1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
199 session_priv: SecretKey,
200 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203 payment_id: PaymentId,
204 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205 payee: Option<Payee>,
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
212 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
214 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
216 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
219 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
230 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
233 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236 payment_secret: None,
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
245 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
256 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270 err: msgs::LightningError,
271 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
276 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
278 err: LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
288 shutdown_finish: None,
292 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
299 shutdown_finish: None,
303 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
307 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
309 err: LightningError {
311 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
318 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
323 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
326 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
334 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
343 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
354 shutdown_finish: None,
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
373 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
390 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401 /// commitment transaction.
402 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
408 latest_features: InitFeatures,
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
416 struct PendingInboundPayment {
417 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
418 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
419 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
420 /// this payment being removed.
422 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
423 user_payment_id: u64,
424 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
425 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
426 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
429 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
430 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
431 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
433 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
436 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
437 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
438 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
439 pending_amt_msat: u64,
440 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
441 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
442 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
444 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
445 starting_block_height: u32,
447 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
448 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
449 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
451 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
456 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
458 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
462 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
464 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
468 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
470 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
475 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
476 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
477 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
478 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
480 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
483 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
486 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
487 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
488 let remove_res = match self {
489 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
490 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
491 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
492 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
496 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
497 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
498 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
499 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
500 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
501 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
508 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
509 let insert_res = match self {
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
512 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
517 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
518 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
519 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
520 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
521 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
528 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
539 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
540 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
541 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
542 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
543 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
544 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
545 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
546 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
548 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
549 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
550 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
551 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
552 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
553 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
554 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
555 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
556 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
558 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
559 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
561 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
562 /// to individual Channels.
564 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
565 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
566 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
567 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
569 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
570 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
571 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
572 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
573 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
574 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
575 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
577 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
578 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
579 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
580 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
583 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
584 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
585 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
586 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
587 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
589 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
590 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
591 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
592 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
593 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
594 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
595 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
596 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
597 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
598 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
601 default_configuration: UserConfig,
602 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
608 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
610 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
611 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
613 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
614 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
615 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
616 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
618 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
619 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
620 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
621 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
622 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
623 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
625 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
626 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
627 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
628 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
629 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
630 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
631 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
632 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
634 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
636 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
637 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
639 our_network_key: SecretKey,
640 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
642 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
643 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
644 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
646 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
647 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
648 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
649 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
651 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
652 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
653 /// are currently open with that peer.
654 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
655 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
658 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
659 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
661 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
662 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
663 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
664 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
665 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
666 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
667 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
668 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
669 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
671 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
678 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
680 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
681 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
682 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
683 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
684 pub struct ChainParameters {
685 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
686 pub network: Network,
688 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
690 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
691 pub best_block: BestBlock,
694 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
700 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
701 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
702 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
703 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
704 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
705 /// updates are ready for persistence).
707 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
708 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
709 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
710 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
711 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
713 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
714 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
717 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
718 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
719 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
722 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
723 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
725 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
726 persistence_notifier: notifier,
727 should_persist: persist_check,
728 _read_guard: read_guard,
733 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
735 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
736 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
741 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
742 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
744 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
747 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
748 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
749 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
750 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
752 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
753 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
755 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
757 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
758 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
759 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
760 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
761 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
762 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
763 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
765 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
766 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
768 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
769 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
770 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
771 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
773 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
774 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
775 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
776 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
777 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
778 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
781 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
783 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
784 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
787 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
789 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
791 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
792 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
793 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
794 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
795 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
796 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
797 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
798 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
799 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
802 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
803 /// to better separate parameters.
804 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
805 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
806 /// The node_id of our counterparty
807 pub node_id: PublicKey,
808 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
809 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
810 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
811 pub features: InitFeatures,
812 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
813 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
814 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
816 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
818 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
819 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
820 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
821 /// payments to us through this channel.
822 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
825 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
826 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
827 pub struct ChannelDetails {
828 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
829 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
830 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
831 /// lifetime of the channel.
832 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
833 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
834 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
835 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
836 /// our counterparty already.
838 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
839 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
840 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
841 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
842 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
843 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
844 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
845 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
846 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
847 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
848 /// this value on chain.
850 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
852 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
854 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
855 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
856 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
857 pub user_channel_id: u64,
858 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
859 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
860 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
861 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
863 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
864 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
865 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
866 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
867 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
868 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
869 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
870 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
871 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
873 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
874 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
875 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
876 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
877 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
878 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
879 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
880 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
881 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
883 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
885 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
886 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
887 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
888 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
889 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
890 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
891 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
892 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
893 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
895 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
896 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
897 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
898 pub is_outbound: bool,
899 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
900 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
901 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
902 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
903 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
905 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
906 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
907 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
908 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
910 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
912 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
916 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
917 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
919 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
920 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
921 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
922 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
923 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
924 ParameterError(APIError),
925 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
926 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
927 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
930 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
932 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
933 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
934 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
935 /// paths than the ones selected).
936 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
937 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
938 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
939 /// in over-/re-payment.
941 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
942 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
943 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
945 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
946 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
947 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
948 /// with the latest update_id.
949 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
952 macro_rules! handle_error {
953 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
956 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
957 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
959 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
960 // entering the macro.
