1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::crypto::sign;
58 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use util::errors::APIError;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
400 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
401 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
402 /// confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
689 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
733 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
734 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
735 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
737 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
738 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
739 /// the handling of the events.
742 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
743 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
744 /// would break backwards compatability.
745 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
746 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
747 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
748 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
750 our_network_key: SecretKey,
751 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
753 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
755 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
756 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
757 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
759 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
760 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
762 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
763 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
764 /// keeping additional state.
765 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
767 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
768 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
769 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
771 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
772 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
773 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
774 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
776 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
777 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
778 /// are currently open with that peer.
779 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
780 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
783 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
784 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
786 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
787 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
788 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
789 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
790 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
791 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
792 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
793 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
794 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
796 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
803 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
805 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
806 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
807 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
808 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
809 pub struct ChainParameters {
810 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
811 pub network: Network,
813 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
815 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
816 pub best_block: BestBlock,
819 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
825 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
826 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
827 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
828 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
829 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
830 /// updates are ready for persistence).
832 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
833 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
834 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
835 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
836 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
838 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
839 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
842 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
843 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
844 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
847 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
848 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
850 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
851 persistence_notifier: notifier,
852 should_persist: persist_check,
853 _read_guard: read_guard,
858 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
860 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
861 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
866 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
867 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
869 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
871 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
872 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
873 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
874 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
875 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
877 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
878 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
880 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
882 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
883 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
884 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
885 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
886 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
887 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
888 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
889 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
890 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
891 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
892 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
893 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
894 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
896 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
897 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
899 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
900 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
901 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
902 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
904 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
905 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
906 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
907 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
908 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
909 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
912 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
914 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
915 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
918 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
920 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
921 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
922 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
924 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
925 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
927 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
928 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
929 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
930 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
931 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
932 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
933 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
934 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
935 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
936 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
937 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
940 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
941 /// to better separate parameters.
942 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
943 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
944 /// The node_id of our counterparty
945 pub node_id: PublicKey,
946 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
947 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
948 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
949 pub features: InitFeatures,
950 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
951 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
952 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
954 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
956 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
957 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
958 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
959 /// payments to us through this channel.
960 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
961 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
962 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
963 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
964 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
965 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
966 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
969 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
970 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
971 pub struct ChannelDetails {
972 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
973 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
974 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
975 /// lifetime of the channel.
976 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
977 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
978 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
979 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
980 /// our counterparty already.
982 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
983 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
984 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
985 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
987 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
988 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
989 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
990 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
992 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
993 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
995 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
996 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
998 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
999 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1000 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1001 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1002 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1003 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1004 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1005 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1006 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1009 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1011 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1012 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1013 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1014 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1015 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1016 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1017 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1019 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1020 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1022 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1023 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1024 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1025 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1026 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1027 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1028 /// this value on chain.
1030 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1032 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1034 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1035 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1036 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1037 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1038 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1039 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1040 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1042 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1043 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1044 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1045 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1047 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1048 pub balance_msat: u64,
1049 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1050 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1051 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1052 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1054 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1056 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1057 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1058 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1059 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1060 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1061 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1062 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1063 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1065 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1066 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1067 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1068 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1069 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1070 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1071 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1073 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1074 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1075 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1076 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1077 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1078 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1079 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1080 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1083 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1085 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1086 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1087 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1088 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1089 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1090 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1091 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1092 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1093 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1095 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1096 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1097 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1098 pub is_outbound: bool,
1099 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1100 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1101 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1102 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1103 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1105 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1106 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1107 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1108 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1110 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1111 pub is_usable: bool,
1112 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1113 pub is_public: bool,
1114 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1115 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1116 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1118 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1119 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1121 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1122 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1125 impl ChannelDetails {
1126 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1127 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1128 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1130 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1131 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1132 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1133 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1136 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1137 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1138 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1140 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1141 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1142 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1147 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1148 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1149 /// states for more.
1150 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1151 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1152 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1153 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1154 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1155 ParameterError(APIError),
1156 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1157 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1158 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1159 /// payment in full.
1161 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1163 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1164 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1165 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1166 /// paths than the ones selected).
1167 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1168 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1169 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1170 /// in over-/re-payment.
1172 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1173 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1174 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1176 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1177 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1178 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1179 /// with the latest update_id.
1181 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1182 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1183 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1184 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1185 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1186 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1187 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1188 payment_id: PaymentId,
1192 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1194 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1196 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1197 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1198 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1199 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1201 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1202 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1203 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1206 macro_rules! handle_error {
1207 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1210 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1211 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1213 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1214 // entering the macro.
1215 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1216 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1219 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1221 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1222 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1223 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1224 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1228 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1229 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1230 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1231 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1236 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1237 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1239 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1240 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1241 action: err.action.clone()
1245 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1246 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1249 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1256 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1257 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1258 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1259 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1261 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1262 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1263 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1264 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1265 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1267 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1268 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1270 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1271 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1275 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1276 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1277 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1279 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1280 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1282 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1283 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1285 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1286 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1287 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1288 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1289 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1290 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1296 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1297 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1301 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1303 $entry.remove_entry();
1311 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1312 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1316 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1318 $entry.remove_entry();
1326 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1327 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1329 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1330 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1336 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1337 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1339 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1340 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1341 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1342 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1343 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1344 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1345 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1346 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1347 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1348 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1349 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1350 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1351 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1352 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1355 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1356 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1357 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1358 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1359 match $action_type {
1360 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1361 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1363 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1364 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1366 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1367 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1368 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1369 if !$resend_commitment {
1370 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1373 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1375 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1376 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1381 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1383 $entry.remove_entry();
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1388 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1389 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1392 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1395 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1397 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1398 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1401 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1405 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1406 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1407 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1410 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1414 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1415 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1416 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1417 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1418 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1421 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1426 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1427 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1428 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1429 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1430 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1432 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1433 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1434 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1435 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1436 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1437 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1438 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1439 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1440 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1445 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1446 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1447 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1448 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1449 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1451 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1452 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1453 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1455 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1456 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1457 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1458 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1461 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1462 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1463 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1464 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1465 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1466 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1467 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1468 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1469 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1470 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1471 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1472 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1475 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1476 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1477 // before it should be allowed to.
