1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
68 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
69 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
70 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
71 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
72 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
73 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
74 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
75 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
78 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
79 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
80 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
81 crate::sign::KeysManager,
84 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
87 use crate::prelude::*;
89 use core::cell::RefCell;
91 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
92 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
93 use core::time::Duration;
96 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
97 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
98 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
100 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
102 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
103 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
104 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
106 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
107 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
108 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
109 // before we forward it.
111 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
112 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
113 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
114 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
115 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
117 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
120 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
121 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
123 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
124 /// do with the HTLC.
125 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
126 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
128 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
129 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
130 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
131 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
132 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
133 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
135 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
137 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
138 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
140 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
141 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
142 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
143 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
144 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
146 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
147 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
148 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
149 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
150 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
152 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
153 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
154 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
155 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
157 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
158 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
160 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
161 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
162 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
163 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
164 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
165 requires_blinded_error: bool,
167 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
168 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
169 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
171 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
172 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
174 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
175 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
176 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
178 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
179 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
180 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
182 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
183 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
184 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
185 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
187 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
188 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
189 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
193 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
197 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
198 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
199 pub struct BlindedForward {
200 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
201 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
202 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
203 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
204 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
207 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
208 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
209 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
210 // TODO: needs update when we support forwarding blinded HTLCs as non-intro node
212 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
213 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
219 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
221 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
222 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
223 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
224 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
225 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
226 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
228 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
229 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
230 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
231 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
234 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
236 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
237 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
238 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
240 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
241 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
242 /// it along another path).
244 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
245 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
246 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
247 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
248 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
249 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
250 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
251 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
252 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
254 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
257 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
259 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
261 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
264 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
265 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
266 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
267 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
270 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
271 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
272 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
273 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
274 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
277 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
278 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
279 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
281 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
282 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
283 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
286 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
287 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
289 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
290 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
293 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
294 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
295 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
298 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
303 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
307 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
309 enum BlindedFailure {
310 FromIntroductionNode,
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
316 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
317 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
318 short_channel_id: u64,
319 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
322 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
323 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
325 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
326 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
331 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
333 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
334 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
335 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
337 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
338 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
341 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
342 struct ClaimableHTLC {
343 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
345 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
347 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
348 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
349 sender_intended_value: u64,
350 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
352 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
353 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
354 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
355 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
357 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
358 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
361 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
362 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
363 events::ClaimedHTLC {
364 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
365 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
366 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
367 value_msat: val.value,
368 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
373 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
374 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
376 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
377 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
378 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
381 /// Number of bytes in the id.
382 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
385 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
386 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
391 impl Readable for PaymentId {
392 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
393 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
398 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
400 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
404 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
406 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
407 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
408 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
410 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
411 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
416 impl Readable for InterceptId {
417 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
418 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
423 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
424 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
425 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
426 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
427 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
430 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
432 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
433 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
434 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
436 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
437 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
441 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
442 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
443 (0, short_channel_id, required),
444 (2, htlc_id, required),
446 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
447 (0, session_priv, required),
452 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
453 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
455 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
456 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
459 session_priv: SecretKey,
460 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
461 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
462 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
463 payment_id: PaymentId,
466 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
467 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
468 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
470 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
472 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
474 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
477 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
478 payment_id.hash(hasher);
479 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
485 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
487 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
488 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
489 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
490 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
491 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
492 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
496 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
497 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
498 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
499 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
500 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
501 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
503 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
509 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
510 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
512 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
513 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
514 pub enum FailureCode {
515 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
516 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
517 TemporaryNodeFailure,
518 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
519 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
520 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
521 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
522 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
523 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
524 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
525 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
526 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
527 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
529 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
530 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
531 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
534 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
535 fn into(self) -> u16 {
537 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
538 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
539 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
540 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
545 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
546 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
547 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
548 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
549 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
551 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
552 err: msgs::LightningError,
553 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
554 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
555 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
557 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
559 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
561 err: LightningError {
563 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
564 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
571 shutdown_finish: None,
572 channel_capacity: None,
576 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
577 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
580 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
581 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
582 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
583 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
584 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
585 // commitment upon reconnecting.
586 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
588 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
591 err: LightningError { err, action },
592 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
593 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
594 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
598 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
601 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
603 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
604 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
608 log_level: Level::Warn,
611 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
613 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
615 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
618 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
626 shutdown_finish: None,
627 channel_capacity: None,
631 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
632 self.chan_id.is_some()
636 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
637 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
638 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
639 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
640 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
642 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
643 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
644 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
645 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
646 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
647 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
648 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
650 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
654 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
655 struct ClaimingPayment {
657 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
658 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
659 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
660 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
662 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
663 (0, amount_msat, required),
664 (2, payment_purpose, required),
665 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
666 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
667 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
670 struct ClaimablePayment {
671 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
672 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
673 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
676 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
677 struct ClaimablePayments {
678 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
679 /// failed/claimed by the user.
681 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
682 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
684 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
685 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
686 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
688 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
689 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
690 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
691 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
694 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
695 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
696 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
697 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
699 enum BackgroundEvent {
700 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
701 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
702 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
703 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
705 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
706 /// are regenerated on startup.
707 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
708 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
709 /// channel to continue normal operation.
711 /// In general this should be used rather than
712 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
713 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
714 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
716 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
717 /// are regenerated on startup.
718 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
719 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
720 funding_txo: OutPoint,
721 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
723 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
724 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
726 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
727 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
728 channel_id: ChannelId,
733 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
734 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
735 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
736 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
737 /// event can be generated.
738 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
739 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
740 /// operation of another channel.
742 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
743 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
744 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
745 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
747 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
748 event: events::Event,
749 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
751 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
752 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
753 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
755 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
756 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
757 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
758 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
759 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
761 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
762 /// stored for later processing.
763 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
764 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
765 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
766 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
770 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
771 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
772 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
773 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
774 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
775 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
776 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
777 (4, blocking_action, required),
779 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
780 (0, event, upgradable_required),
781 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
782 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
783 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
784 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
785 // downgrades to prior versions.
786 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
791 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
792 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
793 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
794 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
798 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
799 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
800 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
804 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
805 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
806 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
807 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
808 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
809 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
811 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
812 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
813 channel_id: ChannelId,
814 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
819 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
820 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
821 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
822 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
823 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
829 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
833 /// State we hold per-peer.
834 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
835 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
837 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
838 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
839 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
841 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
842 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
843 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
844 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
845 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
846 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
847 latest_features: InitFeatures,
848 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
849 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
850 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
851 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
852 /// user but which have not yet completed.
854 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
855 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
856 /// for a missing channel.
857 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
858 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
859 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
861 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
862 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
863 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
864 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
866 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
867 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
868 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
869 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
870 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
871 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
872 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
873 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
874 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
875 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
876 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
877 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
878 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
879 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
880 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
884 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
885 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
886 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
887 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
888 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
889 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
892 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
893 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
894 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
897 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
898 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
899 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
902 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
903 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
904 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
905 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
909 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
910 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
911 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
912 /// The original OpenChannel message.
913 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
914 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
915 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
918 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
919 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
920 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
922 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
923 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
925 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
928 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
929 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
930 struct PendingInboundPayment {
931 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
932 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
933 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
934 /// this payment being removed.
936 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
937 user_payment_id: u64,
938 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
939 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
940 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
943 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
944 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
945 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
946 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
947 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
948 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
949 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
950 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
952 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
953 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
954 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
962 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
964 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
965 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
966 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
971 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
972 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
973 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
974 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
975 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
976 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
977 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
978 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
979 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
981 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
982 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
983 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
992 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
994 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
995 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
996 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1001 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1003 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1005 pub trait AChannelManager {
1006 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1007 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1008 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1009 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1010 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1011 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1012 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1013 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1014 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1015 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1016 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1017 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1018 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1019 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1020 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1021 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1022 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1023 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1024 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1025 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1026 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1027 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1028 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1029 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1030 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1031 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1032 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1033 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1034 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1035 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1036 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1037 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1038 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1039 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1040 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1041 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1044 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1045 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1047 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1048 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1049 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1050 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1051 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1056 type Watch = M::Target;
1058 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1060 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1062 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1064 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1065 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1067 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1069 type Router = R::Target;
1071 type Logger = L::Target;
1073 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1076 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1077 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1079 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1080 /// to individual Channels.
1082 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1083 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1084 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1085 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1087 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1088 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1089 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1090 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1091 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1092 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1093 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1094 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1095 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1097 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1098 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1099 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1101 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1102 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1103 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1104 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1105 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1107 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1108 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1109 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1110 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1112 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1113 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1114 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1116 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1117 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1118 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1119 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1120 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1122 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1123 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1124 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1125 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1126 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1127 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1128 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1129 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1132 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1133 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1134 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1135 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1136 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1140 // `pending_offers_messages`
1142 // `total_consistency_lock`
1144 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1146 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1148 // |__`per_peer_state`
1150 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1152 // |__`claimable_payments`
1154 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1158 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1160 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1162 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1166 // |__`pending_events`
1168 // |__`pending_background_events`
1170 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1172 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1173 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1174 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1175 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1176 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1177 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1181 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1182 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1183 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1189 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1191 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1193 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1194 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1196 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1197 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1198 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1199 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1201 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1202 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1204 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1205 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1206 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1207 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1208 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1209 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1210 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1211 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1213 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1215 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1216 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1218 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1220 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1221 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1222 /// and via the classic SCID.
1224 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1225 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1231 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1232 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1233 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1235 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1236 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1238 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1239 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1241 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1242 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1244 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1245 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1246 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1247 /// active channel list on load.
1249 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1250 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1252 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1254 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1255 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1256 /// the handling of the events.
1258 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1259 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1262 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1263 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1264 /// would break backwards compatability.
1265 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1266 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1267 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1269 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1271 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1273 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1275 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1277 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1278 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1279 /// confirmation depth.
1281 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1282 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1283 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1287 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1289 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1291 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1293 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1295 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1296 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1297 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1299 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1300 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1302 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1303 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1304 /// keeping additional state.
1305 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1307 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1308 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1309 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1310 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1312 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1313 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1315 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1316 /// are currently open with that peer.
1318 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1319 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1322 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1324 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1325 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1326 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1327 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1328 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1330 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1331 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1332 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1333 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1334 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1336 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1337 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1339 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1340 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1341 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1342 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1343 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1345 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1346 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1348 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1349 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1350 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1351 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1352 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1354 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1356 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1358 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1359 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1360 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1361 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1362 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1363 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1364 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1365 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1366 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1367 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1368 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1370 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1371 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1372 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1374 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1376 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1377 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1379 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1383 signer_provider: SP,
1388 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1390 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1391 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1392 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1393 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1394 pub struct ChainParameters {
1395 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1396 pub network: Network,
1398 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1400 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1401 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1404 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1408 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1409 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1412 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1413 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1414 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1415 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1416 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1417 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1419 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1420 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1421 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1422 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1423 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1424 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1426 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1427 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1430 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1431 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1432 /// events to handle.
1434 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1435 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1437 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1438 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1441 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1442 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1443 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1444 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1446 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1447 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1448 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1449 should_persist: move || {
1450 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1451 // processing and return that.
