1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PendingOutboundPayment};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, Sign, SignerProvider};
61 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
62 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
63 use crate::util::events;
64 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
65 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
66 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
67 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
68 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
253 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
254 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
255 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
259 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
264 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
265 payment_id.hash(hasher);
266 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
267 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
268 payment_params.hash(hasher);
273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
276 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
277 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
279 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
280 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
281 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
282 payment_secret: None,
283 payment_params: None,
288 struct ReceiveError {
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
296 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303 err: msgs::LightningError,
304 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
309 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
327 err: LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
332 shutdown_finish: None,
336 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
340 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
342 err: LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
351 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
356 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
366 log_level: Level::Warn,
369 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
373 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
403 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
407 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
408 struct ClaimingPayment {
410 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
411 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
413 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
414 (0, amount_msat, required),
415 (2, payment_purpose, required),
416 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
419 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
420 struct ClaimablePayments {
421 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
422 /// failed/claimed by the user.
424 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
425 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
427 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
428 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
429 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
431 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
432 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
433 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
434 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
437 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
438 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
439 /// quite some time lag.
440 enum BackgroundEvent {
441 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
442 /// commitment transaction.
443 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
446 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
447 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
448 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
449 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
450 /// event can be generated.
451 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
452 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
453 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
456 /// State we hold per-peer.
457 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: Sign> {
458 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
460 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
461 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
463 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
464 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
465 latest_features: InitFeatures,
466 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
467 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
468 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
471 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
472 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
474 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
477 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
478 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
479 struct PendingInboundPayment {
480 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
481 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
482 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
483 /// this payment being removed.
485 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
486 user_payment_id: u64,
487 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
488 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
489 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
492 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
493 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
494 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
495 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
496 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
497 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
498 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
500 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
501 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
509 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
511 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
516 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
517 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
518 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
519 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
520 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
521 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
522 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
523 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
525 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
526 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
528 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
529 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
531 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
532 /// to individual Channels.
534 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
535 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
536 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
537 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
539 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
540 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
541 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
542 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
543 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
544 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
545 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
547 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
548 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
549 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
550 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
553 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
554 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
555 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
556 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
557 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
559 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
560 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
561 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
562 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
563 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
566 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
567 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
568 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
569 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
570 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
574 // `total_consistency_lock`
576 // |__`forward_htlcs`
578 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
580 // |__`per_peer_state`
582 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
584 // | |__`claimable_payments`
586 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
592 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
594 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
598 // | |__`pending_events`
600 // | |__`pending_background_events`
602 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
604 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
605 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
606 ES::Target: EntropySource,
607 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
608 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
609 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
613 default_configuration: UserConfig,
614 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
615 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
621 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
623 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
625 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
628 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
629 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
630 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
631 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
633 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
634 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
636 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
637 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
638 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
639 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
640 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
641 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
642 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
643 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
645 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
647 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
648 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
650 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
652 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
653 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
654 /// and via the classic SCID.
656 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
657 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
659 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
661 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
663 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
664 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
665 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
667 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
668 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
670 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
671 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
673 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
674 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
676 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
677 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
678 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
679 /// active channel list on load.
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
684 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
686 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
687 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
688 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
690 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
691 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
692 /// the handling of the events.
694 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
695 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
698 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
699 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
700 /// would break backwards compatability.
701 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
702 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
703 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
705 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
706 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
708 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
710 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
711 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
712 /// confirmation depth.
714 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
715 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
716 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
722 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
724 our_network_key: SecretKey,
725 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
727 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
729 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
730 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
731 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
733 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
734 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
736 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
737 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
738 /// keeping additional state.
739 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
741 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
742 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
743 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
744 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
746 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
747 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
750 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
751 /// are currently open with that peer.
753 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
754 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
757 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
760 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
761 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
762 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
763 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
769 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
770 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
771 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
772 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
773 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
774 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
775 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
777 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
786 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
788 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
789 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
790 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
791 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
792 pub struct ChainParameters {
793 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
794 pub network: Network,
796 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
798 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
799 pub best_block: BestBlock,
802 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
808 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
809 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
810 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
811 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
812 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
813 /// updates are ready for persistence).
