1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
84 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo,
85 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
86 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
87 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
88 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
93 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
94 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
97 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
100 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
101 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
104 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
106 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
108 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
112 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
116 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
117 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
118 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
119 short_channel_id: u64,
121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 struct ClaimableHTLC {
125 src: HTLCPreviousHopData,
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
130 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
132 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
133 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
136 session_priv: SecretKey,
137 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
138 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
139 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
144 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
145 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
146 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
147 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
148 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
153 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
154 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
156 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
165 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
166 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
167 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
168 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
169 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
171 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
173 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
174 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
175 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
176 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
177 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
179 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
180 err: msgs::LightningError,
181 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
183 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
185 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
187 err: LightningError {
189 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
190 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
192 data: err.to_string()
196 shutdown_finish: None,
200 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
202 err: LightningError {
204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
206 shutdown_finish: None,
210 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
211 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
214 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
221 data: err.to_string()
225 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
229 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
232 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
236 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
238 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
239 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
241 data: msg.to_string()
245 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
250 data: msg.to_string()
255 shutdown_finish: None,
260 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
261 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
262 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
263 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
264 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
266 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
267 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
268 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
269 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
271 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
272 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
274 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
278 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
279 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
280 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
281 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
282 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
283 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
284 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
285 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
286 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
287 /// Tracks things that were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
288 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
289 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
291 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
292 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
293 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
294 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
297 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
298 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
300 latest_features: InitFeatures,
303 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
304 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
306 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
307 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
308 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
309 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
310 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
311 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
313 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
314 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
315 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
316 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
317 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
318 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
319 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
321 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
322 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
324 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
325 /// to individual Channels.
327 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
328 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
329 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
330 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
332 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
333 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
334 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
335 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
336 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
337 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
338 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
340 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
341 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
342 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
343 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
346 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
347 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
348 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
349 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
350 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
352 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
353 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
354 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
355 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
356 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
357 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
358 default_configuration: UserConfig,
359 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
360 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
362 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
365 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
367 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
368 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
369 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
372 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
374 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
375 our_network_key: SecretKey,
377 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
379 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
380 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
381 /// are currently open with that peer.
382 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
383 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
385 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
387 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
388 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
389 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
390 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
391 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
393 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
398 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
399 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
400 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
401 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
402 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
404 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
405 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
406 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
407 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
408 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
409 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
410 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
412 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
413 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
414 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
415 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
416 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
417 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
420 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
422 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
423 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
426 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
428 macro_rules! secp_call {
429 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
432 Err(_) => return Err($err),
437 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
438 pub struct ChannelDetails {
439 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
440 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
441 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
442 /// lifetime of the channel.
443 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
444 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
445 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
446 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
447 /// The node_id of our counterparty
448 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
449 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
450 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
451 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
452 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
453 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
454 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
455 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
457 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
458 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
459 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
460 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
461 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
462 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
463 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
464 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
465 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
466 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
467 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
468 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
469 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
473 macro_rules! handle_error {
474 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
477 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
478 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
479 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
480 if let Some(update) = update_option {
481 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
486 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
487 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
488 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
489 // Return error in case higher-API need one
496 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
497 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
500 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
501 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
503 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
504 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
505 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
506 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
507 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
509 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
511 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
516 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
517 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
520 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
523 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
524 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
525 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
526 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
527 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
531 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
532 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
533 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
534 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
535 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
537 if let Some(update) = update {
538 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
540 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
541 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
542 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
543 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
544 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
545 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
549 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
550 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
551 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
553 shutdown_res.0.clear();
554 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
560 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
561 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
562 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
564 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
566 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
567 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
568 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
569 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
570 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
572 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
573 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
574 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
575 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
576 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
577 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
578 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
579 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
580 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
581 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
584 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
585 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
586 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
587 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
589 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
590 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
592 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
593 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
595 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
596 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
597 if !$resend_commitment {
598 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
601 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
603 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
604 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
610 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
611 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
612 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
614 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
615 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
619 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
620 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
621 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
622 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
