054 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9055 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9058 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9059 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9060 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9061 events.push_back((ev, action));
9062 } else if action.is_some() {
9063 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9070 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9071 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9072 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9073 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9074 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9075 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9078 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9080 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9082 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9083 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9084 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9085 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9086 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9087 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9088 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9089 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9090 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9091 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9092 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9093 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9094 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9096 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9097 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9099 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9100 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9102 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9103 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9104 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9105 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9106 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9107 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9109 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9110 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9112 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9113 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9114 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9115 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9116 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9121 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9122 pub entropy_source: ES,
9124 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9125 pub node_signer: NS,
9127 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9128 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9130 pub signer_provider: SP,
9132 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9134 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9135 pub fee_estimator: F,
9136 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9138 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9139 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9140 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9141 pub chain_monitor: M,
9143 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9144 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9145 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9146 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9147 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9148 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9150 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9152 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9153 /// deserialization.
9155 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9156 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9157 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9159 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9160 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9162 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9163 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9164 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9165 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9167 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9170 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9171 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9174 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9175 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9177 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9178 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9179 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9180 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9181 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9182 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9186 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9187 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9188 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9189 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9190 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9192 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9193 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9198 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9199 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9200 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9201 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9203 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9204 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9205 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9206 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9207 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9208 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9212 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9213 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9214 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9218 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9219 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9221 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9223 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9224 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9225 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9230 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9231 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9233 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9234 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9235 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9237 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9239 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9240 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9241 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9242 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9243 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9244 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9245 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9246 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9247 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9248 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9250 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9251 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9252 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9253 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9254 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9255 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9256 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9257 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9258 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9259 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9260 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9261 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9262 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9264 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9265 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9266 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9268 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9269 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9270 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9272 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9273 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9274 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9276 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9277 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9280 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9281 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9282 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9285 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9286 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9287 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9288 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9289 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9290 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9291 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9293 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9294 let mut found_htlc = false;
9295 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9296 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9299 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9300 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9301 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9302 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9303 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9304 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9305 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9306 log_info!(args.logger,
9307 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9308 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9309 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9313 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9314 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9315 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9316 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9317 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9319 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9320 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9322 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9324 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9325 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9328 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9329 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9330 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9334 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9335 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9336 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9337 // safely discard the channel.
9338 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9339 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9340 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9341 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9342 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9343 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9344 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9347 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9348 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9349 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9350 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9351 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9356 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9357 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9358 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9359 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9360 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9361 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9362 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9364 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9368 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9369 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9370 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9371 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9372 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9373 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9374 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9375 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9376 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9378 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9381 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9382 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9383 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9384 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9385 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9386 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9387 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9388 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9390 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9393 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9396 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9397 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9398 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9399 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9400 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9401 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9402 is_connected: false,
9406 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9407 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9408 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9409 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9410 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9411 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9412 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9413 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9416 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9417 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9418 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9419 for _ in 0..event_count {
9420 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9421 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9426 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9427 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9428 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9430 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9431 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9432 // on-startup monitor updates.
9433 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9434 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9436 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9440 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9441 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9443 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9444 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9445 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9446 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9447 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9451 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9452 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9453 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9454 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9455 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9456 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9457 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9459 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9460 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9464 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9465 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9466 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9467 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9468 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9469 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9470 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9471 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9472 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9473 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9474 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9475 let mut events_override = None;
9476 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9477 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9478 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9479 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9480 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9481 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9482 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9483 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9484 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9485 (8, events_override, option),
9486 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9487 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9488 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9489 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9491 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9492 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9495 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9496 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9499 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9500 pending_events_read = events;
9503 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9504 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9507 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9508 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9509 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9510 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9511 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9512 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9514 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9516 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9517 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9518 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9521 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9522 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9523 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9524 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9525 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9527 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9528 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9529 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9531 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9532 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9533 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9534 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9535 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9537 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9538 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9539 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9540 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9541 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9542 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9543 pending_background_events.push(
9544 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9545 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9546 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9547 update: update.clone(),
9550 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9551 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9552 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9553 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9554 pending_background_events.push(
9555 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9556 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9557 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9560 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9561 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9564 max_in_flight_update_id
9568 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9571 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9572 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9573 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9575 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9576 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9577 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9578 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9579 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9580 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9581 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9582 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9583 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9586 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9587 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9588 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9589 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9590 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9591 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9592 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9593 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9594 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9595 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9596 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9599 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9600 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9601 debug_assert!(false);
9602 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9607 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9608 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9609 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9610 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9611 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9612 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9613 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9614 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9616 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9617 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9618 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9620 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9621 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9622 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9623 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9624 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9625 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9626 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9632 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9633 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9635 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9636 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9637 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9638 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9641 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9642 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9643 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9644 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9645 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9646 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9647 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9649 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9650 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9651 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9652 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9653 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9654 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9655 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9659 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9660 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9661 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9662 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9664 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9665 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9666 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9669 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9670 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9671 retry_strategy: None,
9672 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9673 payment_params: None,
9674 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9675 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9676 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9677 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9678 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9679 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9680 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9681 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9682 total_msat: path_amt,
9683 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9684 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9686 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9687 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9692 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9694 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9695 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9696 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9697 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9699 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9700 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9701 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9702 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9703 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9704 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9705 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9706 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9707 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9708 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9709 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9714 !forwards.is_empty()
9716 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9717 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9718 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9719 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9720 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9721 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9722 intercepted_id != ev_id
9729 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9730 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9731 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9732 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9733 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9734 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9735 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9736 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9737 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9738 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9739 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9741 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9742 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9743 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9745 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9746 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9747 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9754 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9755 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9757 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9759 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9760 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9761 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9762 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9763 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9764 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9765 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9766 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9767 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9768 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9771 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9772 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9773 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9774 // channel still live case here.
