1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// A payment identifier used to correlate an MPP payment's per-path HTLC sources internally.
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub(crate) struct MppId(pub [u8; 32]);
180 impl Writeable for MppId {
181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
186 impl Readable for MppId {
187 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
207 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
208 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
210 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
211 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
212 mpp_id: MppId([2; 32]),
217 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
218 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
220 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
228 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
229 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
231 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
236 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
238 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
239 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
240 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
241 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
242 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
244 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
245 err: msgs::LightningError,
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
261 shutdown_finish: None,
265 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
267 err: LightningError {
269 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
271 shutdown_finish: None,
275 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
276 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
279 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
281 err: LightningError {
283 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
284 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
290 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
294 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
297 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
299 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
301 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
305 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
307 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
308 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
314 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
316 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
317 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
324 shutdown_finish: None,
329 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
330 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
331 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
332 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
333 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
335 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
336 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
337 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
338 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
339 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
340 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
341 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
343 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
347 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
348 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
349 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
350 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
351 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
352 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
353 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
354 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
355 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
356 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
357 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
358 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
360 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
361 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
362 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
363 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
366 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
367 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
368 /// quite some time lag.
369 enum BackgroundEvent {
370 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
371 /// commitment transaction.
372 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
375 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
376 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
378 latest_features: InitFeatures,
381 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
382 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
384 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
386 struct PendingInboundPayment {
387 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
388 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
389 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
390 /// this payment being removed.
392 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
393 user_payment_id: u64,
394 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
395 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
396 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
399 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
400 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
401 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
402 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
403 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
404 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
405 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
406 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
408 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
409 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
410 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
411 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
412 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
413 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
414 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
415 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
416 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
418 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
419 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
421 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
422 /// to individual Channels.
424 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
425 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
426 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
427 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
429 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
430 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
431 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
432 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
433 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
434 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
435 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
437 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
438 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
439 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
440 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
443 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
444 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
445 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
446 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
447 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
449 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
450 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
451 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
452 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
453 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
454 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
455 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
456 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
457 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
458 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
461 default_configuration: UserConfig,
462 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
468 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
470 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
471 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
473 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
474 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
475 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
476 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
478 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
479 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
480 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
481 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
482 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
483 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
485 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
486 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
487 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
488 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
489 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
490 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
491 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
492 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
494 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
495 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
497 our_network_key: SecretKey,
498 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
500 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
501 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
502 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
504 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
505 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
506 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
507 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
509 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
510 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
511 /// are currently open with that peer.
512 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
513 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
516 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
517 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
519 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
520 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
521 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
522 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
523 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
524 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
525 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
526 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
527 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
529 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
536 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
538 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
539 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
540 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
541 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
542 pub struct ChainParameters {
543 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
544 pub network: Network,
546 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
548 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
549 pub best_block: BestBlock,
552 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
558 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
559 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
560 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
561 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
562 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
563 /// updates are ready for persistence).
565 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
566 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
567 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
568 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
569 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
571 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
572 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
575 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
576 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
577 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
580 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
581 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
583 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
584 persistence_notifier: notifier,
585 should_persist: persist_check,
586 _read_guard: read_guard,
591 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
593 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
594 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
599 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
600 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
602 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
604 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
605 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
606 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
607 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
608 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
610 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
611 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
613 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
615 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
616 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
617 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
618 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
619 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
620 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
621 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
623 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
624 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
626 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
627 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
628 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
629 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
631 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
632 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
633 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
634 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
635 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
636 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
639 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
641 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
642 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
645 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
647 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
648 /// to better separate parameters.
649 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
650 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
651 /// The node_id of our counterparty
652 pub node_id: PublicKey,
653 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
654 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
655 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
656 pub features: InitFeatures,
657 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
658 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
659 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
661 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
663 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
664 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
665 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
666 /// payments to us through this channel.
667 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
670 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
671 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
672 pub struct ChannelDetails {
673 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
674 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
675 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
676 /// lifetime of the channel.
677 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
678 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
679 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
680 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
681 /// our counterparty already.
683 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
684 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
685 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
686 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
687 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
688 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
689 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
690 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
691 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
692 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
693 /// this value on chain.
695 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
697 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
699 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
700 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
701 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
703 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
704 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
705 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
706 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
708 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
709 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
710 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
711 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
712 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
713 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
714 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
715 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
716 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
718 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
719 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
720 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
721 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
722 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
723 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
724 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
725 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
726 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
728 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
730 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
731 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
732 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
733 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
734 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
735 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
736 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
737 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
738 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
740 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
741 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
742 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
743 pub is_outbound: bool,
744 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
745 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
746 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
747 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
748 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
750 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
751 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
752 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
753 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
755 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
757 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
761 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
762 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
764 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
765 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
766 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
767 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
768 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
769 ParameterError(APIError),
770 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
771 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
772 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
775 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
777 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
778 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
779 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
780 /// paths than the ones selected).
781 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
782 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
783 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
784 /// in over-/re-payment.
786 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
787 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
788 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
790 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
791 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
792 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
793 /// with the latest update_id.
794 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
797 macro_rules! handle_error {
798 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
801 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
804 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
805 // entering the macro.
