1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
297 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
299 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
304 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
306 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
307 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
308 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
309 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
310 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
312 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
313 err: msgs::LightningError,
314 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
315 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
317 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
319 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
321 err: LightningError {
323 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
324 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
331 shutdown_finish: None,
335 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
337 err: LightningError {
339 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
347 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
350 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
352 err: LightningError {
354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
355 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
361 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
362 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
366 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
369 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
372 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
376 log_level: Level::Warn,
379 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
383 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
385 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
386 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
399 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
400 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
401 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
402 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
403 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
405 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
406 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
407 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
408 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
409 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
410 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
411 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
413 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
417 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
418 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
419 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
420 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
421 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
422 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
425 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
426 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
427 /// quite some time lag.
428 enum BackgroundEvent {
429 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
430 /// commitment transaction.
431 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
434 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
435 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
437 latest_features: InitFeatures,
440 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
441 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
443 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
446 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
447 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
448 struct PendingInboundPayment {
449 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
450 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
451 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
452 /// this payment being removed.
454 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
455 user_payment_id: u64,
456 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
457 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
458 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
461 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
462 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
463 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
468 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
471 pending_amt_msat: u64,
472 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
473 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
476 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
477 starting_block_height: u32,
479 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
480 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
481 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
483 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
484 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
485 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
507 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
513 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
520 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
529 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
530 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
531 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
538 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
539 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
542 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
543 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
544 let our_payment_hash;
545 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
551 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
555 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
559 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
560 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
561 let remove_res = match self {
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
566 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
570 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
571 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
572 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
573 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
574 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
575 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
582 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
583 let insert_res = match self {
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
586 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
592 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
593 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
594 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
595 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
596 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
603 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
607 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
608 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
615 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
616 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
617 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
618 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
619 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
620 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
621 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
623 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
626 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
627 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
628 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
629 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
630 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
631 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
632 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
633 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
635 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
636 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
638 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
639 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
641 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
642 /// to individual Channels.
644 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
645 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
646 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
647 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
649 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
650 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
651 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
652 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
653 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
654 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
655 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
657 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
658 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
659 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
660 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
663 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
664 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
665 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
666 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
667 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
669 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
670 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
671 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
672 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
673 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
676 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
677 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
678 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
679 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
680 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
684 // `total_consistency_lock`
686 // |__`forward_htlcs`
688 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
690 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
692 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
694 // | |__`channel_state`
698 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
700 // | |__`per_peer_state`
702 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
706 // | |__`pending_events`
708 // | |__`pending_background_events`
710 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
711 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
712 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
713 K::Target: KeysInterface,
714 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
717 default_configuration: UserConfig,
718 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
719 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
723 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
725 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
727 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
728 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
732 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
733 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
734 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
736 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
737 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
738 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
739 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
741 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
742 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
744 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
745 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
746 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
747 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
748 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
749 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
750 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
751 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
753 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
755 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
756 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
758 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
760 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
761 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
762 /// and via the classic SCID.
764 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
765 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
769 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
771 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
772 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
773 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
775 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
776 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
778 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
779 /// failed/claimed by the user.
781 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
782 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
784 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
787 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
788 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
789 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
790 /// active channel list on load.
792 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
793 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
795 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
797 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
798 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
799 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
801 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
802 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
803 /// the handling of the events.
806 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
807 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
808 /// would break backwards compatability.
809 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
810 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
811 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
813 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
814 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
816 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
818 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
819 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
820 /// confirmation depth.
822 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
823 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
824 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
826 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
828 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
830 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
832 our_network_key: SecretKey,
833 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
835 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
837 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
838 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
839 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
841 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
842 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
844 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
845 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
846 /// keeping additional state.
847 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
849 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
850 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
851 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
852 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
854 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
855 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
856 /// are currently open with that peer.
857 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
858 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
861 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
862 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
864 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
865 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
866 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
868 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
869 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
870 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
871 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
872 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
873 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
874 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
876 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
883 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
885 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
886 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
887 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
888 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
889 pub struct ChainParameters {
890 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
891 pub network: Network,
893 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
895 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
896 pub best_block: BestBlock,
899 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
905 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
906 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
907 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
908 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
909 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
910 /// updates are ready for persistence).
912 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
913 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
914 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
915 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
916 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
918 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
919 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
922 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
923 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
924 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
927 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
928 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
930 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
931 persistence_notifier: notifier,
932 should_persist: persist_check,
933 _read_guard: read_guard,
938 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
940 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
941 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
946 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
947 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
949 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
951 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
952 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
953 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
954 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
955 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
957 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
958 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
960 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
962 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
963 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
964 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
965 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
966 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
967 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
968 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
969 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
970 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
971 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
972 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
973 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
974 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
976 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
977 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
979 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
980 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
981 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
982 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
984 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
985 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
986 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
987 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
988 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
989 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
992 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
994 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
995 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
998 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1000 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1001 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1003 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1004 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1005 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1006 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1008 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1009 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1010 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1011 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1012 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1013 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1014 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1015 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1016 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1017 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1018 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1021 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1022 /// to better separate parameters.
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1025 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1026 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1027 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1028 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1029 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1030 pub features: InitFeatures,
1031 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1032 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1033 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1035 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1037 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1038 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1039 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1040 /// payments to us through this channel.
1041 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1042 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1043 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1044 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1045 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1046 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1047 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1050 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1051 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1052 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1053 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1054 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1055 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1056 /// lifetime of the channel.
1057 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1058 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1059 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1060 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1061 /// our counterparty already.
1063 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1064 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1065 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1066 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1068 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1069 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1070 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1071 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1073 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1074 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1076 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1077 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1079 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1080 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1081 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1082 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1083 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1084 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1085 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1086 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1087 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1090 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1092 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1093 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1094 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1095 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1096 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1097 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1098 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1100 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1101 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1103 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1104 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1105 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1106 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1107 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1108 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1109 /// this value on chain.
1111 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1113 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1115 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1116 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1118 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1120 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1121 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1122 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1123 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1125 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1126 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1127 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1128 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1130 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1131 pub balance_msat: u64,
1132 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1133 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1134 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1135 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1137 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1139 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1140 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1141 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1142 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1143 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1144 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1145 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1146 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1148 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1149 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1150 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1151 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1152 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1153 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1154 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1156 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1157 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1158 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1159 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1160 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1161 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1162 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1163 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1164 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1166 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1168 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1169 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1170 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1171 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1172 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1174 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1175 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1176 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1177 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1178 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1179 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1180 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1182 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1183 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1184 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1185 pub is_outbound: bool,
1186 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1187 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1188 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1189 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1190 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1192 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1193 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1194 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1195 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1197 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1198 pub is_usable: bool,
1199 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1200 pub is_public: bool,
1201 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1202 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1203 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1204 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1205 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1206 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1208 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1209 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1212 impl ChannelDetails {
1213 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1214 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1215 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1217 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1218 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1219 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1220 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1223 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1224 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1225 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1227 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1228 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1229 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1230 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1234 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1235 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1236 /// states for more.
1237 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1238 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1239 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1240 /// send the payment at all.
1242 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1244 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1245 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1246 /// for this payment.