1478 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1479 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1481 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1482 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1483 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1488 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1489 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1490 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1491 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1492 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1493 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1494 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1495 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1496 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1497 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1498 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1499 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1500 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1501 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1502 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1503 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1504 let mut order = $order;
1506 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1508 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1512 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1513 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1514 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1515 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1520 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1521 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1522 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1523 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1524 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1529 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1533 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1538 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1539 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1540 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1545 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1546 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1547 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1548 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1549 assert!(res.is_ok());
1552 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1556 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1557 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1558 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1560 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1562 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1563 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1568 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1569 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1570 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1571 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1572 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1575 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1577 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1578 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1580 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1582 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1583 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1584 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1585 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1586 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1587 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1588 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1589 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1591 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1592 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1593 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1597 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1599 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1600 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1601 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1602 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1603 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1604 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1606 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1607 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1608 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1609 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1611 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1612 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1615 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1616 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1618 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1620 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1621 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1623 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1625 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1626 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1627 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1628 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1636 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1637 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1638 &self.default_configuration
1641 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1642 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1643 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1646 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1647 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1649 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1651 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1655 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1660 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1662 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1663 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1664 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1665 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1666 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1669 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1670 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1672 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1673 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1674 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1676 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1677 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1678 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1679 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1680 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1681 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1683 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1684 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1685 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1686 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1687 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1688 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1693 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1694 Some(peer_state) => {
1695 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1696 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1697 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1698 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1699 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1700 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1701 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1705 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1710 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1713 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1716 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1717 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1719 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1720 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1724 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1726 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1731 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1732 node_id: their_network_key,
1735 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1738 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1739 let mut res = Vec::new();
1741 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1742 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1743 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1744 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1745 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1746 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1747 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1748 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1749 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1750 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1751 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1752 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1753 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1754 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1755 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1756 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1757 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1758 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1759 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1760 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1761 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1763 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1764 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1765 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1766 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1767 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1768 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1769 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1770 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1771 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1772 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1773 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1774 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1775 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1776 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1777 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1778 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1779 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1780 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1781 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1782 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1783 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1784 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1785 config: Some(channel.config()),
1789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1790 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1791 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1792 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1798 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1799 /// more information.
1800 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1801 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1804 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1805 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1807 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1808 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1811 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1812 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1813 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1814 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1815 // really wanted anyway.
1816 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1819 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1820 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1821 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1822 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1823 Some(transaction) => {
1824 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1828 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1829 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1830 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1831 reason: closure_reason
1835 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1838 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1839 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1842 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1844 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1848 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1849 Some(peer_state) => {
1850 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1852 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1854 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1856 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1858 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1859 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1860 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1861 let (result, is_permanent) =
1862 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1864 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1870 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1871 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1875 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1876 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1877 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1878 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1882 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1890 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1891 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1895 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1899 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1900 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1901 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1903 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1904 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1906 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1907 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1908 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1909 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1911 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1913 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1914 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1915 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1916 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1917 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1920 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1921 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1922 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1924 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1925 /// the channel being closed or not:
1926 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1927 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1928 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1929 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1930 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1931 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1932 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1934 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1936 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1937 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1938 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1939 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1940 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1944 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1945 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1946 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1947 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1952 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1953 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1954 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1955 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1956 // ignore the result here.
1957 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1961 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1962 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1963 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1964 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1966 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1967 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1968 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1969 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1970 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1972 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1973 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1975 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1977 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1982 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1983 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1984 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1985 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1991 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1994 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1996 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1997 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1998 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1999 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2000 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2001 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2002 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2012 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2013 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2014 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2016 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2017 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2018 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2021 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2022 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2023 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2025 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2026 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2027 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2028 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2029 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2032 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2033 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2034 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2035 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2036 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2040 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2041 /// local transaction(s).
2042 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2043 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2044 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2048 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2049 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2051 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2052 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2053 return Err(ReceiveError {
2054 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2056 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2059 // final_expiry_too_soon
2060 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2061 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2062 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2063 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2064 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2065 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2068 err_data: Vec::new(),
2069 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2072 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2073 return Err(ReceiveError {
2075 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2076 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2080 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2081 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2084 err_data: Vec::new(),
2085 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2088 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2091 err_data: Vec::new(),
2092 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2095 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2096 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2098 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2102 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2103 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2105 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2106 phantom_shared_secret,
2108 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2109 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2110 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2111 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2112 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2113 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2114 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2115 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2118 err_data: Vec::new(),
2119 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2123 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2125 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2128 return Err(ReceiveError {
2129 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2130 err_data: Vec::new(),
2131 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2136 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2139 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2140 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2141 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2145 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2146 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2147 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2149 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2150 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2151 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2152 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2153 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2154 failure_code: $err_code,
2160 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2161 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2164 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2166 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2167 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2168 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2169 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2170 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2171 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2172 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2173 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2175 macro_rules! return_err {
2176 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2178 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2179 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2180 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2181 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2182 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2188 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2190 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2191 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2193 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2194 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2198 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2199 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2201 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2203 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2204 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2205 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2206 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2207 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2209 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2212 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2213 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2214 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2216 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2217 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2218 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2221 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2222 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2223 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2224 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2225 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2229 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2230 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2231 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2234 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2235 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2236 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2237 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2242 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2243 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2244 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2245 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2246 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2247 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2248 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2249 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2250 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2251 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2252 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2254 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2257 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2260 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2262 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2263 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2264 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2265 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2266 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2267 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2268 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2270 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2271 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2272 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2273 // we don't have the channel here.
2274 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2276 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2278 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2279 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2280 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2281 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2282 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2283 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2284 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2286 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2287 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2289 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2290 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2294 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2296 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2303 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2304 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2305 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2306 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2307 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2308 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2310 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2311 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2313 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2314 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2315 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2316 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2317 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2318 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2319 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2320 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2321 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2322 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2328 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2329 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2330 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2331 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2333 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2334 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2336 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2337 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2338 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2340 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2341 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2342 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2344 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2349 pending_forward_info
2352 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2353 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2354 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2356 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2357 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2358 if !chan.should_announce() {
2359 return Err(LightningError {
2360 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2364 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2365 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2368 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2371 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2372 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2373 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2374 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2375 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2376 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2378 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2379 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2383 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2385 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2387 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2389 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2390 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2392 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2393 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2394 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2395 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2396 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2397 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2398 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2399 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2402 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2403 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2405 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2411 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2412 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2414 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2415 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2416 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2418 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2419 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2420 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2421 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2422 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2424 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2428 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2429 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2431 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2432 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2433 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2434 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2435 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2436 err: "Payment already completed"
2441 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2442 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2443 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2446 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2448 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2449 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2450 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2451 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2452 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2453 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2454 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2455 total_msat: total_value,
2457 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2462 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2464 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2465 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2467 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2468 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2470 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2471 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2473 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2474 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2476 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2477 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2478 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2479 channel_state, chan)
2481 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2483 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2484 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2485 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2486 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2487 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2488 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2489 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2490 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2492 insert_outbound_payment!();
2494 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2496 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2497 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2498 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2499 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2500 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2501 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2507 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2509 } else { unreachable!(); }
2513 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2514 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2516 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2521 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2523 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2524 /// fields for more info.