806 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
809 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
811 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
812 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
813 if let Some(update) = update_option {
814 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
820 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
821 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
823 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
824 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
825 action: err.action.clone()
829 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
830 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
833 // Return error in case higher-API need one
840 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
841 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
842 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
844 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
845 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
847 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
849 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
850 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
852 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
853 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
854 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
855 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
857 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
858 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
860 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
861 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
862 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
863 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
865 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
866 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
872 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
873 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
877 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
879 $entry.remove_entry();
887 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
888 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
892 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
894 $entry.remove_entry();
902 macro_rules! remove_channel {
903 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
905 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
906 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
907 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
914 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
915 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
916 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
918 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
920 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
921 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
922 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
923 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
925 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
926 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
927 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
928 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
929 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
930 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
931 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
932 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
933 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
934 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
935 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
938 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
939 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
940 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
941 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
943 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
944 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
946 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
947 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
949 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
950 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
951 if !$resend_commitment {
952 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
955 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
957 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
958 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
962 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
963 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
965 $entry.remove_entry();
971 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
972 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
973 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
975 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
976 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
980 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
981 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
982 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
983 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
984 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
987 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
992 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
993 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
994 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
995 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
996 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
997 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
999 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1000 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1002 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1003 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1004 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1005 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1008 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1009 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1010 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1011 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1012 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1013 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1014 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1015 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1016 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1017 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1018 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1019 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1022 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1023 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1024 // before it should be allowed to.
1025 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1026 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1027 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1030 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1031 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1032 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1033 msg: announcement_sigs,
1036 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1039 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1040 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1041 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1042 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1043 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1044 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1045 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1046 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1047 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1048 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1049 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1050 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1051 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1052 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1053 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1054 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1055 let mut order = $order;
1057 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1059 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1063 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1064 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1065 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1066 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1071 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1072 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1073 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1074 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1075 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1080 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1084 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1089 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1090 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1091 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1096 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1097 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1098 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1099 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1100 assert!(res.is_ok());
1103 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1107 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1108 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1109 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1111 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1113 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1114 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1119 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1120 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1121 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1122 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1123 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1126 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1128 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1129 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1131 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1133 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1135 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1136 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1137 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1138 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1139 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1140 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1143 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1144 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1145 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1149 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1151 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1152 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1153 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1154 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1155 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1156 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1158 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1159 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1161 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1162 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1165 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1166 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1168 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1170 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1171 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1172 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1173 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1181 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1182 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1183 &self.default_configuration
1186 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1188 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1189 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1190 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1191 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1192 /// otherwise ignored.
1194 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1195 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1197 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1198 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1200 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1201 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1202 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1203 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1204 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1205 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1210 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1211 Some(peer_state) => {
1212 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1213 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1214 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1215 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1217 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1220 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1223 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1224 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1226 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1227 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1229 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1230 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1232 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1237 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1238 node_id: their_network_key,
1244 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1245 let mut res = Vec::new();
1247 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1248 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1249 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1250 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1251 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1252 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1253 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1254 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1255 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1256 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1257 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1258 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1259 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1261 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1262 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1263 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1264 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1265 inbound_capacity_msat,
1266 outbound_capacity_msat,
1267 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1268 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1269 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1270 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1271 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1272 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1273 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1278 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1279 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1280 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1286 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1287 /// more information.
1288 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1289 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1292 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1293 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1295 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1296 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1298 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1299 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1300 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1301 // really wanted anyway.
1302 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1305 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1308 let counterparty_node_id;
1309 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1310 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1311 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1312 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1313 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1315 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1317 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1318 Some(peer_state) => {
1319 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1320 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1321 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1323 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1325 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1327 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1328 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1329 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1330 let (result, is_permanent) =
1331 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1333 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1339 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1340 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1344 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1345 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1346 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1358 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1359 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1362 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1366 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1367 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1368 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1370 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1371 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1373 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1374 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1375 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1376 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1378 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1380 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1381 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1382 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1383 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1384 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1387 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1388 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1389 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1391 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1392 /// the channel being closed or not:
1393 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1394 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1395 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1396 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1397 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1398 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1399 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1401 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1403 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1404 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1405 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1406 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1407 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1411 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1412 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1413 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1414 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1417 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1418 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1419 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1420 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1421 // ignore the result here.