623 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
626 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
631 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
632 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
634 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
635 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
637 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
639 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
641 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
642 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
644 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
645 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
646 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
647 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
648 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
650 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
651 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
653 let res = ChannelManager {
654 default_configuration: config.clone(),
655 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
656 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
660 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
661 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
664 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
665 by_id: HashMap::new(),
666 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
667 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
668 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
669 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
671 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
673 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
675 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
677 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
678 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
688 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
690 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
691 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
692 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
693 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
695 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
696 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
698 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
699 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
700 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
701 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
702 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
705 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
706 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
708 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
709 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
710 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
712 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
713 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
715 panic!("RNG is bad???");
718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
720 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
721 node_id: their_network_key,
727 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
728 let mut res = Vec::new();
730 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
731 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
732 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
733 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
734 res.push(ChannelDetails {
735 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
736 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
737 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
738 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
739 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
740 inbound_capacity_msat,
741 outbound_capacity_msat,
742 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
743 is_live: channel.is_live(),
747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
748 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
749 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
750 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
756 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
757 /// more information.
758 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
759 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
762 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
763 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
765 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
766 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
767 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
768 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
769 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
770 // really wanted anyway.
771 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
774 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
775 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
776 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
778 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
779 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
780 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
782 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
787 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
788 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
789 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
792 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
793 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
794 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
796 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
797 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
802 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
805 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
806 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
811 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
812 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
822 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
823 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
824 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
825 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
828 for tx in local_txn {
829 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
830 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
834 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
835 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
836 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
837 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
842 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
843 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
844 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
851 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
852 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
853 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
854 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
861 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
862 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
863 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
864 for chan in self.list_channels() {
865 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
869 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
870 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
871 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
873 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
874 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
875 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
876 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
877 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
878 failure_code: $err_code,
879 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
884 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
885 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
888 let shared_secret = {
889 let mut arr = [0; 32];
890 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
893 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
895 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
896 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
897 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
898 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
899 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
900 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
901 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
902 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
905 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
906 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
907 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
908 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
909 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
912 let mut channel_state = None;
913 macro_rules! return_err {
914 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
916 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
917 if channel_state.is_none() {
918 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
920 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
921 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
922 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
923 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
924 })), channel_state.unwrap());
929 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
930 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
931 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
932 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
934 let error_code = match err {
935 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
936 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
937 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
938 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
939 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
941 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
944 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
945 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
946 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
953 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
956 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
957 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
958 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
959 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
960 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
961 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
962 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
963 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
964 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
965 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
966 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
967 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
971 // final_expiry_too_soon
972 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
973 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
975 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
976 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
977 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
979 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
980 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
981 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
984 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
985 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
986 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
987 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
990 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
991 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
992 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
993 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
995 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
996 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data },
997 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
998 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
999 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1000 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1003 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1004 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1007 // Check two things:
1008 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1009 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1010 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1012 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1014 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1015 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1016 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1018 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1020 let blinding_factor = {
1021 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1022 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1023 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1024 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1027 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1029 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1031 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1034 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1035 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1038 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1039 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1040 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1041 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1042 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1046 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1047 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1048 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1049 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1051 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1052 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1053 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1054 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1058 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1059 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref type_data, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1060 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here (which is
1061 // important as various things later assume we are a ::Receive if short_channel_id is
1063 if let &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = type_data {
1064 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1065 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1066 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1067 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1069 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1071 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1072 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1074 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1075 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1076 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1077 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1078 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1079 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1080 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1082 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1083 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1085 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1086 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1087 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1089 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1090 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1092 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1093 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1094 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1095 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1097 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1098 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1103 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1104 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1105 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1106 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1108 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1109 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1111 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1112 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1114 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1116 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1121 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1124 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1125 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1126 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1127 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1128 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1132 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1134 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1135 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1136 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1137 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1138 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1139 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1140 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1141 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1142 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1143 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1146 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1147 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1149 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1155 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1157 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1158 /// fields for more info.