2526 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2527 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2528 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2529 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2530 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2531 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2533 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2535 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2536 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2537 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2539 /// In general, a path may raise:
2540 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2541 /// node public key) is specified.
2542 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2543 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2545 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2546 /// relevant updates.
2548 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2549 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2550 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2552 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2553 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2554 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2555 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2557 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2558 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2559 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2560 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2561 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2564 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2565 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2566 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2568 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2569 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2571 let mut total_value = 0;
2572 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2573 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2574 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2575 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2576 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2577 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2578 continue 'path_check;
2580 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2581 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2582 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2583 continue 'path_check;
2586 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2587 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2589 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2590 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2592 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2593 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2594 total_value = amt_msat;
2597 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2598 let mut results = Vec::new();
2599 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2600 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2602 let mut has_ok = false;
2603 let mut has_err = false;
2604 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2605 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2606 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2607 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2608 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2609 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2610 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2614 } else if res.is_err() {
2615 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2616 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2619 if has_err && has_ok {
2620 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2623 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2624 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2625 Some(RouteParameters {
2626 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2627 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2628 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2634 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2635 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2636 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2637 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2643 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2645 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2646 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2647 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2648 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2649 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2651 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2652 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2653 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2654 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2655 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2656 if path.len() == 0 {
2657 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2658 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2663 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2664 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2665 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2667 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2668 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2670 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2671 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2672 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2673 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2676 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2678 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2679 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2680 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2684 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2685 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2688 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2689 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2690 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2695 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2696 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2700 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2703 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2705 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2706 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2707 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2708 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2710 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2711 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2712 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2714 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2716 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2717 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2720 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2721 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2722 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2723 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2724 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2726 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2734 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2735 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2736 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2737 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2738 /// never reach the recipient.
2740 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2742 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2743 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2745 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2747 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2748 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2749 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2751 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2753 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2754 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2755 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2760 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2761 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2762 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2763 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2764 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2766 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2769 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2770 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2774 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2776 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2777 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2782 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2784 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2785 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2786 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2789 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2790 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2791 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2792 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2793 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2794 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2797 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2798 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2799 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2800 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2801 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2803 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2805 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2807 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2808 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2809 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2810 } else { unreachable!(); })
2813 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2815 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2816 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2819 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2820 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2827 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2832 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2835 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2836 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2837 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2846 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2847 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2848 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2852 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2854 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2855 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2857 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2858 /// across the p2p network.
2860 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2861 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2863 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2864 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2865 /// keys per-channel).
2867 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2868 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2869 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2871 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2872 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2873 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2875 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2876 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2877 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2878 /// for more details.
2880 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2881 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2882 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2885 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2886 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2888 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2893 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2894 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2895 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2896 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2897 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2898 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2899 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2900 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2904 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2905 let mut output_index = None;
2906 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2907 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2908 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2909 if output_index.is_some() {
2910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2914 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2916 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2919 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2922 if output_index.is_none() {
2923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2924 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2927 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2932 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2933 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
2934 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2936 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2939 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2940 // smaller than 100:
2941 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
2943 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2944 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2945 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2946 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2947 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2948 /// our network addresses.
2950 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2951 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2953 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2954 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2955 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2956 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2958 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
2960 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2961 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2964 if addresses.len() > 100 {
2965 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2968 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2969 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2970 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2972 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2973 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2974 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2975 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2976 rgb, alias, addresses,
2977 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2978 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2980 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2981 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2983 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2986 let mut announced_chans = false;
2987 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2988 if chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()).is_some()
2989 && self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).is_ok()
2991 announced_chans = true;
2995 if announced_chans {
2996 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2997 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2998 signature: node_announce_sig,
2999 contents: announcement
3005 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3007 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3008 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3009 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3010 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3012 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3013 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3015 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3016 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3018 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3020 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3021 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3022 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3023 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3024 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3025 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3026 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3027 pub fn update_channel_config(
3028 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3029 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3030 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3031 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3032 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3037 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3042 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3043 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3044 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3045 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3047 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3048 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3049 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3050 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3054 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3055 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3056 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3059 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3060 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3061 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3062 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3063 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3072 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3074 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3075 /// Will likely generate further events.
3076 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3079 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3080 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3081 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3082 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3084 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3085 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3087 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3088 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3089 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3090 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3092 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3093 match forward_info {
3094 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3095 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3096 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3097 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3098 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3099 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3101 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3102 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3103 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3104 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3105 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3106 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3109 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3110 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3112 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3115 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3116 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3122 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3123 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3125 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3129 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3130 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3132 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3136 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3137 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3138 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3139 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3140 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3142 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3143 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3144 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3145 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3146 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3148 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3150 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3151 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3155 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3156 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3157 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3158 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3164 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3167 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3170 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3171 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3172 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3173 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3174 // problem, not ours.
3181 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3182 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3183 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3184 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3185 match forward_info {
3186 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3187 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3189 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3190 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3192 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3193 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3194 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3195 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3196 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3197 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3198 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3200 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3202 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3205 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3207 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3208 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3209 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3210 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3216 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3218 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3219 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3220 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3221 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3222 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3223 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3224 // this channel currently :/.
3230 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3231 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3233 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3235 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3237 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3240 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3242 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3243 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3244 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3247 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3249 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3250 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3251 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3252 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3253 // messages when we can.
3254 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3255 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3256 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3263 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3264 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3267 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3268 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3269 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3270 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3271 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3272 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3274 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3276 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3277 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3278 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3281 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3285 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3286 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3289 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3290 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3292 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3293 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3294 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3295 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3296 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3297 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3299 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3307 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3308 match forward_info {
3309 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3310 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3311 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3312 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3313 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3314 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3315 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3317 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3318 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3320 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3323 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3324 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3325 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3326 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3327 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3328 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3329 phantom_shared_secret,
3331 value: amt_to_forward,
3333 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3338 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3339 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3340 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3341 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3342 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3344 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3345 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3346 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3347 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3348 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3349 phantom_shared_secret,
3351 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3352 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3357 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3358 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3359 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3361 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3362 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3363 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3366 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3367 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3368 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3369 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3371 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3375 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3376 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3377 total_value += htlc.value;
3378 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3379 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3380 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3382 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3383 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3385 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3387 _ => unreachable!(),
3390 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3392 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3393 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3394 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3395 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3396 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3399 amount_msat: total_value,
3401 payment_received_generated = true;
3403 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3404 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3406 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3408 payment_received_generated
3412 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3413 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3414 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3415 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3416 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3417 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3418 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3419 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3421 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3422 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3423 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3424 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3425 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3431 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3433 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3434 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3435 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3436 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3437 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3438 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3440 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3446 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3453 if payment_data.is_none() {
3454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3455 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3458 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3459 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3461 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3462 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3464 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3465 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3467 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3468 if payment_received_generated {
3469 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3475 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3476 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3484 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3485 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3487 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3489 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3490 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3493 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3494 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3495 events.append(&mut new_events);
3498 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3500 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3501 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3503 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3504 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3505 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3506 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3507 if background_events.is_empty() {
3511 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3513 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3514 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3515 // monitor updating completing.