1422 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1426 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1428 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1429 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1430 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1431 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1432 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1433 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1436 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1437 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1439 chan.remove_entry().1
1441 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1444 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1445 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1446 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1447 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1453 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1456 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1457 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1458 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1460 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1461 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1462 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1463 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1464 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1465 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1466 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1476 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1477 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1478 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1479 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1480 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1484 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1485 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1486 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1488 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1489 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1490 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1491 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1492 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1493 failure_code: $err_code,
1494 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1499 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1500 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1503 let shared_secret = {
1504 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1505 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1508 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1510 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1511 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1512 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1513 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1514 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1515 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1516 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1517 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1520 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1521 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1522 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1523 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1524 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1527 let mut channel_state = None;
1528 macro_rules! return_err {
1529 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1531 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1532 if channel_state.is_none() {
1533 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1535 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1536 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1537 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1538 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1539 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1544 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1545 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1546 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1547 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1549 let error_code = match err {
1550 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1551 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1552 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1553 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1554 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1556 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1559 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1560 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1561 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1568 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1571 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1572 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1573 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1574 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1575 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1576 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1577 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1578 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1579 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1580 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1581 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1582 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1586 // final_expiry_too_soon
1587 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1588 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1589 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1590 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1591 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1592 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1593 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1595 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1596 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1597 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1599 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1600 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1601 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1604 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1605 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1606 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1607 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1608 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1609 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1610 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1611 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1613 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1615 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1616 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1617 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1618 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1619 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1620 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1621 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1622 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1623 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1626 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1628 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1631 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1636 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1637 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1638 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1639 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1641 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1643 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1644 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1645 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1646 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1649 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1650 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1651 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1653 // Check two things:
1654 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1655 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1656 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1658 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1660 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1661 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1662 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1664 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1666 let blinding_factor = {
1667 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1668 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1669 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1670 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1673 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1675 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1677 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1680 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1681 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1684 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1685 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1686 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1687 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1688 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1692 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1693 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1694 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1697 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1698 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1699 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1700 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1704 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1705 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1706 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1707 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1708 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1709 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1710 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1711 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1712 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1713 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1714 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1716 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1719 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1721 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1722 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1723 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1724 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1725 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1728 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1729 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1730 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1731 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1732 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1733 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1734 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1736 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1737 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1739 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1740 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1741 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1742 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1743 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1745 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1746 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1748 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1749 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1750 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1751 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1752 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1754 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1755 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1757 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1758 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1759 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1760 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1766 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1767 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1768 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1769 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1771 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1772 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1774 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1775 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1776 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1778 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1780 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1785 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1788 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1789 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1790 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1792 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1793 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1794 if !chan.should_announce() {
1795 return Err(LightningError {
1796 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1797 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1800 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1801 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1804 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1805 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1806 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1807 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1808 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1809 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1811 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1812 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1816 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1818 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1819 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1821 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1822 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1823 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1824 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1825 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1826 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1827 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1828 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1831 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1832 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1834 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1840 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1841 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, mpp_id: MppId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1843 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1844 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1845 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1847 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1848 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1849 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1850 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1851 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1853 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1856 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1858 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1859 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1860 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1861 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1862 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1866 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1868 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1869 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1871 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1872 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1874 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1876 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1877 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1879 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1881 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1882 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1883 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1884 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1885 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1886 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1887 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1888 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1889 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1892 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1893 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1894 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1895 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1896 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1897 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1898 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1899 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1907 } else { unreachable!(); }
1911 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1912 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1914 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1919 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1921 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1922 /// fields for more info.
1924 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1925 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1926 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1927 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1928 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1929 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1931 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1933 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1934 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1935 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1937 /// In general, a path may raise:
1938 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1939 /// node public key) is specified.
1940 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1941 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1943 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1944 /// relevant updates.
1946 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1947 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1948 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1950 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1951 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1952 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1953 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1955 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1956 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1957 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1958 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1959 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1962 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1963 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1964 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1966 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1967 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1968 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1969 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1970 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1972 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1973 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
1975 let mut total_value = 0;
1976 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1977 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1978 let mpp_id = MppId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1979 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1980 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1981 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1982 continue 'path_check;
1984 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1985 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1986 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1987 continue 'path_check;
1990 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1991 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1993 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1994 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1997 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1998 let mut results = Vec::new();
1999 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2000 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, mpp_id, &keysend_preimage));
2002 let mut has_ok = false;
2003 let mut has_err = false;
2004 for res in results.iter() {
2005 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2006 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2007 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2008 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2015 if has_err && has_ok {
2016 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2018 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2024 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2025 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2026 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2027 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2028 /// never reach the recipient.
2030 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2032 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2033 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2035 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2037 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2038 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2039 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2041 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2043 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2044 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2045 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2050 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2051 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2052 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2053 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2055 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2057 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2059 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2060 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2061 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2062 } else { unreachable!(); })
2065 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2067 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2068 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2071 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2072 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2077 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2079 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2082 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2084 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2094 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2095 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2096 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2100 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2102 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2103 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2105 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2107 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2108 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2109 /// keys per-channel).
2111 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2112 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2113 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2115 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2116 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2117 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2119 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2120 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2123 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2124 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2125 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2126 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2130 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2131 let mut output_index = None;
2132 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2133 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2134 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2135 if output_index.is_some() {
2136 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2137 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2140 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2141 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2142 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2145 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2148 if output_index.is_none() {
2149 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2150 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2153 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2157 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2158 if !chan.should_announce() {
2159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2163 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2165 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2167 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2168 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2170 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2171 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2172 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2173 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2174 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2179 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2180 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2181 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2183 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2186 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2187 // smaller than 500:
2188 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2190 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2191 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2192 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2193 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2194 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2195 /// our network addresses.
2197 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2198 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2200 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2201 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2202 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2203 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2205 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2207 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2208 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2211 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2212 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2215 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2216 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2217 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2219 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2220 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2221 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2222 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2223 rgb, alias, addresses,
2224 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2225 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2227 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2228 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2230 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2231 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2233 let mut announced_chans = false;
2234 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2235 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2238 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2243 announced_chans = true;
2245 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2246 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2247 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2251 if announced_chans {
2252 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2253 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2254 signature: node_announce_sig,
2255 contents: announcement
2261 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2263 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2264 /// Will likely generate further events.