815 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
816 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
817 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
818 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
819 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
821 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
822 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
825 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
826 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
827 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
830 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
831 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
833 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
834 persistence_notifier: notifier,
835 should_persist: persist_check,
836 _read_guard: read_guard,
841 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
843 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
844 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
849 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
850 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
852 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
855 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
856 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
857 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
858 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
860 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
861 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
863 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
865 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
866 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
867 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
868 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
869 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
870 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
871 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
872 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
873 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
874 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
875 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
876 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
877 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
879 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
880 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
882 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
883 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
884 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
885 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
887 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
888 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
889 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
890 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
891 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
892 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
895 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
897 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
898 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
901 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
903 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
904 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
906 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
907 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
908 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
909 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
911 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
912 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
913 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
914 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
915 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
916 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
917 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
918 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
919 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
920 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
921 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
924 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
925 /// to better separate parameters.
926 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
927 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
928 /// The node_id of our counterparty
929 pub node_id: PublicKey,
930 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
931 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
932 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
933 pub features: InitFeatures,
934 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
935 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
936 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
938 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
940 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
941 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
942 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
943 /// payments to us through this channel.
944 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
945 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
946 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
947 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
948 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
949 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
950 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
953 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
954 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
955 pub struct ChannelDetails {
956 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
957 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
958 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
959 /// lifetime of the channel.
960 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
961 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
962 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
963 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
964 /// our counterparty already.
966 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
967 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
968 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
969 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
971 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
972 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
973 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
974 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
976 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
977 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
979 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
980 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
982 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
983 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
984 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
985 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
986 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
987 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
988 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
989 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
990 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
993 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
995 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
996 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
997 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
998 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
999 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1000 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1001 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1003 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1004 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1006 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1007 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1008 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1009 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1010 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1011 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1012 /// this value on chain.
1014 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1016 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1018 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1019 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1020 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1021 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1023 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1024 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1025 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1026 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1028 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1029 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1030 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1031 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1033 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1034 pub balance_msat: u64,
1035 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1036 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1037 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1038 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1040 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1042 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1043 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1044 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1045 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1046 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1047 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1048 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1049 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1051 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1052 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1053 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1054 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1055 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1056 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1057 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1059 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1060 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1061 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1062 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1063 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1064 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1065 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1066 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1067 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1069 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1071 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1072 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1073 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1074 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1075 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1077 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1078 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1079 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1080 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1081 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1082 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1083 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1085 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1086 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1087 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1088 pub is_outbound: bool,
1089 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1090 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1091 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1092 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1093 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1096 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1097 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1098 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1100 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1101 pub is_usable: bool,
1102 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1103 pub is_public: bool,
1104 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1105 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1106 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1107 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1108 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1109 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1111 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1112 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1115 impl ChannelDetails {
1116 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1117 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1118 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1120 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1121 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1122 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1123 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1126 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1127 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1128 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1130 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1131 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1132 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1133 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1137 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1139 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1141 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1142 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1143 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1144 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1146 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1147 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1148 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1151 macro_rules! handle_error {
1152 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1155 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1156 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1158 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1159 // entering the macro.
1160 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1161 assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1164 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1166 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1167 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1168 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1169 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1173 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1174 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1175 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1176 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1181 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1182 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1184 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1185 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1186 action: err.action.clone()
1190 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1191 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1192 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1193 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1194 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1196 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1198 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1199 // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id
1200 // has been passed to our message handling functions.
1201 let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id);
1203 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data }
1207 assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str);
1208 if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1209 assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id);
1212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1218 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1225 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1226 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1227 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1228 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1229 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1230 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1232 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1233 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1234 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1235 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1236 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1238 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1239 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1241 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1245 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1246 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1247 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1249 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1250 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1252 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1253 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1255 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1256 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1257 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1258 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1259 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1260 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1266 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1267 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1271 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1273 $entry.remove_entry();
1281 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1282 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1286 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1288 $entry.remove_entry();
1296 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1297 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1299 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1300 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1306 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1307 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1309 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1310 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1311 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1312 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1313 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1314 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1315 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1316 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1317 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1318 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1319 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1320 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1321 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1322 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1325 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1326 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1327 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1328 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1329 match $action_type {
1330 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1331 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1333 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1334 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1336 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1337 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1338 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1339 if !$resend_commitment {
1340 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1343 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1345 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1346 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1348 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1353 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1354 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1356 $entry.remove_entry();
1360 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1361 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1362 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1364 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1365 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1367 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1368 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1370 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1371 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1373 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1374 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1378 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1379 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1380 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1381 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1382 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1384 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1385 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1386 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1387 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1388 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1389 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1390 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1391 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1392 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1393 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1398 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1399 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1400 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1402 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1403 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1404 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1405 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1406 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1407 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1410 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1415 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1417 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1418 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1419 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1420 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1421 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1422 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1426 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1428 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1429 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1431 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1433 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1434 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1435 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1436 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1437 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1438 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1439 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1440 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1442 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1443 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1444 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1449 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1451 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1452 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1453 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1454 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1455 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1456 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1457 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1458 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1460 our_network_key: node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1461 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1464 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1465 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1467 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1469 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1471 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1473 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1474 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1475 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1476 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1486 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1487 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1488 &self.default_configuration
1491 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1492 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1493 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1496 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1497 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1499 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1501 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1505 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1510 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1512 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1513 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1514 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1515 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1516 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1518 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1519 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1521 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1522 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1523 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1525 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1526 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1527 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1528 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1529 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1530 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1532 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1533 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1534 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1535 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1536 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1541 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1542 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1546 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key);
1547 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1548 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) });
1551 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1553 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1554 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1555 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1556 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1557 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1558 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1562 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1567 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1569 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1570 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1573 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1575 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1581 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1582 node_id: their_network_key,
1585 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1588 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1589 let mut res = Vec::new();
1590 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1591 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1592 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1593 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1594 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1595 // the same channel.
