1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
363 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
364 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
365 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
366 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
369 err: msgs::LightningError,
370 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
371 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 shutdown_finish: None,
391 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
392 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
395 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397 err: LightningError {
399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
406 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
407 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
411 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
421 log_level: Level::Warn,
424 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
444 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
445 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
446 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
447 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
448 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
451 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
452 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
453 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
454 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
455 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
456 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
462 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
463 struct ClaimingPayment {
465 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
466 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
469 (0, amount_msat, required),
470 (2, payment_purpose, required),
471 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
474 struct ClaimablePayment {
475 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
476 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
477 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
480 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
481 struct ClaimablePayments {
482 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
483 /// failed/claimed by the user.
485 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
486 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
489 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
490 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
493 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
494 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
495 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
498 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
499 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
500 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
501 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
504 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
505 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
506 /// need the counterparty node_id.
508 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
509 /// are regenerated on startup.
510 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
511 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
512 /// channel to continue normal operation.
514 /// In general this should be used rather than
515 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
516 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
517 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
519 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
520 /// are regenerated on startup.
521 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
522 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
523 funding_txo: OutPoint,
524 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
529 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
530 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
531 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
532 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
533 /// event can be generated.
534 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
535 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
536 /// operation of another channel.
538 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
539 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
540 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
541 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
543 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
544 event: events::Event,
545 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
549 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
550 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
551 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
552 (0, event, upgradable_required),
553 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
554 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
555 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
556 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
557 // downgrades to prior versions.
558 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
562 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
563 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
564 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
565 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
566 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
569 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
570 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
571 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
572 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
576 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
577 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
578 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
579 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
580 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
581 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
583 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
584 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
585 channel_id: [u8; 32],
586 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
591 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
593 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
594 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
595 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
596 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
602 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
606 /// State we hold per-peer.
607 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
608 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
610 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
611 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
613 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
614 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
615 latest_features: InitFeatures,
616 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
617 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
618 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
619 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
620 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
622 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
623 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
624 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
625 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
627 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
628 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
629 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
630 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
631 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
632 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
633 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
634 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
635 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
636 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
637 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
638 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
639 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
640 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
641 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
645 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
646 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
647 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
648 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
649 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
650 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
653 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
657 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
658 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
660 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
663 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
664 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
665 struct PendingInboundPayment {
666 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
667 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
668 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
669 /// this payment being removed.
671 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
672 user_payment_id: u64,
673 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
674 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
675 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
678 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
679 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
680 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
681 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
682 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
683 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
684 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
685 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
687 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
688 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
696 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
698 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
699 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
700 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
705 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
706 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
707 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
708 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
709 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
710 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
711 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
712 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
713 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
715 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
716 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
718 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
719 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
720 $vis trait AChannelManager {
721 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
722 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
723 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
724 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
725 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
726 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
727 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
728 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
729 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
730 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
731 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
732 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
733 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
734 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
735 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
736 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
737 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
738 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
741 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
742 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
743 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
744 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
745 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
746 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
748 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
750 ES::Target: EntropySource,
751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
752 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
757 type Watch = M::Target;
759 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
761 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
763 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
765 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
766 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
768 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
770 type Router = R::Target;
772 type Logger = L::Target;
774 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
777 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
778 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
780 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
781 /// to individual Channels.
783 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
784 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
785 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
786 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
788 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
789 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
790 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
791 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
792 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
793 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
794 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
796 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
797 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
798 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
800 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
801 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
802 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
803 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
804 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
806 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
807 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
808 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
809 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
811 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
812 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
813 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
815 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
816 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
817 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
818 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
819 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
821 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
822 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
823 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
824 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
825 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
826 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
827 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
828 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
831 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
832 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
833 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
834 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
835 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
839 // `total_consistency_lock`
841 // |__`forward_htlcs`
843 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
845 // |__`per_peer_state`
847 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
849 // | |__`claimable_payments`
851 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
857 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
859 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
863 // | |__`pending_events`
865 // | |__`pending_background_events`
867 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
869 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
870 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
871 ES::Target: EntropySource,
872 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
873 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
874 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
878 default_configuration: UserConfig,
879 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
880 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
886 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
888 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
890 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
891 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
893 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
894 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
895 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
896 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
898 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
899 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
901 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
902 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
903 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
904 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
905 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
906 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
907 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
908 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
910 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
912 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
913 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
915 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
917 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
918 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
919 /// and via the classic SCID.
921 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
922 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
926 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
928 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
929 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
930 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
932 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
933 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
935 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
936 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
939 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
941 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
942 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
943 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
944 /// active channel list on load.
946 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
947 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
949 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
951 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
952 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
953 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
955 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
956 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
957 /// the handling of the events.
959 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
960 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
963 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
964 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
965 /// would break backwards compatability.
966 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
967 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
968 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
970 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
971 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
973 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
975 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
976 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
977 /// confirmation depth.
979 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
980 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
981 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
983 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
985 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
987 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
989 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
991 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
993 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
994 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
995 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
997 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
998 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1000 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1001 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1002 /// keeping additional state.
1003 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1005 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1006 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1007 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1008 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1010 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1011 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1013 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1014 /// are currently open with that peer.
1016 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1017 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1020 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1023 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1024 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1025 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1026 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1028 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1029 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1030 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1031 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1032 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1034 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1035 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1037 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1039 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1040 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1042 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1043 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1044 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1045 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1046 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1048 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1050 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1052 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1053 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1054 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1055 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1056 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1057 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1058 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1059 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1060 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1063 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1065 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1069 signer_provider: SP,
1074 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1076 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1077 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1078 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1079 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1080 pub struct ChainParameters {
1081 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1082 pub network: Network,
1084 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1086 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1087 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1090 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1097 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1098 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1099 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1100 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1101 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1102 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1104 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1105 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1106 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1107 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1108 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1110 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1111 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1114 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1115 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1116 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1117 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1119 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1120 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1121 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1122 _read_guard: read_guard,
1127 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1128 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1129 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1130 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1132 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1133 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1134 should_persist: persist_check,
1135 _read_guard: read_guard,
1140 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1141 fn drop(&mut self) {
1142 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1143 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1148 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1149 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1151 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1153 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1154 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1155 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1156 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1157 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1159 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1160 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1162 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1164 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1165 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1166 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1167 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1168 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1169 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1170 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1171 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1172 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1173 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1174 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1175 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1176 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1178 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1179 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1181 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1182 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1183 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1184 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1186 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1187 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1188 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1189 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1190 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1191 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1194 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1196 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1197 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1200 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1202 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1203 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1205 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1206 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1207 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1208 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1210 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1211 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1212 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1214 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1215 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1216 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1218 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1219 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1220 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1221 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1223 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1224 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1225 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1227 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1228 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1229 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1231 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1232 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1233 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1234 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1235 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1236 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1237 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1238 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1239 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1240 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1241 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1244 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1245 /// to better separate parameters.
1246 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1247 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1248 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1249 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1250 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1251 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1252 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1253 pub features: InitFeatures,
1254 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1255 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1256 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1258 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1260 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1261 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1262 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1263 /// payments to us through this channel.
1264 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1265 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1266 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1267 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1268 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1269 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1270 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1273 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1274 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1275 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1276 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1277 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1278 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1279 /// lifetime of the channel.
1280 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1281 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1282 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1283 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1284 /// our counterparty already.
1286 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1287 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1288 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1289 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1291 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1292 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1293 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1294 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1296 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1297 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1299 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1300 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1302 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1303 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1304 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1305 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1306 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1307 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1308 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1309 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1310 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1313 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1315 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1316 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1317 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1318 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1319 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1320 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1321 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1323 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1324 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1326 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1327 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1328 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1329 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1330 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1331 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1332 /// this value on chain.
1334 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1336 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1338 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1339 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1340 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1341 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1343 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1344 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1345 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1347 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1348 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1349 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1350 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1351 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1353 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1354 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1355 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1356 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1358 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1359 pub balance_msat: u64,
1360 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1361 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1362 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1363 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1365 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1367 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1368 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1369 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1370 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1371 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1372 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1373 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1374 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1376 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1377 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1378 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1379 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1380 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1381 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1382 /// route which is valid.