2265 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2268 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2269 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2270 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2272 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2273 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2275 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2276 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2277 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2278 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2280 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2281 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2282 match forward_info {
2283 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2284 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2285 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2286 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2287 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2288 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2289 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2291 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2292 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2295 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2296 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2297 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2298 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2299 // problem, not ours.
2306 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2307 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2308 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2309 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2310 match forward_info {
2311 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2312 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2314 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2315 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2316 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2317 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2318 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2319 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2320 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2323 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2325 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2328 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2330 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2331 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2332 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2338 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2340 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2341 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2342 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2343 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2344 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2345 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2346 // this channel currently :/.
2352 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2353 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2355 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2357 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2359 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2362 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2364 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2365 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2366 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2369 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2371 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2372 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2373 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2374 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2375 // messages when we can.
2376 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2377 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2378 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2385 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2386 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2389 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2390 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2391 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2392 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2393 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2394 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2398 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2399 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2400 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2402 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2404 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2406 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2410 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2411 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2414 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2415 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2417 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2418 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2419 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2420 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2421 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2422 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2424 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2432 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2433 match forward_info {
2434 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2435 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2436 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2437 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2438 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2439 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2440 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2441 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2443 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2446 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2447 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2448 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2449 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2450 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2451 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2453 value: amt_to_forward,
2458 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2460 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2461 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2462 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2464 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2465 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2466 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2467 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2468 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2470 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2475 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2476 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2477 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2478 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2479 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2480 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2481 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2482 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2484 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2485 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2487 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2489 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2490 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2492 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2493 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2495 amt: amt_to_forward,
2496 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2501 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2509 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2513 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2516 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2517 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2518 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2519 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2520 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2521 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2522 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2524 let mut total_value = 0;
2525 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2526 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2527 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2528 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2530 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2534 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2535 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2536 total_value += htlc.value;
2537 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2538 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2539 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2540 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2541 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2542 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2544 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2546 _ => unreachable!(),
2549 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2550 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2551 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2552 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2555 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2556 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2558 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2559 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2560 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2561 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2565 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2566 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2568 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2570 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2571 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2578 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2579 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2587 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2588 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2591 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2592 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2595 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2596 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2597 events.append(&mut new_events);
2600 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2602 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2603 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2605 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2606 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2607 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2608 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2609 if background_events.is_empty() {
2613 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2615 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2616 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2617 // monitor updating completing.
2618 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2626 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2627 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2628 self.process_background_events();
2631 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2632 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2633 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2634 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2636 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2637 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2639 if !chan.is_live() {
2640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2641 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2642 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2645 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2647 let mut retain_channel = true;
2648 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2651 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2652 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2656 let ret_err = match res {
2657 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2658 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2659 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2660 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2663 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2664 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2665 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2666 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2667 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2668 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2669 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2670 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2680 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2684 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2685 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2686 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2687 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2688 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2689 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2690 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2692 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2694 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2696 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2698 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2699 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2700 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2701 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2702 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2704 handle_errors.push(err);
2714 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2716 /// This currently includes:
2717 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2718 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2719 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2722 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2723 /// estimate fetches.
2724 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2725 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2726 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2727 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2729 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2731 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2733 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2735 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2736 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2737 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2738 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2739 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2740 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2742 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2744 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2746 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2747 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2748 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2749 if needs_close { return false; }
2752 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2753 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2754 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2755 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2756 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2757 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2758 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2759 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2763 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2764 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2766 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2767 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2772 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2773 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2782 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2783 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2789 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2790 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2791 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2792 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2793 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2794 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2795 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2797 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2798 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2799 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2800 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2801 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2802 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2803 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2804 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2805 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2806 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2807 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2813 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2814 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2815 // be surfaced to the user.
2816 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2817 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2819 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2820 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2821 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2823 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2824 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2826 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2831 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2832 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2833 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2835 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2837 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2838 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2839 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2841 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2842 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2844 rejected_by_dest: false,
2845 network_update: None,
2853 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2860 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2861 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2862 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2863 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2864 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2865 /// still-available channels.
2866 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2867 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2868 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2869 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2872 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2873 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2874 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2876 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2878 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2879 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2880 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2886 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2887 match &onion_error {
2888 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2890 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2892 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2893 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2894 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2895 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2896 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2897 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2898 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2899 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2902 error_code: onion_error_code,
2904 error_data: onion_error_data
2908 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2914 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2915 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2916 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2917 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2919 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2920 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2921 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2922 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2923 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2924 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2925 network_update: None,
2927 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2929 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2935 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2936 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2937 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2939 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2940 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2942 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2944 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2948 let mut forward_event = None;
2949 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2950 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2952 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2954 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2957 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2960 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2961 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2962 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2963 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2964 time_forwardable: time
2971 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2972 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2973 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2975 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2976 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2977 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2978 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2980 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2982 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2983 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2984 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2985 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2987 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2989 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2990 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2991 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2992 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2994 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2995 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2996 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2997 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2999 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3000 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3001 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3002 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3003 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3005 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3006 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3007 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3013 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3014 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3015 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3017 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3018 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3019 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3020 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3022 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3023 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3025 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3026 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3027 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3028 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3029 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3030 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3031 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3032 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3034 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3035 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3036 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3037 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3038 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3039 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3041 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3046 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3047 // which were generated.