1596 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1600 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1603 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1604 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1605 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1606 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1607 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1608 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1609 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1610 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1611 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1612 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1613 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1614 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1615 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1616 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1617 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1618 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1619 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1620 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1621 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1623 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1624 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1625 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1626 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1627 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1628 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1629 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1630 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1631 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1632 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1633 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1634 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1635 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1636 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1637 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1638 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1639 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1640 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1641 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1642 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1643 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1644 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1645 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1646 config: Some(channel.config()),
1654 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1655 /// more information.
1656 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1657 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1660 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1661 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1663 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1664 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1667 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1668 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1669 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1670 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1671 // really wanted anyway.
1672 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1675 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1676 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1677 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1678 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1679 Some(transaction) => {
1680 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1684 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1685 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1686 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1687 reason: closure_reason
1691 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1694 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1695 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1698 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
1699 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1700 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1705 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1707 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1708 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1710 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1711 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1712 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1713 let (result, is_permanent) =
1714 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1716 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1722 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1726 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1727 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1728 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1733 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1741 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1742 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1743 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1744 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1747 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1751 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1752 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1753 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1755 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1756 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1758 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1759 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1760 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1761 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1763 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1765 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1766 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1767 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1768 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1769 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1772 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1773 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1774 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1776 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1777 /// the channel being closed or not:
1778 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1779 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1780 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1781 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1782 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1783 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1784 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1786 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1788 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1789 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1790 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1791 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1792 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1796 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1797 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1798 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1799 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1800 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1801 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1802 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1805 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1806 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1807 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1808 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1809 // ignore the result here.
1810 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1814 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1815 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1816 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1817 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1819 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id);
1821 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1826 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1827 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1828 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1830 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1832 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1834 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1837 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1838 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1839 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1840 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1846 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1849 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1851 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1852 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1853 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1854 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1855 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1856 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1857 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1858 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1859 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1860 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1871 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1872 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1873 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1875 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1876 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1877 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1880 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1881 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1882 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1884 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1885 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1886 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1887 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1888 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1891 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1892 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1893 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1894 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1895 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1899 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1900 /// local transaction(s).
1901 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1902 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1903 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1907 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1908 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1910 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1911 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1912 return Err(ReceiveError {
1913 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1915 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1918 // final_expiry_too_soon
1919 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1920 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1921 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1922 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1923 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1924 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1925 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1926 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1927 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1928 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1929 return Err(ReceiveError {
1930 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1931 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1934 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1935 return Err(ReceiveError {
1937 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1938 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1942 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1943 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1944 return Err(ReceiveError {
1945 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1946 err_data: Vec::new(),
1947 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1950 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1951 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1952 return Err(ReceiveError {
1953 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1954 err_data: Vec::new(),
1955 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1957 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1958 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1960 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1961 phantom_shared_secret,
1963 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1964 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1965 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1966 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1967 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1968 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1969 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1970 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1971 return Err(ReceiveError {
1972 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1973 err_data: Vec::new(),
1974 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1978 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1980 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1983 return Err(ReceiveError {
1984 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1985 err_data: Vec::new(),
1986 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1991 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
1994 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1995 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
1996 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
1997 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2001 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2002 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2003 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2005 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2006 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2007 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2008 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2009 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2010 failure_code: $err_code,
2016 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2017 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2020 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2022 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2023 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2024 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2025 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2026 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2027 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2028 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2029 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2031 macro_rules! return_err {
2032 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2034 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2035 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2036 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2037 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2038 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2039 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2045 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2047 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2048 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2050 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2051 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2055 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2056 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2058 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2060 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2061 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2062 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2063 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2064 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2066 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2069 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2070 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2071 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2073 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2074 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2075 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2078 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2079 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2080 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2081 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2085 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2086 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2087 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2090 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2091 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2092 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2093 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2094 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2099 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2100 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2101 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2102 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2103 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2104 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2105 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2106 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2107 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2108 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2109 // phantom or an intercept.