9778 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9779 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9784 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9785 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9786 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9787 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9788 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9789 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9790 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9791 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9795 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9796 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9798 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9799 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9800 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9801 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9803 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9804 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9805 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9807 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9808 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9810 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9811 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9813 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9816 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9817 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9818 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9820 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9824 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9825 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9826 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9827 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9828 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9830 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9831 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9832 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9833 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9834 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9835 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9836 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9837 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9839 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9840 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9844 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9846 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9848 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9849 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9851 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9852 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9857 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9858 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9860 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9862 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9864 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9865 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9866 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9867 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9871 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9872 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9875 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9876 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9877 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9878 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9880 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9881 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9882 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9884 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9885 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9886 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9887 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9888 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9889 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9891 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9892 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9893 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9894 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9895 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9896 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9900 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9901 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9902 debug_assert!(false);
9903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9908 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9910 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9911 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9912 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9913 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9914 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9915 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9916 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9917 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9918 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9919 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9920 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9922 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9923 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9925 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9926 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9927 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9928 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9930 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9931 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9932 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9933 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9935 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9936 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9937 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9938 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9940 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9941 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9942 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9945 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9946 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9949 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9950 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9953 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9956 purpose: payment.purpose,
9957 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9958 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9959 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9965 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9966 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9967 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9968 for action in actions.iter() {
9969 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9970 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9971 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9973 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9974 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9975 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9976 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9978 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9979 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9980 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9981 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9987 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9989 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9990 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9994 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9996 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9997 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9998 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9999 router: args.router,
10001 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10003 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10004 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10005 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10006 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10008 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10009 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10010 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10011 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10012 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10013 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10015 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10017 our_network_pubkey,
10020 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10022 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10024 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10025 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10026 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10027 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10028 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10030 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10031 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10033 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10035 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10036 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10037 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10039 logger: args.logger,
10040 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10043 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10044 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10045 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10046 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10047 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10050 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10051 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10052 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10053 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10054 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10055 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10058 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10059 //connection or two.
10061 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10067 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10068 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10069 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10070 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10071 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10072 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10073 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10074 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10075 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10076 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10077 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10078 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10079 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10080 use crate::util::test_utils;
10081 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10082 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10085 fn test_notify_limits() {
10086 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10087 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10088 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10089 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10090 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10091 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10093 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10094 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10095 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10096 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10097 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10099 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10101 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10102 // to connect messages with new values
10103 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10104 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10105 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10106 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10107 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10108 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10110 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10111 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10113 // ... but the last node should not.
10114 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10115 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10116 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10117 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10119 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10120 // about the channel.
10121 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10122 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10123 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10125 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10127 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10128 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10129 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10130 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10131 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10132 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10134 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10135 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10136 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10138 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10139 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10140 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10141 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10142 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10143 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10145 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10146 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10147 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10148 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10149 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10150 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10151 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10152 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10154 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10155 // the channel info has updated.
10156 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10157 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10158 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10159 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10160 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10161 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10165 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10166 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10170 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10171 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10172 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10174 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10175 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10176 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10177 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10179 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10180 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10181 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10182 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10183 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10184 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10185 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10186 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10188 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10190 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10192 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10193 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10194 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10198 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10199 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10200 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10202 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10203 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10204 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10206 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10207 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10208 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10209 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10210 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10211 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10212 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10213 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10214 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10216 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10217 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10218 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10220 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10222 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10224 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10225 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10226 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10227 // lightning messages manually.