1383 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1384 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1385 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1386 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1387 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1388 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1390 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1391 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1392 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1393 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1394 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1395 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1396 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1397 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1398 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1400 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1402 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1403 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1404 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1405 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1406 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1408 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1409 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1410 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1411 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1412 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1413 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1414 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1416 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1417 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1418 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1419 pub is_outbound: bool,
1420 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1421 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1422 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1423 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1424 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1426 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1427 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1428 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1429 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1431 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1432 pub is_usable: bool,
1433 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1434 pub is_public: bool,
1435 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1436 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1437 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1438 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1439 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1440 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1442 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1443 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1446 impl ChannelDetails {
1447 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1448 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1449 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1451 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1452 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1453 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1454 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1457 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1458 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1459 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1461 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1462 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1463 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1464 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1467 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1468 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1470 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1471 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1472 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1474 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1475 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1476 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1477 features: latest_features,
1478 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1479 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1480 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1481 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1482 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1483 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1484 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1485 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1486 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1487 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1489 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1490 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1491 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1492 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1493 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1494 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1495 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1496 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1497 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1498 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1499 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1500 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1501 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1502 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1503 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1504 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1505 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1506 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1507 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1508 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1509 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1510 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1511 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1512 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1513 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1514 config: Some(channel.config()),
1519 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1520 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1521 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1522 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1523 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1525 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1527 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1528 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1529 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1532 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1533 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1534 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1536 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1537 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1538 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1540 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1541 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1542 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1544 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1545 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1549 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1551 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1553 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1554 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1555 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1556 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1558 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1559 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1560 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1563 macro_rules! handle_error {
1564 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1565 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1566 // entering the macro.
1567 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1568 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1572 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1573 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1575 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1576 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1577 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1578 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1582 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1583 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1584 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1585 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1590 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1591 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1593 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1594 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1595 action: err.action.clone()
1599 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1600 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1601 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1602 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1603 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1607 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1614 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1615 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1616 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1617 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1618 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1619 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1621 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1622 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1623 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1624 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1625 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1627 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1628 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1630 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1634 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1635 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1636 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1638 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1639 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1641 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1642 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1644 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1645 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1646 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1647 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1648 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1649 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1655 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1656 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1660 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1662 $entry.remove_entry();
1670 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1671 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1675 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1677 $entry.remove_entry();
1685 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1686 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1688 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1689 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1695 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1696 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1697 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1698 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1699 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1701 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1702 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1703 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1704 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1705 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1706 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1707 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1708 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1709 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1710 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1715 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1716 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1717 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1718 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1719 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1720 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1721 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1722 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1723 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1725 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1730 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1731 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1732 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1733 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1734 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1735 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1736 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1737 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1738 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1740 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1745 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1746 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1747 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1748 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1749 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1750 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1751 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1752 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1753 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1754 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1755 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1757 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1758 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1759 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1765 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1766 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1768 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1769 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1770 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1771 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1772 updates.announcement_sigs);
1773 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1774 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1777 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1778 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1779 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1781 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1783 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1784 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1786 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1787 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1788 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1789 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1794 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1795 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1796 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1797 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1798 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1800 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1803 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1804 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1805 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1808 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1809 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1810 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1811 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1812 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1813 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1814 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1815 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1819 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1820 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1821 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1822 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1828 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1829 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1833 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1834 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1835 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1836 while !processed_all_events {
1837 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1841 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1844 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1845 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1846 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1848 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1849 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1850 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1852 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1853 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1854 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1855 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1859 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1860 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1861 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1862 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1865 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1867 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1868 $event_to_handle = event;
1870 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1871 post_event_actions.push(action);
1876 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1877 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1878 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1879 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1882 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1883 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1884 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1885 processed_all_events = false;
1888 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1889 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1895 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1897 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1899 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1900 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1901 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1906 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1908 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1909 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1911 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1913 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1914 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1915 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1918 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1919 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1920 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1921 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1922 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1923 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1924 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1925 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1927 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1928 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1929 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1934 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1936 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1937 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1938 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1939 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1940 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1941 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1942 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1943 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1945 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1948 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1949 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1951 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1953 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1955 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1957 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1958 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1959 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1960 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1961 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1962 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
1963 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1973 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1974 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1975 &self.default_configuration
1978 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1979 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1980 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1983 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1984 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1986 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1988 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1992 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1997 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1999 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2000 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2001 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2002 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2003 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2005 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2006 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2008 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2009 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2010 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2012 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2013 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2014 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2016 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2017 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2018 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2019 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2020 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2021 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2023 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2024 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2025 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2026 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2027 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2028 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2032 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2033 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2037 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2038 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2040 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2042 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2043 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2044 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2045 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2046 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2047 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2051 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2056 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2058 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
2059 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2064 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2070 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2071 node_id: their_network_key,
2074 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2077 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2078 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2079 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2080 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2081 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2082 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2083 // the same channel.
2084 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2086 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2088 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2091 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2092 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
2093 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2101 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2102 /// more information.
2103 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2104 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2107 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2108 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2110 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2111 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2113 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2114 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2115 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2116 // really wanted anyway.
2117 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2120 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2121 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2122 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2125 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2128 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2129 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2132 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2138 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2139 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2141 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2142 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2143 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2145 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2146 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2147 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2148 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2149 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2150 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2151 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2152 total_msat: *total_msat,
2155 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2156 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2158 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2159 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2161 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2166 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2167 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2168 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2169 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2170 Some(transaction) => {
2171 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2172 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2177 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2178 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2179 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2180 reason: closure_reason
2184 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2187 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2188 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2191 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2192 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2196 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2198 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2199 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2200 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2201 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2202 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2204 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2205 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2206 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2207 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2208 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2212 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2213 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2214 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2215 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2216 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2219 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2220 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2221 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2222 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2226 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2234 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2235 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2236 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2240 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2244 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2245 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2246 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2248 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2249 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2251 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2252 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2253 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2254 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2256 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2258 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2259 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2260 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2263 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2264 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2265 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2266 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2267 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2268 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2271 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2272 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2273 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2275 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2276 /// the channel being closed or not:
2277 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2278 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2279 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2280 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2281 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2282 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2283 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2285 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2286 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2287 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2288 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2290 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2292 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2293 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2294 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2297 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2298 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2299 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2300 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2301 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2302 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2306 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2307 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2308 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2309 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2310 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2311 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2312 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2313 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2315 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2316 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2317 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2318 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2319 // ignore the result here.
2320 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2324 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2325 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2326 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2327 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2329 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2330 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2334 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2335 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2336 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2338 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2340 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2342 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2345 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2346 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2347 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2348 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2349 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2354 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2357 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2359 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2360 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2362 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2363 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2364 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2365 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2366 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2379 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2380 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2381 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2383 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2384 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2385 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2388 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2389 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2390 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2392 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2393 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2394 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2395 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2396 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2399 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2400 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2401 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2402 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2403 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2407 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2408 /// local transaction(s).
2409 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2410 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2411 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2415 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2416 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2418 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2419 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2420 return Err(ReceiveError {
2421 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2423 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2426 // final_expiry_too_soon
2427 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2428 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2430 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2431 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2432 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2433 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2434 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2435 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2436 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2437 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2438 return Err(ReceiveError {
2439 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2440 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2443 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2444 return Err(ReceiveError {
2446 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2447 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2451 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2452 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2453 return Err(ReceiveError {
2454 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2455 err_data: Vec::new(),
2456 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2459 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2460 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2461 return Err(ReceiveError {
2462 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2463 err_data: Vec::new(),
2464 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2466 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2467 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2470 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2471 phantom_shared_secret,
2473 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2474 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2475 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2476 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2477 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2478 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2479 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2480 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2481 return Err(ReceiveError {
2482 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2483 err_data: Vec::new(),
2484 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2488 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2491 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2494 return Err(ReceiveError {
2495 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2496 err_data: Vec::new(),
2497 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2502 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2505 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2506 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2507 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2508 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2512 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2513 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2514 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2516 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2517 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2518 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2519 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2520 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2521 failure_code: $err_code,
2527 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2528 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2531 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2532 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2533 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2535 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2536 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2537 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2538 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2539 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2540 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2541 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2542 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2544 macro_rules! return_err {
2545 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2547 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2548 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2549 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2550 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2551 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2552 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2558 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2560 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2561 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2563 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2564 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2568 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2569 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2571 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2573 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2574 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2575 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2576 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2577 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2579 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2582 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2583 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2584 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2586 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2587 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2588 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2591 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2592 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2593 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2594 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2598 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2599 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2600 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2603 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2604 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2605 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2606 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2607 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2612 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2613 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2614 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2615 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2616 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2617 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2618 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2619 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2620 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2621 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2622 // phantom or an intercept.
2623 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2624 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2625 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2629 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2632 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2634 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2636 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2637 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2638 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2640 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2641 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2642 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2644 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2645 // have no consistency guarantees.