2110 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2111 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2112 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2116 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2119 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2121 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2123 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2124 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2125 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2129 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2131 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2132 // have no consistency guarantees.
2133 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2137 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2138 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2139 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2140 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2141 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2143 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2144 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2145 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2146 // we don't have the channel here.
2147 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2149 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2151 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2152 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2153 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2154 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2155 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2156 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2157 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2159 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2160 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2162 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2163 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2167 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2168 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2169 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2170 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2172 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2179 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2180 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2181 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2182 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2183 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2184 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2186 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2187 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2189 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2190 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2191 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2192 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2193 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2194 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2195 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2196 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2197 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2198 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2204 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2205 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2206 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2207 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2209 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2210 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2212 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2213 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2214 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2216 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2217 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2218 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2219 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2220 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2221 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2222 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2226 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2231 pending_forward_info
2234 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2235 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2236 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2238 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2239 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2240 if !chan.should_announce() {
2241 return Err(LightningError {
2242 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2246 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2247 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2249 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2250 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2253 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2254 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2255 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2256 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2257 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2258 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2260 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2261 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2265 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2267 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2268 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2269 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2271 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2272 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2274 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2275 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2276 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2277 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2278 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2279 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2280 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2281 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2284 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2285 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2287 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2293 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2294 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2296 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2297 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2299 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2300 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2301 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2302 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2303 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2305 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2309 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2310 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2311 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2312 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2315 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2316 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2317 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2318 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" });
2320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2322 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2324 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2325 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2327 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2328 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2330 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2331 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2333 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2334 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2335 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2338 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2339 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2340 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2342 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2343 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2345 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2346 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2347 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2348 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2349 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2350 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2351 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2352 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2353 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2354 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2356 _ => unreachable!(),
2359 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2361 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2362 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2363 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2364 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2365 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2366 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2375 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2376 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2377 // `channel_by_id` map.
2378 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2384 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2385 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2387 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2392 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2394 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2395 /// fields for more info.
2397 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2398 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2399 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2400 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2403 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2404 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2405 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2406 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2407 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2409 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2410 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2412 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2413 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2414 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2416 /// In general, a path may raise:
2417 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2418 /// node public key) is specified.
2419 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2420 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2422 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2423 /// relevant updates.
2425 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2426 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2427 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2429 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2430 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2431 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2432 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2435 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2436 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2437 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2439 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2440 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2441 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2442 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2443 self.pending_outbound_payments
2444 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2445 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2446 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2450 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2451 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2452 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2453 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2454 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2458 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2459 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2460 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2464 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2466 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2467 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2468 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2469 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2470 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2472 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2473 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2474 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2475 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2476 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2477 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2478 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2481 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2483 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2484 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2485 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2487 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2488 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2489 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2491 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2492 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2493 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2494 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2495 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2497 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2498 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2499 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2500 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2501 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2503 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2504 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2508 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2509 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2510 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2511 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2512 /// never reach the recipient.
2514 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2515 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2517 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2518 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2520 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2522 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2523 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2524 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2525 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2526 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2527 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2530 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2531 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2532 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2533 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2534 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2535 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2536 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2537 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2540 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2543 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2544 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2547 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2548 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2549 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2550 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2551 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2553 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2554 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2555 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2562 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2564 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2566 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2567 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2568 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2569 } else { unreachable!(); })
2572 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2575 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2576 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2579 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2580 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2585 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2586 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2589 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2591 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2594 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2595 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2596 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2605 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2606 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2607 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2611 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2613 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2614 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2616 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2617 /// across the p2p network.
2619 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2620 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2622 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2623 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2624 /// keys per-channel).
2626 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2627 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2628 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2630 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2631 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2632 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2634 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2635 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2636 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2637 /// for more details.
