1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
309 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
322 struct ReceiveError {
328 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
329 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
331 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
332 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
333 pub enum FailureCode {
334 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
335 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
336 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
337 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
338 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
339 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
340 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
341 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
342 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
343 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
344 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
347 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
349 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
350 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
351 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
352 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
353 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
355 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
356 err: msgs::LightningError,
357 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
358 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
360 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
362 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
364 err: LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
378 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
379 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
382 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
393 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
394 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
398 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
401 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
404 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
408 log_level: Level::Warn,
411 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
413 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
415 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
418 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
426 shutdown_finish: None,
431 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
432 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
433 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
434 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
435 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
437 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
438 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
439 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
440 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
441 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
442 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
443 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
445 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
449 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
450 struct ClaimingPayment {
452 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
453 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
455 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
456 (0, amount_msat, required),
457 (2, payment_purpose, required),
458 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
461 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
462 struct ClaimablePayments {
463 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
464 /// failed/claimed by the user.
466 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
467 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
469 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
470 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
471 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
473 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
474 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
475 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
476 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
479 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
480 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
481 /// quite some time lag.
482 enum BackgroundEvent {
483 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
484 /// commitment transaction.
485 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
489 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
490 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
491 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
492 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
493 /// event can be generated.
494 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
495 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
496 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
499 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
500 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
501 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
504 /// State we hold per-peer.
505 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
506 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
508 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
509 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
511 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
512 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
513 latest_features: InitFeatures,
514 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
515 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
516 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
517 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
518 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
520 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
521 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
522 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
523 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
525 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
526 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
527 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
528 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
529 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
530 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
531 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
532 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
533 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
534 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
538 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
539 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
540 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
541 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
542 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
543 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
546 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
550 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
551 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
553 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
556 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
557 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
558 struct PendingInboundPayment {
559 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
560 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
561 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
562 /// this payment being removed.
564 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
565 user_payment_id: u64,
566 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
567 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
568 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
571 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
572 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
573 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
574 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
575 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
576 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
577 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
578 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
580 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
581 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
589 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
591 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
596 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
597 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
598 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
599 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
600 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
601 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
602 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
603 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
604 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
606 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
607 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
609 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
610 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
612 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
613 /// to individual Channels.
615 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
616 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
617 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
618 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
620 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
621 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
622 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
623 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
624 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
625 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
626 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
628 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
629 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
630 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
632 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
633 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
634 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
635 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
636 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
638 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
639 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
640 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
641 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
643 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
644 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
645 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
647 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
648 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
649 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
650 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
651 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
653 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
654 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
655 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
656 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
657 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
658 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
659 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
660 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
663 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
664 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
665 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
666 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
667 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
671 // `total_consistency_lock`
673 // |__`forward_htlcs`
675 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
677 // |__`per_peer_state`
679 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
681 // | |__`claimable_payments`
683 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
689 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
691 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
695 // | |__`pending_events`
697 // | |__`pending_background_events`
699 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
701 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
703 ES::Target: EntropySource,
704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
705 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
710 default_configuration: UserConfig,
711 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
712 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
722 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
723 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
725 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
726 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
727 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
728 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
733 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
734 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
735 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
736 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
737 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
738 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
739 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
740 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
742 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
744 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
745 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
747 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
749 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
750 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
751 /// and via the classic SCID.
753 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
754 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
756 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
758 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
760 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
761 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
762 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
767 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
768 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
770 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
773 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
774 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
775 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
776 /// active channel list on load.
778 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
779 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
781 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
783 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
784 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
785 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
787 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
788 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
789 /// the handling of the events.
791 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
792 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
795 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
796 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
797 /// would break backwards compatability.
798 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
799 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
800 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
802 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
803 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
805 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
807 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
808 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
809 /// confirmation depth.
811 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
812 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
813 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
815 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
817 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
819 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
821 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
823 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
825 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
826 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
827 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
829 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
830 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
832 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
833 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
834 /// keeping additional state.
835 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
837 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
838 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
839 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
840 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
842 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
843 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
845 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
846 /// are currently open with that peer.
848 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
849 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
852 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
856 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
857 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
858 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
860 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
861 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
862 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
863 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
864 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
865 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
866 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
867 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
868 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
869 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
870 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
872 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
881 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
883 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
884 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
885 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
886 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
887 pub struct ChainParameters {
888 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
889 pub network: Network,
891 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
893 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
894 pub best_block: BestBlock,
897 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
903 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
904 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
905 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
906 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
907 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
908 /// updates are ready for persistence).
910 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
911 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
912 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
913 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
914 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
916 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
917 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
920 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
921 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
922 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
925 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
926 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
928 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
929 persistence_notifier: notifier,
930 should_persist: persist_check,
931 _read_guard: read_guard,
936 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
938 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
939 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
944 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
945 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
947 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
949 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
950 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
951 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
952 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
953 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
955 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
956 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
958 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
960 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
961 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
962 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
963 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
964 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
965 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
966 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
967 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
968 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
969 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
970 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
971 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
972 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
974 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
975 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
977 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
978 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
979 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
980 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
982 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
983 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
984 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
985 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
986 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
987 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
990 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
992 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
993 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
996 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
998 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
999 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1001 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1002 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1003 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1004 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1006 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1007 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1008 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1009 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1011 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1012 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1013 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1015 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1016 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1017 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1019 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1020 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1021 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1022 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1023 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1024 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1025 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1026 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1027 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1028 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1029 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1032 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1033 /// to better separate parameters.
1034 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1035 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1036 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1037 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1038 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1039 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1040 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1041 pub features: InitFeatures,
1042 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1043 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1044 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1046 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1048 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1049 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1050 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1051 /// payments to us through this channel.
1052 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1053 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1054 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1055 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1056 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1057 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1058 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1061 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1062 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1063 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1064 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1065 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1066 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1067 /// lifetime of the channel.
1068 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1069 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1070 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1071 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1072 /// our counterparty already.
1074 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1075 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1076 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1077 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1079 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1080 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1081 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1082 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1084 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1085 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1087 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1088 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1090 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1091 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1092 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1093 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1094 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1095 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1097 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1098 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1101 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1103 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1104 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1105 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1106 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1107 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1108 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1109 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1111 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1112 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1114 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1115 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1116 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1117 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1118 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1119 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1120 /// this value on chain.
1122 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1124 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1126 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1127 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1128 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1129 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1131 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1132 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1133 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1135 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1136 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1137 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1138 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1139 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1141 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1142 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1143 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1144 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1146 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1147 pub balance_msat: u64,
1148 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1149 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1150 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1151 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1153 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1155 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1156 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1157 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1158 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1159 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1160 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1161 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1162 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1164 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1165 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1166 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1167 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1168 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1169 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1170 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1172 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1173 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1174 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1175 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1176 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1177 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1178 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1180 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1182 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1184 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1185 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1186 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1187 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1188 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1190 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1191 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1192 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1193 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1194 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1195 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1196 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1198 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1199 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1200 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1201 pub is_outbound: bool,
1202 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1203 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1204 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1205 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1206 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1208 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1209 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1210 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1211 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1213 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1214 pub is_usable: bool,
1215 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1216 pub is_public: bool,
1217 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1218 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1219 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1220 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1221 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1222 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1224 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1225 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1228 impl ChannelDetails {
1229 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1230 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1231 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1233 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1234 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1235 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1236 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1239 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1240 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1241 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1243 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1244 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1245 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1246 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1249 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1250 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1252 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1253 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1254 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1256 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1257 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1258 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1259 features: latest_features,
1260 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1261 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1262 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1263 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1264 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1265 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1266 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1267 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1268 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1269 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1271 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1272 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1273 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1274 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1275 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1276 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1277 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1278 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1279 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1280 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1281 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1282 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1283 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1284 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1285 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1286 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1287 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1288 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1289 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1290 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1291 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1292 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1293 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1294 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1295 config: Some(channel.config()),
1300 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1301 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1302 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1303 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1304 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1306 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1308 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1309 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1310 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1313 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1314 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1315 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1317 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1318 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1319 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1321 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1322 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1323 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1325 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1326 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1330 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1332 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1334 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1335 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1336 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1337 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1339 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1340 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1341 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1344 macro_rules! handle_error {
1345 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1348 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1349 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1350 // entering the macro.