1247 ParameterError(APIError),
1248 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1249 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1251 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1253 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1256 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1257 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1258 /// for this payment.
1259 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1260 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1261 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1262 /// paths than the ones selected).
1264 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1265 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1266 /// for this payment.
1267 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1268 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1269 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1270 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1272 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1274 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1275 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1276 /// in over-/re-payment.
1278 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1279 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1280 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1282 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1283 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1284 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1285 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1287 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1288 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1289 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1290 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1291 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1292 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1293 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1294 payment_id: PaymentId,
1298 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1300 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1302 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1303 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1304 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1305 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1307 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1308 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1309 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1312 macro_rules! handle_error {
1313 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1316 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1317 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1320 // entering the macro.
1321 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1322 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1325 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1327 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1328 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1329 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1330 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1334 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1335 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1336 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1337 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1342 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1343 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1345 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1346 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1347 action: err.action.clone()
1351 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1352 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1355 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1362 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1363 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1364 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1365 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1366 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1367 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1369 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1370 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1371 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1372 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1373 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1375 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1376 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1378 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1382 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1383 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1384 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1386 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1387 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1389 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1390 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1392 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1393 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1394 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1395 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1396 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1397 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1403 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1404 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1408 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1410 $entry.remove_entry();
1418 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1419 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1423 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1425 $entry.remove_entry();
1433 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1434 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1436 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1437 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1443 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1444 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1446 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1447 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1448 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1449 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1450 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1451 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1452 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1453 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1454 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1455 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1456 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1457 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1458 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1459 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1462 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1463 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1464 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1465 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1466 match $action_type {
1467 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1468 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1470 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1471 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1473 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1474 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1475 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1476 if !$resend_commitment {
1477 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1480 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1482 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1483 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1490 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1491 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1493 $entry.remove_entry();
1497 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1498 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1499 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1501 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1502 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1504 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1505 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1507 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1508 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1510 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1511 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1515 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1516 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1517 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1518 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1519 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1521 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1522 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1523 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1524 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1525 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1526 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1527 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1528 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1529 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1530 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1535 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1536 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1537 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1539 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1540 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1541 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1542 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1543 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1544 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1547 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1552 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1553 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1554 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1555 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1556 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1559 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1561 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1562 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1564 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1566 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1567 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1568 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1569 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1570 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1571 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1572 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1573 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1575 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1576 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1577 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1581 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1583 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1584 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1585 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1587 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1588 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1589 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1590 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1591 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1592 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1593 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1594 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1596 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1597 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1600 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1601 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1603 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1605 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1607 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1609 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1610 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1611 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1612 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1620 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1621 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1622 &self.default_configuration
1625 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1626 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1627 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1630 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1631 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1633 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1635 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1639 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1644 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1646 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1647 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1648 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1649 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1650 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1652 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1653 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1655 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1656 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1657 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1659 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1660 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1661 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1662 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1663 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1664 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1666 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1667 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1668 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1669 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1670 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1671 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1675 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1676 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1677 Some(peer_state) => {
1678 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1679 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1680 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1681 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1682 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1683 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1684 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1688 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1693 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1696 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1699 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1700 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1702 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1703 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1704 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1707 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1709 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1715 node_id: their_network_key,
1718 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1721 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1722 let mut res = Vec::new();
1724 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1725 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1726 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1727 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1728 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1729 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1730 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1731 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1732 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1733 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1734 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1735 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1736 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1737 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1738 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1739 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1740 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1741 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1742 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1743 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1744 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1745 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1747 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1748 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1749 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1750 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1751 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1752 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1753 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1754 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1755 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1756 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1757 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1758 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1759 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1760 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1761 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1762 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1763 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1764 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1765 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1766 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1767 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1768 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1769 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1770 config: Some(channel.config()),
1774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1775 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1776 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1777 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1783 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1784 /// more information.
1785 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1786 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1789 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1790 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1792 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1793 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1796 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1797 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1798 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1799 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1800 // really wanted anyway.
1801 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1804 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1805 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1806 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1807 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1808 Some(transaction) => {
1809 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1813 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1814 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1815 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1816 reason: closure_reason
1820 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1821 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1823 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1824 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1826 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1827 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1829 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1830 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1832 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1833 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1834 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1835 Some(peer_state) => {
1836 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1837 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1838 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1840 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1843 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1845 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1846 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1847 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1848 let (result, is_permanent) =
1849 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1851 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1857 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1861 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1862 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1863 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1864 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1868 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1876 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1877 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1881 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1885 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1886 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1887 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1889 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1890 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1892 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1893 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1894 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1895 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1897 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1899 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1900 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1901 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1902 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1903 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1906 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1907 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1908 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1910 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1911 /// the channel being closed or not:
1912 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1913 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1914 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1915 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1916 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1917 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1918 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1920 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1922 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1923 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1924 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1925 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1926 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1930 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1931 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1932 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1933 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1934 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1935 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1936 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1938 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1939 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1940 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1941 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1942 // ignore the result here.
1943 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1947 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1948 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1949 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1950 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1953 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1954 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1955 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1956 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1958 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1959 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1961 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1963 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1965 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1968 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1969 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1970 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1971 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1977 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1980 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1982 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1983 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1984 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1985 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1986 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1987 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1988 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1998 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1999 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2000 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2002 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2003 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2004 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2007 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2008 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2009 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2011 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2012 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2013 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2014 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2015 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2018 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2019 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2020 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2021 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2022 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2026 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2027 /// local transaction(s).
2028 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2029 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2030 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2034 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2035 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2037 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2038 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2039 return Err(ReceiveError {
2040 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2042 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2045 // final_expiry_too_soon
2046 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2047 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2048 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2049 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2050 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2051 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2052 return Err(ReceiveError {
2054 err_data: Vec::new(),
2055 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2058 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2059 return Err(ReceiveError {
2061 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2062 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2066 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2067 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2068 return Err(ReceiveError {
2069 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2070 err_data: Vec::new(),
2071 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2074 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2075 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2076 return Err(ReceiveError {
2077 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2078 err_data: Vec::new(),
2079 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2081 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2082 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2084 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2085 phantom_shared_secret,
2087 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2088 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2089 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2090 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2091 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2092 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2093 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2094 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2096 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2097 err_data: Vec::new(),
2098 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2102 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2104 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2107 return Err(ReceiveError {
2108 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2109 err_data: Vec::new(),
2110 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2115 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2118 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2119 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2120 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2121 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2125 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2126 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2127 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2129 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2130 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2131 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2132 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2133 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2134 failure_code: $err_code,
2140 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2141 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2144 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2146 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2147 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2148 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2149 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2150 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2151 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2152 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2153 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2155 macro_rules! return_err {
2156 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2158 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2159 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2160 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2161 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2162 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2168 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2170 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2171 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2173 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2174 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2178 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2179 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2181 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2183 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2184 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2185 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2186 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2187 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2189 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2192 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2193 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2194 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2196 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2197 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2198 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2201 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2202 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2203 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2204 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2208 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2209 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2210 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2213 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2214 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2215 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2216 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2217 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2222 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2223 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2224 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2225 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2226 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2227 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2228 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2229 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2230 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2231 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2232 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2234 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2237 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2240 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2242 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2243 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2245 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2246 // no consistency guarantees.