2646 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2650 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2651 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2652 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2653 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2654 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2656 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2657 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2658 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2659 // we don't have the channel here.
2660 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2662 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2664 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2665 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2666 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2667 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2668 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2669 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2670 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2671 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2672 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2673 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2674 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2676 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2679 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2680 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2682 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2683 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2687 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2688 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2689 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2690 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2692 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2699 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2700 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2701 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2702 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2703 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2704 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2706 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2707 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2709 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2710 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2711 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2712 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2713 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2714 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2715 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2716 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2717 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2718 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2724 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2725 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2726 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2727 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2729 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2730 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2732 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2733 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2734 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2736 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2737 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2738 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2739 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2740 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2741 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2742 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2746 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2751 pending_forward_info
2754 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2755 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2756 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2758 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2759 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2760 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2762 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2763 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2764 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2765 if !chan.should_announce() {
2766 return Err(LightningError {
2767 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2768 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2771 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2772 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2774 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2775 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2778 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2779 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2780 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2781 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2783 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2784 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2785 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2787 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2788 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2789 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2791 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2792 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2796 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2798 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2800 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2802 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2803 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2804 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2805 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2806 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2809 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2810 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2812 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2813 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2814 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2815 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2816 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2817 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2818 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2819 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2821 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2822 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2823 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2825 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2827 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2834 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2836 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2839 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2841 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2844 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2845 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2847 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2848 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2849 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2851 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2852 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2854 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2855 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2856 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2857 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2860 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2861 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2862 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2865 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2866 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2867 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2869 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2870 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2871 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2873 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2874 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2876 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2877 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2878 Some(monitor_update) => {
2879 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2880 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2881 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2884 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2885 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2886 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2887 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2888 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2889 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2890 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2891 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2897 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2898 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2899 // `channel_by_id` map.
2900 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2901 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2906 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2907 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2909 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2914 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2916 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2917 /// fields for more info.
2919 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2920 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2922 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2924 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2925 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2926 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2927 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2928 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2930 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2931 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2932 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2933 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2934 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2936 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2937 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2938 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2939 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2941 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2943 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2944 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2945 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2947 /// In general, a path may raise:
2948 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2949 /// node public key) is specified.
2950 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2951 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2953 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2954 /// relevant updates.
2956 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2957 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2958 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2960 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2961 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2962 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2963 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2964 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2965 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2966 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2968 self.pending_outbound_payments
2969 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2970 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2971 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2974 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
2975 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2976 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2977 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2979 self.pending_outbound_payments
2980 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2981 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2982 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2983 &self.pending_events,
2984 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2985 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2989 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2990 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2992 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2993 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2994 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2998 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2999 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3000 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3004 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3005 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3009 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3010 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3011 /// retries are exhausted.
3013 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3014 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3016 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3017 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3018 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3020 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3021 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3023 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3024 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3025 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3027 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3030 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3031 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3032 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3033 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3034 /// never reach the recipient.
3036 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3037 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3039 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3040 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3042 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
3044 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3045 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3046 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3048 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3049 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3050 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3051 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3052 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3055 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3056 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3058 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3061 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3062 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3063 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3065 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3066 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3067 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3068 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3069 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3070 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3073 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3074 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3075 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3076 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3077 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3079 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3080 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3081 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3084 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3087 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3088 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3091 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3092 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3093 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3094 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3095 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3097 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3098 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3100 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3101 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3102 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3104 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3106 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3107 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3108 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3109 } else { unreachable!(); });
3111 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3113 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3114 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3116 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3117 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3118 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3126 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3127 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3133 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3136 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3137 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3138 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3141 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3142 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3143 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3152 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3153 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3154 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3158 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3160 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3161 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3163 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3164 /// across the p2p network.
3166 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3167 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3169 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3170 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3171 /// keys per-channel).
3173 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3174 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3175 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3177 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3178 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3179 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3181 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3182 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3183 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3184 /// for more details.
3186 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3187 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3188 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3191 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3192 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3193 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3194 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3199 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3200 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3201 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3202 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3203 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3204 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3205 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3206 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3210 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3211 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3212 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3213 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3217 let mut output_index = None;
3218 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3219 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3220 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3221 if output_index.is_some() {
3222 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3223 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3226 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3229 if output_index.is_none() {
3230 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3231 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3234 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3238 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3240 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3241 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3242 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3243 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3245 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3246 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3248 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3249 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3251 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3253 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3254 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3255 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3256 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3257 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3258 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3259 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3260 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3261 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3262 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3263 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3264 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3265 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3271 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3272 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3273 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3274 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3275 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3276 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3277 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3278 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3282 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3283 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3284 let mut config = channel.config();
3285 config.apply(config_update);
3286 if !channel.update_config(&config) {
3289 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3290 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3291 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3292 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3293 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3301 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3303 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3304 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3305 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3306 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3308 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3309 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3311 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3312 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3314 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3316 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3317 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3318 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3319 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3320 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3321 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3322 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3323 pub fn update_channel_config(
3324 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3325 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3326 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3329 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3330 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3332 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3333 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3335 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3336 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3337 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3338 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3339 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3341 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3342 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3344 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3347 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3348 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3349 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3350 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3351 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3354 let next_hop_scid = {
3355 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3356 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3357 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3360 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3362 if !chan.is_usable() {
3363 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3364 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3367 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3369 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3370 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3375 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3376 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3377 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3380 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3381 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3382 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3384 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3386 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3387 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3390 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3391 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3392 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3393 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3394 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3396 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3400 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3401 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3403 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3406 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3407 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3410 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3411 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3412 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3415 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3416 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3417 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3418 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3419 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3420 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3421 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3424 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3425 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3426 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3427 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3432 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3434 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3435 /// Will likely generate further events.
3436 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3439 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3440 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3441 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3443 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3444 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3446 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3447 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3448 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3450 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3451 match forward_info {
3452 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3453 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3454 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3455 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3456 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3459 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3460 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3461 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3463 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3464 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3465 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3466 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3467 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3468 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3471 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3472 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3474 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3477 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3478 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3484 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3485 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3487 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3491 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3492 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3494 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3498 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3499 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3500 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3501 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3502 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3504 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3505 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3506 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3507 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3508 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3510 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3512 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3513 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3517 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3518 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3519 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3520 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3526 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3529 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3532 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3533 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3534 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3535 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3536 // problem, not ours.
3542 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3543 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3545 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3549 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3550 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3551 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3552 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3555 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3556 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3557 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3559 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3563 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3564 match forward_info {
3565 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3566 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3567 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3568 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3569 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3573 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3574 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3575 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3576 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3577 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3578 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3579 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3581 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3582 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3583 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3585 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3586 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3588 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3590 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3591 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3592 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3593 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3598 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3599 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3601 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3603 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3604 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3606 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3607 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3609 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3611 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3612 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3613 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3622 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3623 match forward_info {
3624 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3625 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3626 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3627 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3630 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3631 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3632 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3634 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3635 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3636 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3638 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3639 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3640 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3641 None, None, onion_fields)
3644 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3647 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3648 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3649 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3650 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3651 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3652 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3653 phantom_shared_secret,
3655 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3656 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3657 // if routing nodes overpay
3658 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3659 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3661 total_value_received: None,
3662 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3667 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3669 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3670 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3671 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3672 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3673 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3674 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3676 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3677 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3678 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3679 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3680 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3681 phantom_shared_secret,
3683 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3684 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3686 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3689 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3690 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3691 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3692 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3693 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3696 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3697 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3698 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3700 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3701 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3702 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3705 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3706 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3707 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3709 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3710 .entry(payment_hash)
3711 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3712 .or_insert_with(|| {
3713 committed_to_claimable = true;
3715 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3718 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3719 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3720 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3723 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3725 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3726 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3727 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3729 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3732 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3733 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3734 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3735 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3736 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3737 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3738 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3739 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3741 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3742 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3744 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3746 _ => unreachable!(),
3749 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3750 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3751 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3752 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3753 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3754 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3755 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3756 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3757 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3758 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3759 committed_to_claimable = true;
3761 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3762 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3763 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3764 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3765 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3766 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3770 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3771 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3772 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3773 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3775 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3777 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3778 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3780 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3781 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3782 committed_to_claimable = true;
3785 payment_claimable_generated
3789 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3790 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3791 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3792 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3793 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3794 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3795 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3796 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3798 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3799 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3800 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3801 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3802 Ok(result) => result,
3804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3805 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3808 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3809 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3810 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3812 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3813 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3816 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3818 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3819 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3820 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3821 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3823 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3825 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3826 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3827 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3828 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3829 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3830 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3831 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3832 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3834 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3835 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3836 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3840 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3841 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3843 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3847 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3848 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3855 if payment_data.is_none() {
3856 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3857 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3859 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3860 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3861 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3862 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3863 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3864 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3865 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3866 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3868 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3869 if payment_claimable_generated {
3870 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3876 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3877 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3885 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3886 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3887 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3888 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3889 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3890 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3892 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3895 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3897 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3898 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3899 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3901 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3903 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3904 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3905 events.append(&mut new_events);
3908 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3910 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3911 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3912 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3914 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3915 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3917 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3918 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3919 if background_events.is_empty() {
3920 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3923 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3925 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3926 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3927 // monitor updating completing.