3048 channel_state.take();
3050 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3051 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3052 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3059 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3060 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3061 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3062 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3063 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3065 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3069 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3070 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3071 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3072 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3073 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3074 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3075 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3076 payment_preimage, e);
3077 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3078 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3079 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3080 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3083 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3084 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3085 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3086 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3087 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3088 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3089 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3090 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3091 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3092 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3098 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3100 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3103 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3104 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3105 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3106 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3107 payment_preimage, e);
3109 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3110 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3112 chan.remove_entry();
3114 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3117 } else { unreachable!(); }
3120 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3122 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
3123 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3125 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3126 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3127 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3129 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3130 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
3134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3138 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3139 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3140 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3141 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3142 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3143 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3146 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3147 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3148 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3149 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3150 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3153 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3154 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3155 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3156 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3157 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3158 payment_preimage, e);
3160 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3161 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3162 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3163 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3166 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3167 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3168 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3169 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3173 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3174 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3175 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3178 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3179 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3181 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3189 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3190 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3191 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3194 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3195 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3198 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3199 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3201 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3202 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3203 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3204 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3206 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3207 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3208 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3209 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3210 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3211 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3212 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3213 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3214 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3217 let chan_restoration_res;
3218 let mut pending_failures = {
3219 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3221 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3225 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3229 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3230 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3231 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3232 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3233 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3234 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3235 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3236 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3237 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3240 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3241 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3242 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3246 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3247 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3252 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3253 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3257 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3258 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3259 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3260 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3261 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3264 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3265 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3266 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3268 entry.insert(channel);
3274 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3275 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3276 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3277 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3278 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3280 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3281 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3283 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3284 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3286 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3290 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3291 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3292 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3294 user_channel_id: user_id,
3299 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3300 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3301 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3302 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3306 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3309 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3314 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3315 // lock before watch_channel
3316 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3318 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3319 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3320 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3321 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3322 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3323 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3324 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3325 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3326 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3327 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3328 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3330 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3331 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3332 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3333 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3334 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3335 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3339 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3340 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3341 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3342 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3343 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3346 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3347 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3356 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3358 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3359 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3361 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3362 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3363 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3364 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3366 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3367 Ok(update) => update,
3368 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3370 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3371 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3378 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3379 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3383 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3388 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3389 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3391 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3392 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3394 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3395 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3396 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3397 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3398 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3399 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3400 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3401 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3402 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3404 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3405 msg: announcement_sigs,
3407 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3409 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3410 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3419 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3420 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3421 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3423 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3427 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3431 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3432 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3433 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3434 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3437 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3438 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3440 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3441 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3442 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3443 let (result, is_permanent) =
3444 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3446 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3452 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3454 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3464 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3465 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3468 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3472 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3473 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3474 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3475 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3478 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3481 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3482 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3483 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3484 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3489 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3490 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3491 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3492 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3493 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3494 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3495 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3497 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3498 } else { (tx, None) }
3500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3503 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3504 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3505 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3507 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3508 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3509 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3518 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3519 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3520 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3521 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3523 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3524 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3525 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3526 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3528 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3531 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3533 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3534 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3537 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3538 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3539 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3540 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3541 match pending_forward_info {
3542 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3543 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3544 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3545 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3546 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3547 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3548 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3549 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3553 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3554 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3555 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3556 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3557 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3558 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3559 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3560 // no problem just calling this
3561 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3562 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3565 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3567 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3568 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3569 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3572 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3574 _ => pending_forward_info
3577 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3584 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3585 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3586 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3590 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3593 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3598 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3602 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3603 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3605 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3607 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3608 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3610 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3617 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3618 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3619 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3620 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3622 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3625 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3626 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3627 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3629 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3636 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3637 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3638 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3639 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3641 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3642 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3644 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3645 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3646 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3647 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3648 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3649 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3650 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3655 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3656 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3658 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3659 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3660 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3662 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3663 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3664 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3665 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3666 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3667 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3668 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3669 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3671 commitment_signed: msg,
3677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3682 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3683 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3684 let mut forward_event = None;
3685 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3686 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3687 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3688 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3690 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3691 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3692 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3693 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3694 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3697 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3698 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3701 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3702 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3707 match forward_event {
3709 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3710 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3711 time_forwardable: time
3719 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3720 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3722 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3724 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3726 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3727 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3729 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3730 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3731 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3732 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3733 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3734 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3735 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3736 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3738 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3740 } else { unreachable!(); }
3743 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3744 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3745 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3749 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3754 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3756 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3757 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3760 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3767 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3768 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3769 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3770 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3772 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3773 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3775 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3782 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3783 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3786 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3788 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3789 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3791 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3792 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3795 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3796 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3797 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3798 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3799 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3807 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3808 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3809 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3810 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3811 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3812 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3814 // It's not a local channel
3815 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3818 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3820 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3821 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3822 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3823 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3824 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3825 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3827 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3829 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3830 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3831 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3832 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3834 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3839 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3842 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3843 let chan_restoration_res;
3844 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3845 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3846 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3853 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3854 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3855 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3856 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3857 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3858 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3859 let mut channel_update = None;
3860 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3861 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3862 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3865 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3866 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3867 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3868 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3869 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3870 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3871 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3874 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3875 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3876 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3877 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3879 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3884 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3885 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3887 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3888 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3893 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3894 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3895 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3896 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3897 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3898 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3899 match monitor_event {
3900 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3901 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3902 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3903 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3906 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3909 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3910 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3912 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3913 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3914 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3915 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3916 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3917 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3919 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3920 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3921 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3925 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3926 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3927 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3928 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3936 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3937 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3940 has_pending_monitor_events
3943 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3944 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3945 /// update was applied.