2247 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2251 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2252 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2253 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2254 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2255 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2257 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2258 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2259 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2260 // we don't have the channel here.
2261 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2263 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2265 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2266 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2267 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2268 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2269 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2270 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2271 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2273 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2274 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2276 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2277 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2281 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2283 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2290 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2291 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2292 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2293 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2294 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2295 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2297 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2298 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2300 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2301 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2302 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2303 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2304 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2305 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2306 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2307 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2308 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2309 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2315 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2316 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2317 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2318 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2320 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2321 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2323 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2324 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2325 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2327 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2328 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2329 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2331 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2336 pending_forward_info
2339 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2340 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2341 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2343 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2344 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2345 if !chan.should_announce() {
2346 return Err(LightningError {
2347 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2348 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2351 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2352 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2355 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2358 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2359 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2360 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2361 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2362 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2363 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2365 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2366 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2370 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2372 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2374 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2376 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2377 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2379 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2380 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2381 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2382 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2383 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2384 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2385 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2386 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2389 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2390 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2392 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2398 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2399 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2401 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2402 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2404 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2405 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2406 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2407 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2408 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2410 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2412 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2414 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2415 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2416 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2417 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2420 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2421 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2422 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2424 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2425 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2427 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2428 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2430 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2431 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2433 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2434 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2436 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2437 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2438 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2441 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2442 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2443 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2445 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2446 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2448 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2449 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2450 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2451 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2452 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2453 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2454 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2455 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2456 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2457 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2459 _ => unreachable!(),
2462 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2464 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2465 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2466 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2467 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2468 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2469 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2478 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2479 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2480 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2481 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2486 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2487 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2489 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2494 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2496 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2497 /// fields for more info.
2499 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2500 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2501 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2502 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2505 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2506 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2507 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2508 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2509 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2511 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2512 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2514 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2515 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2516 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2518 /// In general, a path may raise:
2519 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2520 /// node public key) is specified.
2521 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2522 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2524 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2525 /// relevant updates.
2527 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2528 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2529 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2531 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2532 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2533 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2534 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2537 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2538 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2539 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2541 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2542 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2543 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2544 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2545 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2549 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2550 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2553 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2554 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2555 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2556 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2559 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2560 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2563 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2564 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2565 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2566 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2569 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2570 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2573 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2574 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2577 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2582 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2583 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2584 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2586 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2587 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2589 let mut total_value = 0;
2590 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2591 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2592 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2593 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2594 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2595 continue 'path_check;
2597 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2598 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2599 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2600 continue 'path_check;
2603 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2604 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2606 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2607 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2609 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2610 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2611 total_value = amt_msat;
2614 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2615 let mut results = Vec::new();
2616 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2617 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2618 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2621 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2622 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2623 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2624 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2627 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2628 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2629 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2630 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2632 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2633 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2637 results.push(path_res);
2639 let mut has_ok = false;
2640 let mut has_err = false;
2641 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2642 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2643 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2644 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2645 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2646 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2647 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2651 } else if res.is_err() {
2652 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2653 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2656 if has_err && has_ok {
2657 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2660 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2661 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2662 Some(RouteParameters {
2663 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2664 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2665 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2671 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2672 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2673 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2674 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2675 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2681 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2683 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2684 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2685 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2686 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2687 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2689 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2690 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2691 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2692 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2693 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2694 if path.len() == 0 {
2695 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2696 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2701 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2702 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2703 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2706 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2707 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2708 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2710 let res = match payment {
2711 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2712 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2714 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2715 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2716 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2717 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2720 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2722 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2723 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2724 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2727 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2728 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2729 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2732 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2733 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2734 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2738 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2739 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2744 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2745 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2749 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2752 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2754 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2755 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2756 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2757 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2759 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2760 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2761 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2763 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2764 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2765 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2766 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2769 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2770 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2771 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2772 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2773 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2775 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2783 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2784 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2785 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2786 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2787 /// never reach the recipient.
2789 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2790 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2792 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2793 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2795 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2797 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2798 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2799 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2801 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2803 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2804 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2806 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2807 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2812 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2813 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2814 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2815 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2816 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2818 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2821 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2822 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2826 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2827 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2829 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2830 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2835 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2837 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2838 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2839 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2842 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2843 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2844 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2845 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2846 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2847 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2850 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2851 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2852 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2853 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2854 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2856 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2858 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2860 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2861 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2862 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2863 } else { unreachable!(); })
2866 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2868 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2869 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2872 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2873 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2878 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2879 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2880 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2883 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2885 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2888 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2889 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2890 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2899 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2900 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2901 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2905 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2907 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2908 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2910 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2911 /// across the p2p network.
2913 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2914 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2916 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2917 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2918 /// keys per-channel).
2920 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2921 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2922 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2924 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2925 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2926 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2928 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2929 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2930 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2931 /// for more details.
2933 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2934 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2935 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2938 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2939 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2941 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2946 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2947 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2948 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2949 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2950 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2952 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2956 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2957 let mut output_index = None;
2958 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2959 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2960 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2961 if output_index.is_some() {
2962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2963 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2966 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2968 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2971 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2974 if output_index.is_none() {
2975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2976 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2979 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2983 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2985 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2986 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2987 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2988 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2990 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2991 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2993 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2994 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2996 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2998 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2999 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3000 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3001 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3002 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3003 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3004 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3005 pub fn update_channel_config(
3006 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3007 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3008 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3009 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3010 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3015 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3018 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3019 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3020 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3021 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3022 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3023 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3025 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3026 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3028 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3032 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3033 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3034 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3037 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3038 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3039 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3041 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3050 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3052 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3053 /// Will likely generate further events.
3054 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3055 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3057 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3058 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3059 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3060 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3062 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3063 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3065 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3066 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3067 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3069 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3070 match forward_info {
3071 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3072 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3073 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3074 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3075 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3078 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3079 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3080 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3082 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3083 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3084 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3085 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3086 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3087 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3090 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3091 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3093 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3096 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3097 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3103 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3104 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3106 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3110 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3111 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3113 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3117 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3118 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3119 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3120 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3121 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3123 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3124 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3125 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3126 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3127 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3129 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3131 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3132 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3136 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3137 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3138 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3139 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3145 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3148 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3151 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3152 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3153 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3154 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3155 // problem, not ours.
3161 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3162 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3164 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3168 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3172 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3176 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3177 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3178 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3179 match forward_info {
3180 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3181 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3182 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3183 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3184 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3188 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3189 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3190 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3191 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3192 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3193 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3194 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3196 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3198 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3201 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3203 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3204 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3205 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3206 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3212 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3214 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3215 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3216 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3217 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3218 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3219 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3220 // this channel currently :/.
3226 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3227 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3229 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3231 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3233 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3236 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3238 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3239 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3240 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3243 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3245 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3246 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3247 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3248 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3249 // messages when we can.