1452 let notify = persist_check();
1453 match (notify, force_notify) {
1454 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1455 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1456 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1457 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1458 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1461 _read_guard: read_guard,
1465 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1466 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1467 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1468 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1469 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1470 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1472 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1473 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1474 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1475 should_persist: persist_check,
1476 _read_guard: read_guard,
1481 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1482 fn drop(&mut self) {
1483 match (self.should_persist)() {
1484 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1485 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1486 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1488 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1489 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1490 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1495 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1496 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1498 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1500 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1501 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1502 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1503 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1504 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1506 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1507 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1509 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1511 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1512 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1513 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1514 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1515 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1516 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1517 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1518 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1519 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1520 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1521 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1522 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1523 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1525 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1526 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1528 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1529 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1530 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1531 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1533 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1534 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1535 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1536 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1537 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1538 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1540 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1542 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1543 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1545 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1547 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1548 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1550 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1551 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1552 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1554 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1555 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1556 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1558 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1559 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1560 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1561 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1563 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1564 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1565 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1567 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1568 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1569 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1571 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1572 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1573 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1574 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1575 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1576 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1577 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1578 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1579 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1580 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1581 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1584 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1585 /// to better separate parameters.
1586 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1587 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1588 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1589 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1590 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1591 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1592 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1593 pub features: InitFeatures,
1594 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1595 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1596 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1598 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1600 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1601 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1602 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1603 /// payments to us through this channel.
1604 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1605 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1606 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1607 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1608 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1609 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1610 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1613 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1614 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1615 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1616 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1617 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1618 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1619 /// lifetime of the channel.
1620 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1621 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1622 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1623 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1624 /// our counterparty already.
1626 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1627 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1628 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1629 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1631 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1632 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1633 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1634 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1636 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1637 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1639 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1640 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1642 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1643 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1644 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1645 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1646 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1647 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1648 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1649 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1650 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1653 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1655 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1656 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1657 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1658 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1659 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1660 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1661 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1663 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1664 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1666 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1667 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1668 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1669 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1670 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1671 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1672 /// this value on chain.
1674 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1676 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1678 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1679 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1680 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1681 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1682 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1683 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1684 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1686 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1687 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1688 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1689 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1690 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1691 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1693 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1694 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1695 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1696 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1697 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1699 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1700 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1701 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1702 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1704 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1705 pub balance_msat: u64,
1706 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1707 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1708 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1709 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1711 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1713 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1714 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1715 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1716 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1717 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1718 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1719 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1720 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1722 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1723 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1724 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1725 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1726 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1727 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1728 /// route which is valid.
1729 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1730 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1731 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1732 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1733 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1734 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1736 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1737 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1738 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1739 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1740 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1741 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1742 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1743 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1744 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1746 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1748 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1749 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1750 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1751 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1752 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1754 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1755 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1756 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1757 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1758 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1759 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1760 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1762 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1763 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1764 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1765 pub is_outbound: bool,
1766 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1767 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1768 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1769 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1770 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1772 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1773 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1774 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1775 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1776 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1777 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1778 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1780 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1781 pub is_usable: bool,
1782 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1783 pub is_public: bool,
1784 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1785 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1786 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1787 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1788 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1789 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1791 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1792 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1795 impl ChannelDetails {
1796 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1797 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1798 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1800 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1801 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1802 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1803 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1806 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1807 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1808 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1810 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1811 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1812 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1813 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1816 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1817 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1818 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1821 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1822 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1824 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1825 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1826 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1828 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1829 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1830 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1831 features: latest_features,
1832 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1833 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1834 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1835 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1836 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1837 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1838 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1839 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1840 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1841 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1843 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1844 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1845 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1846 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1847 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1848 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1849 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1850 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1851 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1852 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1853 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1854 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1855 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1856 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1857 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1858 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1859 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1860 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1861 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1862 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1863 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1864 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1865 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1866 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1867 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1868 config: Some(context.config()),
1869 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1874 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1875 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1876 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1877 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1878 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1879 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1880 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1881 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1882 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1884 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1886 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1887 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1889 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1890 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1891 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1892 /// to drop the channel.
1896 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1897 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1898 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1899 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1900 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1902 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1903 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1904 payment_id: PaymentId,
1906 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1908 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1909 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1910 payment_id: PaymentId,
1911 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1913 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1914 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1915 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1918 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1919 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1920 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1922 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1923 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1924 payment_id: PaymentId,
1925 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1926 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1927 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1929 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1930 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1931 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1933 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1934 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1935 payment_id: PaymentId,
1936 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1937 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1941 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1943 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1945 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1946 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1947 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1948 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1950 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1951 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1952 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1955 macro_rules! handle_error {
1956 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1957 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1958 // entering the macro.
1959 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1960 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1964 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1965 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1967 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1968 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1969 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1970 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1974 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1975 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1976 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1977 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1978 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1979 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1984 let logger = WithContext::from(
1985 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1987 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1988 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1990 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1991 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1992 action: err.action.clone()
1996 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1997 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1998 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1999 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2004 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2011 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2012 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2013 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2014 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2016 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2017 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2018 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2020 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2021 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2022 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2023 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2024 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2026 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2027 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2029 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2033 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2034 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2035 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2037 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2038 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2040 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2041 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2043 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2044 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2045 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2046 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2047 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2048 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2049 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2051 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2052 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2056 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2057 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2059 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2060 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2062 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2063 match $channel_phase {
2064 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2065 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2067 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2068 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2070 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2071 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2077 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2078 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2082 let key = *$entry.key();
2083 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2085 $entry.remove_entry();
2093 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2094 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2098 let key = *$entry.key();
2099 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2101 $entry.remove_entry();
2109 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2110 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2112 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2113 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2119 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2120 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2121 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2122 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2123 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2125 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2126 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2127 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2128 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2129 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2130 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2131 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2132 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2133 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2134 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2139 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2140 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2141 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2142 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2143 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2144 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2145 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2146 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2147 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2149 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2154 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2155 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2156 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2157 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2158 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2159 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2160 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2161 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2162 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2164 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2169 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2170 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2171 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2172 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2173 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2174 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2175 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2176 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2177 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2178 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2179 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2180 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2182 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2183 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2184 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2190 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2191 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2193 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2194 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2195 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2196 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2197 updates.announcement_sigs);
2198 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2199 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2202 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2203 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2204 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2205 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2207 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2208 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2209 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2210 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2211 let mut batch_completed = false;
2212 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2213 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2214 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2215 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2217 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2218 channel_state.2 = true;
2220 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2222 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2224 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2227 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2228 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2229 if batch_completed {
2230 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2231 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2232 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2233 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2234 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2235 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2236 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2237 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2238 chan.set_batch_ready();
2239 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2240 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2244 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2245 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2246 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2251 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2253 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2254 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2256 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2257 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2258 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2259 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2264 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2265 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2266 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2267 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2269 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2270 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2271 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2272 panic!("{}", err_str);
2274 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2275 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2276 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2279 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2285 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2286 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2287 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2289 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2290 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2291 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2292 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2293 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2294 // filter for uniqueness here.
2295 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2296 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2297 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2298 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2300 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2301 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2303 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2304 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2305 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2311 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2312 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2313 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2314 while !processed_all_events {
2315 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2322 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2323 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2324 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2326 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2327 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2328 result = $self.process_background_events();
2330 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2331 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2332 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2333 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2337 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2338 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2339 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2340 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2343 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2345 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2346 $event_to_handle = event;
2348 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2349 post_event_actions.push(action);
2354 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2355 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2356 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2357 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2358 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2359 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2362 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2363 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2364 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2365 processed_all_events = false;
2369 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2370 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2371 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2373 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2374 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2375 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2381 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2383 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2384 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2385 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2386 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2387 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2388 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2392 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2394 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2396 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2397 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2399 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2401 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2402 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2403 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2406 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2407 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2408 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2410 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2411 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2412 current_timestamp: u32,
2414 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2415 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2416 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2417 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2419 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2420 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2421 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2426 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2428 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2429 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2430 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2431 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2432 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2433 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2434 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2435 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2437 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2440 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2441 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2443 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2445 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2447 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2449 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2450 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2451 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2452 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2453 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2454 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2455 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2456 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2458 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2468 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2469 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2470 &self.default_configuration
2473 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2474 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2475 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2478 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2479 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2481 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2483 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2487 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2492 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2494 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2495 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2496 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2497 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2498 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2500 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2501 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2503 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2504 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2505 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2507 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2508 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2509 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2511 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2512 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2514 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2515 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2516 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2517 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2518 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2519 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2521 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2522 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2523 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2524 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2525 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2526 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2530 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2531 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2535 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2536 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2538 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2540 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2541 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2542 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2547 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2548 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2549 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2550 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2551 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2552 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2556 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2561 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2563 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2564 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2569 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2575 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2576 node_id: their_network_key,
2579 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2582 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2583 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2584 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2585 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2586 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2587 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2588 // the same channel.
2589 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2591 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2593 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2594 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2595 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2596 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2597 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2598 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2599 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2603 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2604 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2605 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2613 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2614 /// more information.
2615 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2616 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2617 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2618 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2619 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2620 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2621 // the same channel.
2622 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2624 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2626 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2629 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2630 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2631 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2639 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2640 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2642 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2643 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2645 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2646 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2647 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2648 // really wanted anyway.
2649 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2652 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2653 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2654 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2655 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2657 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2660 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2661 let context_to_details = |context| {
2662 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2664 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2666 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2667 .map(context_to_details)
2673 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2674 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2676 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2677 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2678 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2680 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2681 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2682 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2683 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2684 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2685 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2687 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2688 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2689 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2691 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2692 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2693 payment_id: *payment_id,
2694 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2695 total_msat: *total_msat,
2698 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2699 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2701 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2702 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2704 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2709 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2710 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2711 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2712 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2713 Some(transaction) => {
2714 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2715 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2720 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2721 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2722 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2723 reason: closure_reason,
2724 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2725 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2729 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2732 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2733 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2738 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2739 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2741 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2742 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2744 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2746 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2747 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2748 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2749 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2750 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2751 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2753 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2754 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2755 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2756 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2757 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2761 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2762 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2764 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2765 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2766 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2767 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2770 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan_phase_entry.get().context(), ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2771 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2772 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2776 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2778 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2779 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2786 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2787 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2788 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2789 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2792 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2793 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2799 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2800 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2801 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2803 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2804 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2806 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2807 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2808 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2809 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2811 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2813 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2814 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2815 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2818 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2819 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2820 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2821 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2822 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2823 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2826 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2827 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2828 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2830 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2831 /// the channel being closed or not:
2832 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2833 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2834 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2835 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2836 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2837 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2838 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2840 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2841 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2842 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2843 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2845 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2847 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2848 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2849 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2852 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2853 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2854 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2855 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2856 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2859 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2860 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2861 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2862 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2863 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2866 let logger = WithContext::from(
2867 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2869 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2870 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2871 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2872 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2873 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2876 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2877 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2878 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2879 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2880 // ignore the result here.
2881 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2883 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2884 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2885 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2886 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2888 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2889 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2890 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2891 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2892 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2893 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2894 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2895 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2898 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2901 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2902 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2905 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2906 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2910 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2911 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2912 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2913 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2915 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2916 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2917 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2918 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2919 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2920 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2922 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2924 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2925 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2926 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2927 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2928 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2929 mem::drop(peer_state);
2930 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2932 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2933 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2934 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2936 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2937 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2938 // Unfunded channel has no update
2939 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2942 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2943 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2944 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2945 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2947 (None, *peer_node_id)
2949 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2952 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2953 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2954 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2956 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2957 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2958 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2959 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2960 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2966 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2969 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2971 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2972 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2974 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2975 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2976 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2977 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2979 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2980 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2991 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2992 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2993 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2995 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2996 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2997 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3000 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3001 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3002 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3004 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3005 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3006 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3007 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3008 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3011 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3012 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3013 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3014 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3015 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3019 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3020 /// local transaction(s).