1160 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1161 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1162 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1163 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1164 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1165 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1167 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1169 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1170 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1171 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1172 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1173 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1174 /// relevant updates.
1176 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1177 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1178 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1179 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1180 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1181 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1182 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1183 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1185 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1186 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1187 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1188 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1192 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1194 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1196 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1197 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1198 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1199 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1200 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"});
1202 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1204 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1206 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1207 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1209 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1210 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1211 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1214 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1215 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1217 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1218 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1220 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1221 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1223 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1224 route: route.clone(),
1225 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1226 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1227 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1229 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1230 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1231 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1232 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1233 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1234 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1235 // something else in case we will resend later!
1236 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1239 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1240 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1241 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1242 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1243 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1244 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1245 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1253 } else { unreachable!(); }
1257 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1258 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1259 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1263 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1265 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1266 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1268 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1270 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1271 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1272 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1273 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1275 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1276 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1277 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1279 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1280 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1281 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1282 } else { unreachable!(); })
1287 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1288 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1289 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1291 Err(_) => { return; }
1294 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1295 // lock before add_update_monitor
1296 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1298 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1300 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1301 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1302 Err(_) => { return; },
1303 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1307 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1308 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1309 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1310 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1312 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1317 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1318 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1319 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1324 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1332 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1333 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1335 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1337 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1339 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1340 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1342 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1343 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1344 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1345 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1346 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1350 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1351 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1353 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1354 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1356 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1357 /// incoming connections.
1358 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1359 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1361 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1362 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1363 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1364 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1366 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1367 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1368 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1370 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1372 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1374 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1375 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1376 contents: announcement
1381 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1383 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1384 /// Will likely generate further events.
1385 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1386 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1388 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1389 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1390 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1392 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1395 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1396 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1397 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1398 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1400 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1401 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1402 match forward_info {
1403 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1404 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1405 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1406 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1407 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1409 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1411 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1412 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1413 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1414 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1415 // problem, not ours.
1422 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1423 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1424 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1425 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1426 match forward_info {
1427 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1428 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1430 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1431 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1432 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1433 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1434 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1435 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1437 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1439 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1440 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1442 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1444 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1445 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1450 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1452 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1453 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1454 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1455 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1456 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1457 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1458 // this channel currently :/.
1464 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1465 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1467 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1468 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1469 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1471 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1472 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1474 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1476 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1477 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1478 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1481 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1483 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1484 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1485 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1486 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1487 // messages when we can.
1488 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1489 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1490 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1497 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1498 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1501 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1502 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1503 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1504 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1505 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1506 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1508 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1509 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1510 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1511 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1512 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1514 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1516 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1518 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1519 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1520 Err(_) => { continue; },
1524 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1525 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1529 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1530 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1531 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1532 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1533 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1534 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1536 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1544 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1545 match forward_info {
1546 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1547 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { payment_data },
1548 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1549 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1550 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1551 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1552 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1554 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(ClaimableHTLC {
1556 value: amt_to_forward,
1559 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1560 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1561 amt: amt_to_forward,
1564 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1565 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1567 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1568 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1576 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1578 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1579 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1583 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1584 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1585 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1586 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1590 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1591 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1592 events.append(&mut new_events);
1595 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1596 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1597 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1599 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1600 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1601 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1602 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1603 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1604 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1605 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1606 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1607 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1612 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1614 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1615 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1620 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1621 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1622 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1623 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1624 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1625 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1626 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1628 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1629 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1630 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1631 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1632 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1633 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1634 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_hash,
1635 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1641 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1642 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1643 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1644 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1645 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1646 /// still-available channels.