3516 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3524 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3525 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3526 self.process_background_events();
3529 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3530 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3531 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3532 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3534 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3535 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3537 if !chan.is_live() {
3538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3539 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3540 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3543 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3545 let mut retain_channel = true;
3546 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3549 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3550 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3554 let ret_err = match res {
3555 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3556 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3557 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3558 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3561 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3562 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3563 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3564 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3565 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3566 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3567 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3568 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3578 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3582 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3583 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3584 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3585 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3586 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3587 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3588 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3590 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3592 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3594 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3596 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3597 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3598 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3599 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3600 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3602 handle_errors.push(err);
3612 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3614 /// This currently includes:
3615 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3616 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3617 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3619 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3620 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3622 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3623 /// estimate fetches.
3624 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3625 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3626 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3627 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3629 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3631 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3632 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3636 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3637 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3638 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3639 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3640 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3641 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3643 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3645 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3647 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3648 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3649 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3650 if needs_close { return false; }
3653 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3654 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3655 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3656 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3657 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3658 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3659 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3664 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3665 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3667 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3669 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3673 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3674 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3679 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3684 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3685 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3686 // This should be unreachable
3687 debug_assert!(false);
3690 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3691 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3692 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3693 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3695 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3696 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3697 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3699 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3707 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3708 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3709 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3712 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3713 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3719 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3720 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3721 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3723 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3724 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3725 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3726 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3728 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3729 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3730 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3731 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3732 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3735 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3736 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3737 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3738 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3739 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3740 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3741 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3742 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3744 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3745 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3746 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3751 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3752 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3754 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3756 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3757 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3758 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3759 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3760 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3761 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3762 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3764 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3766 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3767 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3769 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3774 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3775 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3776 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3777 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3778 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3779 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3780 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3781 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3782 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3783 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3785 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3786 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3787 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3788 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3790 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3791 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3792 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3793 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3794 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3798 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3799 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3800 // be surfaced to the user.
3801 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3802 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3803 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3805 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3807 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3808 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3809 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3811 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3815 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3817 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3818 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver)
3820 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3821 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3822 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3823 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3824 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3825 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3826 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3827 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3828 Some(RouteParameters {
3829 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3830 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3831 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3834 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3835 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3836 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3838 rejected_by_dest: false,
3839 network_update: None,
3840 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3842 short_channel_id: None,
3849 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3850 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3852 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3858 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3865 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3866 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3867 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3868 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3869 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3870 /// still-available channels.
3871 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3872 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3873 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3874 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3877 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3878 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3879 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3881 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3882 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3883 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3884 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3885 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3886 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3887 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3888 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3889 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3892 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3893 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3896 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3897 all_paths_failed = true;
3898 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3899 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3901 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3910 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3911 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3912 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3913 Some(RouteParameters {
3914 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3915 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3916 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3919 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3921 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3922 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3924 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3926 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3928 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3929 if !payment_retryable {
3930 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3932 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3936 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3937 payment_id: payment_id,
3938 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3944 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3945 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3946 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3947 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3948 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3950 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3951 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3952 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3953 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3960 error_code: onion_error_code,
3962 error_data: onion_error_data
3966 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3972 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3973 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3974 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3975 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3977 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3978 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3979 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3980 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3981 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3982 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3983 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3984 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3985 network_update: None,
3988 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3991 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3993 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3997 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3998 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3999 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4001 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4002 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4003 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4004 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4005 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4006 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4007 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4008 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4010 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4011 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4014 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4015 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4016 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4020 let mut forward_event = None;
4021 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4022 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4024 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4026 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4029 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4032 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4033 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4034 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4035 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4036 time_forwardable: time
4039 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4040 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4041 failed_next_destination: destination
4047 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4048 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4050 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4051 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4052 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4054 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4055 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4056 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4057 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4059 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4060 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4061 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4062 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4063 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4064 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4065 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4066 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4070 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4071 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4072 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4073 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4075 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4076 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4077 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4078 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4080 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4081 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4082 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4083 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4084 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4086 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4087 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4088 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4089 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4090 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4094 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4095 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4096 debug_assert!(false);
4100 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4101 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4102 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4103 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4104 if sources.len() != 1 {
4105 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4106 debug_assert!(false);
4112 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4114 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4115 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4118 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4119 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4120 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4124 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4125 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4126 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4128 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4129 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4130 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4131 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4132 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4133 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4134 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4135 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4137 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4138 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4139 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4140 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4141 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4142 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4143 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4144 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4146 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4147 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4148 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4149 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4150 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4151 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4153 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4158 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4159 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4161 purpose: payment_purpose,
4162 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4166 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4167 // which were generated.
4168 channel_state.take();
4170 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4171 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4172 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4177 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4178 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4179 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4180 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4181 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4183 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4187 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4188 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4189 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4190 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4191 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4192 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4193 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4194 payment_preimage, e);
4195 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4196 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4197 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4198 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4201 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4202 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4203 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4204 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4205 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4206 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4207 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4208 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4209 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4210 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4216 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4218 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4221 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4222 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4223 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4224 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4225 payment_preimage, e);
4227 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4228 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4230 chan.remove_entry();
4232 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4235 } else { unreachable!(); }
4238 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4239 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4240 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4241 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4242 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4243 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4244 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4245 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4246 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4247 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4248 pending_events.push(
4249 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4251 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4256 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4264 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4267 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4268 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4269 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4270 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4271 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4273 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4274 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4275 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4276 pending_events.push(
4277 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4278 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4284 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4288 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4289 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4290 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4292 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4293 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4294 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4295 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4296 pending_events.push(
4297 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4305 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4313 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4314 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4315 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4316 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4317 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4318 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4319 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4322 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4323 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4324 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4325 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4326 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4329 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4330 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4331 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4332 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4333 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4334 payment_preimage, e);
4336 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4337 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4338 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4339 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4342 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4343 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4344 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4345 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4349 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4350 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4351 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4354 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4355 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4356 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4358 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4360 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4370 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4371 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4372 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4375 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4378 let chan_restoration_res;
4379 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4380 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4381 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4382 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4386 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4390 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4391 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4392 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4393 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4394 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4395 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4396 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4398 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4399 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4400 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4405 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4406 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4407 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4410 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4412 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4413 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4414 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4415 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4416 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4420 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4422 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4423 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4426 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4427 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4428 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4430 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4431 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4432 /// used to accept such channels.