3021 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3022 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3023 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3027 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3028 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3030 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3032 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3033 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3036 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3037 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3038 // TODO: update this when we support blinded forwarding as non-intro node
3039 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3044 macro_rules! return_err {
3045 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3048 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3049 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3051 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3052 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3053 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3054 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3055 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3056 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3057 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3061 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3062 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3063 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3064 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3065 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3066 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3067 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3068 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3074 let NextPacketDetails {
3075 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3076 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3077 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3078 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3079 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3082 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3083 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3084 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3085 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3086 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3087 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3088 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3089 // phantom or an intercept.
3090 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3091 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3092 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3096 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3099 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3101 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3103 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3104 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3105 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3107 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3108 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3109 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3110 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3113 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3114 // have no consistency guarantees.
3115 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3119 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3120 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3121 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3122 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3123 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3125 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3126 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3127 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3128 // we don't have the channel here.
3129 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3131 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3133 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3134 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3135 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3136 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3137 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3138 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3139 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3140 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3141 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3142 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3143 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3145 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3148 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3149 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3151 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3152 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3159 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3161 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3162 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3164 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3165 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3166 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3167 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3168 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3170 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3171 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3177 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3178 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3179 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3180 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3182 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3183 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3185 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3186 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3187 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3189 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3190 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3191 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3192 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3193 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3194 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3195 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3199 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3201 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3204 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3205 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3206 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3207 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3208 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3209 macro_rules! return_err {
3210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3212 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3213 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3214 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3215 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3216 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3217 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3218 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3219 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3220 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3224 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3225 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3226 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3227 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3228 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3234 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3236 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3237 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3238 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3239 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3242 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3243 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3244 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3245 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3246 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3248 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3251 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3252 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3253 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3254 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3255 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3261 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3262 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3263 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3265 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3266 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3267 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3269 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3270 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3271 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3272 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3273 return Err(LightningError {
3274 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3275 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3278 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3279 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3281 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3282 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3283 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3286 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3287 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3288 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3289 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3291 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3292 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3293 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3295 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3296 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3297 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3298 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3299 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3300 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3301 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3305 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3308 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3309 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3310 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3311 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3313 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3314 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3315 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3316 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3317 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3320 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3321 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3323 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3324 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3325 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3326 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3327 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3328 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3329 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3330 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3332 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3333 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3334 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3336 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3338 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3345 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3346 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3347 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3348 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3353 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3354 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3355 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3358 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3359 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3360 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3361 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3363 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3364 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3365 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3367 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3368 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3372 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3373 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3375 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3376 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3377 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3379 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3382 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3384 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3385 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3388 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3389 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3390 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3391 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3392 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3393 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3394 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3395 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3396 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3398 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3399 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3400 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3401 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3403 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3404 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3406 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3407 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3408 Some(monitor_update) => {
3409 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3411 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3412 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3413 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3414 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3415 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3416 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3417 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3425 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3428 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3429 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3430 // `channel_by_id` map.
3431 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3432 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3436 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3437 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3439 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3444 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3446 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3447 /// fields for more info.
3449 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3450 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3452 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3454 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3455 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3456 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3457 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3458 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3460 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3461 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3462 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3463 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3464 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3466 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3467 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3468 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3469 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3471 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3473 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3474 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3475 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3477 /// In general, a path may raise:
3478 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3479 /// node public key) is specified.
3480 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3481 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3482 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3483 /// relevant updates.
3485 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3486 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3487 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3489 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3490 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3491 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3492 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3493 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3494 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3495 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3496 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3498 self.pending_outbound_payments
3499 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3500 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3501 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3504 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3505 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3506 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3507 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3509 self.pending_outbound_payments
3510 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3511 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3512 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3513 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3517 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3518 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3520 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3521 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3522 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3526 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3527 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3528 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3532 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3533 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3536 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3537 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3539 self.pending_outbound_payments
3540 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3541 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3542 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3543 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3544 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3548 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3549 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3550 /// retries are exhausted.
3552 /// # Event Generation
3554 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3555 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3557 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3558 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3559 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3561 /// # Requested Invoices
3563 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3564 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3565 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3566 /// once the invoice has been received.
3568 /// # Restart Behavior
3570 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3571 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3572 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3574 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3575 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3577 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3580 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3581 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3582 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3583 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3584 /// never reach the recipient.
3586 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3587 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3589 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3590 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3592 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3593 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3596 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3597 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3598 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3601 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3602 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3604 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3607 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3608 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3609 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3611 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3612 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3613 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3614 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3617 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3618 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3619 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3620 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3621 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3623 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3624 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3625 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3628 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3631 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3632 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3635 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3636 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3638 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3639 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3640 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3641 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3642 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3643 let payment_params =
3644 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3646 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3648 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3651 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3652 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3654 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3655 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3656 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3657 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3659 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3660 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3661 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3662 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3663 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3664 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3665 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3666 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3667 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3668 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3670 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3671 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3672 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3673 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3677 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3679 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3680 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3683 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3685 let mut res = Vec::new();
3687 for mut path in route.paths {
3688 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3689 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3690 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3691 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3692 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3695 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3698 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3699 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3701 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3703 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3704 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3709 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3712 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3717 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3718 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3719 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3721 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3722 let used_liquidity =
3723 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3725 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3726 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3728 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3731 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3736 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3737 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3738 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3745 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3746 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3747 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3748 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3749 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3750 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3753 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3758 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3759 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3760 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3762 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3763 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3764 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3765 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3766 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3767 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3768 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3769 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3770 } else { unreachable!(); });
3772 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3773 Err((chan, err)) => {
3774 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3775 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3776 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3777 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3778 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3784 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3785 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3787 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3788 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3791 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3792 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3793 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3797 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3798 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3799 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3805 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3808 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3809 if outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3810 panic!("outpoint_to_peer map already contained funding outpoint, which shouldn't be possible");
3812 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3819 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3820 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3821 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3825 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3827 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3828 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3830 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3831 /// across the p2p network.
3833 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3834 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3836 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3837 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3838 /// keys per-channel).
3840 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3841 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3842 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3844 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3845 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3846 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3848 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3849 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3850 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3851 /// for more details.
3853 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3854 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3855 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3856 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3859 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3861 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3862 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3864 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3865 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3866 /// signature for each channel.
3868 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3869 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3871 let mut result = Ok(());
3873 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3874 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3875 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3876 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3877 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3882 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3883 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3884 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3888 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3889 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3890 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3891 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3892 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3893 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3894 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3895 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3897 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3898 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3903 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3904 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3905 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3906 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3910 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3911 match states.entry(txid) {
3912 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3913 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3914 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3918 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3921 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3922 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3923 temporary_channel_id,
3924 counterparty_node_id,
3925 funding_transaction.clone(),
3928 let mut output_index = None;
3929 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3930 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3931 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3932 if output_index.is_some() {
3933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3934 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3937 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3940 if output_index.is_none() {
3941 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3942 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3945 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3946 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3947 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3953 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3954 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3955 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3956 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3957 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3958 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3959 .into_iter().flatten()
3960 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3962 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3963 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3965 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3968 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3969 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3970 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3971 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3973 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3974 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3975 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3979 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3980 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3986 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3988 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3989 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3990 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3991 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3993 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3994 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3996 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3997 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3999 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4001 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4002 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4003 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4004 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4005 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4006 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4007 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4008 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4009 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4010 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4011 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4013 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4019 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4020 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4023 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4024 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4025 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4026 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4030 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4031 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4032 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4033 config.apply(config_update);
4034 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4037 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4038 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4039 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4040 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4041 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4042 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4049 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4050 debug_assert!(false);
4051 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4053 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4054 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4061 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4063 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4064 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4065 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4066 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4068 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4069 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4071 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4072 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4074 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4076 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4077 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4078 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4079 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4080 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4081 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4082 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4083 pub fn update_channel_config(
4084 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4085 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4086 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4089 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4090 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4092 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4093 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4095 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4096 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4097 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4098 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4099 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4101 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4102 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4103 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4106 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4109 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4110 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4111 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4112 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4113 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4114 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4117 let next_hop_scid = {
4118 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4119 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4120 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4123 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4124 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4125 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4126 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4127 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4130 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4132 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4133 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4134 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4137 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4138 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4139 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4140 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4141 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4148 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4149 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4150 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4153 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4154 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4155 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4156 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4159 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4161 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4162 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4163 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4164 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4165 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4168 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4169 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4170 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4171 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4172 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4174 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4178 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4179 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4181 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4184 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4185 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4186 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4188 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4189 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4190 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4193 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4194 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4195 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4196 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4197 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4198 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4200 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4201 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4204 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4205 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4206 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4207 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4212 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4214 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4215 /// Will likely generate further events.
4216 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4219 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4220 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4221 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4223 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4224 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4226 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4227 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4228 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4229 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4231 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4232 match forward_info {
4233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4234 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4235 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4236 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4237 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4240 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4241 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4242 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4243 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4245 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4246 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4247 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4248 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4249 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4250 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4251 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4252 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4255 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4256 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4258 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4261 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4262 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4268 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4269 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4271 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4275 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4276 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4278 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4282 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4283 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4284 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4285 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4286 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4287 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4288 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4291 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4292 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4293 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4294 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4295 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4297 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4299 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4300 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4304 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4305 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4306 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4307 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4308 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4309 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4311 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4312 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4318 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4321 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4324 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4325 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4326 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4327 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4328 // problem, not ours.
4334 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4335 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4336 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4338 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4342 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4344 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4345 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4346 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4351 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4352 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4353 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4354 match forward_info {
4355 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4356 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4357 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4358 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4359 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4360 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4361 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4364 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4365 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4366 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4367 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4368 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4369 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4370 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4371 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4372 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4373 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4375 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4376 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4377 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4378 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4379 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4380 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4383 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4384 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4385 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4388 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4389 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4391 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4393 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4394 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4395 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4396 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4401 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4402 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4404 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4405 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4406 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4407 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4409 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4410 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4412 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4414 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4415 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4416 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4420 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4422 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &self.logger) {
4423 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4426 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_malformed_htlc() were not met");
4428 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4429 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4430 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4437 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4441 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4442 match forward_info {
4443 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4444 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4445 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4446 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4447 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4450 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4451 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4452 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4453 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4454 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4456 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4457 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4458 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4459 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4460 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4462 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4463 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4464 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4469 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4472 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4475 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4476 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4477 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4478 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4479 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4480 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4481 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4482 phantom_shared_secret,
4485 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4486 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4487 // if routing nodes overpay
4488 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4489 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4491 total_value_received: None,
4492 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4495 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4498 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4500 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4501 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4502 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4503 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4504 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4505 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4507 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4508 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4509 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4510 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4511 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4512 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4513 phantom_shared_secret,
4516 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4517 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4519 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4522 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4523 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4524 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4525 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4526 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4529 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4530 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4531 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4532 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4533 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4534 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4536 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4537 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4538 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4540 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4541 .entry(payment_hash)
4542 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4543 .or_insert_with(|| {
4544 committed_to_claimable = true;
4546 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4549 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4550 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4554 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4555 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4556 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4558 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4559 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4560 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4563 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4565 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4566 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4567 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4568 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4569 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4570 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4571 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4573 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4574 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4576 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4578 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4579 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4580 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4582 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4586 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4587 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4588 committed_to_claimable = true;
4590 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4591 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4592 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4593 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4594 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4595 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4596 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4597 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4598 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4599 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4603 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4604 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4605 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4606 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4607 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4609 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4611 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4612 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4614 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4615 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4616 committed_to_claimable = true;
4619 payment_claimable_generated
4623 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4624 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4625 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4626 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4627 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4628 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4629 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4630 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4632 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4633 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4634 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4635 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4636 Ok(result) => result,
4638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4639 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4642 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4643 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4644 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4646 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4647 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4650 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4651 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4652 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4654 check_total_value!(purpose);
4656 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4657 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4658 check_total_value!(purpose);
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4663 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4667 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4668 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4670 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4671 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4673 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4674 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4676 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4677 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4678 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4680 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4681 if payment_claimable_generated {
4682 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4688 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4689 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4697 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4698 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4699 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4700 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4702 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4703 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4705 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4707 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4708 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4709 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4711 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4713 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4714 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4715 events.append(&mut new_events);
4718 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4720 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4721 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4722 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4724 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4726 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4727 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4728 if background_events.is_empty() {
4729 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4732 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4734 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4735 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4736 // monitor updating completing.