1647 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1648 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1649 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1650 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1653 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1654 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1655 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1656 match &onion_error {
1657 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1659 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1661 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1662 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1663 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1664 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1665 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1666 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1667 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1672 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1673 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1674 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1675 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1677 error_code: onion_error_code
1681 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1685 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1686 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1687 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1688 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1690 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1691 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1692 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1693 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1694 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1695 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1697 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1703 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1704 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1705 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1706 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1707 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1708 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1710 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1711 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1712 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1716 let mut forward_event = None;
1717 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1718 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1720 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1722 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1725 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1728 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1729 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1730 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1731 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1732 time_forwardable: time
1739 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1740 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1741 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1743 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1744 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1745 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1746 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1747 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1748 /// motivated attackers.
1750 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1751 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1752 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1754 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1756 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1757 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1758 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1759 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1760 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1761 if htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2 {
1762 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1763 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1764 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1765 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1766 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), &payment_hash,
1767 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1769 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.src), payment_preimage);
1775 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1776 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1778 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1779 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1781 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1785 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1786 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1787 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1789 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1790 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1792 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1793 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1794 // why it's missing.
1799 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1800 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1801 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1802 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1803 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1804 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1805 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1806 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1808 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1812 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1814 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1815 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1816 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1817 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1818 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1819 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1827 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1828 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1829 //TODO: Do something with e?
1833 } else { unreachable!(); }
1839 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1842 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1843 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1844 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1847 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1848 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1850 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1851 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1852 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1853 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1854 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1855 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1858 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1859 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1860 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1861 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1862 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1863 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1864 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1865 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1867 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1868 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1869 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1870 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1871 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1872 // on-chain confirmations.
1873 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1874 // should be written.
1875 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1876 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1878 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1880 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1886 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1889 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1890 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1891 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1893 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1895 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1896 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1897 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1898 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1903 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1904 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1905 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1906 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1907 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1912 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1916 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1921 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1922 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1923 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1924 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1927 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1929 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1932 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1934 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1935 msg: announcement_sigs,
1938 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1946 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1948 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1951 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1953 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1954 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1958 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1959 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1960 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1963 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1964 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1965 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1966 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1971 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1972 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1974 entry.insert(channel);
1980 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1981 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1982 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1983 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1984 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1986 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1987 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1989 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1990 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1995 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1996 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1997 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1998 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1999 output_script: output_script,
2000 user_channel_id: user_id,
2005 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2006 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2007 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2008 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2009 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2011 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2012 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2014 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2019 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2020 // lock before add_update_monitor
2021 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2023 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2024 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2025 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2026 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2027 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2028 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2030 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2031 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2032 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2033 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2034 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2035 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2039 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2040 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2041 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2042 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2047 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2056 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2057 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2058 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2059 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2060 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2061 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2062 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2063 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2065 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2066 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2067 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2069 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2074 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2075 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2076 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2077 user_channel_id: user_id,
2082 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2083 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2084 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2085 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2087 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2088 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2090 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2091 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2092 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2093 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2094 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2095 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2096 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2097 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2098 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2099 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2100 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2101 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2102 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2103 msg: announcement_sigs,
2108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2112 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2113 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2114 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2115 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2117 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2119 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2122 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2123 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2125 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2129 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2131 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2135 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2136 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2137 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2139 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2140 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2145 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2146 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2148 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2149 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2150 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2151 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2159 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2160 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2161 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2162 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2163 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2165 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2168 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2169 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2171 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2176 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2177 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2178 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2179 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2180 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2181 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2182 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2184 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2185 } else { (tx, None) }