3947 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3948 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3949 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3950 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3951 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3952 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3953 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3954 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3956 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3957 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3958 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3959 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3960 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3962 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3963 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3964 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3965 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3966 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3968 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3969 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3970 has_monitor_update = true;
3971 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3972 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3973 if close_channel { return false; }
3975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3976 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3977 updates: commitment_update,
3984 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3985 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3992 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
3993 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3994 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3997 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3998 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4004 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4005 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4006 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4007 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4008 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4009 let mut has_update = false;
4011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4013 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4014 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4015 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4017 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4018 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4019 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4020 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4022 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4023 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4026 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4027 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4028 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4029 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4030 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4033 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4034 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4039 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4040 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4046 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4047 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4054 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4055 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4061 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4062 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4064 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4065 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4066 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4067 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4068 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4069 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4070 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4071 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4072 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4073 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4074 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4075 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4076 assert!(should_broadcast);
4077 } else { unreachable!(); }
4078 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4080 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4084 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4085 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4087 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4090 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4091 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4093 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4094 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4095 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4096 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4097 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4098 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4099 // never fail a payment too early.
4100 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4102 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4110 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4113 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4114 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4116 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4117 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4118 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4120 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4122 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4123 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4124 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4125 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4126 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4127 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4128 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4131 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4132 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4135 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4136 /// stored external to LDK.
4138 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4139 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4140 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4142 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4143 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4145 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4146 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4147 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4148 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4149 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4151 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4152 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4153 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4154 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4156 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4157 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4158 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4159 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4160 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4162 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4163 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4164 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4165 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4166 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4168 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4169 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4170 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4172 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4174 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4175 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4177 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4178 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4179 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4180 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4181 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4184 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4185 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4186 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4187 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4188 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4193 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4194 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4195 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4196 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4197 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4200 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4201 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4202 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4203 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4205 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4206 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4207 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4208 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4211 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4212 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4214 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4215 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4218 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4219 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4220 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4222 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4223 events.replace(pending_events);
4232 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4234 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4235 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4236 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4237 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4240 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4242 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4243 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4245 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4246 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4247 /// restarting from an old state.
4248 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4249 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4250 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4252 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4253 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4254 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4255 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4258 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4259 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4260 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4263 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4264 handler.handle_event(&event);
4272 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4274 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4275 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4276 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4280 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4282 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4283 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4284 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4285 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4286 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4289 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4290 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4291 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4294 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4296 let new_height = height - 1;
4298 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4299 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4300 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4301 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4302 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4303 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4306 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4310 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4312 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4314 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4315 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4318 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4319 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4320 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4321 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4323 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4324 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4327 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4330 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4331 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4332 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4333 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4335 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4336 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4338 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4340 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4342 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4344 macro_rules! max_time {
4345 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4347 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4348 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4349 // having an explicit local time source.
4350 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4351 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4352 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4353 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4354 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4360 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4361 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4362 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4363 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4364 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4368 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4369 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4370 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4371 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4372 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4373 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4379 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4381 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4382 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4383 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4384 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4385 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4386 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4391 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4393 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4394 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4395 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4396 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4399 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4400 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4402 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4403 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4404 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4405 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4406 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4408 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4409 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4411 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4412 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4413 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4414 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4415 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4416 let res = f(channel);
4417 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4418 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4419 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4420 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4421 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4425 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4426 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4427 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4428 msg: funding_locked,
4430 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4433 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4434 msg: announcement_sigs,
4436 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4439 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4440 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4443 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4445 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4447 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4448 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4449 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4451 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4452 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4453 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4454 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4455 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4459 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4460 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4468 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4469 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4470 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4471 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4472 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4473 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4474 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4475 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4476 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4477 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4478 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4479 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4480 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4485 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4490 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4492 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4493 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4497 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4498 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4499 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4501 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4502 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4503 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4504 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4507 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4508 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4510 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4511 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4514 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4515 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4516 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4517 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4518 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4522 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4523 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4524 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4525 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4529 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4530 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4531 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4532 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4533 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4534 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4537 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4542 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4544 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4547 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4552 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4557 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4559 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4562 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4567 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4572 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4577 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4579 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4582 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4584 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4587 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4589 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4592 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4594 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4597 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4602 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4607 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4612 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4613 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4614 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4617 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4622 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4627 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4629 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4630 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4634 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4635 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4636 if no_connection_possible {
4637 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4638 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4639 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4640 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4641 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4643 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4644 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4645 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4655 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4656 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4657 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4658 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4659 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4660 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4661 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4665 no_channels_remain = false;
4671 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4676 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4679 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4680 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4681 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4682 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4684 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4685 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4686 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4688 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4689 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4690 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4691 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4695 if no_channels_remain {