1351 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1352 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1354 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1356 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1357 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1358 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1359 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1363 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1364 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1365 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1366 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1371 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1372 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1374 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1375 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1376 action: err.action.clone()
1380 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1381 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1382 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1383 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1384 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1388 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1395 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1396 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1397 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1398 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1399 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1400 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1402 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1403 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1404 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1405 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1406 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1408 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1409 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1411 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1415 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1416 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1417 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1419 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1420 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1422 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1423 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1425 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1426 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1427 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1428 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1429 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1430 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1436 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1437 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1441 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1443 $entry.remove_entry();
1451 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1452 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1456 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1458 $entry.remove_entry();
1466 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1467 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1469 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1470 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1476 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1477 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1478 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1479 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1480 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1482 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1483 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1484 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1485 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1486 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1487 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1488 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1489 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1490 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1491 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1496 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1497 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1498 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1499 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1500 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1501 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1502 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1503 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1504 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1506 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1511 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1512 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1513 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1514 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1515 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1516 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1517 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1518 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1519 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1521 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1526 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1527 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1528 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1529 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1530 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1531 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1532 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1533 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1534 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1535 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1536 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1538 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1539 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1540 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1546 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1547 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1549 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1550 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1551 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1552 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1553 updates.announcement_sigs);
1554 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1555 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1558 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1559 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1560 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1562 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1564 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1565 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1567 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1568 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1569 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1570 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1575 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1576 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1577 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1578 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1579 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1581 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1582 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1583 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1586 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1587 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1588 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1589 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1590 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1591 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1592 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1593 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1597 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1598 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1599 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1600 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1601 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1603 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1609 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1610 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1614 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1616 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1617 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1618 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1619 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1620 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1621 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1625 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1627 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1628 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1630 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1632 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1633 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1634 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1637 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1638 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1639 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1640 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1641 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1642 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1643 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1644 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1646 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1647 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1648 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1653 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1655 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1656 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1657 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1658 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1659 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1660 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1661 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1662 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1664 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1667 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1668 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1670 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1672 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1674 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1676 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1677 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1678 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1679 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1689 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1690 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1691 &self.default_configuration
1694 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1695 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1696 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1699 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1700 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1702 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1704 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1708 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1713 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1715 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1716 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1717 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1718 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1719 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1721 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1722 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1724 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1725 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1726 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1728 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1729 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1730 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1731 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1732 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1733 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1735 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1736 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1738 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1739 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1740 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1744 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1745 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1749 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1750 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1752 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1754 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1755 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1756 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1757 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1758 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1759 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1763 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1768 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1770 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1771 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1776 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1783 node_id: their_network_key,
1786 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1789 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1790 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1791 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1792 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1793 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1794 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1795 // the same channel.
1796 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1798 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1800 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1803 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1804 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1805 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1813 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1814 /// more information.
1815 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1816 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1819 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1820 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1822 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1823 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1825 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1826 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1827 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1828 // really wanted anyway.
1829 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1832 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1833 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1834 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1837 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1840 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1841 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1844 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1850 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1851 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1853 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1854 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1855 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1857 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1858 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1859 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1860 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1861 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1862 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1863 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1864 total_msat: *total_msat,
1867 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1868 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1870 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1871 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1878 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1879 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1880 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1881 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1882 Some(transaction) => {
1883 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1887 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1888 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1889 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1890 reason: closure_reason
1894 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1897 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1898 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1901 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1902 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1906 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1908 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1909 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1910 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1911 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1912 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1914 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1915 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1916 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1917 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1918 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1922 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1923 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1924 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1925 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1926 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1929 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1930 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1931 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1932 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1936 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1944 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1945 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1946 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1947 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1950 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1954 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1955 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1956 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1958 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1959 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1961 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1962 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1963 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1964 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1966 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1968 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1969 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1970 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1971 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1972 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1973 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1976 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1977 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1978 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1980 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1981 /// the channel being closed or not:
1982 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1983 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1984 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1985 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1986 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1987 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1988 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1990 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1992 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1993 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1994 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1995 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1996 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1997 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2001 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2002 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2003 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2004 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2005 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2006 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2007 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2008 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2010 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2011 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2012 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2013 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2014 // ignore the result here.
2015 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2019 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2020 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2021 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2022 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2025 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2029 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2030 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2031 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2033 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2035 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2037 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2040 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2041 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2043 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2044 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2049 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2052 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2054 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2055 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2056 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2057 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2058 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2059 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2060 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2061 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2062 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2063 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2074 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2075 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2076 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2078 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2079 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2080 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2083 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2084 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2085 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2087 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2088 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2089 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2090 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2091 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2094 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2095 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2096 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2097 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2098 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2102 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2103 /// local transaction(s).
2104 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2105 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2106 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2110 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2111 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2113 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2114 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2115 return Err(ReceiveError {
2116 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2118 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2121 // final_expiry_too_soon
2122 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2123 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2125 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2126 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2127 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2128 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2129 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2130 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2131 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2132 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2133 return Err(ReceiveError {
2134 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2135 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2138 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2139 return Err(ReceiveError {
2141 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2142 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2146 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2147 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2148 return Err(ReceiveError {
2149 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2150 err_data: Vec::new(),
2151 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2154 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2155 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2157 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2158 err_data: Vec::new(),
2159 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2161 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2162 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2164 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2165 phantom_shared_secret,
2167 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2168 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2169 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2170 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2171 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2172 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2173 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2174 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2175 return Err(ReceiveError {
2176 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2177 err_data: Vec::new(),
2178 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2182 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2184 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2187 return Err(ReceiveError {
2188 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2189 err_data: Vec::new(),
2190 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2195 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2198 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2199 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2200 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2201 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2205 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2206 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2207 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2209 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2210 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2213 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2214 failure_code: $err_code,
2220 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2221 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2224 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2225 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2226 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2228 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2229 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2230 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2231 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2232 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2233 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2234 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2235 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2237 macro_rules! return_err {
2238 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2240 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2241 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2242 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2243 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2244 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2245 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2251 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2253 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2254 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2256 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2257 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2261 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2262 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2264 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2266 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2267 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2268 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2269 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2270 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2272 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2275 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2276 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2277 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2279 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2280 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2281 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2284 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2285 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2286 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2287 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2291 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2292 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2293 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2296 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2297 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2298 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2299 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2300 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2305 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2306 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2307 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2308 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2309 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2310 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2311 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2312 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2313 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2314 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2315 // phantom or an intercept.
2316 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2317 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2318 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2322 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2325 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2327 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2329 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2330 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2331 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2335 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2337 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2338 // have no consistency guarantees.
2339 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2343 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2344 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2345 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2346 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2347 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2349 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2350 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2351 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2352 // we don't have the channel here.