3928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3930 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3931 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3935 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3938 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3940 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3946 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3947 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3948 // however, ensure that.
3950 log_error!(self.logger,
3951 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3953 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3957 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3960 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3961 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3962 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3963 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3964 let _ = self.process_background_events();
3967 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3968 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3969 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3970 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3971 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3972 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3973 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3975 if !chan.is_live() {
3976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3977 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3978 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3981 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3983 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3984 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3988 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3989 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3990 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3991 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3992 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3993 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3994 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3996 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3999 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4002 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4003 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4004 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4012 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4014 /// This currently includes:
4015 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4016 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4017 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4019 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4020 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4021 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4023 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4024 /// estimate fetches.
4026 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4027 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4028 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4029 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4030 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4032 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4034 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4035 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4036 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4038 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4039 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4042 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4043 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4044 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4045 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4046 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4048 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4049 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4050 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4051 if needs_close { return false; }
4054 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4055 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4056 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4057 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
4058 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4059 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
4060 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4061 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
4063 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4064 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4065 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4066 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4070 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4072 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4075 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
4077 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4078 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4079 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4080 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4084 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4086 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4092 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4094 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4095 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4096 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4097 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4098 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4099 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4100 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4101 channel_id: *chan_id,
4102 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4110 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4111 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4116 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4117 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4118 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4119 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4120 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4121 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4122 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4123 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4124 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4125 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4126 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4128 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4129 // have no channels to the peer.
4130 let remove_entry = {
4131 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4132 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4135 entry.remove_entry();
4138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4143 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4144 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4145 // This should be unreachable
4146 debug_assert!(false);
4149 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4150 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4151 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4152 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4153 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4154 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4155 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4158 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4159 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4160 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4162 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4163 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4170 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4171 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4172 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4173 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4174 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4177 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4178 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4181 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4183 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4184 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4185 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4186 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4187 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4194 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4195 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4196 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4198 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4199 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4200 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4201 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4203 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4204 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4205 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4206 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4207 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4211 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4212 /// reason for the failure.
4214 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4215 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4218 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4219 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4220 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4221 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4222 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4223 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4224 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4229 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4230 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4231 match failure_code {
4232 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4233 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4234 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4235 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4236 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4237 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4242 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4243 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4245 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4247 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4248 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4249 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4250 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4251 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4252 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4253 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4255 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4257 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4258 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4260 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4265 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4266 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4267 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4268 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4269 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4270 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4271 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4272 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4273 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4274 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4276 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4277 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4278 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4279 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4281 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4282 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4283 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4284 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4285 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4289 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4290 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4291 // be surfaced to the user.
4292 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4293 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4294 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4296 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4298 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4301 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4303 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4307 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4310 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4311 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4312 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4313 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4317 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4318 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4319 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4320 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4321 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4322 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4323 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4324 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4325 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4328 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4329 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4330 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4333 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4334 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4335 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4338 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4339 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4340 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4341 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4343 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4345 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4347 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4348 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4349 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4350 push_forward_ev = true;
4352 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4354 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4357 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4360 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4361 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4362 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4363 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4364 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4365 failed_next_destination: destination,
4371 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4372 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4374 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4375 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4376 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4377 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4379 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4380 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4381 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4382 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4384 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4385 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4386 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4387 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4388 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4389 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4390 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4391 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4396 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4397 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4398 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4399 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4400 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4401 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4402 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4403 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4408 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4409 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4410 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4412 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4413 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4414 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4415 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4420 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4422 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4423 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4424 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4425 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4426 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4427 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4428 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4429 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4430 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4432 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4433 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4434 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4435 debug_assert!(false);
4439 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4441 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4442 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4443 debug_assert!(false);
4447 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4449 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4450 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4451 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4452 if sources.len() != 1 {
4453 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4454 debug_assert!(false);
4460 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4462 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4463 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4464 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4465 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4468 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4469 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4470 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4471 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4475 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4476 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4477 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4478 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4480 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4481 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4482 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4483 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4484 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4489 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4490 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4491 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4492 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4493 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4494 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4495 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4497 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4500 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4501 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4502 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4503 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4507 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4508 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4509 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4510 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4513 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4514 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4515 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4516 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4520 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4521 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4522 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4525 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4528 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4529 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4530 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4532 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4533 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4535 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4536 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4538 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4539 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4540 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4541 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4542 if let Err(e) = res {
4543 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4544 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4545 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4546 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4547 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4554 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4555 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4556 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4560 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4561 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4562 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4563 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4564 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4565 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4566 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4567 // again on restart.
4568 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4569 payment_preimage, update_res);
4571 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4572 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4573 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4574 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4575 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4576 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4580 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4581 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4584 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4586 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4587 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4589 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4590 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4591 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4592 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4593 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4594 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4595 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4598 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4599 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4601 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4602 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4603 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4604 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4606 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4610 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4611 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4612 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4618 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4619 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4620 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4623 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4624 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4626 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4627 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4628 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4629 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4630 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4634 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4635 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4637 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4638 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4639 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4646 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4647 /// update completion.
4648 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4649 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4650 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4651 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4652 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4653 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4655 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4656 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4657 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4658 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4659 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4660 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4662 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4664 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4665 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4666 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4667 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4670 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4671 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4673 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4675 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4680 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4681 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4683 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4688 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4689 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4690 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4691 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4692 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4697 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4701 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4707 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4708 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4709 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4713 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4714 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4715 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4721 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4722 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4724 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4725 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4727 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4728 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4729 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4730 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4731 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4737 let mut peer_state_lock;
4738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4739 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4740 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4743 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4748 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4749 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4750 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4753 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4756 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4758 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4759 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4762 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4763 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4764 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4766 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4767 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4768 /// used to accept such channels.
4770 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4771 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4772 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4773 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4776 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4777 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4779 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4780 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4781 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4783 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4784 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4786 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4787 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4789 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4790 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4792 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4793 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4794 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4795 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4798 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4801 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4803 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4804 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4807 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4808 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4810 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4811 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4814 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4815 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4816 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4817 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4818 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4819 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4822 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4823 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4824 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4826 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4827 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4828 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4829 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4830 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4831 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4832 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4833 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4836 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4837 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4838 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4842 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4843 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4844 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4848 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4854 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4855 /// or 0-conf channels.
4857 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4858 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4859 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4860 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4861 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4862 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4864 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4865 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4866 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4867 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4868 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4869 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4870 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4874 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4877 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4878 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4880 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4881 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4882 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4883 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4885 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4888 num_unfunded_channels
4891 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4892 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4893 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4896 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4900 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4901 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4902 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4903 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4905 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4906 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4907 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4908 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4911 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4913 debug_assert!(false);
4914 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4919 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4920 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4921 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4922 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4923 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4924 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4927 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4928 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4931 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4932 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4934 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4935 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4938 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4939 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4940 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4943 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4944 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4950 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4951 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4954 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4955 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4956 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4958 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4959 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4960 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4963 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4965 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4966 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4967 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4968 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4969 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4973 entry.insert(channel);
4979 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4980 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4982 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4984 debug_assert!(false);
4985 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4987 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4988 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4989 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4991 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4992 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4997 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4998 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4999 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5000 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5001 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5003 user_channel_id: user_id,
5008 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5009 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5012 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5014 debug_assert!(false);
5015 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5018 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5019 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5020 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
5021 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5023 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
5025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5028 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5030 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5033 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
5034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5035 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5036 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5037 funding_msg.channel_id))
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5040 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
5044 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5045 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5046 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5047 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5048 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5049 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5050 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5054 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5056 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5057 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5058 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5060 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5061 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5062 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5063 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5064 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5065 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5066 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5067 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5075 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5076 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5080 debug_assert!(false);
5081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5086 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5088 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5089 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5090 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5091 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5092 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5093 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5094 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5095 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5096 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5097 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5106 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5108 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5110 debug_assert!(false);
5111 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5115 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5116 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5117 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5118 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5119 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5120 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5121 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5122 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5123 msg: announcement_sigs,
5125 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5126 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5127 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5128 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5129 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5130 // announcement_signatures.