4696 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4699 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4700 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4704 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4705 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4710 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4711 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4713 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4714 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4718 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4723 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4724 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4725 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4726 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4727 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4728 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4729 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4730 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4731 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4736 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4737 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4743 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4746 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4749 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4750 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4751 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4752 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4753 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4757 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4758 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4763 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4764 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4765 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4766 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4767 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4768 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4771 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4774 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4780 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4781 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4786 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4787 let result = *guard;
4795 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4796 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4797 let current_time = Instant::now();
4799 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4800 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4805 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4806 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4807 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4808 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4809 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4811 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4812 let result = *guard;
4813 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4817 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4818 None => return result,
4824 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4826 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4827 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4828 *persistence_lock = true;
4829 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4834 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4835 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4837 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4839 (0, onion_packet, required),
4840 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4843 (0, payment_data, required),
4844 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4846 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4847 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4848 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4852 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4853 (0, routing, required),
4854 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4855 (4, payment_hash, required),
4856 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4857 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4864 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4869 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4870 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4871 (2, outpoint, required),
4872 (4, htlc_id, required),
4873 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4876 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4877 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4878 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4879 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4882 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4883 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4884 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4889 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4890 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4891 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4897 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4898 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4899 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4901 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4902 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4903 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4907 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4908 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4909 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4911 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4913 if payment_data.is_some() {
4914 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4916 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4919 if payment_data.is_none() {
4920 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4922 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4926 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4934 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4935 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4936 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4939 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4940 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
4941 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
4942 let mut mpp_id = None;
4943 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4944 (0, session_priv, required),
4945 (1, mpp_id, option),
4946 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4947 (4, path, vec_type),
4949 if mpp_id.is_none() {
4950 // For backwards compat, if there was no mpp_id written, use the session_priv bytes
4952 mpp_id = Some(MppId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
4954 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4955 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
4956 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
4957 path: path.unwrap(),
4958 mpp_id: mpp_id.unwrap(),
4961 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4962 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
4967 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4968 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
4970 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, mpp_id } => {
4972 let mpp_id_opt = Some(mpp_id);
4973 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
4974 (0, session_priv, required),
4975 (1, mpp_id_opt, option),
4976 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4977 (4, path, vec_type),
4980 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
4982 field.write(writer)?;
4989 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4990 (0, LightningError) => {
4994 (0, failure_code, required),
4995 (2, data, vec_type),
4999 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5001 (0, forward_info, required),
5002 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5003 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5004 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5007 (0, htlc_id, required),
5008 (2, err_packet, required),
5012 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5013 (0, payment_secret, required),
5014 (2, expiry_time, required),
5015 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5016 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5017 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5020 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5021 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5022 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5023 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5024 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5027 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5028 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5030 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5032 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5034 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5035 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5036 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5039 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5040 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5041 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5042 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5043 unfunded_channels += 1;
5046 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5047 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5048 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5049 channel.write(writer)?;
5053 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5054 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5055 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5056 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5057 for forward in pending_forwards {
5058 forward.write(writer)?;
5062 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5063 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5064 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5065 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5066 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5067 htlc.write(writer)?;
5071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5072 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5073 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5074 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5075 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5076 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5079 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5080 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5081 for event in events.iter() {
5082 event.write(writer)?;
5085 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5086 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5087 for event in background_events.iter() {
5089 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5091 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5092 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5097 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5098 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5100 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5101 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5102 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5103 hash.write(writer)?;
5104 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5107 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5108 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5109 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5110 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5113 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
5119 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5121 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5123 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5124 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5125 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5126 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5127 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5128 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5129 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5130 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5131 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5132 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5133 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5135 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5136 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5138 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5139 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5140 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5141 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5142 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5143 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5144 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5145 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5147 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5148 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5151 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5152 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5154 pub keys_manager: K,
5156 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5158 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5159 pub fee_estimator: F,
5160 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5162 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5163 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5164 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5165 pub chain_monitor: M,
5167 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5168 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5169 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5170 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5171 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5172 /// deserialization.
5174 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5175 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5176 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5178 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5179 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5181 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5182 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5183 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5184 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5186 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5189 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5190 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5193 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5194 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5195 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5196 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5197 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5201 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5202 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5203 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5204 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5205 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5207 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5208 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5213 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5214 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5215 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5216 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5217 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5218 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5219 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5220 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5223 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5224 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5225 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5229 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5230 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5231 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5233 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5234 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5237 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5238 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5240 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5241 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5242 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5244 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5246 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5247 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5248 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5249 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5250 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5251 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5252 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5253 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5254 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5255 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5256 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5257 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5258 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5259 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5260 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5261 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5262 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5263 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5264 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5265 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5266 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5267 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5268 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5269 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5270 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5271 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5272 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5273 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5274 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5275 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5276 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5277 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5278 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5279 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5281 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5282 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5284 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5287 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5288 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5289 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5290 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5291 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5292 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5296 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5297 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5298 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5302 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5303 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5304 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5305 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5306 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5307 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5308 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5309 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5310 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5312 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5315 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5316 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5317 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5318 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5319 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5320 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5321 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5322 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5324 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5327 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5328 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5329 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5330 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5331 let peer_state = PeerState {
5332 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5334 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5337 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5338 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5339 for _ in 0..event_count {
5340 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5341 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5346 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5347 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5348 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5349 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5350 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5351 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5355 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5356 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5358 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5359 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5360 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5361 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5366 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5367 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5368 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5369 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5374 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5376 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5377 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5379 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5381 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5382 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5383 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5385 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5387 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5392 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5394 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5395 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5397 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5398 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5401 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5402 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5404 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5406 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5407 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5408 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5409 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5411 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5412 logger: args.logger,
5413 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5416 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5417 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5420 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5421 //connection or two.