3250 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3251 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3252 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3259 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3260 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3263 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3264 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3265 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3266 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3267 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3268 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3270 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3272 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3273 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3274 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3277 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3281 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3282 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3284 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3288 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3289 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3291 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3292 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3293 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3294 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3295 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3296 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3298 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3305 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3306 match forward_info {
3307 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3308 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3309 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3310 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3313 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3314 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3315 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3316 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3318 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3319 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3321 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3324 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3325 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3326 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3327 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3328 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3330 phantom_shared_secret,
3332 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3334 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3339 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3340 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3341 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3342 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3343 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3345 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3346 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3347 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3348 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3349 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3350 phantom_shared_secret,
3352 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3353 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3357 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3358 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3359 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3360 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3361 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3364 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3365 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3366 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3368 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3369 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3370 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3373 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3374 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3375 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3376 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3377 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3379 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3383 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3384 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3385 total_value += htlc.value;
3386 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3387 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3388 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3389 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3390 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3391 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3393 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3395 _ => unreachable!(),
3398 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3400 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3402 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3403 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3404 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3405 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3406 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3409 amount_msat: total_value,
3410 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3411 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3413 payment_received_generated = true;
3415 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3416 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3418 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3420 payment_received_generated
3424 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3425 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3426 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3427 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3428 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3429 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3430 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3431 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3433 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3434 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3435 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3436 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3437 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3443 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3445 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3446 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3448 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3449 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3450 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3451 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3452 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3454 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3456 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3457 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3462 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3469 if payment_data.is_none() {
3470 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3471 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3474 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3475 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3477 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3478 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3480 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3481 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3483 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3484 if payment_received_generated {
3485 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3491 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3492 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3500 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3501 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3503 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3505 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3506 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3509 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3510 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3511 events.append(&mut new_events);
3514 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3516 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3517 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3519 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3520 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3521 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3522 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3523 if background_events.is_empty() {
3527 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3529 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3530 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3531 // monitor updating completing.
3532 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3539 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3540 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3541 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3542 self.process_background_events();
3545 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3546 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3547 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3548 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3549 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3550 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3551 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3553 if !chan.is_live() {
3554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3555 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3556 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3559 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3561 let mut retain_channel = true;
3562 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3565 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3566 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3570 let ret_err = match res {
3571 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3572 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3575 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3576 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3577 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3578 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3579 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3580 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3581 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3588 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3589 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3597 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3601 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3602 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3603 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3604 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3605 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3606 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3607 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3609 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3611 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3613 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3614 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3615 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3616 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3617 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3618 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3620 handle_errors.push(err);
3630 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3631 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3632 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3633 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3634 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3635 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3636 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3638 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3639 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3640 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3641 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3642 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3643 if no_remaining_entries {
3644 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3646 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3647 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3648 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3649 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3650 no_remaining_entries = false;
3658 if no_remaining_entries {
3659 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3660 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3662 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3669 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3671 /// This currently includes:
3672 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3673 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3674 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3676 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3677 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3679 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3680 /// estimate fetches.
3681 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3682 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3683 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3684 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3686 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3688 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3689 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3691 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3692 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3693 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3694 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3695 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3696 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3697 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3699 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3701 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3703 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3704 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3705 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3706 if needs_close { return false; }
3709 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3710 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3711 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3712 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3713 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3714 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3715 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3716 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3720 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3721 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3723 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3724 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3725 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3729 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3730 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3735 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3741 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3742 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3743 // This should be unreachable
3744 debug_assert!(false);
3747 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3748 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3749 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3750 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3752 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3753 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3754 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3756 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3763 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3764 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3765 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3768 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3769 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3772 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3778 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3779 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3780 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3782 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3783 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3784 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3785 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3787 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3788 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3789 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3790 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3791 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3794 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3795 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3796 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3797 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3798 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3799 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3800 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3801 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3802 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3803 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3808 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3809 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3811 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3813 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3814 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3815 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3816 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3817 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3818 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3819 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3821 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3823 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3824 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3826 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3831 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3832 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3833 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3834 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3835 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3836 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3837 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3838 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3839 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3840 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3842 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3843 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3844 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3845 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3847 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3848 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3849 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3850 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3851 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3855 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3856 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3857 // be surfaced to the user.
3858 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3859 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3860 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3862 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3863 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3864 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3866 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3871 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3876 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3877 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3878 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3879 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3881 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3882 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3883 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3884 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3885 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3888 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3889 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3890 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3893 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3894 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3895 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3897 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3898 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3899 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3900 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3901 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3902 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3903 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3904 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3908 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3909 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3912 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3913 all_paths_failed = true;
3914 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3915 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3917 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3926 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3927 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3928 Some(RouteParameters {
3929 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3930 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3931 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3934 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3936 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3937 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3939 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3941 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3943 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3944 if !payment_retryable {
3945 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3947 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3951 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3953 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3959 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3960 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3961 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3962 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3963 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3965 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3966 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3967 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3968 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3975 error_code: onion_error_code,
3977 error_data: onion_error_data
3981 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3987 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3988 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3989 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3990 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3992 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3993 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3994 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3995 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3997 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3998 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4000 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4002 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4005 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4006 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4007 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4008 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4009 network_update: None,
4012 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4015 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4017 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4022 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4023 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4024 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4026 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4027 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4028 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4029 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4030 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4031 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4032 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4033 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4035 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4036 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4039 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4040 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4041 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4045 let mut forward_event = None;
4046 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4047 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4048 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4050 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4052 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4055 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4058 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4059 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4060 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4061 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4062 time_forwardable: time
4065 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4066 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4067 failed_next_destination: destination
4073 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4074 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4076 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4077 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4078 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4080 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4081 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4082 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4083 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4085 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4086 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4087 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4088 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4089 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4090 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4091 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4092 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4096 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4097 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4098 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4100 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4101 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4102 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4103 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4105 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4106 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4107 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4108 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4109 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4111 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4112 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4113 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4114 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4115 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4116 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4118 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4119 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4120 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4121 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4128 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4133 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4134 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4135 debug_assert!(false);
4139 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4140 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4141 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4142 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4143 if sources.len() != 1 {
4144 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4145 debug_assert!(false);
4150 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4151 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4152 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4153 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4154 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4157 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4159 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4160 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4163 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4164 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4165 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4169 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4170 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4171 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4172 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4173 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4174 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4175 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4176 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4177 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4179 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4180 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4181 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4182 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4183 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4184 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4186 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4190 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4192 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4193 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4194 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4195 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4196 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4197 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4198 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4199 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4203 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4204 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4207 purpose: payment_purpose,
4208 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4212 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4213 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4214 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4215 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4220 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4221 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4223 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4224 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4225 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4226 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4227 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4228 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4229 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4230 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4232 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4233 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4234 payment_preimage, e);
4235 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4236 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4237 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4238 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4242 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4243 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4244 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4245 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4246 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4247 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4248 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4249 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4250 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4251 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4257 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4259 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4262 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4263 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4264 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4266 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4267 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4268 payment_preimage, e);
4271 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4272 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4274 chan.remove_entry();
4276 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4279 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4282 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4283 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4284 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4285 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4286 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4287 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4288 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4289 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4290 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4291 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4292 pending_events.push(
4293 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4295 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4305 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4307 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4308 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4309 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4310 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4311 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4312 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4313 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4314 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4315 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4316 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4317 pending_events.push(
4318 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4319 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4325 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4329 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4330 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4331 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4333 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4334 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4335 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4336 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4337 pending_events.push(
4338 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4350 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4351 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4352 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4353 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4354 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4355 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4356 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4359 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4360 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4361 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4362 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4363 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4366 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4367 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4368 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4369 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4370 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4371 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4372 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4373 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4374 // again on restart.