2187 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2190 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2191 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2192 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2194 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2195 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2196 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2205 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2206 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2207 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2208 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2210 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2211 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2212 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2213 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2215 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2216 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2218 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2220 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2221 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2223 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2224 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2225 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2226 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2227 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2228 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2229 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2230 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2231 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2232 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2233 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2234 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2235 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2236 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2238 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2239 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2240 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2241 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2245 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2246 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2247 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2248 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2249 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2250 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2255 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2262 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2263 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2266 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2271 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2276 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2280 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2281 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2282 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2283 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2285 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2288 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2295 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2296 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2300 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2303 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2304 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2306 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2313 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2314 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2315 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2316 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2318 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2321 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2322 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2323 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2324 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2325 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2328 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2329 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2331 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2333 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2334 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2335 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2336 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2337 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2338 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2340 commitment_signed: msg,
2344 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2346 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2357 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2358 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2359 let mut forward_event = None;
2360 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2361 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2362 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2363 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2365 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2366 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.type_data {
2367 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2368 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { .. } => 0,
2370 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2371 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2374 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2379 match forward_event {
2381 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2382 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2383 time_forwardable: time
2391 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2392 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2393 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2394 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2395 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2397 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2398 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2400 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2401 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2402 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2403 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2404 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2405 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2406 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2408 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2411 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2412 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2413 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2417 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2419 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2423 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2428 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2429 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2431 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2436 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2437 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2438 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2439 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2440 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2441 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2442 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2444 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2451 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2452 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2455 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2457 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2458 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2460 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2464 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2465 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2466 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2468 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2469 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2470 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2471 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2472 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2475 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2477 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2478 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2479 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2480 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2481 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2482 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2483 contents: announcement,
2485 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2493 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2494 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2495 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2499 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2502 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2503 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2504 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2505 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2506 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2507 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2508 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2509 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2510 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2512 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2513 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2515 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2516 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2519 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2520 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2521 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2525 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2526 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2528 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2533 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2534 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2535 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2536 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2542 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2546 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2551 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2552 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2553 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2563 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2564 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2565 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2566 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2568 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2569 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2570 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2572 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2575 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2578 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2581 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2582 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2584 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2585 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2587 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2588 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2589 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2591 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2594 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2595 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2596 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2597 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2598 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2599 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2600 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2601 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2611 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2612 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2613 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2618 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2619 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2620 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2621 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2622 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2624 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2625 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2626 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2627 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2628 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2630 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2636 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2637 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2638 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2643 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2644 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2645 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2646 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2647 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2649 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2650 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2651 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2652 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2653 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2655 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2661 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2662 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2663 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2668 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2669 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2670 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2671 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2673 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2675 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2677 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2678 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2679 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2680 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2681 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2683 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2684 msg: funding_locked,
2686 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2687 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2688 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2689 msg: announcement_sigs,
2692 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2693 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2694 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2695 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2696 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2700 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2701 for tx in txn_matched {
2702 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2703 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2704 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2705 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2706 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2708 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2709 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2710 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2711 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2712 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2713 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2722 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2723 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2724 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2726 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2727 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2728 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2729 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2730 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2731 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2732 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2741 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2742 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2744 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2745 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2748 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2749 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2750 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2751 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2753 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2755 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2756 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2757 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2758 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2759 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2760 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2762 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2763 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2764 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2774 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2775 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2777 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2778 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2782 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2783 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2784 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2785 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2787 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2788 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2792 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2793 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2794 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2796 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2797 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2801 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2802 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2803 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2805 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2806 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2810 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2811 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2812 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2814 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2815 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2819 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2821 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2824 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2828 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2829 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2830 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2832 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2833 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2837 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2838 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2839 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2841 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2842 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2846 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2848 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2855 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2856 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2857 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2859 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2860 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2864 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2865 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2866 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2868 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2869 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2873 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2874 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2875 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2877 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2878 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2882 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2883 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2884 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2886 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2887 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2891 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2892 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2893 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2895 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2896 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2900 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2901 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2902 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2904 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2905 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2909 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2910 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2911 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2913 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2914 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2918 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2919 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2920 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2923 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2927 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2928 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2929 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2930 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2931 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2933 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2935 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2936 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2937 if no_connection_possible {