961 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
962 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
965 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
967 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
968 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
969 if let Some(update) = update_option {
970 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
974 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
975 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
976 channel_id, user_channel_id,
977 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
982 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
983 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
985 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
986 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
987 action: err.action.clone()
991 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
992 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
995 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1002 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1003 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1004 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1006 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1007 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1009 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1011 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1012 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1014 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1015 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1016 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1017 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1019 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1020 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1021 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1023 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1024 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1025 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1026 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1028 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1029 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1030 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1036 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1037 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1041 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1043 $entry.remove_entry();
1051 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1052 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1056 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1058 $entry.remove_entry();
1066 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1067 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1069 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1070 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1071 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1078 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1079 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1080 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1082 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1084 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1085 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1086 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1087 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1089 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1090 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1091 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1092 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1093 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1094 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1095 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1096 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1097 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1098 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1099 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1102 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1103 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1104 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1105 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1106 match $action_type {
1107 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1108 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1110 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1111 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1113 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1114 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1115 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1116 if !$resend_commitment {
1117 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1120 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1122 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1123 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1127 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1128 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1130 $entry.remove_entry();
1134 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1135 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1139 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1140 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1141 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1143 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1144 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1148 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1149 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1150 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1151 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1152 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1155 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1160 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1161 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1162 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1163 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1164 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1165 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1167 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1168 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1170 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1171 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1172 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1173 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1176 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1177 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1178 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1179 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1180 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1181 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1182 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1183 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1184 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1185 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1186 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1187 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1190 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1191 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1192 // before it should be allowed to.
1193 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1194 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1195 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1198 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1199 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1200 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1201 msg: announcement_sigs,
1204 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1207 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1208 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1209 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1210 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1211 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1212 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1213 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1214 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1215 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1216 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1217 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1218 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1219 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1220 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1221 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1222 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1223 let mut order = $order;
1225 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1227 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1231 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1232 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1233 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1234 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1239 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1240 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1241 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1242 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1243 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1248 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1252 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1257 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1258 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1259 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1264 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1265 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1266 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1267 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1268 assert!(res.is_ok());
1271 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1275 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1276 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1277 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1279 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1281 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1282 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1287 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1288 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1289 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1290 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1291 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1294 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1296 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1297 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1299 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1301 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1303 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1304 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1305 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1306 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1307 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1308 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1311 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1312 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1313 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1317 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1319 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1320 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1321 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1322 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1323 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1324 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1326 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1327 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1329 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1330 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1333 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1334 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1336 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1338 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1339 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1340 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1341 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1349 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1350 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1351 &self.default_configuration
1354 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1356 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1357 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1358 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1359 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1360 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1363 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1364 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1366 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1367 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1368 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1370 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1371 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1372 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1373 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1374 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1375 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1377 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1378 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1379 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1380 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1381 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1382 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1387 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1388 Some(peer_state) => {
1389 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1390 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1391 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1392 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1394 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1397 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1400 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1401 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1403 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1404 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1407 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1410 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1415 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1416 node_id: their_network_key,
1419 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1422 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1423 let mut res = Vec::new();
1425 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1426 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1427 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1428 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1429 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1430 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1431 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1432 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1433 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1434 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1435 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1436 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1437 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1439 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1440 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1441 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1442 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1443 inbound_capacity_msat,
1444 outbound_capacity_msat,
1445 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1446 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1447 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1448 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1449 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1450 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1451 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1456 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1457 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1458 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1464 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1465 /// more information.
1466 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1467 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1470 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1471 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1473 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1474 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1476 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1477 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1478 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1479 // really wanted anyway.
1480 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1483 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1484 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1485 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1486 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1487 Some(transaction) => {
1488 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1492 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1493 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1494 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1495 reason: closure_reason
1499 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1502 let counterparty_node_id;
1503 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1504 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1505 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1506 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1507 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1509 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1511 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1512 Some(peer_state) => {
1513 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1514 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1515 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1517 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1519 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1521 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1522 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1523 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1524 let (result, is_permanent) =
1525 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1527 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1533 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1534 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1538 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1539 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1540 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1545 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1553 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1557 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1561 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1562 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1563 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1565 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1566 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1568 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1569 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1570 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1571 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1573 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1575 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1576 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1577 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1578 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1579 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1582 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1583 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1584 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1586 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1587 /// the channel being closed or not:
1588 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1589 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1590 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1591 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1592 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1593 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1594 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1596 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1598 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1599 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1600 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1601 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1602 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1606 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1607 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1608 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1609 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1612 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1613 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1614 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1615 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1616 // ignore the result here.