2353 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2355 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2357 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2358 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2359 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2360 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2361 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2362 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2363 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2365 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2366 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2368 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2369 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2373 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2374 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2375 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2376 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2378 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2385 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2386 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2387 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2388 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2389 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2390 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2392 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2393 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2395 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2396 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2397 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2398 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2399 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2400 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2401 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2402 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2403 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2404 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2410 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2411 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2412 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2413 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2415 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2416 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2418 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2419 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2420 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2422 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2423 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2424 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2425 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2426 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2427 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2428 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2432 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2437 pending_forward_info
2440 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2441 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2442 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2444 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2445 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2446 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2448 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2449 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2450 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2451 if !chan.should_announce() {
2452 return Err(LightningError {
2453 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2454 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2457 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2458 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2461 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2464 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2465 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2466 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2467 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2469 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2470 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2471 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2473 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2474 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2475 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2477 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2478 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2482 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2484 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2486 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2488 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2489 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2491 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2492 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2493 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2494 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2495 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2496 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2497 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2498 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2500 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2501 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2502 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2504 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2506 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2513 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2514 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2515 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2518 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2519 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2520 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2523 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2524 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2526 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2527 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2528 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2529 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2530 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2532 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2534 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2535 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2536 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2537 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2541 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2542 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2545 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2546 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2547 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2549 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2550 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2551 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2553 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2554 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2556 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2557 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2558 Some(monitor_update) => {
2559 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2560 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2561 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2564 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2565 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2566 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2567 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2568 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2569 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2570 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2571 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2577 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2578 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2579 // `channel_by_id` map.
2580 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2581 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2586 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2587 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2589 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2594 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2596 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2597 /// fields for more info.
2599 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2600 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2602 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2604 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2605 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2606 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2607 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2608 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2610 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2611 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2612 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2613 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2614 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2616 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2617 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2618 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2619 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2621 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2623 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2624 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2625 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2627 /// In general, a path may raise:
2628 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2629 /// node public key) is specified.
2630 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2631 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2633 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2634 /// relevant updates.
2636 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2637 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2638 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2640 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2642 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2643 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2644 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2645 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2646 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2648 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2649 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2650 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2652 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2653 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2654 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2655 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2656 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2657 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2660 self.pending_outbound_payments
2661 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2662 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2663 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2666 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2667 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2668 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2671 self.pending_outbound_payments
2672 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2673 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2674 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2675 &self.pending_events,
2676 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2677 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2681 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2682 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2684 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2685 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2686 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2690 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2692 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2696 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2697 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2698 /// retries are exhausted.
2700 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2701 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2703 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2704 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2705 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2707 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2708 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2710 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2711 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2712 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2713 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2714 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2717 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2718 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2719 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2720 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2721 /// never reach the recipient.
2723 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2724 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2726 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2727 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2729 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2731 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2732 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2733 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2735 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2736 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2738 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2739 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2742 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2743 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2745 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2748 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2749 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2750 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2752 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2753 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2754 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2755 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2756 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2757 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2760 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2761 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2762 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2763 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2764 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2766 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2767 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2768 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2771 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2774 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2775 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2778 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2779 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2780 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2781 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2782 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2793 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2795 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2796 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2797 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2798 } else { unreachable!(); })
2801 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2804 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2805 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2808 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2809 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2814 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2815 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2818 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2820 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2823 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2824 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2825 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2834 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2836 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2840 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2842 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2843 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2845 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2846 /// across the p2p network.
2848 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2849 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2851 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2852 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2853 /// keys per-channel).
2855 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2856 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2857 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2859 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2860 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2861 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2863 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2864 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2865 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2866 /// for more details.
2868 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2869 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2870 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2873 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2874 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2875 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2876 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2881 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2882 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2883 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2884 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2885 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2886 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2887 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2891 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2892 let mut output_index = None;
2893 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2894 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2895 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2896 if output_index.is_some() {
2897 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2898 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2901 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2906 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2909 if output_index.is_none() {
2910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2914 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2918 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2920 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2921 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2922 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2923 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2925 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2926 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2928 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2929 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2931 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2933 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2934 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2935 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2936 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2938 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2939 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2940 pub fn update_channel_config(
2941 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2942 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2943 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2944 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2945 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2950 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2953 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2954 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2957 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2958 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2959 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2960 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2964 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2965 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2966 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2969 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2970 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2971 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2972 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2973 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2981 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2982 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2984 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2985 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2987 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2988 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2989 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2990 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2991 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2993 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2994 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2996 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2999 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3000 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3001 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3002 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3003 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3006 let next_hop_scid = {
3007 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3008 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3009 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3010 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3011 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3012 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3014 if !chan.is_usable() {
3015 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3016 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3019 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3021 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3022 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3027 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3028 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3029 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3032 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3033 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3034 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3036 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3038 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3039 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3042 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3043 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3044 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3045 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3046 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3048 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3052 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3053 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3055 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3058 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3059 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3062 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3063 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3064 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3067 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3068 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3069 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3070 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3071 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3072 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3073 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3076 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3077 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3079 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3084 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3086 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3087 /// Will likely generate further events.
3088 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3091 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3092 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3093 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3095 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3096 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3098 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3099 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3100 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3102 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3103 match forward_info {
3104 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3105 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3106 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3107 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3108 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3111 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3112 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3113 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3115 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3116 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3117 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3118 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3120 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3123 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3124 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3126 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3129 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3130 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3136 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3137 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3139 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3143 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3144 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3146 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3150 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3151 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3152 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3153 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3154 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3156 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3157 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3158 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3159 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3160 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3162 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3164 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3165 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3169 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3170 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3171 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3172 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3178 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3181 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3184 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3185 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3186 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3187 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3188 // problem, not ours.
3194 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3195 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3197 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3201 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3202 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3203 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3204 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3209 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3211 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3215 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3216 match forward_info {
3217 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3218 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3219 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3220 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3221 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3225 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3226 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3227 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3228 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3229 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3230 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3231 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3233 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3234 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3235 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3237 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3240 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3242 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3243 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3244 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3245 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3250 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3251 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3253 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3255 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3256 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3258 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3261 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3263 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3264 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3265 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3274 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3275 match forward_info {
3276 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3277 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3278 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3279 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3282 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3283 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3284 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3285 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3287 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3288 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3290 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3293 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3294 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3295 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3296 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3297 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3298 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3299 phantom_shared_secret,
3301 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3302 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3303 // if routing nodes overpay
3304 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3305 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3307 total_value_received: None,
3308 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3313 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3314 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3315 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3316 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3317 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3319 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3320 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3321 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3322 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3323 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3324 phantom_shared_secret,
3326 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3327 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3331 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3332 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3333 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3334 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3335 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3338 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3339 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3340 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3342 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3343 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3344 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3347 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3348 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3349 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3352 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3353 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3354 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3355 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3361 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3362 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3363 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3364 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3365 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3366 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3368 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3369 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3371 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3373 _ => unreachable!(),
3376 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3377 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3378 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3379 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3380 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3382 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3384 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3385 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3386 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3387 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3388 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3389 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3390 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3394 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3395 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3397 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3399 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3400 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3402 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3404 payment_claimable_generated
3408 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3409 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3410 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3411 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3412 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3413 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3414 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3415 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3417 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3418 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3419 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3420 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3421 Ok(result) => result,
3423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3424 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3428 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3429 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3430 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3432 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3433 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3437 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3439 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3440 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3441 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3442 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3445 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3447 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3448 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3449 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3450 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3451 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3452 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3453 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3457 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3458 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3463 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3470 if payment_data.is_none() {
3471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3472 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3475 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3476 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3478 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3479 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3481 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3482 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3484 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3485 if payment_claimable_generated {
3486 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3492 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3493 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3503 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3504 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3505 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3506 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3508 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3509 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3511 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3513 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3514 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3515 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3517 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3519 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3520 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3521 events.append(&mut new_events);
3524 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3526 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3527 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3529 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3530 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3531 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3532 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3533 if background_events.is_empty() {
3537 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3539 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3540 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3541 // monitor updating completing.