5131 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5132 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5134 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5141 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5142 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5151 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5152 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5153 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5154 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5155 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5157 debug_assert!(false);
5158 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5165 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5166 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5167 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5168 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5171 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
5172 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5173 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5174 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5176 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5177 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5178 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5179 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5180 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5181 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5186 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5187 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5188 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5189 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5190 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5197 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5198 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5199 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5200 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5206 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5207 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5208 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5210 debug_assert!(false);
5211 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5213 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5216 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5217 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5218 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5219 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5220 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5221 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5226 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5227 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5228 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5229 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5230 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5231 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5232 } else { (tx, None) }
5234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5237 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5238 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5239 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5241 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5242 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5245 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5249 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5254 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5255 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5256 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5257 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5259 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5260 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5261 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5262 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5264 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5265 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5266 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5268 debug_assert!(false);
5269 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5273 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5276 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5277 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5278 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5279 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5280 match pending_forward_info {
5281 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5282 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5283 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5284 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5286 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5287 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5288 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5289 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5290 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5293 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5295 _ => pending_forward_info
5298 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5305 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5306 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5310 debug_assert!(false);
5311 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5315 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5317 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5322 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5326 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5328 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5330 debug_assert!(false);
5331 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5335 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5337 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5344 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5346 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5348 debug_assert!(false);
5349 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5353 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5355 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5356 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5357 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5359 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5366 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5368 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5370 debug_assert!(false);
5371 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5375 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5377 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5378 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5379 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5380 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5381 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5382 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5383 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5391 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5392 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5393 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5394 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5395 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5396 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5397 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5398 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5399 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5400 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5401 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5403 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5404 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5406 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5407 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5408 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5410 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5411 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5414 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5415 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5417 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5418 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5419 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5421 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5422 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5423 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5424 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5425 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5428 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5429 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5432 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5433 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5434 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5435 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5436 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5437 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5438 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5441 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5442 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5443 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5448 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5449 // payments are being processed.
5450 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5451 push_forward_event = true;
5453 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5454 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5461 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5462 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5465 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5466 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5467 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5469 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5473 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5474 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5475 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5476 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5477 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5479 if !forward_ev_exists {
5480 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5482 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5487 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5488 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5489 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5490 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5491 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5492 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5493 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5495 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5496 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5497 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5498 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5499 channel_funding_outpoint,
5500 counterparty_node_id,
5505 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5506 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5507 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5508 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5510 debug_assert!(false);
5511 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5512 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5516 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5517 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5518 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5519 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5520 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5521 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5522 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5524 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5529 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5533 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5535 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5537 debug_assert!(false);
5538 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5544 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5551 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5555 debug_assert!(false);
5556 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5560 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5562 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5567 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5568 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5569 msg, &self.default_configuration
5571 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5572 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5573 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5581 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5582 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5583 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5584 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5586 // It's not a local channel
5587 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5591 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5592 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5593 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5599 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5600 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5601 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5602 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5603 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5604 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5608 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5609 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5610 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5611 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5613 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5614 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5619 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5622 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5624 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5627 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5629 debug_assert!(false);
5630 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5634 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5636 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5637 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5638 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5639 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5640 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5641 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5642 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5643 let mut channel_update = None;
5644 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5645 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5646 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5649 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5650 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5651 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5652 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5653 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5654 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5655 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5660 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5661 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5662 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5663 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5664 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5665 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5673 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5674 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5677 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5678 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5683 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5684 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5685 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5687 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5688 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5689 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5690 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5691 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5692 match monitor_event {
5693 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5694 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5695 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5696 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5699 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5700 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5704 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5705 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5706 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5707 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5709 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5710 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5711 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5712 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5715 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5717 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5718 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5719 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5720 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5721 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5722 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5723 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5724 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5725 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5729 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5730 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5732 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5734 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5736 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5737 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5738 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5745 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5746 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5752 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5753 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5756 has_pending_monitor_events
5759 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5760 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5761 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5763 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5765 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5768 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5769 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5770 /// update was applied.
5771 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5772 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5773 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5774 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5776 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5777 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5778 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5779 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5782 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5785 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5786 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5787 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5788 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5789 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5790 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5791 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5792 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5794 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5795 has_monitor_update = true;
5797 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5798 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5799 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5800 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5801 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5802 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5803 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5805 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5807 continue 'peer_loop;
5816 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5817 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5818 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5821 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5822 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5828 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5829 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5830 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5831 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5832 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5833 let mut has_update = false;
5835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5837 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5840 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5841 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5842 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5843 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5844 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5846 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5847 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5850 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5851 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5852 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5853 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5854 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5859 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5861 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5862 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5863 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5869 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5870 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5878 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5879 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5885 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5886 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5888 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5889 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5890 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5891 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5892 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5893 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5894 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5895 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5896 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5897 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5898 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5899 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5900 assert!(should_broadcast);
5901 } else { unreachable!(); }
5902 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5903 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5904 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5907 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5911 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5912 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5914 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5918 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5921 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5922 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5924 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5925 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5926 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5927 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5928 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5929 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5930 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5931 // never fail a payment too early.
5932 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5934 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5942 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5945 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5946 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5948 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5949 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5950 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5951 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5953 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5955 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5956 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5960 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5961 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5963 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5965 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5966 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5968 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5969 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5970 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5971 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5972 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5973 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5974 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5975 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5976 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5977 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5978 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5981 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5982 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5984 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5987 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5989 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5991 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5992 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5993 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5994 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5995 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5998 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5999 /// stored external to LDK.
6001 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6002 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6003 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6005 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6006 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6009 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6010 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6011 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6012 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6014 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6015 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6016 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6017 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6018 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6020 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6021 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6022 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6023 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6024 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6026 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6027 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6029 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6030 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6034 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6035 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6037 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6039 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6040 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6042 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6043 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6044 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6045 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6046 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6047 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6048 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6051 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6052 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6054 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6057 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6059 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6061 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6062 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6065 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6066 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6068 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6069 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6070 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6073 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6074 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6076 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6077 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6078 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6079 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6081 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6082 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6083 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6084 Some(_) => continue,
6085 None => return scid_candidate
6090 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6092 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6093 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6095 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6096 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6097 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6101 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6102 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6103 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6105 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6106 /// times to get a unique scid.
6107 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6108 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6109 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6111 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6112 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6113 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6114 return scid_candidate
6118 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6119 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6120 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6121 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6124 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6125 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6126 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6127 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6128 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6129 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6130 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6139 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6140 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6141 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6142 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6143 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6147 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6148 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6149 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6150 events.push_back((event, None));
6154 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6155 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6156 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6160 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6161 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6165 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6166 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6169 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6170 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6171 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6172 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6173 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6174 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6177 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6178 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6181 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6182 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6183 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6184 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6186 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6190 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6191 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6192 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6193 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6194 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6196 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6200 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6201 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6202 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6203 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6204 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6205 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6206 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6207 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6208 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6210 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6212 if further_update_exists {
6213 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6219 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6223 log_debug!(self.logger,
6224 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6225 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6229 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6230 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6231 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6235 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6236 for action in actions {
6238 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6239 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6241 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6247 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6248 /// using the given event handler.
6250 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6251 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6255 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6259 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6261 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6262 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6263 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6264 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6265 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6270 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6271 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6272 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6273 /// is always placed next to each other.
6275 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6276 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6277 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6278 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6280 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6281 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6282 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6283 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6284 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6285 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6286 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6288 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6289 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6290 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6291 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6294 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6295 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6297 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6298 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6301 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6303 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6304 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6305 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6306 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6307 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6311 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6312 events.replace(pending_events);
6321 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6323 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6324 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6325 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6326 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6327 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6332 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6334 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6335 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6336 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6338 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6342 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6344 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6345 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6346 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6347 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6348 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6353 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6355 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6356 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6357 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6358 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6359 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6362 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6363 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6366 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6367 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6368 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6369 let new_height = height - 1;
6371 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6372 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6373 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6374 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6375 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6376 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6379 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6383 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6385 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6386 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6387 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6388 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6389 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6390 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6394 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6395 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6396 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6397 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6399 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6400 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6403 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6404 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6405 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6407 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6408 if height < last_best_block_height {
6409 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6410 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6414 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6415 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6416 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6417 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6419 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6420 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6423 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6424 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6426 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6428 macro_rules! max_time {
6429 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6431 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6432 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6433 // having an explicit local time source.