1617 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1621 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1622 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1623 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1625 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1626 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1627 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1628 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1629 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1630 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1633 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1634 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1636 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1637 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1638 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1641 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1643 chan.remove_entry().1
1645 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1648 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1649 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1650 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1651 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1657 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1660 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1661 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1662 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1664 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1665 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1666 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1667 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1668 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1669 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1670 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1680 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1681 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1682 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1683 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1684 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1688 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1689 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1690 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1692 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1693 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1694 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1695 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1696 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1697 failure_code: $err_code,
1698 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1703 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1704 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1707 let shared_secret = {
1708 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1709 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1712 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1714 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1715 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1716 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1717 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1718 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1719 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1720 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1721 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1724 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1725 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1726 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1727 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1728 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1731 let mut channel_state = None;
1732 macro_rules! return_err {
1733 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1735 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1736 if channel_state.is_none() {
1737 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1739 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1740 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1741 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1742 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1743 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1748 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1749 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1750 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1751 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1753 let error_code = match err {
1754 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1755 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1756 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1757 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1758 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1760 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1763 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1764 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1765 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1772 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1775 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1776 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1777 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1778 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1779 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1780 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1781 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1782 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1783 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1784 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1785 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1786 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1790 // final_expiry_too_soon
1791 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1792 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1793 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1794 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1795 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1796 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1797 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1799 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1800 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1801 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1803 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1804 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1805 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1808 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1809 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1810 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1811 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1812 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1813 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1814 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1815 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1817 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1819 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1820 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1821 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1822 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1823 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1824 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1825 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1826 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1827 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1830 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1832 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1835 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1840 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1841 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1842 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1843 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1845 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1847 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1848 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1849 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1850 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1853 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1854 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1855 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1857 // Check two things:
1858 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1859 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1860 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1862 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1864 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1865 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1866 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1868 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1870 let blinding_factor = {
1871 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1872 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1873 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1874 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1877 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1879 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1881 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1884 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1885 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1888 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1889 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1890 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1891 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1892 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1896 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1897 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1898 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1901 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1902 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1903 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1904 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1908 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1909 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1910 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1911 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1912 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1913 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1914 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1915 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1916 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1917 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1918 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1920 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1923 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1925 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1926 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1927 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1928 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1929 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1932 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1933 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1934 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1935 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1936 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1937 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1938 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1940 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1941 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1943 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1944 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1945 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1946 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1947 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1949 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1950 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1952 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1953 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1954 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1955 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1956 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1958 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1959 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1961 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1962 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1963 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1964 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1970 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1971 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1972 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1973 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1975 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1976 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1978 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1979 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1980 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1982 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1984 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1989 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1992 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1993 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1994 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1996 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1997 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1998 if !chan.should_announce() {
1999 return Err(LightningError {
2000 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2001 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2004 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2005 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2008 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2009 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2010 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2011 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2012 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2013 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2014 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2015 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2016 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2020 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2022 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2023 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2025 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2026 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2027 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2028 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2029 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2030 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2031 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2032 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2035 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2036 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2038 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2044 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2045 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2047 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2048 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2049 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2051 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2052 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2053 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2054 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2055 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2057 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2061 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2062 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2064 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2065 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2066 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2067 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2068 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2069 err: "Payment already completed"
2074 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2075 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2076 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2079 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2080 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2082 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2083 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2085 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2086 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2088 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2089 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2091 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2092 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2094 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2095 payee: payee.clone(),
2096 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2097 channel_state, chan);
2099 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2100 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2101 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2102 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2103 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2104 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2105 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2106 total_msat: total_value,
2108 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2112 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2113 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2114 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2115 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2116 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2117 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2118 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2119 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2120 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2123 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2125 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2126 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2127 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2128 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2129 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2130 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2138 } else { unreachable!(); }
2142 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2143 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2145 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2150 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2152 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2153 /// fields for more info.
2155 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2156 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2157 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2158 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2159 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2160 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2162 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2164 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2165 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2166 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2168 /// In general, a path may raise:
2169 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2170 /// node public key) is specified.
2171 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2172 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2174 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2175 /// relevant updates.
2177 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2178 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2179 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2181 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2182 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2183 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2184 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2186 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2187 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2188 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2189 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2190 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2193 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2194 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2195 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2197 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2198 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2199 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2200 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2201 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2203 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2204 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2206 let mut total_value = 0;
2207 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2208 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2209 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2210 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2211 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2212 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2213 continue 'path_check;
2215 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2216 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2217 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2218 continue 'path_check;
2221 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2222 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2224 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2225 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2227 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2228 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2229 total_value = amt_msat;
2232 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2233 let mut results = Vec::new();
2234 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2235 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2237 let mut has_ok = false;
2238 let mut has_err = false;
2239 for res in results.iter() {
2240 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2241 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2242 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2243 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2250 if has_err && has_ok {
2251 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2253 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2259 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2261 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2262 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2263 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2264 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2266 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2267 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2268 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2269 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2270 if path.len() == 0 {
2271 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2272 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2277 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2278 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2279 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2281 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2282 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2284 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2285 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2286 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2287 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2290 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2292 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2293 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2294 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2297 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2298 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2299 err: "Payment already completed"
2304 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2305 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2309 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2312 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2313 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2314 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2315 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2316 /// never reach the recipient.
2318 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2320 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2321 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2323 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2325 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2326 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2327 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2329 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2331 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2332 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2333 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2338 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2339 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2340 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2341 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2343 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2345 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2347 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2348 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2349 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2350 } else { unreachable!(); })
2353 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2355 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2356 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2359 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2360 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2365 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2366 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2367 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2370 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2372 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2382 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2383 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2384 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2388 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2390 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2391 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2393 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2395 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2396 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2397 /// keys per-channel).
2399 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2400 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2401 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2403 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2404 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2405 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2407 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2408 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2411 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2412 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2413 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2414 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2418 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2419 let mut output_index = None;
2420 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2421 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2422 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2423 if output_index.is_some() {
2424 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2425 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2428 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2429 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2430 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2433 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2436 if output_index.is_none() {
2437 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2438 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2441 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2445 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2446 if !chan.should_announce() {
2447 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2451 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2453 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2455 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2456 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2458 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2459 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2460 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2461 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2462 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2467 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2468 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2469 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2471 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2474 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2475 // smaller than 500:
2476 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2478 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2479 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2480 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2481 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2482 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2483 /// our network addresses.
2485 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2486 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2488 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2489 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2490 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2491 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2493 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2495 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2496 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2499 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2500 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2503 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2504 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2505 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2507 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2508 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2509 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2510 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2511 rgb, alias, addresses,
2512 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2513 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2515 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2516 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2521 let mut announced_chans = false;
2522 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2523 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2524 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2526 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2531 announced_chans = true;
2533 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2534 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2535 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2539 if announced_chans {
2540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2541 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2542 signature: node_announce_sig,
2543 contents: announcement
2549 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2551 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2552 /// Will likely generate further events.
2553 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2556 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2557 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2558 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2560 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2561 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2563 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2564 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2565 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2566 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2568 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2569 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2570 match forward_info {
2571 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2572 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2573 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2574 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2575 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2576 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2577 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2579 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2580 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2583 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2584 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2585 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2586 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2587 // problem, not ours.