3542 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3549 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3550 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3551 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3552 self.process_background_events();
3555 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3556 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3557 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3558 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3559 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3560 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3561 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3563 if !chan.is_live() {
3564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3565 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3566 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3569 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3571 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3572 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3576 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3577 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3578 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3579 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3580 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3581 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3582 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3584 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3586 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3587 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3588 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3589 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3590 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3591 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3592 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3600 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3602 /// This currently includes:
3603 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3604 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3605 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3607 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3608 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3609 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3611 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3612 /// estimate fetches.
3614 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3615 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3616 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3617 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3618 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3619 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3621 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3623 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3624 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3625 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3628 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3631 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3632 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3633 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3634 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3635 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3637 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3638 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3639 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3640 if needs_close { return false; }
3643 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3644 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3645 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3646 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3647 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3648 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3649 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3650 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3654 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3655 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3657 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3658 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3659 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3663 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3664 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3669 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3673 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3674 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3679 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3680 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3681 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3682 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3683 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3684 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3685 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3686 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3687 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3688 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3689 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3691 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3692 // have no channels to the peer.
3693 let remove_entry = {
3694 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3695 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3698 entry.remove_entry();
3701 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3706 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3707 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3708 // This should be unreachable
3709 debug_assert!(false);
3712 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3713 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3714 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3715 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3716 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3717 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3719 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3720 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3721 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3723 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3730 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3731 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3732 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3733 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3737 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3738 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3741 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3743 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3744 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3745 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3746 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3747 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3754 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3755 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3756 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3758 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3759 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3760 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3761 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3763 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3764 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3765 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3766 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3767 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3768 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3771 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3772 /// reason for the failure.
3774 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3775 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3778 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3779 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3780 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3781 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3782 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3783 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3784 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3789 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3790 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3791 match failure_code {
3792 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3793 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3794 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3795 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3796 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3797 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3802 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3803 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3805 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3807 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3808 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3809 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3810 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3811 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3812 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3813 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3815 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3817 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3818 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3820 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3825 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3826 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3827 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3828 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3829 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3830 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3831 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3832 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3833 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3834 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3836 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3837 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3838 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3839 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3841 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3842 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3843 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3844 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3845 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3849 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3850 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3851 // be surfaced to the user.
3852 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3853 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3854 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3856 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3858 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3861 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3862 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3863 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3867 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3870 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3871 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3872 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3873 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3877 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3878 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3879 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3880 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3881 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3882 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3883 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3884 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3885 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3888 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3889 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3890 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3893 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3894 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3895 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3897 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3898 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3899 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3900 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3901 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3903 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3904 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3905 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3907 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3908 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3909 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3910 push_forward_ev = true;
3912 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3914 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3917 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3920 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3921 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3922 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3923 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3924 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3925 failed_next_destination: destination,
3931 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3932 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3934 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3935 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3936 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3938 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3939 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3940 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3941 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3943 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3944 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3945 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3946 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3947 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3948 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3949 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3954 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3955 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3956 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3957 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3958 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3959 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3960 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3961 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3966 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3967 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3968 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3970 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3971 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3972 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3973 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3978 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3980 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3981 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3982 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3983 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3984 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3986 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3987 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3989 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3990 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3991 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3992 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3993 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3995 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3996 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
3997 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3998 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3999 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4001 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4002 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4003 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4010 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4011 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4019 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
4024 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4025 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4026 debug_assert!(false);
4030 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4032 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4033 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4034 debug_assert!(false);
4038 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4040 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4041 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4042 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4043 if sources.len() != 1 {
4044 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4045 debug_assert!(false);
4051 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4053 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4054 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4055 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4056 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4059 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4060 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4061 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4062 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4066 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4067 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4068 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4069 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4071 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4072 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4073 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4074 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4075 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4080 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4081 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4082 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4083 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4084 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4085 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4088 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4091 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4092 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4093 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4094 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4098 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4099 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4100 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4101 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4104 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4105 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4106 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4110 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4111 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4112 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4116 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4119 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4120 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4121 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4123 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4124 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4126 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4127 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4129 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4130 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4131 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4132 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4133 if let Err(e) = res {
4134 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4135 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4136 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4137 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4138 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4144 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4145 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4146 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4150 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4151 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4152 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4153 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4154 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4155 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4156 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4157 // again on restart.
4158 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4159 payment_preimage, update_res);
4161 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4162 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4163 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4164 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4165 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4166 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4170 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4171 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4174 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4176 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4177 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4179 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4180 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4181 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4182 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4183 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4184 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4185 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4188 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4189 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4191 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4193 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4196 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4200 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4201 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4202 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4208 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4209 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4210 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4213 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4214 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4216 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4217 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4218 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4219 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4220 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4224 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4225 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4231 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4232 /// update completion.
4233 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4234 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4235 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4236 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4237 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4238 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4240 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4241 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4242 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4243 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4244 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4245 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4247 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4249 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4250 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4251 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4252 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4255 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4256 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4258 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4259 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4260 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4265 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4266 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4268 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4273 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4274 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4276 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4277 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4282 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4286 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4292 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4293 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4294 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4298 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4299 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4300 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4306 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4307 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4309 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4310 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4312 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4313 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4314 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4315 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4316 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4322 let mut peer_state_lock;
4323 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4324 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4325 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4328 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4329 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4333 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4334 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4335 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4338 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4341 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4343 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4344 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4347 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4348 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4349 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4351 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4352 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4353 /// used to accept such channels.
4355 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4356 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4357 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4358 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4361 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4362 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4364 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4365 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4366 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4368 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4369 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4371 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4372 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4374 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4375 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4377 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4378 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4379 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4380 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4383 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4386 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4388 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4389 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4392 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4393 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4395 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4396 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4399 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4400 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4401 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4402 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4404 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4408 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4409 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4411 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4412 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4413 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4414 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4415 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4416 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4418 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4421 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4422 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4423 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4427 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4428 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4429 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4433 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4439 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4440 /// or 0-conf channels.
4442 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4443 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4444 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4445 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4446 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4447 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4449 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4450 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4451 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4452 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4453 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4454 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4455 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4459 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4462 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4463 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4465 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4466 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4467 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4468 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4470 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4473 num_unfunded_channels
4476 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4477 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4481 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4485 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4486 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4487 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4488 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4490 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4491 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4492 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4493 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4496 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4498 debug_assert!(false);
4499 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4501 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4502 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4504 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4505 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4506 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4507 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4508 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4509 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4512 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4513 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4516 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4517 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4519 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4520 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4523 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4524 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4525 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4528 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4533 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4535 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4539 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4540 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4541 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4543 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4544 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4545 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4548 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4549 pending_events.push(
4550 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4551 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4552 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4553 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4554 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4555 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4560 entry.insert(channel);
4566 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4571 debug_assert!(false);
4572 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4578 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4579 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4584 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4585 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4586 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4587 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4588 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4590 user_channel_id: user_id,
4595 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4596 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4599 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4601 debug_assert!(false);
4602 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4605 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4606 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4607 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4608 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4610 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4615 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4617 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4620 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4623 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4624 funding_msg.channel_id))
4626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4627 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4631 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4632 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4633 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4634 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4635 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4636 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4637 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4641 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4643 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4644 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4645 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4647 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4648 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4649 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4650 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4651 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4652 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4653 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4654 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4662 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4663 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4665 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4667 debug_assert!(false);
4668 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4675 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4676 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4677 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4678 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4679 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4680 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4681 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4682 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4683 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4684 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4693 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4695 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4697 debug_assert!(false);
4698 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4704 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4705 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4706 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4707 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4708 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4710 msg: announcement_sigs,
4712 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4713 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4714 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4715 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4716 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4717 // announcement_signatures.