4375 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4376 payment_preimage, update_res);
4378 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4379 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4380 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4381 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4384 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4385 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4386 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4387 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4391 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4392 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4393 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4396 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4397 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4398 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4400 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4402 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4412 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4413 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4414 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4417 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4418 /// update completion.
4419 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4420 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4421 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4422 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4423 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4424 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4425 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4427 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4428 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4429 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4430 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4433 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4434 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4436 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4437 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4438 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4443 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4445 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4446 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4448 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4453 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4454 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4455 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4456 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4457 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4462 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4466 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4472 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4473 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4474 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4480 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4481 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4484 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4485 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4487 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4488 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4491 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4495 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4496 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4497 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4498 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4499 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4500 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4501 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4503 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4504 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4505 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4510 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4511 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4515 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4517 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4518 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4520 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4521 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4522 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4523 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4527 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4529 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4530 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4533 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4534 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4535 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4537 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4538 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4539 /// used to accept such channels.
4541 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4542 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4543 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4544 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4547 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4548 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4550 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4551 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4552 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4554 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4555 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4557 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4558 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4560 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4561 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4563 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4564 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4565 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4566 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4569 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4572 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4574 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4575 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4576 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4577 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4579 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4580 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4583 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4584 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4585 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4586 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4587 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4588 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4591 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4592 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4596 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4597 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4598 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4601 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4602 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4608 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4609 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4613 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4617 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4618 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4619 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4621 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4622 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4623 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4624 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4627 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4634 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4636 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4640 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4641 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4642 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4645 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4646 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4649 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4650 pending_events.push(
4651 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4652 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4653 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4654 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4655 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4656 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4661 entry.insert(channel);
4667 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4668 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4669 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4670 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4671 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4673 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4676 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4677 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4682 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4683 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4684 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4685 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4686 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4688 user_channel_id: user_id,
4693 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4694 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4695 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4696 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4697 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4698 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4700 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4703 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4708 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4709 // lock before watch_channel
4710 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4711 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4712 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4713 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4714 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4715 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4716 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4717 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4718 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4719 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4720 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4721 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4722 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4724 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4725 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4726 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4727 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4728 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4729 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4730 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4733 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4735 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4737 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4739 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4740 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4741 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4742 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4744 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4745 funding_msg.channel_id))
4747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4748 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4751 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4752 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4755 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4756 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4764 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4766 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4767 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4771 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4774 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4775 Ok(update) => update,
4776 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4778 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4779 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4781 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4782 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4783 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4784 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4785 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4786 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4787 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4793 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4794 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4801 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4802 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4806 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4807 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4808 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4809 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4811 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4814 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4815 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4816 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4817 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4818 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4819 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4820 msg: announcement_sigs,
4822 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4823 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4824 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4825 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4826 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4827 // announcement_signatures.
4828 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4829 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4830 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4831 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4837 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4845 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4846 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4847 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4851 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4853 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4857 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4858 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4859 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4860 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4863 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4864 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4866 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4867 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4868 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4869 let (result, is_permanent) =
4870 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4872 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4877 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4878 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4879 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4889 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4890 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4891 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4894 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4898 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4899 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4900 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4902 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4904 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4907 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4908 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4910 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4915 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4916 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4917 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4918 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4919 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4920 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4921 } else { (tx, None) }
4923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4926 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4927 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4928 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4930 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4931 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4937 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4942 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4943 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4944 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4945 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4947 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4948 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4949 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4950 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4952 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4953 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4954 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4958 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4962 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4963 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4964 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4965 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4966 match pending_forward_info {
4967 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4968 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4969 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4970 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4972 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4974 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4975 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4976 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4979 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4981 _ => pending_forward_info
4984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4991 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4993 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4997 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5000 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5005 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5009 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5010 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5011 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5014 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5024 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5029 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5032 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5033 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5034 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5036 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5043 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5044 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5046 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5048 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5051 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5052 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5053 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5054 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5055 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5056 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5057 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5062 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5063 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5067 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5068 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5069 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5071 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5072 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5073 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5074 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5075 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5076 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5077 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5078 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5080 commitment_signed: msg,
5086 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5091 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5092 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5093 let mut forward_event = None;
5094 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5095 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5096 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5097 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5099 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5100 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5101 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5102 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5103 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5106 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5107 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5110 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5111 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5116 match forward_event {
5118 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5119 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5120 time_forwardable: time
5128 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5129 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5132 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5135 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5136 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5138 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5139 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5140 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5141 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5142 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5143 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5144 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5145 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5146 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5147 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5148 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5149 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5151 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5152 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5153 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5154 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5155 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5156 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5158 } else { unreachable!(); }
5160 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5161 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5162 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5166 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5167 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5168 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5169 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5170 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5171 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5176 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5178 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5179 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5181 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5182 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5183 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5185 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5186 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5193 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5194 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5196 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5198 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5199 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5201 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5208 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5209 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5210 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5212 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5214 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5217 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5221 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5222 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5223 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5224 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5225 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5226 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5234 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5235 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5236 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5237 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5239 // It's not a local channel
5240 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5243 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5244 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5245 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5247 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5248 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5249 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5250 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5251 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5252 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5256 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5257 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5258 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5259 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5261 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5262 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5265 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5267 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5270 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5272 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5273 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5274 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5276 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5278 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5279 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5281 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5282 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5283 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5284 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5285 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5286 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5287 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5288 let mut channel_update = None;
5289 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5291 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5294 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5295 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5296 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5297 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5298 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5299 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5300 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5305 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5306 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5307 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5308 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5309 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5310 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5318 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5319 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5322 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5323 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5328 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5329 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5330 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5331 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5332 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5333 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5334 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5335 match monitor_event {
5336 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5337 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5338 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5339 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5342 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5343 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5346 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5347 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5348 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5349 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5350 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5351 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5352 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5353 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5354 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5355 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5356 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5360 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5361 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5363 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5365 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5366 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5367 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5368 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5369 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5374 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5375 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5381 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5382 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5385 has_pending_monitor_events
5388 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5389 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5390 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5392 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5393 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5396 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5397 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5398 /// update was applied.
5400 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5401 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5402 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5403 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5404 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5405 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5406 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5407 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5409 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5410 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5411 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5412 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5414 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5415 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5416 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5417 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5419 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5421 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5424 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5425 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5426 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5428 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5429 updates: commitment_update,
5433 has_monitor_update = true;
5434 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5435 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5436 if close_channel { return false; }
5443 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5444 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5445 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5452 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5453 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5454 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5457 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5458 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5464 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5465 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5466 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5467 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5468 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5469 let mut has_update = false;
5471 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5473 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5474 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5476 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5477 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5478 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5479 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5481 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5482 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5485 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5486 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5487 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5488 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5494 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5496 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5497 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5498 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5504 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5505 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5512 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5513 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5519 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5520 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5522 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5523 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5524 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5525 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5526 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5527 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5528 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5529 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5530 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5531 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5532 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5533 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5534 assert!(should_broadcast);
5535 } else { unreachable!(); }
5536 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5538 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5542 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5543 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5545 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5546 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5549 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5552 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5553 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5554 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5555 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5556 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5557 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5558 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5559 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5560 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5561 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5562 // never fail a payment too early.