4737 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4739 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4740 let mut updated_chan = false;
4742 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4743 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4748 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4749 updated_chan = true;
4750 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4751 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4753 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4761 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4762 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4765 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4767 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4768 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4770 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4771 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4773 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4774 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4775 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4776 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4777 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4783 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4786 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4787 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4788 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4789 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4790 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4793 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4794 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4796 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4798 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4799 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4800 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4801 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4802 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4804 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4806 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4807 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4808 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4809 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4811 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4812 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4814 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4815 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4819 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4820 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4821 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4822 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4823 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4824 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4825 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4827 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4828 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4831 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4834 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4835 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4837 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4842 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4843 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4851 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4853 /// This currently includes:
4854 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4855 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4856 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4858 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4859 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4860 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4861 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4862 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4863 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4864 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4865 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4867 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4868 /// estimate fetches.
4870 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4871 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4872 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4873 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4874 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4876 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4877 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4879 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4880 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4881 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4882 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4884 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4885 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4886 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4887 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4888 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4889 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4891 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4892 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4893 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4895 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4896 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4897 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4898 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4899 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4900 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4901 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4902 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4903 channel_id: *chan_id,
4904 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4916 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4919 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4920 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4921 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4923 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4924 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4929 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4930 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4932 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4933 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4934 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4935 if needs_close { return false; }
4938 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4939 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4940 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4941 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4942 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4943 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4944 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4945 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4947 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4948 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4949 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4950 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4954 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4956 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4959 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4961 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4962 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4963 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4964 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4968 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4970 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4976 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4978 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4979 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4980 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4981 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4982 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4983 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4984 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4985 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4986 channel_id: *chan_id,
4987 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4995 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4996 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4997 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4999 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5000 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5001 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5006 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5007 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5008 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5009 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5010 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5011 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5012 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5013 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5014 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5020 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5022 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5023 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5028 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5029 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5030 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5031 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5032 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5033 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5034 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5035 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5036 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5037 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5038 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5039 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5040 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5041 // have no channels to the peer.
5042 let remove_entry = {
5043 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5044 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5047 entry.remove_entry();
5050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5055 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5056 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5057 // This should be unreachable
5058 debug_assert!(false);
5061 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5062 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5063 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5064 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5065 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5066 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5067 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5070 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5071 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5072 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5074 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5075 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5082 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5083 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5084 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5085 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5089 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5090 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5093 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5094 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5097 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5098 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5099 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5100 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5101 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5102 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5103 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5106 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5107 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5110 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5111 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5112 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5113 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5114 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5121 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5122 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5123 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5125 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5126 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5127 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5128 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5130 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5131 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5132 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5133 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5134 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5135 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5138 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5139 /// reason for the failure.
5141 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5142 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5143 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5145 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5146 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5147 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5148 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5149 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5150 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5151 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5156 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5157 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5158 match failure_code {
5159 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5160 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5161 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5162 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5163 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5164 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5166 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5167 let fail_data = match data {
5168 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5171 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5176 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5177 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5179 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5181 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5182 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5183 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5184 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5185 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5186 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5187 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5189 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5191 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5192 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5194 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5199 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5200 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5201 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5202 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5203 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5204 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5205 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5206 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5207 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5208 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5210 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5211 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5212 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5213 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5215 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5216 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5217 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5218 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5219 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5223 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5224 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5225 // be surfaced to the user.
5226 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5227 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5228 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5230 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5232 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5235 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5237 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5238 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5240 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5241 debug_assert!(false);
5242 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5245 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5247 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5250 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5251 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5252 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5253 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5258 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5259 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5260 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5261 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5262 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5263 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5264 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5265 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5266 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5269 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5270 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5271 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5274 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5275 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5276 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5278 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5279 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5280 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5281 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5282 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5284 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5285 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5286 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5289 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5290 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5291 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5293 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5294 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5295 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5296 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5297 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5299 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5301 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5302 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5304 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5305 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5309 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5310 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5312 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5316 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5317 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5318 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5319 push_forward_ev = true;
5321 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5323 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5326 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5329 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5330 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5331 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5332 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5333 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5334 failed_next_destination: destination,
5340 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5341 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5343 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5344 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5345 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5346 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5348 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5349 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5350 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5351 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5353 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5354 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5355 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5357 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5358 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5359 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5360 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5361 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5362 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5363 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5364 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5365 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5368 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5369 /// even type numbers.
5373 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5374 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5376 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5377 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5378 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5381 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5382 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5387 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5388 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5389 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5390 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5391 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5392 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5393 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5394 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5399 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5400 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5401 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5402 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5403 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5405 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5406 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5407 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5411 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5412 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5413 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5414 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5415 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5416 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5417 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5418 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5419 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5420 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5430 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5432 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5433 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5434 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5435 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5436 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5437 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5438 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5439 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5440 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5441 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5442 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5443 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5444 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5445 debug_assert!(false);
5449 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5451 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5452 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5453 debug_assert!(false);
5457 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5458 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5460 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5461 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5462 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5463 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5466 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5467 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5468 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5469 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5473 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5474 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5475 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5476 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5477 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5478 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5479 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5482 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5483 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5484 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5485 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5486 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5487 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5492 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5493 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5494 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5495 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5496 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5497 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5498 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5500 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5503 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5504 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5505 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5506 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5510 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5511 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5512 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5513 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5515 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5516 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5517 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5518 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5520 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5521 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5522 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5523 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5527 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5528 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5529 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5533 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5534 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5535 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5538 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5541 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5542 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5543 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5544 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5545 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5548 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5549 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5550 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5552 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5555 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5556 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5558 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5559 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5560 // monitor update as a background event.
5561 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5562 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5563 counterparty_node_id,
5564 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5565 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5569 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5570 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5575 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5577 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5579 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5580 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5581 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5582 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5583 blocking_action: blocker,
5585 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5587 debug_assert!(false,
5588 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5591 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5592 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5593 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5594 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5595 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5597 let mut found_blocker = false;
5598 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5599 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5600 // which case we need to only remove the one
5601 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5602 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5603 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5604 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5606 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5609 debug_assert!(false);
5618 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5619 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5620 counterparty_node_id: None,
5621 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5627 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5628 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5629 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5630 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5631 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5632 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5633 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5634 // again on restart.
5635 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5636 payment_preimage, update_res);
5639 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5640 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5642 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5643 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5644 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5645 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5646 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5647 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5648 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5649 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5650 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5651 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5654 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5655 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5656 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5657 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5658 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5659 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5663 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5664 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5667 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5668 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5669 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5672 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5673 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5674 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5675 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5676 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5678 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5679 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5680 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5682 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5683 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5686 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5687 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5688 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5689 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5690 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5691 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5692 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5693 let chan_to_release =
5694 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5695 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5697 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5698 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5699 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5700 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5705 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5706 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5707 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5708 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5709 // in the background.
5710 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5711 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5712 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5713 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5715 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5716 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5717 funding_txo, update, ..
5719 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5720 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5721 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5722 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5724 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5730 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5731 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5732 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5734 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5735 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5737 monitor_update.updates[0],
5738 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5743 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5744 // immediately once we get going.
5745 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5748 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5750 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5753 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5754 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5755 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5756 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5757 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5758 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5762 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5763 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5764 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5767 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5768 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5770 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5771 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5772 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5773 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5779 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5780 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5781 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5787 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5788 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5789 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5792 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5793 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5794 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5795 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5797 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5799 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5800 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5801 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5803 payment_purpose: purpose,
5806 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5808 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5812 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5814 sender_intended_total_msat,
5818 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5819 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5821 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5822 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5823 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5826 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5827 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5829 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5830 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5831 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5832 Some(blocking_action),
5839 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5840 /// update completion.
5841 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5842 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5843 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5844 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5845 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5846 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5847 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5848 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5849 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5850 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5851 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5852 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5853 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5854 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5856 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5858 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5859 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5860 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5861 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5864 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5865 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5867 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5868 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5869 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5874 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5875 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5877 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5882 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5883 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5885 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5886 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5891 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5895 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5901 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5902 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5903 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5907 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5908 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5909 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5915 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5916 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5918 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5919 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5921 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5922 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5923 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5924 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5925 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5930 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5931 let mut peer_state_lock;
5932 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5933 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5934 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5935 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5937 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5940 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5941 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5942 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5943 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5944 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5947 let remaining_in_flight =
5948 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5949 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5952 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5953 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5954 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5955 remaining_in_flight);
5956 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5959 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5962 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5964 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5965 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5968 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5969 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5970 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5972 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5973 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5974 /// used to accept such channels.
5976 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5977 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5978 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5979 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5982 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5983 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5985 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5986 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5987 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5989 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5990 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5992 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5993 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5995 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5996 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5998 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5999 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6000 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6001 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6004 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6006 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6009 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6010 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6012 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6014 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6015 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6017 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6021 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6023 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6024 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6025 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6027 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6028 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6029 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6030 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6031 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6032 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6033 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6034 let err_str = e.to_string();
6035 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6037 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6041 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6042 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6044 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6049 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6050 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6051 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6052 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6053 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6054 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6055 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6059 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6060 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6064 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6065 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6066 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6067 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6068 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6069 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6070 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6071 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6074 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6075 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6076 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6078 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6082 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6083 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6084 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6086 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6087 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6088 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6091 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6096 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6097 /// or 0-conf channels.
6099 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6100 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6101 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6102 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6103 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6104 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6106 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6107 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6108 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6109 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6110 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6111 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6112 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6116 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6119 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6120 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6122 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6123 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6125 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6126 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6127 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6128 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6129 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6131 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6134 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6135 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6136 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6139 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6140 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6145 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6148 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6149 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6150 // likely to be lost on restart!
6151 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6155 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6156 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6159 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6160 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6161 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6162 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6163 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6165 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6166 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6168 debug_assert!(false);
6169 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6174 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6175 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6176 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6177 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6178 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6179 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6182 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6183 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6186 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6187 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6188 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6189 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6190 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6193 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6194 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6199 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6200 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6201 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6202 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6204 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6206 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6207 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6208 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6209 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6210 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6211 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6214 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6215 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6216 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6221 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6222 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6223 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6224 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6225 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6226 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6227 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6230 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6235 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6236 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6237 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6239 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6243 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6244 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6246 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6247 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6248 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6250 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6254 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6255 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6256 // likely to be lost on restart!