2594 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2595 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2596 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2597 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2598 match forward_info {
2599 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2600 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2602 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2603 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2605 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2606 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2607 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2608 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2609 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2611 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2613 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2614 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2616 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2618 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2619 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2620 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2626 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2628 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2629 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2630 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2631 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2632 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2633 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2634 // this channel currently :/.
2640 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2641 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2643 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2645 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2647 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2648 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2650 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2652 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2653 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2654 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2657 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2659 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2660 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2661 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2662 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2663 // messages when we can.
2664 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2665 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2666 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2673 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2674 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2677 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2678 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2679 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2680 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2681 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2682 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2684 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2685 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2686 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2687 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2688 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2690 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2691 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2693 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2695 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2699 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2700 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2703 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2704 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2706 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2707 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2708 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2709 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2710 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2711 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2713 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2721 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2722 match forward_info {
2723 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2724 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2725 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2726 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2727 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2728 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2729 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2730 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2732 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2735 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2736 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2737 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2738 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2739 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2740 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2742 value: amt_to_forward,
2747 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2749 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2750 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2751 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2753 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2754 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2755 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2756 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2757 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2759 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2764 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2765 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2766 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2767 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2768 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2769 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2770 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2771 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2773 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2774 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2776 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2778 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2779 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2781 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2782 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2784 amt: amt_to_forward,
2785 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2789 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2790 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2798 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2802 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2805 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2807 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2808 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2809 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2810 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2811 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2813 let mut total_value = 0;
2814 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2815 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2816 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2817 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2818 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2819 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2823 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2824 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2825 total_value += htlc.value;
2826 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2827 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2828 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2829 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2830 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2831 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2833 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2835 _ => unreachable!(),
2838 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2840 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2841 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2844 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2845 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2847 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2848 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2849 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2850 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2854 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2855 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2857 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2859 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2860 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2867 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2868 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2876 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2877 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2880 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2881 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2884 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2885 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2886 events.append(&mut new_events);
2889 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2891 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2892 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2894 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2895 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2896 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2897 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2898 if background_events.is_empty() {
2902 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2904 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2905 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2906 // monitor updating completing.
2907 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2914 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2915 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2916 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2917 self.process_background_events();
2920 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2921 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2922 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2923 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2925 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2926 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2928 if !chan.is_live() {
2929 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2930 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2931 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2933 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2934 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2936 let mut retain_channel = true;
2937 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2940 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2941 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2945 let ret_err = match res {
2946 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2947 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2948 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2949 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2952 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2953 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2954 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2955 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2956 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2957 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2958 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2959 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2969 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2973 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2974 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2975 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2976 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2977 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2978 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2979 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2981 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2983 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2987 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2988 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2989 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2990 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2991 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2993 handle_errors.push(err);
3003 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3005 /// This currently includes:
3006 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3007 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3008 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3011 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3012 /// estimate fetches.
3013 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3014 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3015 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3016 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3018 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3020 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3024 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3025 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3026 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3027 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3028 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3029 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3031 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3033 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3035 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3036 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3037 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3038 if needs_close { return false; }
3041 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3042 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3043 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3044 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3045 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3046 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3047 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3052 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3053 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3055 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3056 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3057 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3061 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3062 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3071 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3072 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3078 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3079 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3080 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3081 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3082 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3083 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3084 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3086 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3087 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3088 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3089 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3090 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3091 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3092 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3093 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3094 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3095 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3096 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3102 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3103 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3104 // be surfaced to the user.
3105 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3106 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3108 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3109 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3110 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3112 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3113 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3115 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3120 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3121 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3122 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3124 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3125 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3126 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3127 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3128 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3129 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3130 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3131 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3132 Some(RouteParameters {
3134 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3135 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3138 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3139 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3140 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3142 rejected_by_dest: false,
3143 network_update: None,
3144 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3146 short_channel_id: None,
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3163 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3164 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3165 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3166 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3167 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3168 /// still-available channels.
3169 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3170 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3171 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3172 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3175 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3176 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3177 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3179 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3180 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3181 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3182 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3183 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3184 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3185 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3189 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3193 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3194 all_paths_failed = true;
3197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3200 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3201 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3202 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3203 Some(RouteParameters {
3204 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3205 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3206 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3210 match &onion_error {
3211 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3213 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3215 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3216 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3217 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3218 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3219 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3220 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3221 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3222 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3223 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3230 error_code: onion_error_code,
3232 error_data: onion_error_data
3236 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3242 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3243 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3244 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3245 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3247 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3248 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3249 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3250 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3251 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3252 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3253 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3254 network_update: None,
3257 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3260 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3262 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3268 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3269 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3270 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3272 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3273 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3275 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3277 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3281 let mut forward_event = None;
3282 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3283 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3285 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3286 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3287 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3290 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3293 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3294 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3296 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3297 time_forwardable: time
3304 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3305 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3306 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3308 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3309 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3310 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3311 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3313 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3315 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3316 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3317 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3318 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3322 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3323 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3324 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3325 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3327 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3328 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3329 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3330 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3332 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3333 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3334 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3335 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3336 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3338 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3339 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3340 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3346 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3347 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3348 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3350 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3351 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3352 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3353 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3354 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3355 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3356 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3358 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3359 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3360 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3361 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3362 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3363 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3364 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3365 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3367 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3368 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3369 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3370 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3371 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3372 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3374 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3379 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3380 // which were generated.