5563 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5565 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5568 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5573 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5576 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5577 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5579 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5580 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5581 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5583 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5585 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5586 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5590 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5591 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5593 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5595 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5596 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5597 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5598 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5599 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5600 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5603 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5604 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5606 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5609 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5611 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5613 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5614 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5615 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5616 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5617 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5620 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5621 /// stored external to LDK.
5623 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5624 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5625 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5627 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5628 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5631 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5632 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5633 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5634 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5636 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5637 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5638 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5639 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5640 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5642 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5643 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5644 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5645 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5646 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5648 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5649 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5651 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5652 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5656 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5657 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5659 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5661 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5662 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5663 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5664 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5667 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5668 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5670 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5673 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5675 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5677 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5678 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5681 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5682 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5684 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5685 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5686 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5689 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5690 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5692 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5693 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5694 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5695 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5697 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5698 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5699 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5700 Some(_) => continue,
5701 None => return scid_candidate
5706 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5708 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5709 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5711 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5712 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5713 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5717 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5718 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5719 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5720 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5722 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5723 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5724 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5725 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5733 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5734 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5735 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5736 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5737 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5742 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5743 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5747 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5748 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5751 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5752 /// using the given event handler.
5754 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5755 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5758 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5759 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5760 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5762 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5764 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5765 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5766 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5767 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5770 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5771 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5772 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5775 for event in pending_events {
5776 handler(event).await;
5779 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5780 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5785 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5786 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5787 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5788 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5789 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5792 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5793 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5794 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5795 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5797 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5798 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5799 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5800 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5803 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5804 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5806 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5807 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5810 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5811 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5812 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5814 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5815 events.replace(pending_events);
5824 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5826 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5827 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5828 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5829 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5832 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5834 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5835 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5836 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5837 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5838 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5840 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5841 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5842 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5843 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5846 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5847 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5848 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5851 for event in pending_events {
5852 handler.handle_event(event);
5860 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5862 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5863 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5864 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5865 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5868 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5870 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5871 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5872 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5873 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5874 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5877 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5878 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5881 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5883 let new_height = height - 1;
5885 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5886 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5887 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5888 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5889 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5890 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5893 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5899 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5900 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5901 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5905 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5906 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5907 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5908 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5910 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5911 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5914 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5915 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5917 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5918 if height < last_best_block_height {
5919 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5920 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5924 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5925 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5926 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5927 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5929 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5930 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5934 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5936 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5938 macro_rules! max_time {
5939 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5941 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5942 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5943 // having an explicit local time source.
5944 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5945 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5946 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5947 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5948 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5954 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5955 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5956 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5957 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5961 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5962 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5963 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5964 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5965 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5966 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5972 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5974 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5975 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5976 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5977 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5978 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5979 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5984 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5986 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5987 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5988 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5992 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5993 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5995 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5996 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5997 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5998 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5999 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6001 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6002 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6004 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6006 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6007 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6008 let res = f(channel);
6009 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6010 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6011 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6012 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6014 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6016 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6017 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6018 if channel.is_usable() {
6019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6020 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6021 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6022 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6027 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6031 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6033 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6035 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6036 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6037 msg: announcement_sigs,
6039 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6040 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6041 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6043 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6044 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6045 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6050 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6051 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6052 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6053 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6054 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6055 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6056 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6057 // is always consistent.
6058 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6059 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6060 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6061 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6062 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6065 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6066 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6067 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6068 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6069 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6070 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6075 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6076 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6077 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6078 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6079 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6080 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6081 data: reason_message,
6090 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6091 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6092 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6093 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6094 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6095 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6096 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6097 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6098 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6099 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6101 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6102 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6103 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6104 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6108 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6112 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6114 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6115 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6119 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6120 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6121 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6122 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6124 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6126 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6127 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6128 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6129 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6130 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6131 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6134 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6135 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6136 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6138 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6139 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6140 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6141 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6144 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6145 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6146 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6147 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6148 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6151 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6152 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6153 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6156 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6157 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6158 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6159 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6163 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6164 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6165 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6166 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6167 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6171 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6176 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6191 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6206 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6247 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6248 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6251 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6256 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6264 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6266 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6267 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6268 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6269 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6270 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6271 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6272 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6273 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6274 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6275 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6276 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6279 no_channels_remain = false;
6284 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6309 if no_channels_remain {
6310 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6313 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6314 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6318 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6319 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6320 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6324 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6329 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6330 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6332 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6333 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6337 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6342 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6343 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6344 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6345 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6346 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6347 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6348 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6349 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6350 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6354 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6355 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6356 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6361 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6362 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6363 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6364 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6365 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6373 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6377 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6380 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6381 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6382 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6383 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6384 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6389 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6390 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6391 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6392 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6395 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6396 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6397 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6405 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6406 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6410 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6411 provided_node_features()
6414 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6415 provided_init_features()
6419 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6420 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6421 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6422 provided_init_features().to_context()
6425 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6426 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6428 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6429 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6430 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6431 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6432 provided_init_features().to_context()
6435 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6436 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6437 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6438 provided_init_features().to_context()
6441 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6442 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6443 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6444 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6445 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6446 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6447 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6448 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6449 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6450 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6451 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6452 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6453 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6454 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6455 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6456 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6457 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6458 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6462 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6463 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6465 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6466 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6467 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6468 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6471 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6472 (2, node_id, required),
6473 (4, features, required),
6474 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6475 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6476 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6477 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6480 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6481 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6482 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6483 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6484 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6485 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6486 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6487 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6488 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6489 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6490 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6491 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6492 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6493 (7, self.config, option),
6494 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6495 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6496 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6497 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6498 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6499 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6500 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6501 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6502 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6503 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6504 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6505 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6506 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6507 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6508 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6509 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6510 (32, self.is_public, required),
6511 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6512 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6513 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6519 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6520 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6521 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6522 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6523 (2, channel_id, required),
6524 (3, channel_type, option),
6525 (4, counterparty, required),
6526 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6527 (6, funding_txo, option),
6528 (7, config, option),
6529 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6530 (9, confirmations, option),
6531 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6532 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6533 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6534 (16, balance_msat, required),
6535 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6536 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6537 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6538 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6539 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6540 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6541 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6542 (26, is_outbound, required),
6543 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6544 (30, is_usable, required),
6545 (32, is_public, required),
6546 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6547 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6548 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6551 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6552 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6553 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6554 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6555 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6559 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6561 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6562 outbound_scid_alias,
6566 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6567 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6569 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6570 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6571 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6572 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6573 confirmations_required,
6575 force_close_spend_delay,
6576 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6577 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6578 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6579 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6580 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6581 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6586 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6587 (2, channels, vec_type),
6588 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6589 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6592 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6594 (0, onion_packet, required),
6595 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6598 (0, payment_data, required),
6599 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6600 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6602 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6603 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6604 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6608 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6609 (0, routing, required),
6610 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6611 (4, payment_hash, required),
6612 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6613 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6614 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6618 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6619 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6621 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6623 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6624 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6625 reason.write(writer)?;
6627 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6628 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6631 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6632 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6633 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6634 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6641 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6642 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6643 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6647 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6648 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6649 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6653 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6654 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6655 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6656 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6657 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6660 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6661 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6662 // messages contained in the variants.