6257 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6259 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6261 debug_assert!(false);
6262 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6264 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6265 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6266 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6268 match phase.get_mut() {
6269 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6270 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6271 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6278 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6282 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6283 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6284 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6285 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6287 user_channel_id: user_id,
6292 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6293 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6296 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6298 debug_assert!(false);
6299 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6304 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6305 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6306 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6307 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6308 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6310 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6311 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6312 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6313 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6314 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6315 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6316 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6317 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6318 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6322 Some(mut phase) => {
6323 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6324 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6325 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6327 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6330 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6332 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6333 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6334 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6335 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6336 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6337 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6339 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6340 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6341 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6344 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6346 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6349 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6350 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6352 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6355 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6356 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6357 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6358 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6360 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6361 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6362 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6363 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6364 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6366 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6371 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6372 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6373 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6375 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6379 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6380 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6381 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6389 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6390 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6392 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6394 debug_assert!(false);
6395 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6398 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6399 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6400 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6402 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6403 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6404 let logger = WithContext::from(
6406 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6407 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6410 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6412 Ok((chan, monitor)) => {
6413 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6414 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6415 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6416 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6417 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6418 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6419 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6420 } else { unreachable!(); }
6423 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6424 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6428 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6429 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6430 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6431 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6432 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6433 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6444 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6445 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6446 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6447 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6448 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6450 debug_assert!(false);
6451 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6455 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6456 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6457 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6458 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6459 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6460 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6461 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6462 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6463 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6464 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6465 msg: announcement_sigs,
6467 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6468 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6469 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6470 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6471 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6472 // announcement_signatures.
6473 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6474 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6475 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6476 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6483 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6484 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6489 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6490 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6494 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6499 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6500 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6501 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6503 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6506 debug_assert!(false);
6507 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6509 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6510 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6511 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6512 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6514 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6515 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6516 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6517 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6519 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6522 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6523 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6524 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6525 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6527 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6528 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6529 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6530 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6532 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6536 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6537 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6538 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6539 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6542 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6543 let context = phase.context_mut();
6544 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6545 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6546 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6547 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6548 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6555 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6556 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6557 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6558 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6560 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6561 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6567 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6571 debug_assert!(false);
6572 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6574 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6577 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6579 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6580 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6581 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6582 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6583 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6584 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6589 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6590 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6591 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6592 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6593 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6594 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6595 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6597 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6598 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6604 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6605 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6606 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6607 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6609 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6610 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6613 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6617 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6619 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6620 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6621 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6626 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6627 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6628 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6629 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6631 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6632 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6633 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6634 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6636 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6637 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6639 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6641 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6643 debug_assert!(false);
6644 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6646 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6647 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6648 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6650 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6651 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6652 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6653 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6654 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6655 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6657 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6659 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6660 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6661 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6662 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6663 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6664 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6665 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6666 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6670 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6671 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6672 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6673 match pending_forward_info {
6674 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6675 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6677 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6678 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6679 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6680 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6681 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6683 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6684 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6685 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6686 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6687 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6690 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6692 _ => pending_forward_info
6695 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6696 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6698 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6699 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6707 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6709 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6711 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6713 debug_assert!(false);
6714 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6718 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6720 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6721 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6722 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6723 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6725 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6727 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6728 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6729 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6731 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6732 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6733 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6734 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6735 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6736 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6737 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6740 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6741 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6747 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6751 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6752 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6753 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6755 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6757 debug_assert!(false);
6758 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6762 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6764 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6765 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6767 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6768 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6776 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6777 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6778 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6779 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6780 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6782 debug_assert!(false);
6783 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6785 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6786 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6787 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6789 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6790 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6791 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6793 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6794 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6796 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6797 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6801 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6805 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6807 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6809 debug_assert!(false);
6810 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6812 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6813 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6814 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6816 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6817 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6818 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6819 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6820 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6821 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6822 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6826 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6827 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6835 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6836 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6837 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6838 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6839 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6840 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6841 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6842 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6843 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6844 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6845 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6847 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6848 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6850 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6851 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6852 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6854 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6855 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6858 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6859 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6861 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6862 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6863 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6865 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6866 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6867 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6868 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6869 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6872 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6873 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6876 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6877 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6878 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6879 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6880 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6881 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6882 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6883 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6884 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6885 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6888 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6889 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6890 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6895 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6896 // payments are being processed.
6897 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6898 push_forward_event = true;
6900 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6901 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6908 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6909 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6912 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6913 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6914 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6916 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6920 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6921 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6922 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6923 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6924 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6926 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6927 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6928 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6929 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6930 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6931 // real by taking more time.
6932 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6933 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6934 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6939 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6940 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6941 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6942 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6943 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6944 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6945 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6947 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6948 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6949 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6950 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6951 channel_funding_outpoint,
6952 counterparty_node_id,
6957 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6958 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6959 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6961 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6962 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6963 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6966 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6967 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6968 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6974 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6975 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6977 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6979 debug_assert!(false);
6980 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6981 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6983 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6985 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6986 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6987 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6988 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6989 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6990 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6991 *counterparty_node_id)
6993 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6994 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6995 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6996 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6997 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6998 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6999 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7003 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7004 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7010 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7014 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7016 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7018 debug_assert!(false);
7019 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7023 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7024 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7025 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7026 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7027 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7029 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7030 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7038 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7040 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7042 debug_assert!(false);
7043 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7045 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7046 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7047 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7049 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7050 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7055 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7056 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7057 msg, &self.default_configuration
7058 ), chan_phase_entry),
7059 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7060 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7061 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7064 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7065 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7073 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7074 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7075 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7076 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7078 // It's not a local channel
7079 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7082 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7083 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7084 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7085 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7089 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7091 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7092 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7093 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7094 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7095 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7096 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7097 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7101 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7102 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7103 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7104 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7106 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7107 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7108 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7109 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7112 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7116 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7117 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7122 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7125 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7127 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7128 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7130 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7132 debug_assert!(false);
7133 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7134 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7138 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7139 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7141 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7143 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7144 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7145 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7146 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7147 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7148 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7149 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7150 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7151 let mut channel_update = None;
7152 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7154 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7157 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7158 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7159 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7160 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7161 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7162 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7163 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7168 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7169 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7170 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7171 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7172 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7173 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7177 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7178 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7182 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7184 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7185 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7186 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7187 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7188 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7189 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7191 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7192 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7193 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7194 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7195 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7196 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7197 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7198 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7199 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7200 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7201 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7202 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7203 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7204 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7205 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7206 next_funding_txid: None,
7209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7210 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7211 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7217 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7218 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7219 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7220 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7223 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7224 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7229 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7230 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7231 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7233 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7234 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7235 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7236 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7237 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7238 match monitor_event {
7239 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7240 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7241 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7242 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7243 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7245 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7246 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7247 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7251 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7252 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7253 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7255 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7256 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7257 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7258 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7261 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7263 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7264 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7265 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7266 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7267 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7268 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7269 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7270 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7271 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7275 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7276 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7277 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7278 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7279 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7287 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7288 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7294 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7295 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7298 has_pending_monitor_events
7301 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7302 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7303 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7305 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7307 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7310 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7311 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7312 /// update was applied.
7313 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7314 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7315 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7317 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7318 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7319 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7320 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7322 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7323 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7326 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7327 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7328 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7330 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7331 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7332 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7333 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7334 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7335 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7337 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7338 has_monitor_update = true;
7340 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7341 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7342 continue 'peer_loop;
7351 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7352 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7353 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7359 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7360 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7362 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7363 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7365 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7366 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7367 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7370 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7371 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7373 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7374 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7375 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7376 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7381 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7382 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7387 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7388 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7391 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7392 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7399 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7404 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7405 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7408 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7409 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7413 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7414 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7415 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7416 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7417 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7423 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7424 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7425 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7426 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7427 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7428 let mut has_update = false;
7429 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7433 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7436 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7437 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7439 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7440 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7441 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7442 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7443 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7446 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7449 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7450 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7451 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7453 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7454 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7455 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7456 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7462 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7464 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7465 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7466 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7472 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7473 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7478 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7484 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7485 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7488 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7489 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7495 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7496 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7498 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7499 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7500 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7501 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7502 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7503 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7504 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7505 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7506 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7507 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7508 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7509 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7510 assert!(should_broadcast);
7511 } else { unreachable!(); }
7512 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7513 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7514 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7517 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7521 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7522 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7523 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7527 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7528 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7529 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7530 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7531 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7533 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7537 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7542 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7544 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7546 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7547 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7548 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7549 &self, description: String
7550 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7551 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7552 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7553 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7554 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7556 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7557 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7558 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7560 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7566 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7567 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7571 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7572 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7574 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7575 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7576 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7579 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7580 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7581 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7583 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7584 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7588 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7589 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7590 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7591 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7592 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7594 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7598 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7599 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7604 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7605 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7606 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7608 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7610 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7611 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7612 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7613 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7614 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7615 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7616 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7617 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7618 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7619 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7620 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7621 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7623 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7624 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7625 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7627 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7628 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7631 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7632 self.pending_outbound_payments
7633 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7634 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7636 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7641 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7642 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7643 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7645 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7646 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7647 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7648 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7649 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7650 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7651 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7653 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7654 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7658 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7659 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7662 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7663 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7664 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7668 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7669 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7670 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7671 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7675 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7676 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7677 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7682 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7683 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7684 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7687 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7688 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7689 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7690 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7691 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7692 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7693 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7694 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7695 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7696 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7697 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7698 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7699 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7700 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7701 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7704 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7705 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7706 let builder = match quantity {
7708 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7710 let builder = match amount_msats {
7712 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7714 let builder = match payer_note {
7716 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7718 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7719 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7721 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7722 self.pending_outbound_payments
7723 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7724 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7726 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7728 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7729 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7730 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7731 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7732 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7735 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7737 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7738 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7739 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7740 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7741 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7742 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7743 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7744 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7745 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7747 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7754 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7757 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7758 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7759 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7763 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7764 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7765 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7766 /// received and no retries will be made.
7770 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7771 /// path for the invoice.
7773 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7774 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7775 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7776 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7777 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7779 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7780 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7782 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7783 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7784 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7785 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7787 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7788 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7789 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7791 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7792 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7793 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7795 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7796 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7797 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7799 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7800 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7801 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7803 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7804 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7805 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7806 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7807 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7810 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7812 for path in refund.paths() {
7813 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7814 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7815 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7816 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7818 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7824 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7828 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7831 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7832 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7834 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7835 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7836 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7837 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7839 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7841 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7842 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7846 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7847 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7849 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7851 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7852 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7854 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7855 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7856 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7857 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7858 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7859 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7860 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7861 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7862 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7863 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7864 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7867 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7868 /// stored external to LDK.
7870 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7871 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7872 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7874 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7875 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7878 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7879 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7880 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7881 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7883 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7884 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7885 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7886 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7887 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7889 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7890 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7891 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7892 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7893 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7895 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7896 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7898 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7899 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7903 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7904 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7906 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7908 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7909 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7911 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7912 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7913 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7914 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7915 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7916 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7917 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7920 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7921 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7923 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7924 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7925 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7928 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7930 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7931 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7932 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7933 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7934 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7936 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7938 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7939 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7940 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7943 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7944 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7947 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7948 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7949 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7950 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7951 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7952 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7953 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7955 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7956 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7957 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7958 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7959 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7961 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7963 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7966 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7967 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7971 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7972 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7974 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7975 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7976 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7977 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7979 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7980 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7981 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7982 Some(_) => continue,
7983 None => return scid_candidate
7988 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7990 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7991 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7993 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7994 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7995 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7999 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8000 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8001 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8003 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8004 /// times to get a unique scid.