4718 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4719 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4720 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4721 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4728 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4729 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4738 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4739 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4740 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4742 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4744 debug_assert!(false);
4745 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4747 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4748 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4749 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4750 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4752 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4753 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4754 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4755 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4758 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4759 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4760 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4761 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4763 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4764 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4765 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4766 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4767 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4768 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4773 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4774 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4775 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4776 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4777 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4784 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4785 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4786 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4787 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4793 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4795 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4797 debug_assert!(false);
4798 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4800 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4805 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4806 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4807 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4808 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4813 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4814 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4815 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4816 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4817 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4818 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4819 } else { (tx, None) }
4821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4824 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4825 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4826 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4828 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4829 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4832 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4836 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4841 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4842 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4843 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4844 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4846 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4847 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4848 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4849 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4851 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4855 debug_assert!(false);
4856 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4860 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4863 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4864 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4865 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4866 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4867 match pending_forward_info {
4868 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4869 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4870 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4871 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4873 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4874 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4875 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4876 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4877 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4880 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4882 _ => pending_forward_info
4885 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4892 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4893 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4895 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4897 debug_assert!(false);
4898 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4902 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4904 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4909 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4913 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4915 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4917 debug_assert!(false);
4918 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4922 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4924 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4931 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4933 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4935 debug_assert!(false);
4936 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4940 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4942 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4943 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4944 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4946 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4953 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4955 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4957 debug_assert!(false);
4958 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4962 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4964 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4965 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4966 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4967 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4968 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4969 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4976 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4977 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4978 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4979 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4980 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4981 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4982 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4983 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4984 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4985 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4986 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4988 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4989 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4991 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4992 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4993 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4994 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4995 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4996 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4999 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5000 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5002 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5003 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5004 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5006 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5007 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5008 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5009 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5010 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5013 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5014 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5017 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5018 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5019 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5020 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5021 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5022 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5023 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5026 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5027 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5028 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5033 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5034 // payments are being processed.
5035 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5036 push_forward_event = true;
5038 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5039 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5046 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5047 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5050 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5051 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5052 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5054 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5058 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5059 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5060 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5061 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5062 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5064 if !forward_ev_exists {
5065 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5067 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5072 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5073 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5075 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5077 debug_assert!(false);
5078 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5079 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5081 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5083 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5084 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5085 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5086 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5087 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5088 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5089 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5094 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5098 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5100 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5102 debug_assert!(false);
5103 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5107 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5108 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5109 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5116 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5118 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5120 debug_assert!(false);
5121 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5123 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5124 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5125 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5127 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5131 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5132 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5133 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5134 msg, &self.default_configuration
5136 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5137 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5138 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5146 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5147 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5148 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5149 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5151 // It's not a local channel
5152 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5156 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5157 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5158 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5164 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5165 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5166 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5167 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5168 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5169 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5173 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5174 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5175 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5176 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5178 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5184 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5187 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5189 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5190 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5194 debug_assert!(false);
5195 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5199 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5201 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5202 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5203 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5204 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5205 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5206 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5207 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5208 let mut channel_update = None;
5209 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5211 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5214 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5215 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5216 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5217 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5218 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5219 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5220 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5225 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5226 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5227 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5228 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5229 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5238 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5239 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5242 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5243 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5248 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5249 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5250 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5252 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5253 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5254 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5255 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5256 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5257 match monitor_event {
5258 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5259 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5261 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5264 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5265 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5266 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5269 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5270 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5271 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5272 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5274 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5275 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5276 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5277 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5280 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5281 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5282 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5283 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5284 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5285 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5286 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5287 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5288 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5289 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5290 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5294 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5295 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5297 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5299 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5300 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5301 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5303 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5310 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5311 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5317 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5318 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5321 has_pending_monitor_events
5324 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5325 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5326 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5328 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5329 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5330 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5331 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5333 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5338 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5339 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5340 /// update was applied.
5341 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5342 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5343 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5344 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5346 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5347 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5348 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5349 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5352 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5355 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5356 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5357 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5358 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5359 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5360 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5361 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5362 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5364 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5365 has_monitor_update = true;
5367 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5368 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5369 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5370 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5371 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5372 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5373 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5375 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5377 continue 'peer_loop;
5386 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5387 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5388 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5391 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5392 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5398 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5399 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5400 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5401 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5402 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5403 let mut has_update = false;
5405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5407 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5410 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5411 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5412 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5413 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5414 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5417 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5420 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5421 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5422 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5423 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5429 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5431 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5432 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5433 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5439 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5440 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5448 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5449 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5455 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5456 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5458 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5459 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5460 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5461 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5462 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5463 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5464 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5465 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5466 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5467 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5468 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5469 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5470 assert!(should_broadcast);
5471 } else { unreachable!(); }
5472 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5474 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5478 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5479 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5481 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5482 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5485 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5488 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5489 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5491 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5492 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5493 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5494 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5495 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5496 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5497 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5498 // never fail a payment too early.
5499 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5501 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5509 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5512 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5513 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5515 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5516 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5517 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5518 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5520 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5522 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5523 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5527 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5528 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5530 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5532 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5533 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5535 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5536 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5537 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5538 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5539 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5540 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5541 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5542 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5543 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5544 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5545 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5548 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5549 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5551 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5554 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5556 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5558 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5559 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5560 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5561 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5562 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5565 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5566 /// stored external to LDK.
5568 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5569 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5570 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5572 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5573 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5576 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5577 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5578 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5579 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5581 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5582 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5583 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5584 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5585 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5587 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5588 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5589 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5590 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5591 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5593 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5594 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5596 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5597 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5601 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5602 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5604 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5606 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5607 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5609 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5610 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5611 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5612 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5613 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5614 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5615 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5618 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5619 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5621 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5624 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5626 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5628 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5629 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5632 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5633 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5635 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5636 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5637 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5640 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5641 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5643 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5644 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5645 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5646 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5648 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5649 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5650 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5651 Some(_) => continue,
5652 None => return scid_candidate
5657 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5659 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5660 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5662 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5663 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5664 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5668 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5669 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5670 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5672 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5673 /// times to get a unique scid.
5674 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5675 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5676 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5678 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5679 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5680 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5681 return scid_candidate
5685 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5686 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5687 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5688 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5690 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5691 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5692 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5693 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5694 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5695 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5696 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5697 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5707 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5708 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5709 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5710 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5714 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5715 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5716 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5721 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5722 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5723 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5727 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5728 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5732 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5733 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5736 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5737 /// using the given event handler.
5739 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5740 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5743 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5744 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5745 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5747 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5749 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5750 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5751 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5752 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5755 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5756 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5757 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5760 for event in pending_events {
5761 handler(event).await;
5764 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5765 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5770 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5772 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5773 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5774 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5775 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5776 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5777 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5781 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5782 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5783 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5784 /// is always placed next to each other.