4434 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4435 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4436 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4437 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4440 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4441 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4443 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4444 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4445 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4447 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4448 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4450 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4451 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4453 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4454 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4456 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4457 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4458 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4459 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4462 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4463 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4465 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4466 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4469 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4472 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4473 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4476 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4477 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4478 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4479 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4481 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4484 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4485 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4486 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4490 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4491 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4495 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4501 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4502 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4503 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4506 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4510 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4511 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4512 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4513 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4516 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4521 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4522 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4523 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4524 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4525 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4526 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4529 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4530 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4531 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4533 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4534 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4535 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4538 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4539 pending_events.push(
4540 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4541 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4542 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4543 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4544 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4545 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4550 entry.insert(channel);
4556 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4557 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4558 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4559 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4560 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4562 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4563 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4565 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4566 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4568 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4571 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4572 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4573 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4574 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4575 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4577 user_channel_id: user_id,
4582 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4583 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4584 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4585 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4586 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4587 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4589 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4592 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4597 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4598 // lock before watch_channel
4599 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4601 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4602 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4603 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4604 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4605 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4606 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4607 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4608 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4609 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4610 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4611 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4613 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4614 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4615 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4616 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4617 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4618 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4619 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4623 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4624 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4625 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4627 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4630 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4631 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4633 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4634 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4635 funding_msg.channel_id))
4637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4638 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4641 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4642 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4645 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4646 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4654 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4656 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4657 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4661 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4664 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4665 Ok(update) => update,
4666 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4668 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4669 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4670 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4671 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4672 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4673 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4674 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4675 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4680 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4681 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4688 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4689 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4693 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4695 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4696 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4698 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4699 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4701 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4702 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4703 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4704 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4706 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4707 msg: announcement_sigs,
4709 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4710 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4711 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4712 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4713 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4714 // announcement_signatures.
4715 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4716 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4717 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4718 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4729 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4730 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4731 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4732 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4733 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4737 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4741 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4742 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4743 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4744 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4747 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4748 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4750 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4751 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4752 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4753 let (result, is_permanent) =
4754 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4756 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4762 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4763 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4764 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4774 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4775 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4776 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4779 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4783 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4784 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4785 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4786 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4787 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4789 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4790 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4792 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4793 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4795 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4800 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4801 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4802 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4803 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4804 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4805 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4806 } else { (tx, None) }
4808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4811 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4812 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4813 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4815 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4816 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4817 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4818 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4822 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4827 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4828 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4829 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4830 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4832 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4833 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4834 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4835 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4837 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4838 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4839 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4841 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4843 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4844 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4847 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4848 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4849 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4850 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4851 match pending_forward_info {
4852 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4853 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4854 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4855 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4857 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4859 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4860 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4861 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4864 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4866 _ => pending_forward_info
4869 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4876 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4877 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4878 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4879 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4882 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4885 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4890 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4894 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4895 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4896 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4897 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4899 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4900 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4902 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4909 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4910 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4912 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4914 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4915 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4917 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4918 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4919 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4921 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4928 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4929 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4930 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4933 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4936 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4937 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4938 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4939 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4940 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4941 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4942 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4947 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4948 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4950 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4951 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4952 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4954 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4956 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4957 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4958 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4959 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4960 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4961 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4963 commitment_signed: msg,
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4974 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4975 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4976 let mut forward_event = None;
4977 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4978 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4979 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4980 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4982 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4983 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4984 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4985 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4986 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4989 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4990 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4993 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4994 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4999 match forward_event {
5001 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5002 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5003 time_forwardable: time
5011 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5012 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5014 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5015 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5016 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5018 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5019 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5021 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5022 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5023 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
5024 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5025 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
5026 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
5027 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5028 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5029 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5030 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5031 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5033 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
5034 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5035 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5036 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5037 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5039 } else { unreachable!(); }
5042 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5044 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5048 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5049 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5050 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5051 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5052 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5057 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5059 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5060 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5062 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5063 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5066 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5067 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5074 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5075 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5076 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5077 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5079 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5080 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5082 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
5084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5089 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5090 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5091 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5093 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5094 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5095 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5098 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5103 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5104 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5105 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5106 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5107 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5115 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5116 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5117 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5119 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5120 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5122 // It's not a local channel
5123 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5128 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5129 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5130 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5131 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5132 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5133 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5137 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5138 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5139 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5140 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5142 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5143 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5148 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5151 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5152 let chan_restoration_res;
5153 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5154 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5155 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5157 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5158 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5159 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5162 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5163 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5164 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5165 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5166 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5167 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5168 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5169 let mut channel_update = None;
5170 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5171 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5172 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5175 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5176 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5177 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5178 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5179 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5180 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5181 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5186 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5187 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5188 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5189 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5190 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5191 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5193 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5198 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5199 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5201 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5202 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5207 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5208 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5209 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5210 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5211 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5212 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5213 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5214 match monitor_event {
5215 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5216 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5218 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5221 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5222 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5225 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5226 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5227 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5229 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5230 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5231 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5232 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5233 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5234 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5239 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5240 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5242 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5244 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5246 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5253 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5254 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5260 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5261 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5264 has_pending_monitor_events
5267 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5268 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5269 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5271 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5272 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5275 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5276 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5277 /// update was applied.
5279 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5280 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5281 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5282 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5283 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5284 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5285 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5286 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5288 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5290 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5291 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5292 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5294 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5295 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5296 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5297 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5299 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5301 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5304 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5305 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5306 has_monitor_update = true;
5307 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5308 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5309 if close_channel { return false; }
5311 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5312 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5313 updates: commitment_update,
5320 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5321 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5322 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5329 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5330 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5331 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5334 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5335 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5341 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5342 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5343 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5344 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5345 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5346 let mut has_update = false;
5348 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5349 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5350 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5351 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5352 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5354 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5355 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5356 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5357 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5360 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5363 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5364 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5365 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5366 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5367 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5372 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5374 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5375 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5376 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5382 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5383 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5390 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5391 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5397 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5398 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5400 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5401 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5402 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5403 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5404 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5405 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5406 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5407 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5408 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5409 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5410 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5411 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5412 assert!(should_broadcast);
5413 } else { unreachable!(); }
5414 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5416 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5420 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5421 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5423 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5424 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5427 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5430 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5431 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5433 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5434 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5435 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5436 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5437 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5438 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5439 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5440 // never fail a payment too early.