8005 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8006 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8007 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8009 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8010 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8011 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8012 return scid_candidate
8016 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8017 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8018 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8019 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8022 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8023 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8024 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8025 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8026 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8028 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8029 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8030 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8039 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8040 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8041 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8042 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8043 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8047 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8048 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8049 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8050 events.push_back((event, None));
8054 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8055 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8056 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8060 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8061 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8065 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8066 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8069 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8070 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8071 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8072 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8073 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8074 let logger = WithContext::from(
8075 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8079 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8080 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8082 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8083 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8084 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8085 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8087 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8091 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8092 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8093 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8094 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8095 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8096 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8097 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8101 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8102 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8103 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8104 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8105 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8106 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8107 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8108 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8109 if further_update_exists {
8110 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8115 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8116 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8122 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8123 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8129 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8130 for action in actions {
8132 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8133 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8135 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8141 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8142 /// using the given event handler.
8144 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8145 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8149 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8153 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8155 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8156 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8157 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8158 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8159 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8164 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8165 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8166 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8167 /// is always placed next to each other.
8169 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8170 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8171 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8172 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8174 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8175 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8176 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8177 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8178 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8179 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8180 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8182 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8183 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8184 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8185 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8188 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8189 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8191 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8192 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8195 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8196 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8197 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8200 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8201 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8205 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8206 events.replace(pending_events);
8215 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8217 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8218 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8219 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8220 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8221 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8222 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8226 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8228 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8229 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8230 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8232 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8236 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8238 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8239 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8240 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8241 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8242 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8243 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8247 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8249 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8250 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8251 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8252 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8253 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8256 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8257 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8260 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8261 let _persistence_guard =
8262 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8263 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8264 let new_height = height - 1;
8266 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8267 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8268 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8269 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8270 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8271 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8274 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8278 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8280 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8282 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8283 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8284 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8285 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8289 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8290 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8291 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8292 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8294 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8295 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8297 let _persistence_guard =
8298 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8299 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8300 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8301 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8303 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8304 if height < last_best_block_height {
8305 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8306 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8310 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8311 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8312 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8313 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8315 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8316 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8318 let _persistence_guard =
8319 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8320 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8321 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8323 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8325 macro_rules! max_time {
8326 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8328 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8329 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8330 // having an explicit local time source.
8331 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8332 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8333 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8334 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8335 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8341 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8342 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8343 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8344 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8348 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8349 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8350 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8353 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8354 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8355 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8356 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8357 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8358 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8365 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8366 let _persistence_guard =
8367 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8368 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8369 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8370 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8371 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8372 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8373 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8374 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8379 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8381 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8382 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8383 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8384 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8385 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8390 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8391 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8393 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8394 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8395 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8396 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8397 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8399 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8400 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8403 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8406 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8407 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8409 // Retain unfunded channels.
8410 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8411 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8412 let res = f(channel);
8413 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8414 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8415 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8416 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8417 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8419 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8420 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8421 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8422 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8423 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8424 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8426 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8431 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8436 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8437 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8440 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8441 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8443 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8444 msg: announcement_sigs,
8446 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8447 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8450 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8451 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8452 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8457 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8458 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8459 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8460 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8461 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8462 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8463 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8464 // is always consistent.
8465 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8466 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8467 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8468 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8469 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8472 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8473 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8474 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8475 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8476 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8477 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8482 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8483 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8485 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8486 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8487 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8488 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8489 data: reason_message,
8502 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8503 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8504 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8505 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8506 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8507 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8508 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8509 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8510 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8511 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8513 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8514 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8515 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8519 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8522 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8523 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8524 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8525 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8526 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8527 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8528 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8529 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8530 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8531 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8532 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8535 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8536 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8537 _ => unreachable!(),
8539 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8540 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8541 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8542 let logger = WithContext::from(
8543 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8545 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8551 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8553 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8558 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8559 /// may have events that need processing.
8561 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8562 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8564 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8565 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8566 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8567 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8570 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8571 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8572 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8575 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8576 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8577 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8580 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8581 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8582 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8583 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8586 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8587 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8588 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8589 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8592 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8593 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8595 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8596 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8597 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8598 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8599 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8602 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8603 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8604 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8605 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8608 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8609 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8610 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8611 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8614 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8615 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8616 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8617 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8620 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8621 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8622 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8623 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8627 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8628 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8630 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8631 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8632 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8633 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8634 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8635 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8639 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8640 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8641 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8642 // change to the contents.
8643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8644 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8645 let persist = match &res {
8646 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8647 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8648 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8650 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8652 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8657 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8658 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8659 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8660 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8663 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8664 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8665 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8666 // change to the contents.
8667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8668 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8669 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8673 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8674 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8675 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8676 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8679 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8681 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8684 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8686 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8689 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8690 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8691 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8692 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8693 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8695 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8696 let persist = match &res {
8697 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8698 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8700 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8705 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8706 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8707 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8708 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8711 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8712 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8713 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8714 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8717 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8718 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8719 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8720 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8723 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8724 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8725 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8726 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8729 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8731 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8734 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8736 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8739 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8740 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8741 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8742 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8744 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8745 let persist = match &res {
8746 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8747 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8748 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8750 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8755 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8757 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8760 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8761 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8762 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8763 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8765 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8766 let persist = match &res {
8767 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8768 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8769 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8771 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8776 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8777 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8778 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8779 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8781 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8782 let persist = match &res {
8783 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8784 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8785 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8787 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8792 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8794 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8797 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8799 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8802 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8803 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8804 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8805 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8806 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8807 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8808 let persist = match &res {
8809 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8810 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8811 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8813 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8818 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8820 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8823 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8824 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8825 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8828 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8833 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8835 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8836 let persist = match &res {
8837 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8838 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8839 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8841 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8846 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8848 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8849 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8850 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8853 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8854 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8855 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8857 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8860 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8861 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8862 let context = match phase {
8863 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8864 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8865 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8866 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8871 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8872 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8875 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8879 // Clean up for removal.
8880 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8881 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8882 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8885 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8886 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8887 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8888 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8890 // V1 Channel Establishment
8891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8895 // V2 Channel Establishment
8896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8898 // Common Channel Establishment
8899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8907 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8908 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8914 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8917 // Channel Operations
8918 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8923 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8926 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8927 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8928 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8936 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8937 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8938 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8939 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8942 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8944 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8946 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8947 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8951 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8952 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8953 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8954 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8958 let mut res = Ok(());
8960 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8961 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8962 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8963 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8964 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8965 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8966 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8969 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8970 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8972 if inbound_peer_limited {
8974 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8976 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8977 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8978 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8979 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8980 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8981 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8982 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8983 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8988 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8989 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8991 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8992 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8993 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8994 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8997 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9000 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9001 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9006 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9008 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9009 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9010 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9011 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9012 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9014 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9015 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9017 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9018 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9019 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9020 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9025 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9026 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9031 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9034 match &msg.data as &str {
9035 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9036 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9038 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9039 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9040 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9041 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9042 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9043 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9044 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9045 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9047 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9048 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9049 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9050 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9051 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9052 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9053 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9057 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9058 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9059 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9060 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9061 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9062 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9064 log_level: Level::Trace,
9074 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9075 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9077 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9078 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9081 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9082 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9083 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9084 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9086 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9087 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9088 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9092 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9094 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9095 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9096 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9097 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9098 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9099 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9100 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9101 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9109 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9110 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9114 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9115 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9118 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9119 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9122 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9123 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9126 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9127 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9128 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9129 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9132 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9133 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9134 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9135 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9138 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9139 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9140 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9141 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9144 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9145 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9146 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9147 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9150 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9151 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9152 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9153 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9156 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9157 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9158 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9159 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9162 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9163 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9164 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9165 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9168 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9169 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9170 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9171 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9174 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9175 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9176 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9177 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9181 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9182 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9184 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9186 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9188 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9193 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9194 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9195 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9198 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9199 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9202 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9203 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9205 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9206 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9208 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9209 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9213 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9214 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9215 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9217 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9219 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9220 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9224 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9225 amount_msats, payment_secret
9227 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9229 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9230 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9234 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9235 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9236 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9239 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9240 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9241 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9242 payment_paths, payment_hash
9244 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9245 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9246 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9248 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9249 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9250 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9253 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9254 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9255 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9256 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9257 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9259 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9260 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9262 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9263 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9264 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9265 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9267 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9268 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9272 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9273 Err(error) => Some(error),
9277 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9278 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9280 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9282 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9283 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9286 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9288 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9295 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9296 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9302 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9303 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9307 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9308 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9309 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9310 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9311 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9315 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9316 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9318 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9319 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9320 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9321 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9322 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9325 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9326 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9327 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9328 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9331 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9332 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9333 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9334 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9337 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9338 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9339 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9340 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9343 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9344 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9345 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9346 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9347 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9348 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9349 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9350 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9351 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9352 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9353 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9354 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9355 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9356 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9357 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9358 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9359 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9360 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9361 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9362 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9367 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9368 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9370 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9371 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9372 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9373 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9376 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9377 (2, node_id, required),
9378 (4, features, required),
9379 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9380 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9381 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9382 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9385 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9386 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9387 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9388 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9389 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9390 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9391 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9392 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9393 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9394 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9395 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9396 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9397 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9398 (7, self.config, option),
9399 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9400 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9401 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9402 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9403 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9404 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9405 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9406 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9407 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9408 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9409 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9410 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9411 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9412 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9413 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9414 (32, self.is_public, required),
9415 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9416 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9417 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9418 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9419 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9425 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9426 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9427 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9428 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9429 (2, channel_id, required),
9430 (3, channel_type, option),
9431 (4, counterparty, required),
9432 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9433 (6, funding_txo, option),
9434 (7, config, option),
9435 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9436 (9, confirmations, option),
9437 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9438 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9439 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9440 (16, balance_msat, required),
9441 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9442 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9443 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9444 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9445 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9446 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9447 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9448 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9449 (26, is_outbound, required),
9450 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9451 (30, is_usable, required),
9452 (32, is_public, required),
9453 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9454 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9455 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9456 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9457 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9460 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9461 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9462 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9463 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9464 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9468 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9470 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9471 outbound_scid_alias,
9475 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9476 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9478 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9479 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9480 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9481 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9482 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9483 confirmations_required,
9485 force_close_spend_delay,
9486 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9487 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9488 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9489 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9490 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9491 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9492 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9493 channel_shutdown_state,
9498 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9499 (2, channels, required_vec),
9500 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9501 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9504 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9505 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9508 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9510 (0, onion_packet, required),
9511 (1, blinded, option),
9512 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9515 (0, payment_data, required),
9516 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9517 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9518 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9519 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9520 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9522 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9523 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9524 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9525 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9526 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9527 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9531 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9532 (0, routing, required),
9533 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9534 (4, payment_hash, required),
9535 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9536 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9537 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9538 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9542 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9543 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9545 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9547 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9548 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9549 reason.write(writer)?;
9551 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9552 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9555 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9556 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9557 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9558 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9565 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9566 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9567 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9570 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9571 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9572 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9573 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9577 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9578 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9579 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9580 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9581 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9584 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9585 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9586 // messages contained in the variants.