3381 channel_state.take();
3383 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3384 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3385 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3392 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3393 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3394 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3395 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3396 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3398 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3402 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3403 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3404 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3405 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3406 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3407 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3408 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3409 payment_preimage, e);
3410 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3411 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3412 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3413 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3416 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3417 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3418 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3420 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3421 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3422 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3423 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3424 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3425 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3431 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3433 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3436 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3437 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3438 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3439 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3440 payment_preimage, e);
3442 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3443 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3445 chan.remove_entry();
3447 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3450 } else { unreachable!(); }
3453 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3454 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3455 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3456 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3457 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3458 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3459 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3460 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3461 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3462 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3470 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3472 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3473 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3474 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3475 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3476 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3477 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3478 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3479 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3480 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3482 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3483 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3484 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3486 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3487 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3488 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
3489 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3494 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3495 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3496 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3497 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3499 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3508 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3509 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3510 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3511 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3512 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3513 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3514 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3517 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3518 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3519 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3520 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3521 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3524 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3525 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3526 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3527 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3528 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3529 payment_preimage, e);
3531 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3532 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3533 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3534 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3537 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3538 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3539 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3540 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3544 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3545 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3546 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3549 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3550 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3552 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3560 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3561 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3562 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3565 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3568 let chan_restoration_res;
3569 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3570 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3571 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3572 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3576 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3580 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3581 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3582 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3583 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3584 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3585 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3586 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3587 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3588 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3591 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3592 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3595 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3597 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3598 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3599 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3600 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3604 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3605 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3606 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3609 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3610 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3611 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3612 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3616 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3617 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3618 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3620 entry.insert(channel);
3626 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3627 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3628 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3629 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3630 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3632 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3633 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3635 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3636 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3641 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3642 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3643 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3644 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3646 user_channel_id: user_id,
3651 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3652 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3653 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3654 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3655 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3656 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3658 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3659 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3661 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3666 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3667 // lock before watch_channel
3668 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3670 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3671 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3672 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3673 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3674 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3675 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3676 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3677 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3678 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3679 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3680 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3682 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3683 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3684 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3685 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3686 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3687 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3691 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3692 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3693 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3699 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3708 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3710 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3711 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3713 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3715 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3718 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3719 Ok(update) => update,
3720 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3722 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3723 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3724 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3725 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3726 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3727 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3728 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3729 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3736 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3739 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3740 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3744 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3745 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3746 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3747 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3749 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3750 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3752 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3753 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3754 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3755 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3756 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3757 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3758 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3759 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3760 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3761 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3762 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3763 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3764 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3765 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3766 msg: announcement_sigs,
3768 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3770 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3771 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3780 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3781 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3782 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3786 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3788 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3789 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3792 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3793 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3794 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3795 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3798 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3799 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3801 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3802 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3803 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3804 let (result, is_permanent) =
3805 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3807 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3813 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3815 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3825 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3829 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3833 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3834 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3836 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3837 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3839 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3842 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3843 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3844 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3845 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3850 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3851 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3852 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3853 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3854 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3855 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3856 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3858 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3859 } else { (tx, None) }
3861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3864 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3865 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3866 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3868 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3869 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3870 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3875 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3880 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3881 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3882 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3883 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3885 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3886 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3887 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3888 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3890 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3895 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3899 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3900 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3901 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3902 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3903 match pending_forward_info {
3904 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3905 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3906 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3907 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3908 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3909 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3910 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3911 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3915 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3916 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3917 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3918 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3919 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3920 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3921 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3922 // no problem just calling this
3923 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3924 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3927 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3929 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3930 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3931 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3934 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3936 _ => pending_forward_info
3939 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3946 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3947 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3948 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3949 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3950 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3952 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3953 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3955 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3960 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3964 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3965 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3966 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3967 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3969 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3970 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3972 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3979 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3980 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3982 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3984 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3985 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3987 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3988 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3989 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3991 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3998 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3999 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4000 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4001 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4003 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4004 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4006 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4007 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4008 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4009 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4010 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4011 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4012 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4017 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4018 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4020 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4021 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4022 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4024 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4025 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4026 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4027 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4028 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4029 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4030 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4031 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4033 commitment_signed: msg,
4039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4044 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4045 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4046 let mut forward_event = None;
4047 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4048 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4049 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4050 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4052 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4053 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4054 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4055 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4056 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4059 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4060 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4063 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4064 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4069 match forward_event {
4071 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4072 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4073 time_forwardable: time
4081 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4082 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4084 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4085 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4088 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4089 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4091 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4092 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4093 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4094 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4095 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4096 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4097 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4098 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4099 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4100 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4101 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4103 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4104 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4105 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4106 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4107 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4109 } else { unreachable!(); }
4112 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4113 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4114 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4118 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4119 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4120 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4121 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4122 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4127 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4129 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4130 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4132 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4133 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4135 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4136 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4143 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4144 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4145 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4146 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4148 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4149 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4151 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4158 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4160 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4162 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4164 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4165 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4167 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4171 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4172 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4173 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4174 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4175 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4178 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4183 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4184 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4185 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4186 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4187 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4188 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4190 // It's not a local channel
4191 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4194 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4195 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4196 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4197 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4198 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4199 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4200 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4201 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4205 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4206 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4207 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4208 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4210 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4215 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4218 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4219 let chan_restoration_res;
4220 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4221 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4222 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4224 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4226 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4229 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4230 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4231 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4232 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4233 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4234 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4235 let mut channel_update = None;
4236 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4237 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4238 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4241 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4242 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4243 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4244 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4245 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4246 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4247 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4250 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4251 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4252 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4253 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4255 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4257 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4260 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4261 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4263 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4264 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4269 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4270 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4271 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4272 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4273 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4274 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4275 match monitor_event {
4276 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4277 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4279 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4281 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4282 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4285 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4286 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4287 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4288 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4289 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4290 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4291 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4292 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4293 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4294 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4296 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4297 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4298 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4302 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4303 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4305 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4307 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4308 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4309 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4316 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4317 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4322 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4323 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4326 has_pending_monitor_events
4329 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4330 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4331 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4332 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4333 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4334 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4337 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4338 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4339 /// update was applied.