5441 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5443 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5451 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5454 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5455 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5457 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5458 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5459 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5461 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5463 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5464 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5468 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5469 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5471 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5473 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5474 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5475 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5476 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5477 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5478 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5481 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5482 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5484 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5487 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5489 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5491 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5492 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5493 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5494 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5495 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5498 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5499 /// stored external to LDK.
5501 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5502 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5503 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5505 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5506 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5509 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5510 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5511 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5512 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5514 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5515 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5516 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5517 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5518 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5520 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5521 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5522 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5523 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5524 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5526 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5527 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5529 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5530 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5534 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5535 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5537 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5539 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5540 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5541 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5542 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5545 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5546 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5548 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5551 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5553 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5555 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5556 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5559 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5560 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5562 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5563 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5564 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5567 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5568 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5570 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5571 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5572 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5573 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5575 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5576 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5577 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5584 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5586 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5587 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5589 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5590 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5591 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5595 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5596 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5597 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5598 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5599 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5604 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5605 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5609 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5610 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5614 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5615 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5616 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5617 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5621 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5622 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5623 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5624 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5626 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5627 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5628 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5629 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5632 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5633 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5635 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5636 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5639 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5640 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5641 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5643 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5644 events.replace(pending_events);
5653 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5655 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5656 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5657 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5661 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5663 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5664 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5665 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5666 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5667 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5669 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5670 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5671 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5672 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5675 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5676 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5677 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5680 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5681 handler.handle_event(&event);
5689 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5691 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5692 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5693 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5694 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5697 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5699 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5700 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5701 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5702 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5703 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5706 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5707 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5710 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5712 let new_height = height - 1;
5714 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5715 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5716 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5717 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5718 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5719 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5722 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5726 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5728 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5729 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5730 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5731 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5734 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5735 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5736 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5737 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5739 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5740 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5743 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5744 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5746 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5747 if height < last_best_block_height {
5748 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5749 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5753 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5754 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5755 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5756 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5758 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5759 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5763 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5765 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5767 macro_rules! max_time {
5768 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5770 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5771 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5772 // having an explicit local time source.
5773 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5774 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5775 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5776 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5777 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5783 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5784 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5785 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5786 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5787 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5790 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5791 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5792 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5793 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5794 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5795 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5796 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5797 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5798 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5806 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5807 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5808 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5809 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5810 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5811 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5817 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5819 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5820 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5821 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5822 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5823 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5824 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5829 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5831 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5832 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5833 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5837 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5838 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5840 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5841 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5842 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5843 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5844 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5846 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5847 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5849 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5851 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5852 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5853 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5854 let res = f(channel);
5855 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5856 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5857 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5858 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5860 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5862 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5863 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5864 if channel.is_usable() {
5865 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5866 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5868 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5876 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5877 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5878 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5879 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5880 msg: announcement_sigs,
5882 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5883 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5884 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5886 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5887 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5888 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5893 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5894 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5895 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5896 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5897 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5898 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5899 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5900 // is always consistent.
5901 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5902 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5903 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5904 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5907 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5908 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5909 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5910 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5911 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5912 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5913 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5917 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5918 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5919 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5920 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5921 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5922 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5923 data: reason_message,
5931 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5932 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5933 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5934 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5935 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5936 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5937 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5938 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5939 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5940 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5942 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5943 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5944 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5945 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5949 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5954 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5956 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5957 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5961 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5962 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5963 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5966 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5967 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5968 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5969 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5972 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5973 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5975 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5976 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5979 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5980 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5981 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5982 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5983 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5986 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5987 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5988 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5991 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5992 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5993 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5994 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5998 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5999 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6000 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6001 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6002 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6003 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6006 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6007 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6011 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6013 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6016 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6018 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6021 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6023 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6026 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6028 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6031 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6033 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6036 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6038 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6041 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6043 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6046 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6048 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6051 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6053 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6056 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6057 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6058 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6061 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6063 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6066 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6068 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6071 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6072 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6073 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6076 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6078 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6081 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6082 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6083 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6086 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6091 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6093 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6096 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6098 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6099 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6101 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6102 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6103 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6104 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
6105 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6106 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6107 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6108 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6109 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6110 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6111 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
6112 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6115 no_channels_remain = false;
6120 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6122 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6125 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6126 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6127 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6128 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6129 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6130 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6134 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6135 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6136 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6138 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6146 if no_channels_remain {
6147 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6150 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6151 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6155 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6156 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6161 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6162 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6164 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6165 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6168 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6169 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6174 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6175 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6176 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6177 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6178 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6179 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6180 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6181 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6182 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6186 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6187 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6188 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6193 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6194 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6195 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6197 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6205 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6208 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6211 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6212 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6213 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6214 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6215 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6220 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6221 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6222 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6223 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6226 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6228 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6236 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6237 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6242 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6243 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6245 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6246 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6247 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6248 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6251 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6252 (2, node_id, required),
6253 (4, features, required),
6254 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6255 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6256 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6257 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6260 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6261 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6262 (2, channel_id, required),
6263 (3, channel_type, option),
6264 (4, counterparty, required),
6265 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6266 (6, funding_txo, option),
6267 (7, config, option),
6268 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6269 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6270 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6271 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6272 (16, balance_msat, required),
6273 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6274 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6275 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6276 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6277 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6278 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6279 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6280 (26, is_outbound, required),
6281 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6282 (30, is_usable, required),
6283 (32, is_public, required),
6284 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6285 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6288 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6289 (2, channels, vec_type),
6290 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6291 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6294 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6296 (0, onion_packet, required),
6297 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6300 (0, payment_data, required),
6301 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6302 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6304 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6305 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6306 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6310 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6311 (0, routing, required),
6312 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6313 (4, payment_hash, required),
6314 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6315 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6319 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6320 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6322 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6324 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6325 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6326 reason.write(writer)?;
6328 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6329 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6332 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6333 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6334 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6335 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6342 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6343 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6344 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6347 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6348 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6349 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6350 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6354 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6355 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6356 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6357 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6358 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6361 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6362 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6363 // messages contained in the variants.