5423 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5429 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5430 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5431 use core::time::Duration;
5432 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5433 use ln::channelmanager::{MppId, PaymentSendFailure};
5434 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5435 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5437 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5438 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5439 use util::errors::APIError;
5440 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5441 use util::test_utils;
5443 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5445 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5446 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5448 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5451 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5452 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5454 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5455 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5456 thread::spawn(move || {
5458 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5459 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5460 *persistence_lock = true;
5463 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5469 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5470 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5472 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5475 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5480 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5482 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5485 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5492 fn test_notify_limits() {
5493 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5494 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5498 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5500 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5501 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5502 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5503 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5504 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5506 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5508 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5509 // to connect messages with new values
5510 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5511 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5512 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5513 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5515 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5516 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5517 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5518 // ... but the last node should not.
5519 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5520 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5521 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5522 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5524 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5525 // about the channel.
5526 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5527 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5528 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5530 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5532 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5533 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5534 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5535 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5536 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5537 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5539 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5540 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5541 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5543 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5544 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5545 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5546 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5547 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5548 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5550 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5551 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5552 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5553 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5554 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5555 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5557 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5559 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5560 // the channel info has updated.
5561 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5562 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5563 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5564 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5565 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5566 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5570 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5571 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5573 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5576 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5577 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5578 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5580 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5581 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5582 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5583 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5584 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
5585 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5586 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5587 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5588 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5592 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5594 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5595 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5597 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5599 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5600 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5605 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5607 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5608 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5609 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5610 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5611 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5612 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5613 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5614 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5615 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5617 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5618 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5620 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5622 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5624 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5625 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5626 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5627 // lightning messages manually.
5628 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5630 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5632 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5634 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5635 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5637 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5638 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5640 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5641 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5642 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5644 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5645 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5646 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5648 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5650 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5652 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5653 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5656 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5657 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5659 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5660 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5665 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5666 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5673 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5674 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5675 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5676 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5677 // fails as expected.
5678 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5679 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5680 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5681 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5682 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5683 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5685 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5686 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5687 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5689 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5690 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5691 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5693 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5695 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5696 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5697 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5699 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5700 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5701 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5703 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5704 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5705 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5706 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5707 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5708 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5709 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5710 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5711 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5713 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5714 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5716 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5717 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5718 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5719 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5723 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5724 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5725 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5727 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5728 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5729 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5731 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5732 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5733 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5734 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5737 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5739 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5741 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5742 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5743 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5744 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5745 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5746 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5747 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5748 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5749 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5751 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5756 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5757 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5758 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5762 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5764 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5765 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5766 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5767 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5769 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5770 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5771 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5772 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5773 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5774 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5776 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5777 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5778 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5781 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5782 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5783 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5784 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5785 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5786 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5789 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5793 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5794 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5795 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5796 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5797 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5798 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5800 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5801 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5802 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5803 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5805 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5806 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5807 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5808 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5809 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5810 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5812 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5813 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5814 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5815 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5818 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5819 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5820 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5821 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5822 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5823 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5824 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5826 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5830 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5834 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5836 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5837 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5838 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5839 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5840 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5842 // Marshall an MPP route.
5843 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5844 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5845 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5846 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5847 route.paths.push(path);
5848 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5849 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5850 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5851 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5852 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5853 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5855 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5856 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5857 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5858 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5863 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5866 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5867 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5868 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5869 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5870 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5871 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5872 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5873 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5874 use routing::router::get_route;
5875 use util::test_utils;
5876 use util::config::UserConfig;
5877 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5879 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5880 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5881 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5883 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5887 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5888 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5889 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5890 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5891 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5892 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5893 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5898 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5899 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5902 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5903 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5904 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5906 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5907 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5909 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5910 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5912 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5913 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5915 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5916 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5917 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5918 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5919 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5921 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5923 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5925 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5926 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5927 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5928 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5929 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5931 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5933 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5935 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5936 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5937 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5938 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5939 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5942 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5943 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5944 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5946 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5947 } else { panic!(); }
5949 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5950 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5952 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5955 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5958 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5959 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5961 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5962 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5963 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5964 match msg_events[0] {
5965 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5966 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5967 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5971 match msg_events[1] {
5972 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5976 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5978 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5979 macro_rules! send_payment {
5980 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5981 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5982 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5983 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5985 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5986 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5988 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5989 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5991 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5992 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5993 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5994 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5995 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5996 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5997 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5998 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6000 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6001 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6002 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6004 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6005 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6006 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6007 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6008 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6010 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6013 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6014 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6015 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6016 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6018 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6023 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6024 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);