9587 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9588 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9589 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9591 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9592 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9593 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9594 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9595 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9598 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9599 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9600 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9601 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9602 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9604 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9609 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9614 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9615 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9616 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9619 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9620 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9621 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9622 (2, outpoint, required),
9623 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9624 (4, htlc_id, required),
9625 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9626 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9629 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9630 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9631 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9632 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9633 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9635 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9636 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9637 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9638 (2, self.value, required),
9639 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9640 (4, payment_data, option),
9641 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9642 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9643 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9644 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9650 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9651 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9652 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9653 (0, prev_hop, required),
9654 (1, total_msat, option),
9655 (2, value_ser, required),
9656 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9657 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9658 (5, total_value_received, option),
9659 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9660 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9661 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9663 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9664 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9665 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9667 if payment_data.is_some() {
9668 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9670 if total_msat.is_none() {
9671 total_msat = Some(value);
9673 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9676 if total_msat.is_none() {
9677 if payment_data.is_none() {
9678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9680 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9682 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9686 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9689 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9690 total_value_received,
9691 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9693 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9694 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9699 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9700 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9701 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9704 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9705 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9706 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9707 let mut payment_id = None;
9708 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9709 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9710 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9711 (0, session_priv, required),
9712 (1, payment_id, option),
9713 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9714 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9715 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9716 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9718 if payment_id.is_none() {
9719 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9721 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9723 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9724 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9725 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9727 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9728 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9729 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9730 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9734 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9735 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9736 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9738 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9741 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9742 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9747 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9748 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9750 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9752 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9753 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9754 (0, session_priv, required),
9755 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9756 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9757 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9758 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9759 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9760 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9763 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9765 field.write(writer)?;
9772 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9773 (0, forward_info, required),
9774 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9775 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9776 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9777 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9780 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9781 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9782 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9784 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9788 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9789 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9790 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9791 (0, htlc_id, required),
9792 (2, err_packet, required),
9795 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9796 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9797 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9798 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9799 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9800 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9801 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9802 (0, htlc_id, required),
9803 (1, failure_code, required),
9804 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9805 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9813 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9814 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9815 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9817 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9819 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9820 (0, htlc_id, required),
9821 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9822 (2, err_packet, required),
9823 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9825 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9826 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9827 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9829 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9833 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9834 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9838 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9843 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9844 (0, payment_secret, required),
9845 (2, expiry_time, required),
9846 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9847 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9848 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9851 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9853 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9854 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9855 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9856 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9857 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9862 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9863 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9865 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9867 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9869 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9870 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9871 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9874 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9877 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9878 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9881 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9882 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9885 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9886 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9890 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9892 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9893 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9894 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9895 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9896 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9897 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9900 channel.write(writer)?;
9906 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9907 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9908 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9909 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9910 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9911 for forward in pending_forwards {
9912 forward.write(writer)?;
9917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9919 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9920 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9921 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9923 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9924 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9925 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9926 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9927 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9928 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9929 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9930 htlc.write(writer)?;
9932 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9933 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9936 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9937 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9938 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9939 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9940 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9941 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9942 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9945 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9946 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9947 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9948 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9949 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9951 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9952 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9953 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9954 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9955 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9956 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9957 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9962 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9963 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9964 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9965 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9966 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9967 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9968 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9969 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9970 0u64.write(writer)?;
9972 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9973 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9974 event.write(writer)?;
9978 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9979 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9980 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9981 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9982 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9983 0u64.write(writer)?;
9985 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9986 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9987 // likely to be identical.
9988 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9989 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9991 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9992 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9993 hash.write(writer)?;
9994 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9997 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9998 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9999 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10000 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10001 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10004 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10005 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10007 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10008 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10009 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10010 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10013 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10014 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10015 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10016 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10020 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10021 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10022 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10024 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10025 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10026 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10032 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10033 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10034 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10035 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10038 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10039 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10040 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10041 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10042 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10045 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10046 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10047 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10048 if !updates.is_empty() {
10049 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10050 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10055 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10056 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10057 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10058 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10059 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10060 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10061 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10062 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10063 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10064 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10065 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10066 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10067 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10074 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10075 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10076 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10077 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10080 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10081 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10082 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10083 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10084 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10085 // check that the event is sane here.
10086 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10087 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10088 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10089 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10095 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10096 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10097 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10098 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10099 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10100 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10103 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10104 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10105 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10106 events.push_back((ev, action));
10107 } else if action.is_some() {
10108 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10115 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10116 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10117 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10118 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10119 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10120 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10123 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10125 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10127 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10128 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10129 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10130 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10131 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10132 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10133 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10134 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10135 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10136 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10137 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10138 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10139 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10141 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10142 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10144 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10145 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10147 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10148 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10149 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10150 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10151 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10152 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10154 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10155 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10157 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10158 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10159 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10160 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10161 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10162 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10166 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10167 pub entropy_source: ES,
10169 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10170 pub node_signer: NS,
10172 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10173 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10175 pub signer_provider: SP,
10177 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10179 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10180 pub fee_estimator: F,
10181 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10183 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10184 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10185 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10186 pub chain_monitor: M,
10188 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10189 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10190 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10191 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10192 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10193 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10195 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10197 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10198 /// deserialization.
10200 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10201 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10202 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10204 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10205 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10207 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10208 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10209 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10210 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10212 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10215 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10216 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10219 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10220 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10222 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10223 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10224 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10225 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10226 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10227 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10231 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10232 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10233 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10234 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10235 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10237 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10238 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10243 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10244 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10245 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10246 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10248 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10249 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10250 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10251 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10252 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10253 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10257 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10258 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10259 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10263 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10264 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10266 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10267 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10268 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10269 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10270 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10275 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10276 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10278 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10279 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10280 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10282 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10284 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10285 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10286 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10287 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10288 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10289 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10290 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10291 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10292 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10293 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10295 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10296 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10297 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10298 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10299 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10300 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10301 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10302 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10303 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10304 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10305 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10306 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10307 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10308 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10310 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10311 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10312 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10314 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10315 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10316 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10318 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10319 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10320 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10322 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10323 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10324 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10326 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10327 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10328 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10331 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10332 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10333 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10334 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10335 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10336 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10337 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10339 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10340 let mut found_htlc = false;
10341 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10342 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10345 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10346 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10347 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10348 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10349 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10350 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10351 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10353 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10354 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10355 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10359 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10360 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10361 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10362 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10363 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10365 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10366 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10368 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10370 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10371 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10374 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10375 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10376 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10380 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10381 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10382 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10383 // safely discard the channel.
10384 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10385 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10386 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10387 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10388 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10389 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10390 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10393 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10394 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10395 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10396 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10397 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10402 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10403 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10404 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10405 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10406 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10407 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10408 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10409 counterparty_node_id: None,
10410 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10412 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10416 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10417 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10418 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10419 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10420 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10421 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10422 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10423 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10424 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10426 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10429 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10430 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10431 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10432 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10433 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10434 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10435 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10436 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10438 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10441 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10444 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10445 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10446 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10447 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10448 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10449 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10450 is_connected: false,
10454 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10455 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10456 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10457 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10458 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10459 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10460 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10461 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10464 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10465 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10466 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10467 for _ in 0..event_count {
10468 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10469 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10474 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10475 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10476 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10478 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10479 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10480 // on-startup monitor updates.
10481 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10482 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10488 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10489 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10491 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10492 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10493 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10494 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10495 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10499 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10500 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10501 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10502 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10503 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10504 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10505 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10507 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10508 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10512 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10513 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10514 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10515 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10516 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10517 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10518 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10519 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10520 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10521 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10522 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10523 let mut events_override = None;
10524 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10525 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10526 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10527 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10528 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10529 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10530 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10531 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10532 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10533 (8, events_override, option),
10534 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10535 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10536 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10537 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10539 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10540 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10543 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10544 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10547 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10548 pending_events_read = events;
10551 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10552 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10555 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10556 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10557 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10558 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10559 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10560 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10562 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10564 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10565 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10566 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10569 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10570 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10571 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10572 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10573 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10575 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10576 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10577 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10579 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10580 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10581 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10582 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10583 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10585 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10586 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10587 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10588 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10589 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10590 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10591 pending_background_events.push(
10592 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10593 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10594 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10595 update: update.clone(),
10598 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10599 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10600 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10601 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10602 pending_background_events.push(
10603 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10604 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10605 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10608 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10609 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10610 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10612 max_in_flight_update_id
10616 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10619 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10620 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10621 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10623 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10625 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10626 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10627 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10628 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10629 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10630 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10631 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10632 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10633 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10636 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10637 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10638 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10639 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10640 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10641 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10642 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10643 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10644 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10645 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10646 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10649 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10650 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10651 debug_assert!(false);
10652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10657 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10658 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10659 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10660 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10661 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10662 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10663 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10664 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10665 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10667 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10668 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10669 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10671 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10672 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10673 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10674 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10675 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10676 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10677 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10678 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10683 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10684 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10686 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10687 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10688 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10689 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10692 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10693 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10694 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10695 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10696 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10697 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10698 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10700 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10701 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10702 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10703 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10704 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10705 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10706 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10707 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10708 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10711 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10712 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10713 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10714 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10715 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10716 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10717 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10718 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10721 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10722 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10723 retry_strategy: None,
10724 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10725 payment_params: None,
10726 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10727 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10728 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10729 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10730 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10731 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10732 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10733 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10734 total_msat: path_amt,
10735 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10736 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10738 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10739 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10744 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10745 match htlc_source {
10746 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10747 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10748 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10749 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10751 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10752 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10753 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10754 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10755 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10756 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10757 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10758 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10759 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10760 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10761 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10766 !forwards.is_empty()
10768 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10769 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10770 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10771 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10772 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10773 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10774 intercepted_id != ev_id
10781 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10782 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10783 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10784 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10785 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10786 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10787 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10788 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10789 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10790 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10791 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10793 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10794 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10795 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10797 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10798 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10799 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10806 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10807 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10809 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10811 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10812 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10813 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10814 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10815 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10816 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10817 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10818 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10819 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10820 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10823 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10824 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10825 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10826 // channel still live case here.
10830 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10831 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10836 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10837 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10838 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10839 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10840 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10841 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10842 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10843 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10847 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10848 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10850 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10851 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10852 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10853 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10855 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10856 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10857 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10859 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10860 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10862 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10863 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10865 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10868 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10869 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10870 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10872 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10876 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10877 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10878 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10879 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10880 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10882 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10883 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10884 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10885 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10886 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10887 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10888 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10889 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10891 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10896 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10898 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10900 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10901 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10903 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10904 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10909 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10910 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10912 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10914 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10916 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10917 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10918 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10923 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10924 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10927 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10928 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10929 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10930 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10931 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10933 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10934 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10935 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10937 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10938 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10939 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10940 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10941 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10942 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10944 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10945 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10946 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10947 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10948 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10953 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10954 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10955 debug_assert!(false);
10956 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10961 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10963 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10964 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10965 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10966 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10967 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10968 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10969 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10970 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10971 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10972 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10973 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10975 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10976 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10978 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10979 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10980 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10981 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10983 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10984 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10985 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10986 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10988 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10989 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10990 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10991 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10993 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10994 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10995 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10998 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10999 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11000 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11003 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11004 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11007 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11010 purpose: payment.purpose,
11011 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11012 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11013 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11019 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11020 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11021 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11022 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11023 for action in actions.iter() {
11024 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11025 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11026 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11028 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11030 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11031 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11032 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11033 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11034 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11036 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11037 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11038 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11039 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11043 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11044 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11048 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11050 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11051 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11055 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11057 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11058 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11059 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11060 router: args.router,
11062 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11064 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11065 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11066 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11067 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11069 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11070 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11071 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11072 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11073 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11074 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11076 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11078 our_network_pubkey,
11081 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11083 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11085 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11086 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11087 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11088 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11089 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11091 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11092 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11094 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11096 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11098 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11099 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11100 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11102 logger: args.logger,
11103 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11106 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11107 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11108 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11109 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11110 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11113 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11114 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11115 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11116 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11117 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11118 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11121 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11122 //connection or two.