2639 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2640 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2641 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2644 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2645 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2646 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2647 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2652 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2653 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2654 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2655 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2656 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2657 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2658 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2662 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2663 let mut output_index = None;
2664 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2665 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2666 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2667 if output_index.is_some() {
2668 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2669 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2672 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2673 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2674 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2677 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2680 if output_index.is_none() {
2681 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2682 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2685 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2689 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2691 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2692 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2693 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2694 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2696 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2697 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2699 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2700 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2702 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2704 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2705 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2706 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2707 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2708 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2709 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2710 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2711 pub fn update_channel_config(
2712 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2713 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2714 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2715 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2716 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2721 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2724 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2725 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2726 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2730 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2731 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2732 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2733 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2737 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2738 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2739 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2742 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2743 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2744 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2745 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2746 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2754 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2755 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2757 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2758 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2760 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2761 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2762 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2763 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2764 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2766 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2767 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2769 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2772 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2773 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2774 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2775 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2776 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2779 let next_hop_scid = {
2780 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2781 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2786 if !chan.is_usable() {
2787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2788 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2791 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2793 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2794 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2798 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2802 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2803 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2804 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2807 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2808 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2809 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2811 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2813 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2814 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2817 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2818 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2819 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2820 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2821 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2823 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2827 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2828 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2830 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2833 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2834 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2837 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2838 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2839 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2842 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2843 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2844 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2845 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2846 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2847 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2848 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2851 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2852 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2853 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2854 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2859 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2861 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2862 /// Will likely generate further events.
2863 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2866 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2867 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2868 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2870 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2871 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2873 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2874 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2875 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2877 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2878 match forward_info {
2879 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2880 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2881 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2882 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2883 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2886 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2887 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2888 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2890 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2891 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2892 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2893 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2894 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2895 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2898 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2899 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2901 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2904 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2905 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2911 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2912 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2914 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2918 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2919 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2921 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2925 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2926 let phantom_secret_res = self.node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2927 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2928 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2929 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2931 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2932 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2933 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2934 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2935 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2937 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2939 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2940 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2944 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2945 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2946 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2947 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2953 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2956 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2959 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2960 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2961 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2962 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2963 // problem, not ours.
2969 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
2970 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2972 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2976 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2977 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2978 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2979 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2984 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2986 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
2989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2990 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2991 match forward_info {
2992 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2993 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
2994 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2995 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
2996 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
2999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3000 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3001 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3002 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3003 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3004 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3005 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3006 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3008 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3009 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3010 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3012 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3015 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3017 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3018 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3019 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3020 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3025 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3026 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3028 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3029 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3030 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3031 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3033 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3036 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3038 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3039 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3040 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3049 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3050 match forward_info {
3051 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3052 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3053 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3054 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3057 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3058 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3059 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3060 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3062 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3063 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3065 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3068 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3069 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3070 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3071 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3072 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3073 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3074 phantom_shared_secret,
3076 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3078 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3083 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3084 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3085 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3086 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3087 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3089 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3090 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3091 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3092 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3093 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3094 phantom_shared_secret,
3096 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3097 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3101 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3102 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3103 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3104 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3105 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3108 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3109 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3110 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3112 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3113 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3114 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3117 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3118 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3119 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3122 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3123 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3124 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3125 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3127 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3131 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3132 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3133 total_value += htlc.value;
3134 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3135 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3136 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3137 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3138 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3139 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3141 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3143 _ => unreachable!(),
3146 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3148 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3149 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3150 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3151 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3152 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3153 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3154 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3157 amount_msat: total_value,
3158 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3159 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3161 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3163 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3164 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3166 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3168 payment_claimable_generated
3172 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3173 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3174 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3175 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3176 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3177 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3178 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3179 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3181 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3182 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3183 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3184 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3185 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3187 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3191 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3193 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3194 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3195 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3196 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3199 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3201 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3202 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3203 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3204 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3205 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3207 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3209 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3210 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3215 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3222 if payment_data.is_none() {
3223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3224 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3227 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3228 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3230 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3231 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3233 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3236 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3237 if payment_claimable_generated {
3238 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3244 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3245 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3253 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3256 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3258 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3259 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3260 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3262 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3264 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3265 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3266 events.append(&mut new_events);
3269 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3271 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3272 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3274 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3275 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3276 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3277 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3278 if background_events.is_empty() {
3282 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3284 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3285 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3286 // monitor updating completing.