4341 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4342 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4343 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4344 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4345 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4346 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4347 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4348 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4350 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4351 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4352 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4353 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4354 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4356 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4357 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4358 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4359 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4360 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4362 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4363 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4364 has_monitor_update = true;
4365 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4366 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4367 if close_channel { return false; }
4369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4370 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4371 updates: commitment_update,
4378 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4379 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4380 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4387 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4388 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4389 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4392 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4393 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4399 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4400 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4401 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4402 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4403 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4404 let mut has_update = false;
4406 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4408 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4409 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4410 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4412 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4413 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4414 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4415 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4417 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4418 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4421 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4422 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4423 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4424 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4425 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4428 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4434 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4436 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4437 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4443 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4444 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4451 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4452 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4458 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4459 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4461 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4462 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4463 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4464 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4465 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4466 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4467 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4468 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4469 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4470 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4471 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4472 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4473 assert!(should_broadcast);
4474 } else { unreachable!(); }
4475 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4477 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4481 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4482 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4484 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4487 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4488 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4490 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4491 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4492 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4493 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4494 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4495 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4496 // never fail a payment too early.
4497 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4499 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4507 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4510 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4511 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4513 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4514 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4515 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4517 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4519 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4520 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4521 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4522 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4523 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4524 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4525 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4528 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4529 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4532 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4533 /// stored external to LDK.
4535 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4536 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4537 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4539 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4540 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4542 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4543 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4544 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4545 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4546 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4548 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4549 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4550 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4551 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4553 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4554 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4555 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4556 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4557 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4559 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4560 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4561 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4562 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4563 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4565 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4566 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4567 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4569 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4571 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4572 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4574 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4575 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4576 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4577 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4578 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4581 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4582 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4583 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4584 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4585 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4590 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4591 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4595 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4596 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4598 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4602 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4603 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4604 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4605 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4607 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4608 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4609 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4610 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4613 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4614 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4616 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4617 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4620 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4621 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4622 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4624 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4625 events.replace(pending_events);
4634 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4636 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4637 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4638 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4639 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4642 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4644 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4645 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4647 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4648 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4649 /// restarting from an old state.
4650 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4651 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4652 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4654 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4655 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4656 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4657 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4660 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4661 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4662 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4665 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4666 handler.handle_event(&event);
4674 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4676 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4677 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4678 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4679 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4682 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4684 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4685 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4686 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4687 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4688 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4691 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4692 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4693 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4696 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4698 let new_height = height - 1;
4700 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4701 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4702 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4703 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4704 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4705 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4708 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4712 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4714 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4715 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4716 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4717 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4720 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4721 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4722 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4723 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4725 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4726 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4729 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4732 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4733 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4734 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4735 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4737 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4738 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4742 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4744 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4746 macro_rules! max_time {
4747 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4749 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4750 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4751 // having an explicit local time source.
4752 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4753 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4754 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4755 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4756 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4762 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4763 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4764 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4765 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4766 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4769 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4770 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4771 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4772 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4773 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4774 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4780 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4781 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4782 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4783 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4784 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4785 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4791 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4793 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4794 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4795 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4796 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4797 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4798 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4803 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4805 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4806 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4807 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4808 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4811 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4812 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4814 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4815 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4816 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4817 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4818 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4820 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4821 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4823 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4825 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4826 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4827 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4828 let res = f(channel);
4829 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4830 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4831 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4832 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4833 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4837 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4838 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4839 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4840 msg: funding_locked,
4842 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4844 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4845 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4846 msg: announcement_sigs,
4848 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4850 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4851 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4852 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4855 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4857 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4859 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4860 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4861 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4863 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4864 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4865 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4871 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4872 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4873 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4874 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4881 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4882 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4883 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4884 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4885 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4886 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4887 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4888 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4889 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4890 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4891 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4892 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4893 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4898 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4903 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4905 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4906 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4910 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4911 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4912 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4914 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4915 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4916 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4917 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4920 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4921 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4923 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4924 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4927 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4928 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4929 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4930 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4931 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4935 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4936 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4937 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4938 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4942 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4943 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4944 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4945 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4946 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4947 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4950 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4955 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4960 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4962 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4965 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4967 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4970 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4972 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4975 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4980 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4982 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4985 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4987 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4990 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4992 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4995 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4997 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5000 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5002 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5005 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5007 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5010 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5011 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5012 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5015 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5020 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5022 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5025 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5026 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5027 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5030 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5035 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5037 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5040 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5042 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5043 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5045 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5046 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5047 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5048 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5049 if no_connection_possible {
5050 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5051 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5052 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5053 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5054 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5056 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5057 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5058 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5062 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5069 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5070 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5071 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5072 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5073 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5074 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5075 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5077 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5080 no_channels_remain = false;
5086 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5088 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5090 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5091 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5092 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5093 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5094 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5099 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5100 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5101 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5103 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5105 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5110 if no_channels_remain {
5111 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5114 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5115 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5119 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5120 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5125 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5126 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5128 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5129 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5133 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5138 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5139 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5140 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5141 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5142 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5143 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5144 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5145 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5146 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5150 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5151 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5152 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5158 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5161 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5164 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5165 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5166 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5167 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5168 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5172 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5173 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5178 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5179 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5180 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5181 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5182 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5183 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5186 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5189 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5195 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5196 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5201 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5202 let result = *guard;
5210 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5211 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5212 let current_time = Instant::now();
5214 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5215 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5220 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5221 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5222 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5223 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5224 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5226 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5227 let result = *guard;
5228 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5232 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5233 None => return result,
5239 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5241 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5242 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5243 *persistence_lock = true;
5244 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5249 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5250 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5252 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5254 (0, onion_packet, required),
5255 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5258 (0, payment_data, required),
5259 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5261 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5262 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5263 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5267 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5268 (0, routing, required),
5269 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5270 (4, payment_hash, required),
5271 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5272 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5276 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5277 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5279 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5281 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5282 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5283 reason.write(writer)?;
5285 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5286 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5289 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5290 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5291 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5292 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5299 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5300 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5301 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5304 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5305 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5306 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5307 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5311 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5312 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5313 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5314 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5315 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5318 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5319 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5320 // messages contained in the variants.