6434 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6435 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6436 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6437 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6438 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6444 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6445 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6446 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6447 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6451 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6452 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6453 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6456 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6457 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6458 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6465 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6467 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6468 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6469 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6470 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6471 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6472 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6473 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6478 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6480 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6481 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6482 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6483 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6484 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6485 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6489 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6490 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6492 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6493 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6494 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6495 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6496 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6498 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6499 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6502 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6505 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6506 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6507 let res = f(channel);
6508 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6509 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6510 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6511 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6512 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6514 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6515 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6516 if channel.is_usable() {
6517 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6518 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6519 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6520 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6530 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6531 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6534 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6536 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6537 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6538 msg: announcement_sigs,
6540 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6541 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6544 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6545 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6546 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6551 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6552 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6553 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6554 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6555 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6556 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6557 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6558 // is always consistent.
6559 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6560 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6561 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6562 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6563 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6566 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6567 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6568 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6569 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6570 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6571 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6576 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6577 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6579 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6580 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6581 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6582 data: reason_message,
6592 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6593 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6594 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6595 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6596 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6597 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6598 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6599 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6600 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6601 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6603 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6604 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6605 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6609 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6612 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6613 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6614 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6615 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6616 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6617 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6618 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6619 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6620 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6623 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6624 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6625 _ => unreachable!(),
6627 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6628 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6629 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6636 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6638 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6643 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6645 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6646 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6648 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6649 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6652 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6653 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6654 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6657 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6658 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6659 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6660 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6663 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6664 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6665 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6666 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6669 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6670 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6672 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6673 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6674 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6675 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6676 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6679 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6680 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6681 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6682 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6685 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6686 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6687 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6688 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6691 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6692 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6693 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6694 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6698 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6699 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6701 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6703 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6705 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6710 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6715 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6716 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6717 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6718 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6721 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6723 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6726 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6727 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6728 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6729 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6732 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6734 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6737 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6739 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6742 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6744 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6747 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6749 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6752 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6754 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6757 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6759 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6762 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6764 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6767 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6769 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6772 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6774 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6777 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6779 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6782 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6784 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6787 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6789 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6792 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6794 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6797 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6798 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6799 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6800 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6801 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6803 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6808 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6810 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6813 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6815 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6816 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6818 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6819 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6820 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6821 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6822 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6823 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6824 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6825 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6826 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6827 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6828 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6833 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6835 // V1 Channel Establishment
6836 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6840 // V2 Channel Establishment
6841 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6842 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6843 // Common Channel Establishment
6844 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6845 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6846 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6847 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6849 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6852 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6853 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6855 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6856 // Channel Operations
6857 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6858 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6859 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6860 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6861 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6862 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6864 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6865 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6866 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6867 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6868 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6869 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6870 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6871 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6872 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6875 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6876 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6877 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6878 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6881 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6883 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6885 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6886 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6890 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6891 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6892 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6898 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6899 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6900 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6901 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6902 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6903 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6906 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6907 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6909 if inbound_peer_limited {
6912 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6913 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6914 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6915 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6916 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6917 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6922 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6923 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6925 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6926 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6927 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6928 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6933 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6934 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6939 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6942 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6945 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6946 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6947 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6948 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6949 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6950 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6951 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6956 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6957 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6962 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6963 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6964 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6966 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6975 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6979 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6982 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6983 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6985 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6986 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6987 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6988 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6989 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6991 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6992 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6993 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6997 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6999 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7000 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7003 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7004 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7005 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7006 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7014 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7015 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7019 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7020 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7023 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7024 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7027 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7028 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7031 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7032 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7033 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7034 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7037 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7038 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7039 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7040 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7043 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7044 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7045 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7046 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7049 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7050 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7051 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7052 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7055 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7056 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7057 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7058 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7061 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7062 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7063 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7064 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7067 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7068 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7069 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7070 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7073 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7074 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7075 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7076 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7079 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7080 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7081 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7082 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7086 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7087 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7088 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7089 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7092 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7093 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7095 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7096 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7097 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7098 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7099 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7102 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7103 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7104 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7105 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7108 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7109 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7110 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7111 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7114 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7115 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7116 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7117 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7118 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7119 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7120 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7121 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7122 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7123 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7124 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7125 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7126 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7127 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7128 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7129 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7130 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7131 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7133 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7134 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7135 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7141 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7142 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7144 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7145 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7146 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7147 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7150 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7151 (2, node_id, required),
7152 (4, features, required),
7153 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7154 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7155 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7156 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7159 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7160 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7161 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7162 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7163 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7164 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7165 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7166 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7167 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7168 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7169 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7170 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7171 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7172 (7, self.config, option),
7173 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7174 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7175 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7176 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7177 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7178 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7179 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7180 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7181 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7182 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7183 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7184 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7185 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7186 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7187 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7188 (32, self.is_public, required),
7189 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7190 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7191 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7192 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7198 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7199 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7200 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7201 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7202 (2, channel_id, required),
7203 (3, channel_type, option),
7204 (4, counterparty, required),
7205 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7206 (6, funding_txo, option),
7207 (7, config, option),
7208 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7209 (9, confirmations, option),
7210 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7211 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7212 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7213 (16, balance_msat, required),
7214 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7215 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7216 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7217 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7218 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7219 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7220 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7221 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7222 (26, is_outbound, required),
7223 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7224 (30, is_usable, required),
7225 (32, is_public, required),
7226 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7227 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7228 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7229 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7232 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7233 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7234 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7235 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7236 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7240 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7242 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7243 outbound_scid_alias,
7247 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7248 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7250 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7251 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7252 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7253 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7254 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7255 confirmations_required,
7257 force_close_spend_delay,
7258 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7259 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7260 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7261 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7262 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7263 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7264 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7269 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7270 (2, channels, vec_type),
7271 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7272 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7275 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7277 (0, onion_packet, required),
7278 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7281 (0, payment_data, required),
7282 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7283 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7284 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7286 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7287 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7288 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7289 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7293 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7294 (0, routing, required),
7295 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7296 (4, payment_hash, required),
7297 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7298 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7299 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7303 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7304 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7306 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7308 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7309 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7310 reason.write(writer)?;
7312 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7313 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7316 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7317 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7318 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7319 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7326 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7327 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7328 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7332 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7333 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7334 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7338 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7339 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7340 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7341 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7342 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7345 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7346 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7347 // messages contained in the variants.
7348 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7349 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7350 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7352 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7353 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7354 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7355 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7356 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7359 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7360 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7361 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7362 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7363 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7365 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7370 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7375 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7376 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7377 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7378 (2, outpoint, required),
7379 (4, htlc_id, required),
7380 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7383 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7384 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7385 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7386 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7387 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7389 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7390 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7391 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7392 (2, self.value, required),
7393 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7394 (4, payment_data, option),
7395 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7396 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7397 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7403 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7404 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7405 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7407 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7408 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7409 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7410 let mut total_value_received = None;
7411 let mut total_msat = None;
7412 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7413 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7414 (0, prev_hop, required),
7415 (1, total_msat, option),
7416 (2, value, required),
7417 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7418 (4, payment_data, option),
7419 (5, total_value_received, option),
7420 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7421 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7423 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7425 if payment_data.is_some() {
7426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7428 if total_msat.is_none() {
7429 total_msat = Some(value);
7431 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7434 if total_msat.is_none() {
7435 if payment_data.is_none() {
7436 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7438 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7440 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7444 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7447 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7448 total_value_received,
7449 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7456 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7457 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7458 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7461 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7462 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7463 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7464 let mut payment_id = None;
7465 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7466 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7467 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7468 (0, session_priv, required),
7469 (1, payment_id, option),
7470 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7471 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7472 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7473 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7475 if payment_id.is_none() {
7476 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7478 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7480 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7481 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7482 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7484 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7485 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7486 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7487 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7491 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7492 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7493 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7495 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7498 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7499 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7504 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7505 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7507 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7509 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7510 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7511 (0, session_priv, required),
7512 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7513 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7514 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7515 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7516 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7517 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7520 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7522 field.write(writer)?;
7529 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7530 (0, forward_info, required),
7531 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7532 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7533 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7534 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7537 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7539 (0, htlc_id, required),
7540 (2, err_packet, required),
7545 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7546 (0, payment_secret, required),
7547 (2, expiry_time, required),
7548 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7549 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7550 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7553 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7555 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7556 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7557 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7558 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7559 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7560 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7564 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7565 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7567 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7569 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7571 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7572 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7573 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7576 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7578 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7579 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7580 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7581 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7584 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7585 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7587 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7588 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7589 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7590 unfunded_channels += 1;
7595 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7597 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7600 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7601 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7602 channel.write(writer)?;
7609 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7610 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7611 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7612 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7613 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7614 for forward in pending_forwards {
7615 forward.write(writer)?;
7620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7622 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7623 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7624 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7626 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7627 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7628 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7629 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7630 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7631 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7632 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7633 htlc.write(writer)?;
7635 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7636 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7639 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7640 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7641 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7642 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7643 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7644 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7645 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7648 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7649 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7650 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7651 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7652 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7654 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7655 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7656 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7657 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7658 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7659 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7660 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7665 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7666 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7667 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7668 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7669 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7670 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7671 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7672 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7673 0u64.write(writer)?;
7675 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7676 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7677 event.write(writer)?;
7681 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7682 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7683 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7684 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7685 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7686 0u64.write(writer)?;
7688 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7689 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7690 // likely to be identical.