3287 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3294 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3295 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3296 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3297 self.process_background_events();
3300 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3301 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3302 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3303 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3305 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3306 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3308 if !chan.is_live() {
3309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3310 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3311 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3314 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3316 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3317 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3321 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3322 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3323 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3324 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3325 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3326 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3327 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3329 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3332 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3335 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3336 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3337 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3345 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3347 /// This currently includes:
3348 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3349 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3350 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3352 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3353 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3355 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3356 /// estimate fetches.
3357 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3358 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3359 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3360 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3362 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3364 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3365 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3368 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3369 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3371 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3372 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3373 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3374 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3376 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3377 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3378 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3379 if needs_close { return false; }
3382 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3383 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3384 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3385 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3386 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3387 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3388 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3389 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3393 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3394 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3396 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3397 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3398 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3402 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3403 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3408 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3415 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3416 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3417 // This should be unreachable
3418 debug_assert!(false);
3421 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3422 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3423 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3424 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3426 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3427 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3428 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3430 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3437 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3438 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3439 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3440 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3441 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3444 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3445 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3448 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3450 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3451 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3452 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3453 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3454 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3461 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3462 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3463 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3465 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3466 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3467 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3468 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3470 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3471 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3472 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3473 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3474 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3477 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3478 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3479 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3480 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3481 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3482 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3483 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3484 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3485 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3490 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3491 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3493 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3495 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3496 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3497 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3498 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3499 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3500 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3501 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3503 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3505 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3506 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3508 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3513 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3514 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3515 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3516 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3517 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3518 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3519 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3520 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3521 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3522 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3524 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3525 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3526 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3527 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3529 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3530 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3531 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3532 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3533 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3537 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3538 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3539 // be surfaced to the user.
3540 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3541 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3542 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3544 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3546 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3551 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3555 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3558 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3559 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3560 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3561 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3565 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3566 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3567 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3568 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3570 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3572 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3573 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3574 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3576 for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3577 assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3581 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3582 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3583 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3586 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3587 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3588 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3590 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3591 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3593 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3595 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3597 let mut forward_event = None;
3598 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3599 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3600 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3602 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3603 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3604 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3607 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3610 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3611 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3612 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3613 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3614 time_forwardable: time
3617 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3618 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3619 failed_next_destination: destination,
3625 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3626 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3628 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3629 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3630 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3632 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3633 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3634 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3635 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3637 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3638 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3639 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3640 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3641 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3642 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3643 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3648 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3649 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3650 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3651 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3652 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3653 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3654 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3655 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3660 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3661 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3662 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3664 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3665 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3666 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3667 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3672 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3674 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3675 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3676 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3677 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3678 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3680 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3681 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3683 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3684 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3685 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3686 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3687 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3689 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3690 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3691 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3692 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3693 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3694 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3695 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3696 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3703 if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3708 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3709 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3710 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3712 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3717 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3718 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3719 debug_assert!(false);
3724 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3725 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3726 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3727 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3728 if sources.len() != 1 {
3729 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3730 debug_assert!(false);
3736 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3738 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3739 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3740 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3741 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3744 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3745 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3746 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3747 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3748 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3752 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3753 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3754 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3755 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3756 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3758 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3759 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3760 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3761 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3762 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3766 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3768 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3769 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3770 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3771 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3772 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3773 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3776 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3779 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3780 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3781 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3782 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3786 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3787 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3788 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3789 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3790 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3792 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3794 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3795 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3799 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3800 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3801 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3802 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3803 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3804 } else { (false, None) };
3807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap();
3808 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3809 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3810 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3811 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3812 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3813 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3814 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3816 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3817 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3818 payment_preimage, e);
3819 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3820 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3821 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3822 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3823 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3826 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3827 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3828 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3830 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3831 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3832 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3833 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3834 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3835 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3841 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3842 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3843 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3849 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3850 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3851 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3853 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3854 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3855 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3856 // again on restart.
3857 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3858 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3859 payment_preimage, e);
3862 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3864 chan.remove_entry();
3866 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3867 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3868 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3869 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3873 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3874 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3878 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3879 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3880 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3884 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3885 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3886 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
3887 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3888 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3889 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3890 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3891 // again on restart.
3892 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3893 payment_preimage, update_res);
3895 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3896 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3897 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3898 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3899 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3900 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3901 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3902 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3907 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3908 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3911 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3913 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3914 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3916 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3917 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3918 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
3919 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
3920 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3921 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3922 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3925 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
3926 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
3928 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3930 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3936 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
3937 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3938 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3944 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3945 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3946 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3949 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
3950 for action in actions.into_iter() {
3952 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
3953 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3954 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
3955 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
3956 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3960 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
3961 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
3967 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
3968 /// update completion.