5786 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5787 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5788 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5789 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5791 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5792 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5793 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5794 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5795 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5796 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5797 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5799 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5800 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5801 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5802 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5805 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5806 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5808 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5809 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5812 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5814 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5817 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5818 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5822 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5823 events.replace(pending_events);
5832 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5834 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5835 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5836 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5837 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5838 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5839 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5843 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5845 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5846 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5847 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5848 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5849 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5851 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5852 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5853 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5854 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5857 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5858 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5859 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5862 for event in pending_events {
5863 handler.handle_event(event);
5871 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5882 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5884 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5885 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5886 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5887 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5888 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5891 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5892 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5895 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5897 let new_height = height - 1;
5899 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5900 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5901 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5902 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5903 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5904 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5907 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5911 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5913 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5914 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5915 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5916 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5917 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5918 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5922 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5923 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5924 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5925 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5927 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5928 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5931 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5932 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5934 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5935 if height < last_best_block_height {
5936 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5937 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5941 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5942 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5943 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5944 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5946 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5947 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5951 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5953 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5955 macro_rules! max_time {
5956 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5958 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5959 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5960 // having an explicit local time source.
5961 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5962 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5963 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5964 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5965 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5971 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5972 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5973 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5974 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5978 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5979 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5980 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5983 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5984 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5985 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5992 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5994 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5995 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5996 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5997 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5998 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5999 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6004 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6006 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6007 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6008 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6009 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6010 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6015 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6016 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6018 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6019 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6020 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6021 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6022 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6024 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6025 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6028 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6031 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6032 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6033 let res = f(channel);
6034 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6035 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6036 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6037 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6038 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6040 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6041 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6042 if channel.is_usable() {
6043 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6044 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6045 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6046 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6051 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6056 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6057 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6060 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6061 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6062 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6063 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6064 msg: announcement_sigs,
6066 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6067 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6068 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6070 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6071 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6072 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6077 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6078 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6079 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6080 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6081 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6082 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6083 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6084 // is always consistent.
6085 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6086 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6087 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6088 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6089 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6092 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6093 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6094 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6095 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6096 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6097 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6098 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6102 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6103 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6104 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6105 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6106 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6107 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6108 data: reason_message,
6118 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6119 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6120 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6121 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6122 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6123 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6124 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6125 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6126 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6127 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6129 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6130 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6131 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6135 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6138 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6139 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6140 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6141 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6142 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6143 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6144 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6145 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6146 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6149 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6150 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6151 _ => unreachable!(),
6153 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6154 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6155 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6162 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6164 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6165 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6169 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6171 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6172 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6174 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6175 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6178 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6179 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6180 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6183 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6184 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6185 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6186 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6189 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6190 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6191 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6192 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6195 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6196 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6198 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6199 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6200 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6201 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6202 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6205 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6206 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6207 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6208 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6211 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6212 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6213 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6214 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6217 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6218 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6219 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6220 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6224 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6225 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6227 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6228 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6229 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6230 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6231 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6232 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6236 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6251 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6271 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6276 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6286 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6288 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6291 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6293 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6296 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6298 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6301 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6303 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6306 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6308 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6311 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6312 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6313 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6316 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6321 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6323 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6326 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6327 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6328 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6329 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6331 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6332 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6333 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6336 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6337 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6338 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6339 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6340 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6341 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6346 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6349 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6371 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6372 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6373 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6374 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6377 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6379 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6381 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6382 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6386 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6387 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6388 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6392 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6394 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6395 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6396 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6397 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6398 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6399 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6402 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6403 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6405 if inbound_peer_limited {
6408 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6409 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6410 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6411 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6412 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6417 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6418 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6420 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6421 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6422 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6423 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6428 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6429 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6434 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6437 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6440 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6441 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6442 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6443 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6444 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6445 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6446 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6451 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6452 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6457 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6458 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6459 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6460 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6461 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6470 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6474 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6477 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6478 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6479 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6480 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6481 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6482 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6483 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6484 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6486 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6487 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6488 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6492 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6494 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6495 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6498 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6499 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6500 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6501 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6509 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6510 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6514 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6515 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6518 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6519 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6523 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6524 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6525 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6526 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6529 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6530 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6532 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6533 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6534 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6535 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6536 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6539 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6540 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6541 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6542 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6545 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6546 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6547 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6548 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6551 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6552 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6553 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6554 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6555 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6556 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6557 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6558 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6559 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6560 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6561 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6562 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6563 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6564 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6565 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6566 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6567 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6568 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6570 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6571 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6572 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6578 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6579 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6581 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6582 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6583 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6584 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6587 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6588 (2, node_id, required),
6589 (4, features, required),
6590 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6591 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6592 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6593 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6596 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6597 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6598 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6599 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6600 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6601 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6602 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6603 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6604 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6605 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6606 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6607 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6608 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6609 (7, self.config, option),
6610 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6611 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6612 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6613 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6614 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6615 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6616 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6617 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6618 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6619 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6620 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6621 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6622 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6623 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6624 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6625 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6626 (32, self.is_public, required),
6627 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6628 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6629 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6630 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6636 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6637 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6638 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6639 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6640 (2, channel_id, required),
6641 (3, channel_type, option),
6642 (4, counterparty, required),
6643 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6644 (6, funding_txo, option),
6645 (7, config, option),
6646 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6647 (9, confirmations, option),
6648 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6649 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6650 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6651 (16, balance_msat, required),
6652 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6653 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6654 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6655 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6656 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6657 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6658 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6659 (26, is_outbound, required),
6660 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6661 (30, is_usable, required),
6662 (32, is_public, required),
6663 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6664 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6665 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6666 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6669 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6670 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6671 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6672 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6673 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6677 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6679 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6680 outbound_scid_alias,
6684 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6685 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6687 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6688 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6689 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6690 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6691 confirmations_required,
6693 force_close_spend_delay,
6694 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6695 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6696 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6697 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6698 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6699 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6700 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6705 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6706 (2, channels, vec_type),
6707 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6708 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6711 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6713 (0, onion_packet, required),
6714 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6717 (0, payment_data, required),
6718 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6719 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6721 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6722 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6723 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6727 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6728 (0, routing, required),
6729 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6730 (4, payment_hash, required),
6731 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6732 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6733 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6737 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6738 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6740 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6742 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6743 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6744 reason.write(writer)?;
6746 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6747 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6750 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6751 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6752 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6753 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6760 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6761 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6762 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6765 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6766 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6767 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6768 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6772 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6773 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6774 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6775 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6776 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6779 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6780 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6781 // messages contained in the variants.