11124 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11130 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11131 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11132 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11133 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11134 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11135 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11136 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11137 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11138 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11139 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11140 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11141 use crate::prelude::*;
11142 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11143 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11144 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11145 use crate::util::test_utils;
11146 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11147 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11150 fn test_notify_limits() {
11151 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11152 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11155 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11156 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11158 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11159 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11160 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11161 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11162 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11164 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11166 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11167 // to connect messages with new values
11168 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11169 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11170 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11171 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11172 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11173 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11175 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11176 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11177 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11178 // ... but the last node should not.
11179 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11180 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11181 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11182 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11184 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11185 // about the channel.
11186 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11187 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11188 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11190 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11192 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11193 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11194 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11195 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11196 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11197 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11199 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11200 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11201 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11203 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11204 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11205 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11206 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11207 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11208 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11210 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11211 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11212 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11213 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11214 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11215 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11216 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11217 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11219 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11220 // the channel info has updated.
11221 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11222 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11223 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11224 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11225 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11226 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11230 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11231 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11233 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11234 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11235 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11236 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11239 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11240 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11241 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11242 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11244 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11245 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11246 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11247 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11248 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11249 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11250 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11251 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11253 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11254 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11255 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11257 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11258 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11259 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11261 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11262 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11263 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11264 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11265 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11267 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11268 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11271 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11272 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11273 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11274 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11275 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11276 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11278 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11279 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11281 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11282 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11283 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11285 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11287 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11289 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11290 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11291 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11292 // lightning messages manually.
11293 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11294 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11297 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11298 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11299 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11300 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11302 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11303 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11305 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11308 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11309 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11310 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11312 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11313 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11314 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11316 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11318 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11320 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11321 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11324 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11325 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11326 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11329 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11330 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11331 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11332 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11337 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11338 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11339 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11340 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11347 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11348 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11349 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11352 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11353 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11354 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11355 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11356 // fails as expected.
11357 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11358 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11359 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11360 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11361 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11362 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11365 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11366 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11369 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11370 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11371 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11373 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11374 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11375 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11377 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11378 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11379 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11380 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11381 let route = find_route(
11382 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11383 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11385 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11386 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11388 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11389 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11390 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11391 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11392 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11394 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11395 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11396 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11397 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11398 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11400 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11401 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11402 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11403 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11404 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11405 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11406 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11407 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11408 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11410 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11411 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11413 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11414 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11415 let route = find_route(
11416 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11417 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11419 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11420 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11422 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11424 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11425 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11426 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11428 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11429 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11430 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11431 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11433 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11435 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11436 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11439 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11440 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11441 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11443 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11444 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11445 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11446 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11447 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11448 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11449 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11451 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11453 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11454 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11456 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11457 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11458 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11459 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11461 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11462 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11463 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11464 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11465 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11467 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11468 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11469 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11472 let route = find_route(
11473 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11474 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11476 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11477 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11478 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11480 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11482 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11483 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11484 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11486 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11487 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11490 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11491 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11492 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11493 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11494 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11495 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11496 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11497 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11498 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11500 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11501 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11505 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11506 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11507 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11513 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11514 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11516 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11517 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11518 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11519 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11520 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11521 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11522 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11523 let route = find_route(
11524 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11525 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11528 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11529 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11530 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11531 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11532 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11533 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11536 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11537 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11538 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11539 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11540 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11541 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11542 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11544 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11548 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11549 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11550 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11551 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11552 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11558 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11559 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11561 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11562 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11563 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11564 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11565 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11566 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11567 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11568 let route = find_route(
11569 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11570 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11573 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11574 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11575 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11576 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11577 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11578 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11579 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11580 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11583 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11584 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11585 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11586 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11587 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11588 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11589 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11591 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11595 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11599 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11601 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11602 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11603 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11604 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11606 // Marshall an MPP route.
11607 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11608 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11609 route.paths.push(path);
11610 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11611 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11612 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11613 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11614 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11615 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11617 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11618 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11620 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11621 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11623 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11628 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11629 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11630 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11631 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11632 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11634 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11636 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11637 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11639 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11640 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11642 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11645 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11646 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11647 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11648 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11649 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11650 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11653 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11656 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11657 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11662 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11663 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11664 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11667 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11669 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11670 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11672 total_msat: 100_000,
11675 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11676 // payment verification fails as expected.
11677 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11678 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11679 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11680 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11682 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11686 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11687 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11691 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11692 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11693 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11694 // the channel is successfully closed.
11695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11698 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11700 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11701 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11702 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11703 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11704 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11706 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11707 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11709 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11710 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11711 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11712 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11715 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11717 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11718 // as it has the funding transaction.
11719 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11720 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11721 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11724 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11726 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11728 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11730 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11731 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11732 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11734 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11737 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11738 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11739 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11740 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11741 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11744 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11745 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11747 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11748 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11749 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11750 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11752 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11753 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11754 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11755 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11757 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11758 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11760 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11761 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11762 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11763 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11764 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11765 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11766 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11770 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11771 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11772 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11773 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11774 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11775 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11776 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11779 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11781 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11782 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11783 // closing transaction).
11784 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11785 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11788 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11789 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11790 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11791 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11792 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11795 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11797 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11799 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11800 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11801 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11803 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11805 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11806 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11809 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11810 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11811 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11814 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11815 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11816 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11819 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11820 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11821 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11824 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11825 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11826 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11829 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11831 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11832 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11834 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11835 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11837 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11838 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11843 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11844 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11845 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11846 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11847 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11848 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11849 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11853 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11854 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11855 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11857 // Test the API functions.
11858 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11860 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11862 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11864 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11866 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11868 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11870 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11874 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11875 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11876 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11877 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11878 // the given `channel_id`.
11879 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11880 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11881 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11884 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11887 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11889 // Test the API functions.
11890 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11892 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11894 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11896 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11898 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11900 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11904 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11905 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11909 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11911 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11913 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11914 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11916 let mut funding_tx = None;
11917 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11918 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11919 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11922 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11923 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11924 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11925 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11926 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11928 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11930 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11932 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11934 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11936 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11938 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11941 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11942 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11944 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11945 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11947 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11948 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11950 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11951 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11952 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11953 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11954 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11955 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11956 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11959 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11960 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11961 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11962 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11963 }, true).unwrap_err();
11965 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11966 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11967 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11968 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11969 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11970 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11971 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11973 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11974 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11976 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11977 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11978 }, true).unwrap_err();
11980 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11981 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11982 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11983 }, false).unwrap();
11984 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11986 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11987 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11989 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11990 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11991 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11992 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11993 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11995 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11996 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11997 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11999 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12000 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12001 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12003 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12004 // "protected" and can connect again.
12005 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12006 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12007 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12009 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12011 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12013 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12014 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12018 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12019 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12025 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12027 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12028 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12030 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12031 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12032 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12033 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12036 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12038 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12039 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12040 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12042 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12043 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12044 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12046 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12047 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12048 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12049 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12053 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12054 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12055 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12056 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12058 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12059 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12061 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12063 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12065 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12066 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12068 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12069 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12070 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12071 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12072 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12073 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12076 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12077 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12079 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12080 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12084 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12085 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12088 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12089 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12090 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12091 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12092 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12094 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12095 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12097 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12098 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12099 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12100 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12106 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12107 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12109 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12110 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12111 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12113 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12114 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12118 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12122 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12123 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12124 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12125 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12126 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12127 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12128 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12129 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12131 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12132 payment_metadata: None,
12133 keysend_preimage: None,
12134 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12135 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12137 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12139 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12140 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12141 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12142 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
12143 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12144 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12145 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12147 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12148 } else { panic!(); }
12150 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12151 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12153 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
12154 payment_metadata: None,
12155 keysend_preimage: None,
12156 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12157 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12159 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12161 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12162 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12163 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12164 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12168 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12169 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12170 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12171 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12172 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12174 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12175 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12177 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
12178 payment_metadata: None,
12179 keysend_preimage: None,
12180 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12181 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12183 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12184 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12185 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12187 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12188 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12189 // is not satisfied.
12190 assert!(result.is_ok());
12194 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12195 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12196 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12197 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12198 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12200 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12201 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12203 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12204 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12205 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12206 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12207 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12209 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12210 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12212 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12213 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12214 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12215 match &msg_events[0] {
12216 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12217 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12219 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12220 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12221 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12227 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12228 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12230 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12231 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12234 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12238 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12239 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12240 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12241 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12244 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12245 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12246 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12247 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12248 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12250 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12251 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12252 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12254 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12255 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12257 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12258 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12263 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12264 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12266 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12267 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12269 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12270 // not have generated any events.
12271 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12275 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12276 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12277 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12278 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12279 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12280 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12281 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12282 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12284 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12285 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12288 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12289 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12291 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12295 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12298 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12299 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12302 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12303 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12304 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12305 ..Default::default()
12307 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12308 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12309 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12311 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12312 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12315 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12316 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12317 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12318 ..Default::default()
12320 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12321 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12325 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12326 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12329 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12330 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12331 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12332 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12333 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12336 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12337 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12338 ..Default::default()
12340 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12343 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12344 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12345 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12350 fn test_payment_display() {
12351 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12352 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12353 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12354 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12355 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12356 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12360 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12361 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12362 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12363 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12364 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12367 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12368 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12369 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12370 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12371 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12372 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12373 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12374 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12376 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12377 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12378 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12381 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12382 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12384 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12385 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12387 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12388 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12389 }, false).unwrap();
12390 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12391 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12392 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12394 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12396 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12397 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12398 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12399 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12400 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12401 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12402 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12403 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12404 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12405 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12406 } else { panic!() };
12407 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12408 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12409 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12410 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12414 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12415 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12416 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12421 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12422 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12423 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12424 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12427 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12428 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12429 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12431 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12432 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12434 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12435 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12438 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12439 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12440 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12442 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12446 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12447 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12448 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12450 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12455 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12456 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12457 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12458 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12460 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12461 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12462 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12464 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12466 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12467 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12468 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12469 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12471 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12472 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12474 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12480 use crate::chain::Listen;
12481 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12482 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12483 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12484 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12485 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12486 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12487 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12488 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12489 use crate::util::test_utils;
12490 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12492 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12493 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12494 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12495 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12497 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12499 use criterion::Criterion;
12501 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12502 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12503 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12504 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12505 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12506 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12507 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12509 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12510 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12512 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12513 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12515 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12517 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12520 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12521 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12524 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12525 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12526 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12528 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12529 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12531 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12532 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12533 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12534 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12535 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12537 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12538 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12539 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12541 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12542 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12543 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12544 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12546 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12547 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12548 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12550 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12551 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12552 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12553 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12554 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12556 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12557 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12558 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12560 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12561 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12563 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12564 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12565 }, false).unwrap();
12566 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12567 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12568 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12571 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12572 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12573 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12575 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12576 } else { panic!(); }
12578 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12579 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12580 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12581 match events_b[0] {
12582 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12583 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12585 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12588 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12589 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12590 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12591 match events_a[0] {
12592 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12593 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12598 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12600 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12601 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12602 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12604 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12605 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12606 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12607 match msg_events[0] {
12608 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12609 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12610 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12614 match msg_events[1] {
12615 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12619 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12620 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12621 match events_a[0] {
12622 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12623 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12628 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12629 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12630 match events_b[0] {
12631 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12632 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12637 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12638 macro_rules! send_payment {
12639 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12640 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12641 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12642 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12643 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12644 payment_count += 1;
12645 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12646 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12648 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12649 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12650 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12651 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12652 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12653 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12654 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12655 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12656 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12657 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12658 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12661 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12662 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12663 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12665 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12666 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12667 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12668 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12669 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12671 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12674 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12675 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12676 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12677 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12679 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12683 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12684 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12685 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);