7691 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7692 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7694 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7695 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7696 hash.write(writer)?;
7697 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7700 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7701 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7702 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7703 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7704 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7707 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7708 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7710 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7711 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7712 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7713 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7716 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7717 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7721 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7722 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7723 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7725 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7726 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7727 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7733 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7734 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7735 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7736 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7739 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7740 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7741 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7742 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7743 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7746 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7747 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7748 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7749 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7750 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7751 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7752 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7753 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7754 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7755 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7756 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7757 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7764 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7765 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7766 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7767 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7770 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7771 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7772 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7773 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7774 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7775 // check that the event is sane here.
7776 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7777 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7778 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7779 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7785 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7786 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7787 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7788 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7789 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7790 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7793 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7794 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7795 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7796 events.push_back((ev, action));
7797 } else if action.is_some() {
7798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7805 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7807 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7809 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7810 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7811 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7812 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7813 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7814 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7815 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7816 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7817 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7818 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7819 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7820 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7821 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7823 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7824 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7826 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7827 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7829 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7830 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7831 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7832 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7833 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7834 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7836 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7837 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7839 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7840 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7841 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7842 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7843 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7844 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7848 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7849 pub entropy_source: ES,
7851 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7852 pub node_signer: NS,
7854 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7855 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7857 pub signer_provider: SP,
7859 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7861 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7862 pub fee_estimator: F,
7863 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7865 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7866 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7867 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7868 pub chain_monitor: M,
7870 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7871 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7872 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7873 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7874 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7875 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7877 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7879 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7880 /// deserialization.
7882 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7883 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7884 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7886 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7887 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7889 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7890 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7891 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7892 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7894 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7897 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7898 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7901 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7902 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7904 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7905 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7906 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7907 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7908 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7909 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7913 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7914 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7915 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7916 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7917 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7919 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7920 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7925 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7926 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7927 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7928 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7930 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7931 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7932 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7933 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7934 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7935 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7939 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7940 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7941 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7945 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7946 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7948 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7949 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7950 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7951 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7952 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7957 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7958 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7960 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7961 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7962 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7964 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7966 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7967 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7968 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7969 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7970 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7971 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7972 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7973 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7974 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7975 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7977 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7978 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7979 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7980 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7981 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7982 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7983 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7984 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7985 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7986 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7987 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7988 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7989 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7990 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7991 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7992 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7993 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7994 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7995 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7996 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7997 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7998 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7999 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
8000 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8001 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8002 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8005 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8006 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8007 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
8008 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
8009 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8011 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8012 let mut found_htlc = false;
8013 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8014 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8017 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8018 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8019 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8020 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8021 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8022 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8023 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8024 log_info!(args.logger,
8025 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8026 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8027 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
8031 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8032 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8033 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8034 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8035 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
8036 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
8038 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
8039 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
8041 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8042 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8043 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8044 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
8046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8047 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8048 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
8049 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8053 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8054 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8055 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8056 // safely discard the channel.
8057 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
8058 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8059 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
8060 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
8061 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8064 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
8065 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8066 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8067 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8068 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8069 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8073 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8074 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8075 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8076 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8077 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8078 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8079 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8081 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8085 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8086 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8087 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8088 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8089 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8090 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8091 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8092 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8093 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8095 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8098 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8099 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8100 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8101 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8102 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8103 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8104 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8105 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8107 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8110 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8111 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8112 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8113 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8114 let peer_state = PeerState {
8115 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8116 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8117 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8118 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8119 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8120 is_connected: false,
8122 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8125 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8126 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8127 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8128 for _ in 0..event_count {
8129 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8130 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8135 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8136 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8137 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8139 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8140 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8141 // on-startup monitor updates.
8142 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8143 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8145 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8149 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8150 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8151 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8152 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8153 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
8154 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8155 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8156 pending_background_events.push(
8157 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8158 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8161 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8167 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8168 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8170 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8171 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8172 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8173 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8174 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8178 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8179 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8180 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8181 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8182 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8183 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8184 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8186 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8191 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8192 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8193 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8194 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8195 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8196 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8197 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8198 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8199 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8200 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8201 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8202 let mut events_override = None;
8203 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8204 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8205 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8206 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8207 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8208 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8209 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8210 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8211 (8, events_override, option),
8212 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8213 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8214 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8216 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8217 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8220 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8221 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8224 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8225 pending_events_read = events;
8228 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8229 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8232 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8233 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8234 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8235 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8236 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8237 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8239 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8241 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8242 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8243 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8247 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8248 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8249 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8250 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8251 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8252 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8253 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8255 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8256 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8257 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8258 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8259 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8260 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8261 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8264 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8265 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8266 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8267 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8269 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8270 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8271 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8274 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8275 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8276 retry_strategy: None,
8277 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8278 payment_params: None,
8279 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8280 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8281 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8282 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8283 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8284 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8285 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8286 total_msat: path_amt,
8287 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8289 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8290 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8295 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8298 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8299 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8300 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8302 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8303 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8304 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8305 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8306 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8307 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8308 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8309 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8310 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8311 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8312 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8317 !forwards.is_empty()
8319 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8320 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8321 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8322 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8323 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8324 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8325 intercepted_id != ev_id
8332 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8333 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8334 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8335 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8336 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8337 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8338 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8339 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8340 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8341 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8342 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8343 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8344 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8353 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8354 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8355 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8356 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8357 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8358 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8359 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8360 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8364 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8365 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8367 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8368 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8369 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8372 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8373 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8374 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8376 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8377 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8379 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8380 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8382 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8385 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8386 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8387 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8389 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8393 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8394 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8395 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8396 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8397 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8399 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8400 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8401 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8402 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8403 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8404 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8405 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8406 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8408 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8409 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8413 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8415 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8417 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8418 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8420 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8421 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8426 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8427 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8429 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8431 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8433 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8434 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8435 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8436 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8440 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8441 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8444 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8445 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8446 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8448 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8449 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8450 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8452 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8453 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8454 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8455 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8456 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8457 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8459 if chan.is_usable() {
8460 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8461 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8462 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8463 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8470 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8472 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8473 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8474 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8475 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8476 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8477 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8478 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8479 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8480 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8481 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8482 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8484 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8485 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8487 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8488 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8489 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8490 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8492 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8493 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8494 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8495 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8497 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8498 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8499 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8500 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8502 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8503 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8504 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8507 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8508 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8511 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8512 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8515 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8518 purpose: payment.purpose,
8519 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8525 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8526 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8527 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8528 for action in actions.iter() {
8529 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8530 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8531 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8533 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8534 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8535 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8536 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8541 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8543 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8544 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8548 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8550 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8551 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8552 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8553 router: args.router,
8555 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8557 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8558 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8559 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8560 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8562 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8563 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8564 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8565 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8566 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8567 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8569 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8574 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8576 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8578 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8579 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8580 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8581 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8583 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8584 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8586 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8587 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8588 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8590 logger: args.logger,
8591 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8594 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8595 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8596 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8597 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8598 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8601 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8602 //connection or two.