5321 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5322 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5323 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5325 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5326 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5327 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5328 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5329 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5332 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5333 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5334 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5335 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5336 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5338 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5343 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5348 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5349 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5350 (2, outpoint, required),
5351 (4, htlc_id, required),
5352 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5355 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5356 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5357 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5358 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5361 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5362 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5363 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5368 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5369 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5370 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5376 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5377 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5378 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5380 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5381 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5382 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5386 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5387 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5388 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5390 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5392 if payment_data.is_some() {
5393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5395 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5398 if payment_data.is_none() {
5399 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5401 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5405 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5413 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5414 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5415 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5418 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5419 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5420 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5421 let mut payment_id = None;
5422 let mut payment_secret = None;
5423 let mut payee = None;
5424 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5425 (0, session_priv, required),
5426 (1, payment_id, option),
5427 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5428 (3, payment_secret, option),
5429 (4, path, vec_type),
5432 if payment_id.is_none() {
5433 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5435 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5437 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5438 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5439 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5440 path: path.unwrap(),
5441 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5446 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5447 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5452 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5453 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5455 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5457 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5458 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5459 (0, session_priv, required),
5460 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5461 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5462 (3, payment_secret, option),
5463 (4, path, vec_type),
5467 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5469 field.write(writer)?;
5476 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5477 (0, LightningError) => {
5481 (0, failure_code, required),
5482 (2, data, vec_type),
5486 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5488 (0, forward_info, required),
5489 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5490 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5491 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5494 (0, htlc_id, required),
5495 (2, err_packet, required),
5499 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5500 (0, payment_secret, required),
5501 (2, expiry_time, required),
5502 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5503 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5504 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5507 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5509 (0, session_privs, required),
5512 (0, session_privs, required),
5515 (0, session_privs, required),
5516 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5517 (2, payment_hash, required),
5518 (4, payment_secret, option),
5519 (6, total_msat, required),
5520 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5521 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5525 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5526 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5528 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5529 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5533 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5535 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5537 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5539 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5540 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5541 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5544 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5545 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5546 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5547 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5548 unfunded_channels += 1;
5551 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5552 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5553 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5554 channel.write(writer)?;
5558 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5559 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5560 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5561 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5562 for forward in pending_forwards {
5563 forward.write(writer)?;
5567 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5568 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5569 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5570 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5571 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5572 htlc.write(writer)?;
5576 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5577 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5578 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5579 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5580 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5581 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5584 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5585 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5586 for event in events.iter() {
5587 event.write(writer)?;
5590 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5591 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5592 for event in background_events.iter() {
5594 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5596 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5597 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5602 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5603 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5605 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5606 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5607 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5608 hash.write(writer)?;
5609 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5612 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5613 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5614 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5615 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5616 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5617 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5620 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5621 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5623 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5624 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5625 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5626 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5629 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5633 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5634 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5635 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5637 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5638 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5639 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5644 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5645 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5646 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5653 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5655 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5657 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5658 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5659 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5660 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5661 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5662 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5663 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5664 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5665 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5666 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5667 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5668 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5669 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5671 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5672 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5674 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5675 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5677 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5678 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5679 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5680 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5681 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5682 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5684 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5685 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5686 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5687 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5688 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5692 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5693 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5695 pub keys_manager: K,
5697 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5699 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5700 pub fee_estimator: F,
5701 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5703 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5704 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5705 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5706 pub chain_monitor: M,
5708 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5709 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5710 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5711 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5712 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5713 /// deserialization.
5715 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5716 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5717 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5719 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5720 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5722 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5723 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5724 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5725 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5727 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5730 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5731 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5734 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5735 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5736 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5738 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5742 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5743 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5744 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5745 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5746 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5748 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5749 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5754 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5755 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5756 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5757 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5758 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5759 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5760 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5761 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5764 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5765 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5766 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5770 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5771 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5772 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5773 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5774 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5778 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5779 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5781 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5782 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5783 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5785 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5787 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5788 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5789 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5790 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5791 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5792 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5793 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5794 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5795 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5796 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5797 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5798 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5799 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5800 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5801 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5802 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5803 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5804 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5805 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5806 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5807 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5808 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5809 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5810 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5811 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5812 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5813 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5814 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5815 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5816 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5817 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5818 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5819 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5820 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5821 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5822 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5823 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5824 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5825 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5828 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5829 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5831 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5834 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5835 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5836 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5837 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5838 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5839 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5843 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5844 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5845 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5849 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5850 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5851 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5852 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5853 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5854 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5855 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5856 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5857 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5859 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5862 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5863 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5864 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5865 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5866 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5867 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5868 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5869 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5871 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5874 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5875 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5876 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5877 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5878 let peer_state = PeerState {
5879 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5881 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5884 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5885 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5886 for _ in 0..event_count {
5887 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5888 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5892 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5893 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5894 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5895 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5896 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5897 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5898 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5899 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5903 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5904 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5905 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5906 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5907 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5908 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5912 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5913 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5915 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5916 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5917 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5918 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5923 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5924 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5925 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5926 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5927 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5928 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5929 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5931 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5932 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5936 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5937 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5938 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5939 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5940 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5941 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5943 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5944 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5945 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5946 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5947 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5948 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5950 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5952 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5953 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5954 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5955 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5956 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5957 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5958 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5960 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5961 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5962 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5963 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5964 if path.is_empty() {
5965 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5966 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5968 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5969 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5970 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5971 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5973 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
5974 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
5975 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5978 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
5979 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
5980 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
5981 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5983 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
5984 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
5985 total_msat: path_amt,
5986 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
5988 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
5989 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
5998 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5999 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6001 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6002 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6005 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6007 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6008 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6009 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6011 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6013 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6018 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6020 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6021 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6023 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6024 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6027 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6028 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6030 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6032 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6033 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6034 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6035 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6037 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6038 logger: args.logger,
6039 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6042 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6043 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6046 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6047 //connection or two.