10228 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10229 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10232 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10233 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10234 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10235 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10237 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10238 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10240 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10241 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10243 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10245 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10247 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10248 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10249 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10253 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10255 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10256 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10259 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10260 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10261 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10262 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10264 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10265 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10266 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10267 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10272 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10273 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10274 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10275 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10282 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10283 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10284 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10287 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10288 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10289 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10290 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10291 // fails as expected.
10292 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10293 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10294 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10295 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10296 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10297 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10300 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10301 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10304 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10305 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10306 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10308 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10309 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10310 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10312 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10313 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10314 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10315 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10316 let route = find_route(
10317 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10318 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10320 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10321 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10323 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10325 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10326 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10327 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10329 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10330 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10331 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10332 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10333 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10335 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10336 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10337 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10338 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10339 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10340 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10341 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10342 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10343 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10345 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10346 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10348 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10349 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10350 let route = find_route(
10351 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10352 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10354 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10355 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10357 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10359 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10360 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10361 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10363 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10364 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10365 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10366 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10368 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10370 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10371 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10375 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10376 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10378 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10379 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10380 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10381 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10382 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10383 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10384 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10385 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10386 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10388 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10391 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10392 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10393 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10394 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10396 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10398 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10399 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10400 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10402 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10403 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10404 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10407 let route = find_route(
10408 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10409 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10411 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10412 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10413 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10415 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10416 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10417 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10418 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10421 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10422 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10423 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10425 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10426 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10427 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10428 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10429 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10430 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10431 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10432 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10433 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10435 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10440 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10441 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10442 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10448 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10449 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10451 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10452 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10453 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10454 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10455 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10456 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10457 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10458 let route = find_route(
10459 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10460 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10463 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10464 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10465 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10466 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10467 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10468 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10471 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10472 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10473 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10474 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10475 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10476 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10479 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10483 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10484 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10485 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10486 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10487 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10493 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10494 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10496 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10497 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10498 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10499 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10500 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10501 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10502 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10503 let route = find_route(
10504 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10505 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10508 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10509 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10510 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10511 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10512 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10513 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10514 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10515 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10518 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10519 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10520 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10521 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10522 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10523 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10524 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10526 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10530 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10531 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10532 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10533 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10534 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10536 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10537 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10538 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10539 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10541 // Marshall an MPP route.
10542 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10543 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10544 route.paths.push(path);
10545 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10546 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10547 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10548 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10549 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10550 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10552 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10553 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10555 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10556 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10558 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10563 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10564 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10567 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10569 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10571 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10572 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10574 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10575 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10577 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10580 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10581 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10582 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10583 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10584 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10585 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10588 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10591 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10592 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10597 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10598 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10602 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10604 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10605 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10607 total_msat: 100_000,
10610 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10611 // payment verification fails as expected.
10612 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10613 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10614 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10615 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10617 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10621 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10622 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10626 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10627 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10628 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10629 // the channel is successfully closed.
10630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10635 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10636 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10637 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10638 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10639 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10641 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10642 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10644 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10645 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10646 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10647 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10650 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10652 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10653 // as it has the funding transaction.
10654 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10655 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10656 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10659 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10661 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10663 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10665 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10666 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10667 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10669 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10672 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10673 // as it has the funding transaction.
10674 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10675 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10676 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10679 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10680 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10682 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10683 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10684 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10685 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10687 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10688 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10689 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10690 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10692 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10693 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10695 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10696 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10697 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10698 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10699 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10700 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10701 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10705 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10706 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10707 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10708 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10709 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10710 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10711 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10714 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10716 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10717 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10718 // closing transaction).
10719 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10720 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10721 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10723 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10724 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10725 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10726 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10727 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10730 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10732 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10734 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10735 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10736 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10738 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10740 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10741 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10744 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10745 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10746 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10749 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10750 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10751 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10754 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
10755 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
10756 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10759 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10760 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
10761 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10764 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10766 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10767 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10769 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10770 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10772 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10773 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10778 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10779 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10780 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10781 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10782 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10783 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10784 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10785 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10788 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10789 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10790 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10792 // Test the API functions.
10793 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10795 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10797 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10799 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10801 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10803 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10805 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10809 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
10810 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
10811 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
10812 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
10813 // the given `channel_id`.
10814 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10815 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10816 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10817 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10819 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10822 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10824 // Test the API functions.
10825 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
10827 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10829 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10831 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10833 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10835 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10839 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10840 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10842 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10844 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10846 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10848 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10849 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10851 let mut funding_tx = None;
10852 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10853 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10854 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10857 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10858 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10859 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10860 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10861 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10863 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10865 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10867 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10869 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10871 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10873 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10876 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10877 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10878 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10879 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10880 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10882 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10883 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10885 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10886 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10887 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10888 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10889 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10890 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10891 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10894 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10895 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10896 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10897 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10898 }, true).unwrap_err();
10900 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10901 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10902 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10903 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10904 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10905 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10906 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10908 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10909 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10911 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10912 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10913 }, true).unwrap_err();
10915 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10916 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10917 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10918 }, false).unwrap();
10919 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10921 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10922 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10924 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10925 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10926 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10927 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10928 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10930 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10931 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10932 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10934 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10935 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10936 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10938 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10939 // "protected" and can connect again.