6663 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6664 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6665 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6667 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6669 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6670 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6671 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6674 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6676 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6677 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6678 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6680 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6685 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6690 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6691 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6692 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6693 (2, outpoint, required),
6694 (4, htlc_id, required),
6695 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6698 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6699 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6700 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6701 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6702 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6704 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6705 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6706 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6707 (2, self.value, required),
6708 (4, payment_data, option),
6709 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6710 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6716 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6717 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6718 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6720 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6721 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6722 let mut total_msat = None;
6723 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6724 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6725 (0, prev_hop, required),
6726 (1, total_msat, option),
6727 (2, value, required),
6728 (4, payment_data, option),
6729 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6730 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6732 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6734 if payment_data.is_some() {
6735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6737 if total_msat.is_none() {
6738 total_msat = Some(value);
6740 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6743 if total_msat.is_none() {
6744 if payment_data.is_none() {
6745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6747 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6749 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6753 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6756 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6763 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6764 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6765 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6768 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6769 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6770 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6771 let mut payment_id = None;
6772 let mut payment_secret = None;
6773 let mut payment_params = None;
6774 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6775 (0, session_priv, required),
6776 (1, payment_id, option),
6777 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6778 (3, payment_secret, option),
6779 (4, path, vec_type),
6780 (5, payment_params, option),
6782 if payment_id.is_none() {
6783 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6785 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6787 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6788 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6789 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6790 path: path.unwrap(),
6791 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6796 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6797 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6802 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6803 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6805 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6807 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6808 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6809 (0, session_priv, required),
6810 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6811 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6812 (3, payment_secret, option),
6813 (4, *path, vec_type),
6814 (5, payment_params, option),
6817 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6819 field.write(writer)?;
6826 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6827 (0, LightningError) => {
6831 (0, failure_code, required),
6832 (2, data, vec_type),
6836 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6837 (0, forward_info, required),
6838 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6839 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6840 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6841 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6844 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6846 (0, htlc_id, required),
6847 (2, err_packet, required),
6852 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6853 (0, payment_secret, required),
6854 (2, expiry_time, required),
6855 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6856 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6857 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6862 (0, session_privs, required),
6865 (0, session_privs, required),
6866 (1, payment_hash, option),
6867 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6870 (0, session_privs, required),
6871 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6872 (2, payment_hash, required),
6873 (4, payment_secret, option),
6874 (6, total_msat, required),
6875 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6876 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6879 (0, session_privs, required),
6880 (2, payment_hash, required),
6884 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6885 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6886 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6887 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6888 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6891 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6892 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6894 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6896 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6898 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6899 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6900 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6904 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6905 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6906 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6907 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6908 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6909 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6910 unfunded_channels += 1;
6913 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6914 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6915 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6916 channel.write(writer)?;
6922 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6923 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6924 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6925 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6926 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6927 for forward in pending_forwards {
6928 forward.write(writer)?;
6933 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6934 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6935 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6937 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6938 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6939 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6940 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6941 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6942 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6943 htlc.write(writer)?;
6945 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6948 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6949 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6950 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6951 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6952 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6953 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6956 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6957 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6958 for event in events.iter() {
6959 event.write(writer)?;
6962 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6963 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6964 for event in background_events.iter() {
6966 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6968 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6969 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6974 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6975 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6976 // likely to be identical.
6977 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6978 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6980 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6981 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6982 hash.write(writer)?;
6983 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6986 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6987 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6988 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6989 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6990 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6993 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6994 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6996 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6997 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6998 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6999 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7002 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7003 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7007 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7008 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7009 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7011 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7012 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7013 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7019 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7020 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7021 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7022 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7024 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7025 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7026 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7027 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7028 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7029 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7030 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7031 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7038 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7040 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7042 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7043 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7044 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7045 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7046 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7047 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7048 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7049 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7050 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7051 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7052 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7053 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7054 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7056 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7057 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7059 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7060 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7062 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7063 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7064 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7065 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7066 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7067 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7069 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7070 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7071 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7073 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7077 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7078 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7080 pub keys_manager: K,
7082 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7084 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7085 pub fee_estimator: F,
7086 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7088 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7089 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7090 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7091 pub chain_monitor: M,
7093 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7094 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7095 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7096 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7097 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7098 /// deserialization.
7100 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7101 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7102 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7104 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7105 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7107 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7108 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7109 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7110 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7112 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7115 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7116 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7119 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7120 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7121 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7122 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7123 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7127 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7128 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7129 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7130 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7131 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7133 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7134 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7139 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7140 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7141 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7142 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7143 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7145 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7149 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7150 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7151 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7155 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7156 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7157 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7158 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7159 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7163 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7164 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7166 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7167 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7172 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7174 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7175 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7176 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7177 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7178 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7179 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7180 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7181 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7182 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7183 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7184 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7185 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7186 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7187 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7188 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7189 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7190 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7191 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7192 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7193 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7194 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7196 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7197 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7198 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7199 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7200 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7201 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7202 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7203 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7204 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7205 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7206 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7207 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7208 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7209 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7210 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7211 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7214 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7215 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7216 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7218 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7219 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7221 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7223 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7224 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7225 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7226 // safely discard the channel.
7227 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7228 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7229 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7230 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7231 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7234 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7235 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7236 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7237 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7238 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7243 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7244 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7245 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7246 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7250 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7251 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7252 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7253 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7254 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7255 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7256 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7257 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7258 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7260 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7263 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7264 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7265 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7266 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7269 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7270 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7272 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7275 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7276 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7277 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7278 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7279 let peer_state = PeerState {
7280 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7282 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7285 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7287 for _ in 0..event_count {
7288 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7289 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7293 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7294 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7295 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7296 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7297 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7298 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7299 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7300 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7304 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7306 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7307 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7308 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7309 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7313 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7314 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7318 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7319 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7320 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7324 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7326 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7327 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7328 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7330 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7332 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7333 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7337 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7338 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7339 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7340 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7341 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7342 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7343 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7344 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7345 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7346 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7347 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7348 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7349 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7350 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7351 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7352 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7354 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7355 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7358 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7359 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7362 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7363 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7364 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7365 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7366 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7367 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7369 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7371 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7372 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7373 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7374 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7375 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7376 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7377 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7379 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7380 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7381 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7382 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7383 if path.is_empty() {
7384 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7385 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7387 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7388 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7389 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7390 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7392 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7393 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7394 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7397 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7398 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7399 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7400 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7402 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7403 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7404 total_msat: path_amt,
7405 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7407 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7408 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7417 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7418 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7420 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7421 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7422 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7425 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7426 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7429 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7430 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7431 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7432 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7435 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7436 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7437 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7438 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7439 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7440 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7441 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7442 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7444 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7445 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7449 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7451 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7453 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7454 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7456 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7460 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7461 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7463 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7464 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7467 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7469 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7471 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7472 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7473 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7474 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7479 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7480 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7481 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7482 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7484 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7485 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7486 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7488 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7489 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7490 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7491 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7492 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7493 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7495 if chan.is_usable() {
7496 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7497 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7498 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7499 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7500 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7505 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7507 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7508 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7509 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7510 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7511 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7512 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7513 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7514 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7515 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7516 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7517 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7519 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7520 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7522 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7523 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7524 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7525 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7527 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7528 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7529 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7530 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7532 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7533 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7534 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7535 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7537 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7538 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7539 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7541 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7542 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7545 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7548 purpose: payment_purpose,
7549 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7555 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7557 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7558 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7559 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7561 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7563 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7565 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7567 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7568 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7569 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7570 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7572 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7573 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7574 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7575 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7576 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7577 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7579 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7585 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7587 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7589 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7590 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7591 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7592 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7594 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7595 logger: args.logger,
7596 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7599 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7600 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7601 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7602 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7605 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7606 //connection or two.