6049 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6055 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6056 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6057 use core::time::Duration;
6058 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6059 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6060 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6061 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6063 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6064 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6065 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6066 use util::errors::APIError;
6067 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6069 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6071 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6072 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6074 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6077 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6078 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6080 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6081 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6082 thread::spawn(move || {
6084 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6085 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6086 *persistence_lock = true;
6089 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6095 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6096 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6098 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6101 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6106 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6108 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6111 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6118 fn test_notify_limits() {
6119 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6120 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6124 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6126 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6127 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6128 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6129 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6130 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6132 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6134 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6135 // to connect messages with new values
6136 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6137 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6138 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6139 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6141 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6142 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6143 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6144 // ... but the last node should not.
6145 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6146 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6147 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6148 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6150 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6151 // about the channel.
6152 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6153 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6154 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6156 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6158 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6159 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6160 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6161 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6162 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6163 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6165 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6166 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6167 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6169 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6170 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6171 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6172 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6173 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6174 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6176 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6177 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6178 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6179 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6180 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6181 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6182 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6183 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6185 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6186 // the channel info has updated.
6187 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6188 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6189 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6190 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6191 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6192 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6196 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6197 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6203 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6205 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6206 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6207 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6208 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6209 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6210 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6211 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6215 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6217 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6218 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6220 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6222 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6223 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6228 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6230 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6231 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6232 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6233 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6234 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6235 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6236 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6237 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6238 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6240 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6241 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6243 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6245 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6247 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6248 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6249 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6250 // lightning messages manually.
6251 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6253 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6254 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6255 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6257 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6258 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6260 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6261 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6263 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6264 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6265 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6267 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6268 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6269 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6271 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6273 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6275 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6276 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6279 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6280 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6281 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6283 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6284 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6285 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6286 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6293 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6294 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6295 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6296 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6297 // fails as expected.
6298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6301 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6302 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6303 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6305 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6306 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6307 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6309 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6310 let params = RouteParameters {
6311 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6312 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6313 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6315 let route = find_route(
6316 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6317 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6319 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6321 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6323 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6324 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6325 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6327 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6329 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6331 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6332 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6333 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6334 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6335 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6336 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6337 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6338 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6339 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6341 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6342 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6344 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6345 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6346 let route = find_route(
6347 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6348 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6350 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6354 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6355 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6356 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6358 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6359 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6360 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6362 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6363 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6364 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6365 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6369 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6370 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6372 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6373 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6374 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6375 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6376 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6377 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6378 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6379 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6380 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6382 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6383 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6387 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6388 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6389 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6393 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6395 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6396 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6397 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6398 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6400 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6401 let params = RouteParameters {
6402 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6403 final_value_msat: 10000,
6404 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6406 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6407 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6408 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6409 let route = find_route(
6410 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6411 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6414 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6415 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6416 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6419 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6420 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6421 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6422 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6423 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6424 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6427 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6431 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6432 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6438 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6439 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6440 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6441 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6443 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6444 let params = RouteParameters {
6445 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6446 final_value_msat: 10000,
6447 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6449 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6450 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6451 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6452 let route = find_route(
6453 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6454 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6457 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6458 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6459 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6460 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6464 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6465 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6466 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6467 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6468 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6469 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6471 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6475 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6479 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6481 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6482 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6483 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6484 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6486 // Marshall an MPP route.
6487 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6488 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6489 route.paths.push(path);
6490 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6491 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6492 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6493 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6494 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6495 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6497 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6498 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6499 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6500 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6505 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6508 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6509 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6510 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6511 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6512 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6513 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6514 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6515 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6516 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6517 use util::test_utils;
6518 use util::config::UserConfig;
6519 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6521 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6522 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6523 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6525 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6529 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6530 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6531 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6532 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6533 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6534 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6535 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6540 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6541 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6544 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6545 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6546 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6548 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6549 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6551 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6552 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6554 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6555 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6557 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6558 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6559 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6560 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6561 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6563 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6565 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6567 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6568 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6569 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6570 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6571 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6573 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6575 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6577 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6578 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6579 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6580 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6581 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6584 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6585 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6586 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6588 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6589 } else { panic!(); }
6591 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6592 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6594 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6597 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6600 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6601 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6603 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6604 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6605 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6606 match msg_events[0] {
6607 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6608 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6609 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6613 match msg_events[1] {
6614 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6618 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6620 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6621 macro_rules! send_payment {
6622 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6623 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6624 let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6625 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6626 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6627 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6628 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6630 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6631 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6633 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6634 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6636 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6637 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6638 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6639 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6640 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6641 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6642 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6643 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6645 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6646 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6647 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6649 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6650 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6651 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6652 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6653 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6655 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6658 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6659 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6660 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6661 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6663 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6668 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6669 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);