10940 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10941 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10942 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10944 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10946 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10948 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10949 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10953 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10954 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10955 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10956 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10957 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10958 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10960 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10962 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10963 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10965 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10966 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10967 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10968 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10971 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10973 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10974 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10975 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10977 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10978 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10979 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10981 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10982 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10983 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10984 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10988 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10989 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10990 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10993 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10994 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10996 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10998 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11000 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11001 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11003 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11004 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11005 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11006 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11007 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11008 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11011 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11014 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11015 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11017 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11019 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11020 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11023 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11024 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11025 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11026 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11027 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11029 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11030 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11032 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11033 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11034 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11035 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11039 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11041 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11042 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11044 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11045 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11046 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11048 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11049 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11053 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11057 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11058 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11059 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11060 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11061 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11062 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11063 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11064 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11066 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11067 payment_metadata: None,
11068 keysend_preimage: None,
11069 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11070 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11072 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11074 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11075 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11076 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11077 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11078 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11080 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11081 } else { panic!(); }
11083 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11084 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11086 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11087 payment_metadata: None,
11088 keysend_preimage: None,
11089 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11090 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11092 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11094 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11095 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11099 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11100 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11101 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11102 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11103 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11105 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11107 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11108 payment_metadata: None,
11109 keysend_preimage: None,
11110 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11111 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11113 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11114 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11116 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11117 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11118 // is not satisfied.
11119 assert!(result.is_ok());
11123 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11124 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11125 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11126 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11127 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11129 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11130 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11135 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11136 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11138 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11139 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11141 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11143 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11144 match &msg_events[0] {
11145 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11146 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11148 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11149 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11150 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11156 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11157 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11159 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11160 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11163 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11167 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11168 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11169 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11170 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11173 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11174 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11175 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11177 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11179 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11180 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11181 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11183 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11184 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11186 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11187 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11192 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11193 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11195 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11196 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11198 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11199 // not have generated any events.
11200 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11204 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11205 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11206 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11207 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11208 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11210 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11211 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11213 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11214 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11217 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11218 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11219 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11220 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11223 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11224 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11227 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11228 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11231 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11232 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11233 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11234 ..Default::default()
11236 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11237 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11240 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11241 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11244 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11245 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11246 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11247 ..Default::default()
11249 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11250 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11251 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11254 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11255 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11258 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11259 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11260 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11261 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11262 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11265 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11266 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11267 ..Default::default()
11269 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11272 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11273 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11274 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11279 fn test_payment_display() {
11280 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11281 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11282 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11283 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11284 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11285 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11291 use crate::chain::Listen;
11292 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11293 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11294 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11295 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11296 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11297 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11298 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11299 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11300 use crate::util::test_utils;
11301 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11303 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11304 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11305 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11307 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11309 use criterion::Criterion;
11311 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11312 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11313 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11314 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11315 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11316 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11317 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11319 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11320 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11322 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11323 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11325 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11327 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11330 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11331 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11334 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11335 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11336 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11338 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11339 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11341 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11342 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11343 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11344 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11345 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11347 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11348 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11349 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11351 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11352 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11353 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11354 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11356 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11357 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11358 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11360 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11361 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11362 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11363 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11364 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11366 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11367 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11368 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11370 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11371 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11373 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11374 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11375 }, false).unwrap();
11376 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11377 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11378 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11381 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11382 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11383 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11385 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11386 } else { panic!(); }
11388 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11389 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11390 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11391 match events_b[0] {
11392 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11393 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11395 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11398 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11399 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11400 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11401 match events_a[0] {
11402 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11403 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11408 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11410 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11411 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11412 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11414 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11415 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11416 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11417 match msg_events[0] {
11418 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11419 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11420 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11424 match msg_events[1] {
11425 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11429 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11430 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11431 match events_a[0] {
11432 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11433 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11438 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11439 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11440 match events_b[0] {
11441 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11442 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11447 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11448 macro_rules! send_payment {
11449 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11450 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11451 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11452 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11453 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11454 payment_count += 1;
11455 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11456 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11458 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11459 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11460 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11461 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11462 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11463 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11464 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11465 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11466 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11467 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11468 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11470 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11471 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11472 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11473 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11475 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11477 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11478 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11479 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11481 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11484 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11485 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11486 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11487 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11489 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11493 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11494 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11495 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);