7608 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7614 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7615 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7616 use core::time::Duration;
7617 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7618 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7619 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7620 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7621 use crate::ln::msgs;
7622 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7623 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7624 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7625 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7626 use crate::util::test_utils;
7627 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7630 fn test_notify_limits() {
7631 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7632 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7636 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7638 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7639 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7640 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7641 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7642 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7644 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7646 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7647 // to connect messages with new values
7648 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7649 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7650 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7651 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7653 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7654 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7655 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7656 // ... but the last node should not.
7657 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7658 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7659 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7660 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7662 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7663 // about the channel.
7664 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7665 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7666 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7668 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7670 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7671 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7672 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7673 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7674 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7675 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7677 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7678 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7679 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7681 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7682 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7683 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7684 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7685 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7686 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7688 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7689 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7690 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7691 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7692 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7693 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7694 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7695 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7697 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7698 // the channel info has updated.
7699 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7700 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7701 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7702 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7703 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7704 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7708 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7709 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7714 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7715 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7717 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7718 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7719 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7720 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7722 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7723 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7724 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7725 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7726 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7727 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7729 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7731 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7733 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7734 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7736 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7738 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7739 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7740 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7742 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7743 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7744 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7746 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7747 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7748 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7749 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7750 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7751 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7752 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7753 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7754 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7756 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7757 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7759 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7761 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7763 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7764 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7765 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7766 // lightning messages manually.
7767 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7768 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7771 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7772 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7773 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7775 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7776 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7778 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7779 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7781 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7782 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7783 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7785 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7786 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7787 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7789 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7791 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7793 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7794 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7797 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7798 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7799 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7802 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7803 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7804 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7805 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7810 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7811 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7812 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7813 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7815 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7818 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7819 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7820 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7821 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7828 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7829 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7830 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7831 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7832 // fails as expected.
7833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7836 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7837 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7838 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7839 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7841 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7842 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7843 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7845 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7846 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7847 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7848 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7849 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7851 let route = find_route(
7852 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7853 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7855 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7857 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7858 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7859 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7860 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7861 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7863 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7864 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7865 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7867 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7869 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7870 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7871 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7872 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7873 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7874 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7875 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7876 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7877 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7879 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7880 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7882 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7883 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7884 let route = find_route(
7885 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7886 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7888 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7890 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7892 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7893 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7894 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7896 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7897 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7900 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7902 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7903 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7904 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7906 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7908 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7910 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7911 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7912 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7913 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7914 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7915 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7917 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7918 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7920 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7921 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7925 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7926 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7927 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7930 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7931 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7933 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7934 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7935 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7936 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7938 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7939 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7940 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7941 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7942 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7944 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7945 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7946 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7947 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7948 let route = find_route(
7949 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7950 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7953 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7954 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7955 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7956 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7959 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7960 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7961 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7962 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7963 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7964 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7965 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7967 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7971 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7972 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7976 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7978 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7979 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7980 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7981 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7983 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7984 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7985 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7986 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7987 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7989 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7990 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7991 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7992 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7993 let route = find_route(
7994 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7995 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7998 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7999 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8000 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8001 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8002 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8005 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8006 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8007 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8008 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8009 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8010 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8011 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8013 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8017 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8021 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8023 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8024 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8025 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8026 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8028 // Marshall an MPP route.
8029 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8030 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8031 route.paths.push(path);
8032 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8033 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8034 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8035 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8036 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8037 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8039 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8040 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8041 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8042 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8047 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8048 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8052 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8054 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8055 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8057 total_msat: 100_000,
8060 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8061 // payment verification fails as expected.
8062 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8063 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8064 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8065 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8067 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8071 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8072 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8076 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8077 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8078 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8079 // the channel is successfully closed.
8080 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8081 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8082 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8083 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8085 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8086 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8087 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8088 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8089 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8091 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8092 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8094 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8095 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8096 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8097 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8100 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8102 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8103 // as it has the funding transaction.
8104 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8105 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8106 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8108 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8111 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8115 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8116 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8117 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8119 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8120 // as it has the funding transaction.
8121 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8122 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8123 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8126 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8127 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8129 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8130 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8131 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8133 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8134 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8135 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8136 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8138 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8139 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8141 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8142 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8143 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8144 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8145 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8146 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8147 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8149 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8150 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8151 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8152 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8153 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8154 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8155 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8158 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8160 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8161 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8162 // closing transaction).
8163 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8164 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8165 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8167 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8168 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8169 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8170 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8171 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8174 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8176 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8178 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8179 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8180 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8182 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8184 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8185 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8189 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8191 use crate::chain::Listen;
8192 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8193 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8194 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8195 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8196 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8197 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8198 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8199 use crate::util::test_utils;
8200 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8201 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8203 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8204 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8205 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8207 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8211 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8212 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8213 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8214 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8215 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8216 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8217 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8222 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8223 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8226 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8227 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8228 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8230 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8231 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8233 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8234 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8236 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8237 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8239 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8240 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8241 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8242 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8243 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8245 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8247 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8249 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8250 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8251 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8252 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8253 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8255 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8257 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8259 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8260 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8261 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8262 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8263 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8266 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8267 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8268 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8270 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8271 } else { panic!(); }
8273 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8274 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8276 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8279 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8282 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8283 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8285 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8286 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8287 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8288 match msg_events[0] {
8289 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8290 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8291 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8295 match msg_events[1] {
8296 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8300 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8301 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8303 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8304 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8309 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8310 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8312 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8313 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8318 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8320 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8321 macro_rules! send_payment {
8322 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8323 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8324 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8325 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8326 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8327 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8328 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8329 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8330 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8331 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8333 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8334 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8336 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8337 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8339 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8340 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8341 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8342 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8343 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8344 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8345 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8346 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8348 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8349 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8350 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8351 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8353 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8354 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8355 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8356 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8357 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8359 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8362 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8363 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8364 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8365 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8367 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8372 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8373 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);