3969 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
3970 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
3971 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
3972 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
3973 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
3974 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
3975 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
3977 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
3978 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3979 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
3980 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
3983 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
3984 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
3986 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
3987 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3988 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3993 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
3995 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
3996 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
3997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3998 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4003 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4004 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4005 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4006 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4007 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4012 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4016 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4022 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4023 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4024 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4030 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4034 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4035 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4036 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4038 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4039 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4040 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4041 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4042 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4048 let mut peer_state_lock;
4049 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4050 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return }
4051 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4054 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4055 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4059 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4063 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4064 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4065 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4066 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4067 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4068 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4070 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4071 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4072 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4077 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4078 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4082 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4084 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4085 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4087 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4088 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4089 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4094 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4096 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4097 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4100 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4101 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4102 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4104 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4105 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4106 /// used to accept such channels.
4108 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4109 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4110 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4111 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4114 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4115 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4117 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4118 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4119 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4121 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4122 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4124 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4125 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4127 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4128 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4130 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4131 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4132 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4133 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4136 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4139 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4140 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4141 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4142 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4144 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4146 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4148 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4149 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4152 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4153 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4154 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4155 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4156 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4157 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4160 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4161 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4162 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4165 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4166 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4167 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4171 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4177 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4178 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4179 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4182 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4186 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4187 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4188 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4190 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4192 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4193 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4198 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4199 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4200 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4203 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4208 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4210 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4211 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4214 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4215 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4216 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4218 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4219 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4220 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4223 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4224 pending_events.push(
4225 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4226 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4227 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4228 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4229 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4230 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4235 entry.insert(channel);
4241 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4242 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4244 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4245 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4250 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4252 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4253 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4258 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4259 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4260 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4261 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4262 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4264 user_channel_id: user_id,
4269 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4271 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4272 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4275 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4276 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4279 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4281 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4286 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4287 // lock before watch_channel
4288 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4289 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4290 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4291 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4292 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4293 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4294 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4295 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4296 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4297 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4298 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4299 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4302 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4303 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4304 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4305 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4306 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4307 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4308 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4311 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4312 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4313 // the channel above.
4314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4318 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4321 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4322 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4325 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4326 funding_msg.channel_id))
4328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4329 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4336 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4337 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4345 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4347 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4349 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4350 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4356 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4358 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4359 Ok(update) => update,
4360 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4362 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4363 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4365 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4366 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4367 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4368 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4369 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4370 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4371 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4377 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4378 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4382 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4385 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4386 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4390 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4392 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4393 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4394 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4398 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4400 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4401 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4402 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4404 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4405 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4406 msg: announcement_sigs,
4408 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4409 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4410 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4411 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4412 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4413 // announcement_signatures.
4414 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4415 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4417 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4423 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4431 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4432 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4433 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4435 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4436 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4444 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4445 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4446 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4447 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4450 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4451 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4453 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4454 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4455 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4456 let (result, is_permanent) =
4457 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4459 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4464 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4465 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4466 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4476 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4477 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4478 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4479 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4482 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4486 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4488 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4489 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4492 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4495 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4497 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4498 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4499 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4500 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4505 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4506 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4507 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4508 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4509 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4510 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4511 } else { (tx, None) }
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4516 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4517 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4518 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4520 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4521 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4524 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4528 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4533 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4534 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4535 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4536 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4538 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4539 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4540 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4541 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4543 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4545 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4546 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4551 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4554 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4555 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4556 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4557 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4558 match pending_forward_info {
4559 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4560 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4561 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4562 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4564 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4565 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4566 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4567 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4568 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4571 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4573 _ => pending_forward_info
4576 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4583 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4584 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4586 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4587 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4592 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4594 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4599 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4603 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4605 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4606 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4607 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4609 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4620 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4622 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4623 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4626 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4627 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4628 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4630 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4631 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4632 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4634 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4641 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4643 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4644 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4645 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4647 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4648 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4649 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4651 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4652 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4653 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4654 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4655 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4656 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4657 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4662 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4663 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4668 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4669 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4671 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4672 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4673 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4674 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4675 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4676 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4677 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4678 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4680 commitment_signed: msg,
4686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4691 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4692 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4693 let mut forward_event = None;
4694 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4695 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4696 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4697 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4698 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4699 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4700 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4701 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4703 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4704 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4706 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4707 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4708 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4710 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4711 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4714 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4715 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4717 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4718 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4719 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4721 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4722 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4723 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4724 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4725 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4728 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4729 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4732 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4733 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4734 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4735 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4736 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4737 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4738 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4741 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4742 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4743 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4748 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4749 // payments are being processed.