6782 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6783 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6784 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6786 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6788 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6789 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6790 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6793 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6795 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6796 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6797 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6799 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6804 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6809 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6810 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6811 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6812 (2, outpoint, required),
6813 (4, htlc_id, required),
6814 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6817 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6818 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6819 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6820 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6821 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6823 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6824 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6825 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6826 (2, self.value, required),
6827 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6828 (4, payment_data, option),
6829 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6830 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6831 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6837 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6838 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6839 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6841 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6842 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6843 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6844 let mut total_value_received = None;
6845 let mut total_msat = None;
6846 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6847 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6848 (0, prev_hop, required),
6849 (1, total_msat, option),
6850 (2, value, required),
6851 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6852 (4, payment_data, option),
6853 (5, total_value_received, option),
6854 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6855 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6857 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6859 if payment_data.is_some() {
6860 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6862 if total_msat.is_none() {
6863 total_msat = Some(value);
6865 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6868 if total_msat.is_none() {
6869 if payment_data.is_none() {
6870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6872 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6874 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6878 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6881 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6882 total_value_received,
6883 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6890 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6891 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6892 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6896 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6897 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6898 let mut payment_id = None;
6899 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6900 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6901 (0, session_priv, required),
6902 (1, payment_id, option),
6903 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6904 (4, path, vec_type),
6905 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6907 if payment_id.is_none() {
6908 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6910 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6912 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6913 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6915 let path = path.unwrap();
6916 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6917 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6918 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6921 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6922 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6923 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6925 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6928 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6929 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6934 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6937 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6939 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6940 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6941 (0, session_priv, required),
6942 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6943 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6944 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6945 (4, *path, vec_type),
6946 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6949 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6951 field.write(writer)?;
6958 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6959 (0, forward_info, required),
6960 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6961 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6962 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6963 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6966 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6968 (0, htlc_id, required),
6969 (2, err_packet, required),
6974 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6975 (0, payment_secret, required),
6976 (2, expiry_time, required),
6977 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6978 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6979 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6982 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6986 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6987 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6988 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6993 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6994 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6996 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6998 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7000 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7001 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7002 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7005 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7008 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7009 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7010 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7013 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7014 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7016 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7017 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7018 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7019 unfunded_channels += 1;
7024 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7026 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7029 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7030 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7031 channel.write(writer)?;
7038 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7039 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7040 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7041 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7042 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7043 for forward in pending_forwards {
7044 forward.write(writer)?;
7049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7051 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7052 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7053 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7055 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7056 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7057 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7058 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7059 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7060 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7061 htlc.write(writer)?;
7063 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7066 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7067 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7068 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7069 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7070 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7071 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7072 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7075 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7076 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7077 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7078 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7079 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7081 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7082 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7083 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7084 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7085 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7086 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7087 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7092 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7093 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7094 for event in events.iter() {
7095 event.write(writer)?;
7098 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7099 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7100 for event in background_events.iter() {
7102 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7104 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7105 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7110 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7111 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7112 // likely to be identical.
7113 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7114 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7116 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7117 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7118 hash.write(writer)?;
7119 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7122 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7123 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7124 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7125 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7126 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7129 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7130 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7132 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7133 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7134 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7135 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7138 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7139 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7143 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7144 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7145 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7147 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7148 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7149 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7155 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7156 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7157 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7158 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7161 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7162 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7163 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7164 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7165 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7168 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7169 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7170 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7171 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7172 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7173 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7174 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7175 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7176 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7177 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7184 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7186 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7188 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7189 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7190 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7191 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7192 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7193 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7194 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7195 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7196 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7197 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7198 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7199 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7200 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7202 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7203 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7205 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7206 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7208 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7209 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7210 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7211 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7212 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7213 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7215 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7216 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7218 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7219 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7220 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7221 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7222 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7223 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7227 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7228 pub entropy_source: ES,
7230 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7231 pub node_signer: NS,
7233 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7234 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7236 pub signer_provider: SP,
7238 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7240 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7241 pub fee_estimator: F,
7242 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7244 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7245 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7246 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7247 pub chain_monitor: M,
7249 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7250 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7251 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7252 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7253 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7254 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7256 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7258 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7259 /// deserialization.
7261 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7262 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7263 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7265 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7266 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7268 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7269 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7270 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7271 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7273 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7276 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7277 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7280 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7281 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7283 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7286 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7287 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7292 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7293 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7294 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7295 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7296 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7298 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7299 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7304 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7305 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7306 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7307 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7309 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7310 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7311 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7312 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7313 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7314 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7318 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7319 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7320 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7324 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7325 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7327 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7328 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7329 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7330 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7331 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7332 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7336 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7337 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7339 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7341 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7345 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7347 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7348 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7349 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7350 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7351 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7352 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7353 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7354 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7356 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7357 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7358 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7359 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7360 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7361 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7362 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7363 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7364 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7365 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7366 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7367 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7368 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7369 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7370 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7372 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7373 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7374 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7375 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7376 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7377 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7378 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7379 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7380 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7381 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7382 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7383 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7385 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7386 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7387 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7388 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7389 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7391 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7392 let mut found_htlc = false;
7393 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7394 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7397 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7398 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7399 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7400 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7401 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7402 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7403 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7404 log_info!(args.logger,
7405 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7406 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7407 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7411 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7412 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7413 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7415 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7416 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7418 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7420 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7421 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7424 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7425 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7426 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7430 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7431 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7432 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7433 // safely discard the channel.
7434 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7435 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7436 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7437 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7438 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7441 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7442 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7443 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7444 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7445 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7446 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7450 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7451 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7452 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7453 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7454 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7456 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7460 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7461 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7463 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7464 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7467 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7468 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7470 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7473 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7475 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7476 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7479 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7480 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7482 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7485 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7487 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7488 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let peer_state = PeerState {
7490 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7491 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7492 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7493 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7494 is_connected: false,
7496 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7499 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7501 for _ in 0..event_count {
7502 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7503 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7508 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7509 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7510 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7512 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7513 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7514 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7515 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7517 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7520 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7524 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7525 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7527 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7529 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7530 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7531 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7535 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7536 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7537 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7538 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7539 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7540 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7541 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7543 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7544 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7548 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7549 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7550 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7551 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7552 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7553 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7554 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7555 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7556 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7557 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7558 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7559 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7560 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7561 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7562 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7563 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7564 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7565 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7566 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7567 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7569 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7570 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7573 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7574 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7577 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7578 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7581 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7582 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7583 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7584 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7585 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7586 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7588 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7590 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7591 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7592 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7596 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7597 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7598 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7599 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7600 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7601 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7602 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7604 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7605 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7606 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7607 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7608 if path.is_empty() {
7609 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7610 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7613 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7614 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7615 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7616 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7618 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7619 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7620 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7623 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7624 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7625 retry_strategy: None,
7626 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7627 payment_params: None,
7628 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7629 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7630 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7631 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7632 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7633 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7634 total_msat: path_amt,
7635 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7637 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7638 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7643 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7645 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7646 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7647 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7648 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7650 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7651 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7652 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7653 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7654 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7655 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7656 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7657 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7658 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7659 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7660 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7665 !forwards.is_empty()
7667 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7668 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7669 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7670 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7671 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7672 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7673 intercepted_id != ev_id
7680 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7681 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7682 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7683 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7684 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7685 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7686 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7687 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7688 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7689 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7690 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7691 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7692 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7701 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7702 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7703 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7704 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7705 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7706 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7707 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7708 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7712 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7713 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7715 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7716 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7717 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7720 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7721 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7724 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7725 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7726 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7727 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7730 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7731 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7732 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7733 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7734 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7735 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7736 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7737 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7739 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7740 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7744 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7746 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7748 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7749 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7751 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7755 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7756 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7758 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7760 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7762 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7763 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7764 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7769 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7770 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7773 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7774 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7775 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7777 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7778 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7779 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7781 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7782 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7783 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7784 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7785 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7786 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7788 if chan.is_usable() {
7789 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7790 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7791 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7792 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7793 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7799 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7801 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7802 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7803 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7804 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7805 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7806 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7807 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7808 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7809 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7810 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7811 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7813 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7814 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7816 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7817 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7818 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7819 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7821 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7822 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7823 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7824 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7826 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7827 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7828 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7829 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7831 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7832 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7833 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7836 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7837 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7840 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7841 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7844 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7847 purpose: payment_purpose,
7848 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7854 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7855 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7856 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7858 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7859 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7863 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7865 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7866 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7867 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7868 router: args.router,
7870 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7872 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7873 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7874 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7875 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7877 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7878 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7879 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7880 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7881 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7882 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7884 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7889 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7891 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7893 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7894 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7895 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7896 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7898 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7899 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7900 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7902 logger: args.logger,
7903 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7906 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7907 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7908 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7909 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7910 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7913 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7914 //connection or two.