6364 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6365 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6366 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6368 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6369 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6370 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6371 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6372 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6375 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6376 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6377 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6378 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6379 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6381 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6386 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6391 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6392 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6393 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6394 (2, outpoint, required),
6395 (4, htlc_id, required),
6396 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6399 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6400 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6401 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6402 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6403 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6405 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6406 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6407 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6408 (2, self.value, required),
6409 (4, payment_data, option),
6410 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6411 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6417 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6418 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6419 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6421 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6422 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6423 let mut total_msat = None;
6424 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6425 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6426 (0, prev_hop, required),
6427 (1, total_msat, option),
6428 (2, value, required),
6429 (4, payment_data, option),
6430 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6431 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6433 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6435 if payment_data.is_some() {
6436 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6438 if total_msat.is_none() {
6439 total_msat = Some(value);
6441 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6444 if total_msat.is_none() {
6445 if payment_data.is_none() {
6446 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6448 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6450 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6454 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6457 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6464 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6465 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6466 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6470 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6471 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6472 let mut payment_id = None;
6473 let mut payment_secret = None;
6474 let mut payment_params = None;
6475 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6476 (0, session_priv, required),
6477 (1, payment_id, option),
6478 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6479 (3, payment_secret, option),
6480 (4, path, vec_type),
6481 (5, payment_params, option),
6483 if payment_id.is_none() {
6484 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6486 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6488 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6489 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6490 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6491 path: path.unwrap(),
6492 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6497 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6498 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6503 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6504 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6506 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6508 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6509 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6510 (0, session_priv, required),
6511 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6512 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6513 (3, payment_secret, option),
6514 (4, path, vec_type),
6515 (5, payment_params, option),
6518 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6520 field.write(writer)?;
6527 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6528 (0, LightningError) => {
6532 (0, failure_code, required),
6533 (2, data, vec_type),
6537 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6539 (0, forward_info, required),
6540 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6541 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6542 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6545 (0, htlc_id, required),
6546 (2, err_packet, required),
6550 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6551 (0, payment_secret, required),
6552 (2, expiry_time, required),
6553 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6554 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6555 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6558 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6560 (0, session_privs, required),
6563 (0, session_privs, required),
6564 (1, payment_hash, option),
6567 (0, session_privs, required),
6568 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6569 (2, payment_hash, required),
6570 (4, payment_secret, option),
6571 (6, total_msat, required),
6572 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6573 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6576 (0, session_privs, required),
6577 (2, payment_hash, required),
6581 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6582 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6583 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6584 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6588 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6589 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6591 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6593 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6595 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6596 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6597 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6600 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6601 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6602 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6603 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6604 unfunded_channels += 1;
6607 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6608 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6609 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6610 channel.write(writer)?;
6614 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6615 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6616 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6617 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6618 for forward in pending_forwards {
6619 forward.write(writer)?;
6623 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6624 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6625 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6626 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6627 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6628 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6629 htlc.write(writer)?;
6631 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6635 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6636 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6637 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6638 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6639 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6642 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6643 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6644 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6645 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6646 for event in events.iter() {
6647 event.write(writer)?;
6650 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6651 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6652 for event in background_events.iter() {
6654 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6656 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6657 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6662 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6663 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6665 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6666 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6667 hash.write(writer)?;
6668 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6671 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6672 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6673 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6674 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6675 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6678 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6679 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6681 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6682 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6683 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6684 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6687 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6688 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6692 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6693 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6694 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6696 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6697 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6698 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6703 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6704 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6705 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6706 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6707 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6708 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6709 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6716 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6718 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6720 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6721 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6722 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6723 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6724 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6725 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6726 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6727 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6728 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6729 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6730 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6731 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6732 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6734 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6735 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6737 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6738 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6740 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6741 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6742 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6743 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6744 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6745 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6747 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6748 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6749 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6750 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6751 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6752 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6755 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6756 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6758 pub keys_manager: K,
6760 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6762 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6763 pub fee_estimator: F,
6764 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6766 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6767 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6768 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6769 pub chain_monitor: M,
6771 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6772 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6773 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6774 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6775 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6776 /// deserialization.
6778 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6779 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6780 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6782 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6783 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6785 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6786 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6787 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6788 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6790 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6793 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6794 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6797 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6798 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6799 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6800 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6801 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6802 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6805 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6806 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6807 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6808 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6809 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6811 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6812 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6817 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6818 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6819 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6820 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6821 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6823 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6827 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6828 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6829 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6833 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6834 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6835 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6837 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6841 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6842 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6844 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6850 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6852 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6853 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6854 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6855 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6856 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6857 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6858 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6859 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6860 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6861 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6862 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6863 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6864 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6865 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6866 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6867 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6868 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6869 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6870 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6871 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6872 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6873 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6874 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6875 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6876 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6877 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6878 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6879 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6880 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6881 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6882 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6883 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6884 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6885 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6886 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6887 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6888 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6889 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6892 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6893 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6894 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6896 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6897 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6899 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6902 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6903 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6904 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6905 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6906 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6907 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6911 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6912 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6913 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6914 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6918 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6919 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6921 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6922 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6923 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6924 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6925 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6926 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6928 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6931 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6933 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6934 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6937 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6938 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6940 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6943 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6945 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6946 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let peer_state = PeerState {
6948 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6950 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6953 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6954 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6955 for _ in 0..event_count {
6956 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6957 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6961 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6962 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6963 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6964 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6965 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6966 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6967 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6968 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6972 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6974 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6975 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6976 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6977 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6981 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6984 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6986 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6987 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6992 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6994 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6995 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6996 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6997 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6998 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7000 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7001 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7005 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7006 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7007 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7008 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7009 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7010 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7011 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7012 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7013 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7014 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7015 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7016 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7017 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7018 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7020 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7021 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7024 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7025 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7028 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7029 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7030 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7031 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7032 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7033 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7035 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7037 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7038 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7039 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7040 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7041 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7042 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7043 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7045 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7046 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7047 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7048 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7049 if path.is_empty() {
7050 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7051 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7053 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7054 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7055 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7056 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7057 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7058 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7059 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7060 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7063 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7064 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7065 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7066 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7068 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7069 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7070 total_msat: path_amt,
7071 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7073 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7074 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7083 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7084 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7086 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7087 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7088 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7089 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7091 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7092 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7095 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7096 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7097 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7098 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7099 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7101 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7102 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7103 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7104 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7105 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7106 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7107 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7108 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7110 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7111 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7115 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7117 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7119 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7120 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7122 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7126 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7127 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7129 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7130 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7133 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7135 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7137 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7138 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7139 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7140 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7145 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7146 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7147 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7148 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7150 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7151 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7152 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7154 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7155 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7156 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7157 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7158 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7159 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7161 if chan.is_usable() {
7162 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7163 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7164 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7165 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7166 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7171 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7173 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7174 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7175 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7176 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7177 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7178 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7179 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7181 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7182 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7183 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7184 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7186 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7187 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7188 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7189 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7191 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7192 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7193 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7194 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7196 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7197 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7198 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7200 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7201 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7204 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7206 purpose: payment_purpose,
7207 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7213 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7215 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7216 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7217 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7219 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7221 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7226 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7228 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7229 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7230 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7232 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7233 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7234 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7236 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7242 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7243 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7245 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7247 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7248 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7249 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7250 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7252 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7253 logger: args.logger,
7254 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7257 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7258 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7259 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7260 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7263 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7264 //connection or two.