8604 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8610 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8611 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8612 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8613 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8614 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8615 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8616 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8617 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8618 use crate::ln::msgs;
8619 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8620 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8621 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8622 use crate::util::test_utils;
8623 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8624 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8627 fn test_notify_limits() {
8628 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8629 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8633 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8635 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8636 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8637 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8639 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8641 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8643 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8644 // to connect messages with new values
8645 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8646 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8647 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8648 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8649 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8650 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8652 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8653 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8654 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8655 // ... but the last node should not.
8656 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8657 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8658 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8659 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8661 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8662 // about the channel.
8663 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8664 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8665 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8667 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8669 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8670 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8671 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8672 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8673 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8674 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8676 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8677 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8678 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8680 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8681 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8682 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8683 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8684 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8685 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8687 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8688 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8689 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8690 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8691 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8692 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8693 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8694 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8696 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8697 // the channel info has updated.
8698 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8699 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8700 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8701 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8702 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8703 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8707 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8708 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8714 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8716 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8717 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8718 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8719 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8721 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8722 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8723 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8724 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8725 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8726 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8727 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8728 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8730 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8732 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8734 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8735 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8736 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8738 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8740 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8741 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8742 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8744 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8745 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8746 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8748 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8749 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8750 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8751 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8752 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8753 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8754 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8755 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8756 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8758 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8759 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8760 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8762 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8764 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8766 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8767 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8768 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8769 // lightning messages manually.
8770 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8771 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8774 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8775 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8776 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8778 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8779 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8781 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8782 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8784 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8785 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8786 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8788 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8790 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8792 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8794 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8796 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8797 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8800 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8801 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8802 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8803 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8805 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8806 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8807 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8808 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8813 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8814 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8815 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8816 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8821 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8822 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8823 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8824 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8831 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8832 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8833 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8834 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8835 // fails as expected.
8836 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8837 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8839 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8840 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8841 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8842 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8844 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8845 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8846 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8848 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8849 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8850 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8851 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8853 let route = find_route(
8854 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8855 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8857 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8858 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8860 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8862 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8863 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8864 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8866 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8867 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8868 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8869 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8870 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8872 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8873 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8874 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8875 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8876 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8877 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8878 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8879 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8880 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8882 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8883 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8885 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8886 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8887 let route = find_route(
8888 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8889 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8891 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8892 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8894 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8896 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8897 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8898 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8900 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8901 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8902 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8903 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8905 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8907 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8908 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8911 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8916 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8917 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8918 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8919 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8920 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8921 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8922 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8923 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8925 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8926 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8930 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8931 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8932 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8936 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8938 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8939 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8941 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8942 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8943 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8944 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8946 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8947 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8948 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8949 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8950 let route = find_route(
8951 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8952 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8955 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8956 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8957 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8958 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8959 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8960 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8963 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8964 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8965 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8966 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8967 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8968 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8969 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8971 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8975 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8976 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8977 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8978 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8979 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8980 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8982 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8983 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8985 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8986 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8987 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8988 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8990 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8991 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8992 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8993 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8994 let route = find_route(
8995 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8996 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8999 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9000 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9001 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9002 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9003 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9004 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9005 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9006 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9009 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9010 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9011 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9012 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9013 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9014 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9015 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9017 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9021 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9025 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9027 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9028 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9029 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9030 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9032 // Marshall an MPP route.
9033 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9034 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9035 route.paths.push(path);
9036 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9037 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9038 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9039 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9040 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9041 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9043 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9044 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9046 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9047 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9049 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9054 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9058 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9060 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9062 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9063 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9066 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9068 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9071 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9072 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9073 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9074 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9075 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9076 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9079 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9082 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9088 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9089 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9090 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9091 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9092 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9093 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9095 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9096 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9098 total_msat: 100_000,
9101 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9102 // payment verification fails as expected.
9103 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9104 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9105 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9106 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9108 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9112 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9113 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9117 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9118 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9119 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9120 // the channel is successfully closed.
9121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9124 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9126 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9127 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9128 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9129 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9130 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9132 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9133 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9135 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9136 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9137 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9138 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9141 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9143 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9144 // as it has the funding transaction.
9145 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9146 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9147 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9150 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9152 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9154 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9156 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9157 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9158 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9160 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9163 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9164 // as it has the funding transaction.
9165 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9166 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9167 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9170 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9171 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9173 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9174 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9175 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9176 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9178 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9179 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9180 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9181 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9183 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9184 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9186 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9187 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9188 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9189 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9190 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9191 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9192 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9196 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9197 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9198 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9199 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9200 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9201 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9202 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9205 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9207 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9208 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9209 // closing transaction).
9210 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9211 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9212 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9214 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9215 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9216 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9217 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9218 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9221 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9223 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9225 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9226 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9227 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9229 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9231 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9235 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9236 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9237 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9240 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9241 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9242 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9245 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9247 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9248 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9250 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9251 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9253 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9254 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9259 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9260 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9261 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9262 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9263 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9264 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9265 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9266 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9269 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9270 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9271 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9273 // Test the API functions.
9274 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9276 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9278 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9280 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9282 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9284 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9286 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9290 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9291 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9297 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9299 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9300 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9302 let mut funding_tx = None;
9303 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9304 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9305 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9308 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9309 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9310 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9311 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9312 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9314 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9316 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9318 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9320 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9322 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9324 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9327 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9328 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9329 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9330 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9331 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9333 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9334 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9336 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9337 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9338 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9339 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9340 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9341 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9342 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9345 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9346 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9347 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9348 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9349 }, true).unwrap_err();
9351 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9352 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9353 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9354 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9355 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9356 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9357 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9359 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9360 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9362 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9363 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9364 }, true).unwrap_err();
9366 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9367 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9368 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9370 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9372 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9373 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9375 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9376 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9377 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9378 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9379 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9381 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9382 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9383 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9385 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9386 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9387 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9389 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9390 // "protected" and can connect again.
9391 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9392 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9393 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9395 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9397 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9399 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9400 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9404 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9405 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9409 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9411 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9413 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9414 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9416 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9417 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9418 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9419 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9422 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9424 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9425 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9426 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9428 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9429 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9430 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9432 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9433 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9434 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9435 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9439 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9440 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9441 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9444 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9445 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9449 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9451 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9452 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9454 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9455 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9456 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9457 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9458 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9459 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9462 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9463 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9465 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9466 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9470 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9471 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9474 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9475 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9476 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9477 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9478 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9480 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9481 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9483 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9484 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9485 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9486 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9492 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9493 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9495 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9496 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9497 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9499 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9500 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9502 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9504 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9509 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9510 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9511 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9512 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9515 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9516 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9517 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9518 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9519 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9521 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9522 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9523 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9525 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9526 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9528 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9529 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9531 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9534 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9535 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9537 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9538 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9540 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9544 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9545 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9546 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9547 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9548 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9550 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9551 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9553 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9554 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9555 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9557 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9558 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9560 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9563 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9564 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9567 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9568 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9569 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9571 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9572 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9573 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9574 ..Default::default()
9576 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9577 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9578 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9580 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9581 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9584 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9585 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9586 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9587 ..Default::default()
9589 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9590 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9591 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9594 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9595 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9602 use crate::chain::Listen;
9603 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9604 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9605 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9606 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9607 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9608 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9609 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9610 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9611 use crate::util::test_utils;
9612 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9614 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9615 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9616 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9618 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9620 use criterion::Criterion;
9622 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9623 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9624 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9625 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9626 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9627 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9628 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9630 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9631 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9633 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9634 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9636 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9638 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9641 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9642 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9645 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9646 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9647 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9649 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9651 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9652 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9653 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9654 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9655 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9657 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9658 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9660 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9661 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9662 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9663 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9665 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9667 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9669 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9670 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9671 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9672 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9673 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9675 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9677 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9679 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9680 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9682 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9683 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9685 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9686 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9687 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9690 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9691 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9692 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9694 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9695 } else { panic!(); }
9697 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9698 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9699 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9701 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9702 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9704 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9707 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9708 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9709 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9711 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9712 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9717 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9719 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9720 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9721 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9723 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9724 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9725 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9726 match msg_events[0] {
9727 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9728 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9729 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9733 match msg_events[1] {
9734 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9738 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9739 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9741 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9742 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9747 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9748 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9750 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9751 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9756 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9757 macro_rules! send_payment {
9758 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9759 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9760 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9761 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9762 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9764 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9765 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9767 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9768 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9769 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9770 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9771 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9772 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9773 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9774 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9775 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9776 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9777 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9779 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9780 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9781 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9782 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9784 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9785 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9786 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9787 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9788 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9790 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9793 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9794 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9795 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9796 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9798 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9802 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9803 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9804 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);