2938 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2939 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2940 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2941 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2942 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2944 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2945 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2946 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2956 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2957 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2958 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2959 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2960 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2961 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2962 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2963 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2965 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2966 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2967 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2971 no_channels_remain = false;
2977 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2979 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2980 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2983 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2984 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2985 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2986 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2987 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2988 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2989 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2990 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2991 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2992 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2993 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2994 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2998 if no_channels_remain {
2999 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3002 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3003 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3005 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3006 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3007 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3012 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3013 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3015 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3018 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3019 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3021 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3022 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3026 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3031 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3032 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3033 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3034 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3035 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3036 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3037 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3038 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3039 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3044 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3045 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3051 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3054 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3055 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3057 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3058 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3059 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3060 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3064 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3069 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3070 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3072 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3074 match &self.type_data {
3075 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3077 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3078 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3080 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
3082 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3085 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3086 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3087 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3088 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3093 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3094 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3095 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3096 type_data: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3097 0u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
3098 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3099 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3101 1u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {
3102 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3104 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3106 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3107 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3108 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3109 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3114 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3115 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3117 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3119 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3121 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3123 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3130 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3131 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3132 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3133 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3134 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3135 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3140 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3143 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3145 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3147 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3149 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3156 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3157 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3158 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3159 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3160 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3161 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3166 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3169 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3172 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3173 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3175 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3177 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3179 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3181 route.write(writer)?;
3182 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3183 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3190 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3191 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3192 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3193 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3194 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3195 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3196 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3197 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3199 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3204 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3205 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3207 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3211 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3213 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3214 data.write(writer)?;
3221 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3222 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3223 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3224 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3225 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3226 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3227 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3229 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3234 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3237 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3239 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3240 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3241 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3243 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3245 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3246 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3253 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3254 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3255 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3256 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3257 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3258 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3259 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3261 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3262 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3263 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3265 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3270 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3271 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3272 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3274 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3275 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3277 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3278 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3279 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3281 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3282 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3283 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3284 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3285 unfunded_channels += 1;
3288 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3289 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3290 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3291 channel.write(writer)?;
3295 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3296 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3297 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3298 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3299 for forward in pending_forwards {
3300 forward.write(writer)?;
3304 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3305 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3306 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3307 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3308 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3309 htlc.src.write(writer)?;
3310 htlc.value.write(writer)?;
3311 htlc.payment_data.write(writer)?;
3315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3316 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3317 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3318 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3319 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3320 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3323 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3329 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3331 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3333 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3334 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3335 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3336 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3337 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3338 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3339 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3340 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3341 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3342 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3343 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3344 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3345 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3346 /// deserialization.
3347 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3349 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3351 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3352 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3353 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3355 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3356 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3357 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3360 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3361 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3362 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3363 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3364 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3365 /// deserialization.
3366 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3367 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3368 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3369 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3371 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3372 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3374 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3375 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3376 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3377 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3379 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3381 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3384 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3385 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3386 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3388 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3389 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3392 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3393 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3394 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3396 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3398 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3399 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3400 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3401 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3402 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3403 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3404 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3405 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3408 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3409 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3410 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3411 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3412 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3413 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3414 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3415 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3416 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3418 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3419 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3421 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3428 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3429 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3430 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3434 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3435 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3436 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3437 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3438 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3439 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3440 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3441 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3443 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3446 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3447 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3448 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3449 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3450 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3451 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3452 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3453 previous_hops.push(ClaimableHTLC {
3454 src: Readable::read(reader)?,
3455 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3456 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3459 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3462 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3463 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3464 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3465 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3466 let peer_state = PeerState {
3467 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3469 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3472 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3474 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3476 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3477 monitor: args.monitor,
3478 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3480 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3481 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3482 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3484 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3489 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3491 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3493 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3495 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3497 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3498 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3499 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3500 logger: args.logger,
3501 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3504 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3505 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3506 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3507 //connection or two.
3510 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))