7266 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7272 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7273 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7274 use core::time::Duration;
7275 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7276 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7277 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7278 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7279 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7280 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7282 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7283 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7284 use util::errors::APIError;
7285 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7286 use util::test_utils;
7287 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7290 fn test_notify_limits() {
7291 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7292 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7296 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7298 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7299 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7300 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7301 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7302 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7304 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7306 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7307 // to connect messages with new values
7308 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7309 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7310 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7311 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7313 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7314 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7315 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7316 // ... but the last node should not.
7317 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7318 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7319 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7320 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7322 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7323 // about the channel.
7324 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7325 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7326 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7328 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7330 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7331 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7332 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7333 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7334 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7335 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7337 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7338 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7339 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7341 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7342 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7343 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7344 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7345 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7346 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7348 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7349 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7350 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7351 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7352 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7353 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7354 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7355 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7357 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7358 // the channel info has updated.
7359 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7360 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7361 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7362 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7363 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7364 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7368 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7369 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7371 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7373 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7374 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7375 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7377 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7378 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7379 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7380 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7381 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7382 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7383 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7385 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7387 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7389 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7390 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7392 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7393 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7394 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7395 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7396 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7398 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7400 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7402 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7403 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7404 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7405 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7406 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7407 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7409 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7410 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7412 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7413 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7415 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7416 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7417 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7419 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7420 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7421 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7422 // lightning messages manually.
7423 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7424 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7427 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7428 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7429 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7431 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7432 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7434 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7435 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7437 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7438 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7439 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7441 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7442 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7443 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7445 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7449 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7450 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7453 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7454 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7455 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7458 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7459 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7460 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7461 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7466 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7467 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7468 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7469 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7474 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7475 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7476 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7477 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7484 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7485 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7486 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7487 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7488 // fails as expected.
7489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7492 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7493 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7494 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7495 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7497 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7498 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7499 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7501 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7502 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7503 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7504 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7505 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7507 let route = find_route(
7508 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7509 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7511 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7515 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7516 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7520 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7521 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7522 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7523 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7525 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7526 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7527 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7528 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7529 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7530 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7531 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7532 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7533 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7535 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7536 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7538 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7539 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7540 let route = find_route(
7541 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7542 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7544 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7546 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7547 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7548 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7549 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7550 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7552 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7553 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7554 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7556 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7558 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7559 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7560 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7562 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7563 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7564 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7566 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7567 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7568 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7569 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7570 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7571 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7572 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7574 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7576 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7581 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7582 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7583 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7589 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7590 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7591 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7592 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7594 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7595 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7596 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7597 final_value_msat: 10000,
7598 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7600 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7601 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7602 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7603 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7604 let route = find_route(
7605 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7606 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7609 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7610 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7611 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7614 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7615 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7616 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7617 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7618 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7619 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7622 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7626 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7627 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7631 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7633 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7634 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7635 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7636 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7638 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7639 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7640 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7641 final_value_msat: 10000,
7642 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7644 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7645 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7646 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7647 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7648 let route = find_route(
7649 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7650 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7653 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7654 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7655 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7656 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7659 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7660 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7661 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7662 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7663 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7664 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7667 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7671 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7675 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7677 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7678 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7679 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7680 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7682 // Marshall an MPP route.
7683 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7684 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7685 route.paths.push(path);
7686 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7687 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7688 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7689 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7690 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7691 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7693 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7694 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7695 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7696 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7701 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7702 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7708 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7709 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7711 total_msat: 100_000,
7714 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7715 // payment verification fails as expected.
7716 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7717 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7718 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7719 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7721 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7725 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7726 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7730 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7731 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7732 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7733 // the channel is successfully closed.
7734 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7735 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7736 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7737 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7739 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7740 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7741 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7742 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7743 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7745 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7746 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7748 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7749 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7750 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7751 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7754 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7756 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7757 // as it has the funding transaction.
7758 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7759 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7760 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7762 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7765 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7767 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7769 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7770 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7771 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7773 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7774 // as it has the funding transaction.
7775 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7776 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7777 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7780 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7781 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7783 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7784 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7785 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7787 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7788 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7789 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7790 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7792 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7793 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7795 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7796 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7797 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7798 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7799 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7800 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7801 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7803 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7804 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7805 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7806 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7807 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7808 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7809 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7812 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7814 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7815 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7816 // closing transaction).
7817 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7818 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7819 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7821 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7822 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7823 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7824 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7825 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7828 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7830 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7832 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7833 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7834 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7836 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7838 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7839 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7843 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7846 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7847 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7848 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7849 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7850 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7851 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7852 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7853 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7854 use util::test_utils;
7855 use util::config::UserConfig;
7856 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7858 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7859 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7860 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7862 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7866 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7867 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7868 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7869 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7870 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7871 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7872 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7877 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7878 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7881 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7882 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7883 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7885 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7886 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7888 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7889 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7891 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7892 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7894 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7895 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7896 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7897 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7898 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7900 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7902 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7904 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7905 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7906 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7907 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7908 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7910 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7912 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7914 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7915 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7916 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7917 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7918 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7921 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7922 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7923 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7925 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7926 } else { panic!(); }
7928 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7929 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7931 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7934 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7937 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7938 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7940 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7941 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7942 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7943 match msg_events[0] {
7944 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7945 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7946 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7950 match msg_events[1] {
7951 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7955 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7957 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7958 macro_rules! send_payment {
7959 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7960 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7961 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7962 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7963 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7964 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7965 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7966 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7967 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7968 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7970 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7971 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7973 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7974 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7976 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7977 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7978 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7979 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7980 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7981 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7982 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7983 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7985 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7986 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7987 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7988 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7990 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7991 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7992 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7993 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7994 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7996 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7999 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8000 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8001 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8002 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8004 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8009 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8010 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);