7916 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7922 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7923 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7924 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7925 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7926 use core::time::Duration;
7927 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7928 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7929 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7930 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7931 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7932 use crate::ln::msgs;
7933 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7934 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7935 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7936 use crate::util::test_utils;
7937 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7938 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7941 fn test_notify_limits() {
7942 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7943 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7947 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7949 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7950 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7951 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7952 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7953 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7955 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7957 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7958 // to connect messages with new values
7959 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7960 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7961 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7962 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7963 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7964 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7966 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7967 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7968 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7969 // ... but the last node should not.
7970 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7971 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7972 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7973 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7975 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7976 // about the channel.
7977 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7978 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7979 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7981 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7983 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7984 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7986 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7987 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7988 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7990 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7992 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7994 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7995 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7996 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7997 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7998 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7999 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8001 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8002 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8003 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8004 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8005 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8006 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8007 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8008 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8010 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8011 // the channel info has updated.
8012 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8013 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8014 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8015 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8016 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8017 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8021 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8022 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8028 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8030 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8031 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8032 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8033 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8035 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8036 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8037 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8038 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8039 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8040 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8042 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8043 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8044 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8046 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8047 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8049 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8051 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8052 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8053 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8056 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8059 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8060 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8061 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8062 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8063 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8064 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8065 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8067 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8069 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8070 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8072 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8074 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8076 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8077 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8078 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8079 // lightning messages manually.
8080 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8081 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8084 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8086 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8088 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8089 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8091 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8092 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8094 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8095 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8096 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8098 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8099 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8100 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8104 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8106 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8110 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8111 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8112 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8113 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8115 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8116 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8117 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8118 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8123 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8124 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8125 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8126 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8131 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8132 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8133 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8134 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8141 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8142 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8143 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8144 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8145 // fails as expected.
8146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8150 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8151 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8152 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8154 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8155 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8156 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8158 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8159 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8160 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8161 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8163 let route = find_route(
8164 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8165 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8167 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8169 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8171 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8172 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8175 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8176 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8177 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8181 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8182 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8183 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8184 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8185 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8186 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8187 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8189 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8191 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8192 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8194 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8195 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8196 let route = find_route(
8197 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8198 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8200 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8202 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8203 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8204 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8205 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8206 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8208 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8209 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8210 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8214 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8215 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8216 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8218 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8219 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8222 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8223 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8224 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8225 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8226 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8227 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8228 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8229 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8230 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8232 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8237 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8238 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8239 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8243 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8245 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8246 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8248 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8249 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8250 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8251 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8253 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8254 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8255 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8256 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8257 let route = find_route(
8258 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8259 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8262 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8263 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8264 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8265 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8268 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8269 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8270 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8271 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8272 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8273 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8274 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8276 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8280 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8281 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8287 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8288 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8290 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8291 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8292 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8293 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8295 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8296 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8297 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8298 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8299 let route = find_route(
8300 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8301 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8304 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8305 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8306 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8307 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8308 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8311 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8312 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8313 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8314 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8315 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8316 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8317 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8319 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8323 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8327 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8329 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8330 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8331 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8332 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8334 // Marshall an MPP route.
8335 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8336 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8337 route.paths.push(path);
8338 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8339 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8340 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8341 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8342 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8343 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8345 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8346 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8347 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8349 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8354 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8362 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8363 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8365 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8366 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8368 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8371 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8372 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8373 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8374 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8375 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8376 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8379 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8382 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8388 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8389 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8393 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8395 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8396 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8398 total_msat: 100_000,
8401 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8402 // payment verification fails as expected.
8403 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8404 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8405 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8406 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8408 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8412 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8413 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8417 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8418 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8419 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8420 // the channel is successfully closed.
8421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8424 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8426 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8427 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8429 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8432 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8433 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8435 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8436 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8437 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8438 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8441 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8443 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8444 // as it has the funding transaction.
8445 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8446 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8447 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8450 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8452 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8456 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8457 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8458 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8460 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8463 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8464 // as it has the funding transaction.
8465 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8466 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8467 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8470 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8473 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8474 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8475 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8476 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8478 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8479 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8480 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8481 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8483 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8484 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8486 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8487 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8488 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8489 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8490 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8491 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8492 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8496 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8497 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8498 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8499 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8500 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8501 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8502 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8505 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8507 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8508 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8509 // closing transaction).
8510 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8511 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8512 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8514 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8515 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8516 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8517 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8518 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8521 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8523 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8525 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8526 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8527 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8529 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8532 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8535 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8536 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8537 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8540 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8541 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8542 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8545 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8547 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8548 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8550 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8551 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8553 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8554 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8559 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8560 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8561 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8562 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8563 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8564 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8565 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8566 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8569 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8570 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8571 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8573 // Test the API functions.
8574 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8576 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8578 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8580 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8582 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8584 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8586 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8590 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8591 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8597 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8599 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8600 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 let mut funding_tx = None;
8603 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8604 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8605 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8608 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8609 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8610 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8611 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8612 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8616 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8622 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8624 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8627 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8628 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8629 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8630 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8631 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8633 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8634 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8636 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8637 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8638 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8639 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8640 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8641 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8642 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8644 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8645 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8646 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8647 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8649 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8650 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8651 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8652 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8653 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8654 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8655 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8657 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8658 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8659 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8660 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8662 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8663 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8664 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8665 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8667 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8668 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8670 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8671 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8672 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8673 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8674 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8676 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8677 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8678 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8680 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8681 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8682 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8684 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8685 // "protected" and can connect again.
8686 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8687 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8688 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8689 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8691 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8693 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8694 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8698 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8699 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8705 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8707 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8708 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8710 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8711 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8712 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8713 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8716 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8718 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8719 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8720 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8722 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8723 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8724 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8726 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8727 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8728 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8729 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8733 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8734 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8735 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8738 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8739 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8743 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8745 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8746 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8748 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8749 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8750 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8751 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8752 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8753 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8755 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8756 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8758 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8759 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8763 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8764 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8767 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8768 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8769 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8770 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8771 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8772 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8773 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8775 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8776 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8777 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8778 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8784 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8785 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8787 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8788 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8789 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8791 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8792 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8796 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8801 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8802 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8803 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8804 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8807 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8808 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8809 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8811 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8813 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8814 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8815 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8817 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8818 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8820 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8821 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8826 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8827 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8829 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8830 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8832 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8836 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8838 use crate::chain::Listen;
8839 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8840 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8841 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8842 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8843 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8844 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8845 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8846 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8847 use crate::util::test_utils;
8848 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8850 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8851 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8852 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8854 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8858 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8859 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8860 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8861 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8862 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8863 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8864 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8865 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8870 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8871 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8874 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8875 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8876 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8878 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8880 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8881 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8882 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8883 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8884 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8886 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8887 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8889 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8890 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8891 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8892 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8894 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8896 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8898 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8899 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8900 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8901 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8902 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8904 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8906 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8908 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8909 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8910 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8911 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8912 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8915 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8916 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8917 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8919 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8920 } else { panic!(); }
8922 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8923 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8924 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8926 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8927 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8932 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8933 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8934 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8936 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8937 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8942 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8945 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8948 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8949 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8951 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8952 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8953 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8954 match msg_events[0] {
8955 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8956 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8957 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8961 match msg_events[1] {
8962 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8966 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8967 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8969 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8970 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8975 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8976 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8978 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8979 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8984 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8986 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8987 macro_rules! send_payment {
8988 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8989 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8990 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8991 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8992 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8993 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8994 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8995 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8996 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8997 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8999 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9000 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9002 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9003 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9005 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9006 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9007 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9008 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9009 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9010 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9011 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9012 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9014 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9015 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9016 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9017 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9019 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9020 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9021 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9022 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9023 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9025 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9028 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9029 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9030 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9031 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9033 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9038 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9039 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);