4750 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4751 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4753 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4754 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4761 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4762 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4765 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4766 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4767 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4770 match forward_event {
4772 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4773 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4774 time_forwardable: time
4782 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4783 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4785 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4786 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4787 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4788 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4790 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4791 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4792 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4794 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4795 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4796 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4797 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4798 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4799 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4800 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4801 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4802 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4803 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4804 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4805 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4807 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4808 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4809 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4810 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4811 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4812 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4814 } else { unreachable!(); }
4816 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4817 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4818 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4822 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4823 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4824 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4825 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4826 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4827 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4832 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4834 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4835 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4837 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4838 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4839 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4841 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4842 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4849 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4852 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4853 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4857 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4858 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4859 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4866 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4867 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4868 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4869 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4870 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4874 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4876 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4877 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4880 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4881 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4882 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(),
4883 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg, &self.default_configuration
4885 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4886 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4887 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4895 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4896 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4897 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4898 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4900 // It's not a local channel
4901 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4905 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4906 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4907 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4913 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4914 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4915 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4916 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4917 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4918 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4922 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4923 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4924 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4925 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4927 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
4928 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
4931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4933 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4936 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4938 let need_lnd_workaround = {
4939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4941 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4942 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4947 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4950 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4951 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4952 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4953 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4954 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4955 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
4956 let mut channel_update = None;
4957 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4958 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4959 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4962 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4963 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4964 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4965 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4966 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4967 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4968 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4973 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4974 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
4975 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4976 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
4977 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4978 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4986 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4987 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4990 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4991 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
4996 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4997 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4998 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4999 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5000 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5001 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5002 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5003 match monitor_event {
5004 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5005 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5007 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5009 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5011 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5012 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5015 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5016 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5017 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5018 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5020 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5021 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5022 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5023 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5026 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5028 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5031 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5032 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5033 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5034 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5035 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5036 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5040 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5041 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5043 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5045 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5047 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5048 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5049 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5056 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5057 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5063 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5064 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5067 has_pending_monitor_events
5070 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5071 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5072 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5074 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5075 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5078 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5079 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5080 /// update was applied.
5081 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5082 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5083 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5084 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5088 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5091 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5092 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5093 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5094 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5095 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5097 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5099 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5102 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5103 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5104 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5105 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5106 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5107 updates: commitment_update,
5111 has_monitor_update = true;
5112 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5113 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5114 if close_channel { return false; }
5121 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5122 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5123 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5131 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5132 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5133 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5136 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5137 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5143 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5144 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5145 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5146 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5147 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5148 let mut has_update = false;
5150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5152 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5153 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5154 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5155 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5156 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5157 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5158 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5159 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5161 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5162 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5165 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5166 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5167 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5168 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5169 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5174 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5176 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5177 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5178 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5184 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5185 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5193 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5194 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5200 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5201 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5203 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5204 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5205 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5206 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5207 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5208 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5209 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5210 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5211 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5212 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5213 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5214 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5215 assert!(should_broadcast);
5216 } else { unreachable!(); }
5217 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5219 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5223 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5224 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5226 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5227 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5230 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5233 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5234 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5236 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5237 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5238 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5239 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5240 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5241 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5242 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5243 // never fail a payment too early.
5244 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5246 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5249 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5254 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5257 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5258 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5260 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5261 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5262 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5264 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5266 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5267 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5271 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5272 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5274 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5276 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5277 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5278 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5279 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5280 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5281 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5284 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5285 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5287 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5290 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5292 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5294 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5295 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5296 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5297 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5298 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5301 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5302 /// stored external to LDK.
5304 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5305 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5306 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5308 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5309 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5312 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5313 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5314 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5315 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5317 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5318 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5319 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5320 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5321 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5323 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5324 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5325 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5326 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5327 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5329 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5330 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5332 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5333 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5337 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5338 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5340 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5342 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5343 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5344 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5345 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5348 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5349 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5351 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5354 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5356 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5358 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5359 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5362 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5363 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5365 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5366 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5367 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5370 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5371 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5373 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5374 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5375 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5376 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5378 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5379 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5380 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5381 Some(_) => continue,
5382 None => return scid_candidate
5387 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5389 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5390 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5392 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5393 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5394 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5398 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5399 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5400 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5402 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5403 /// times to get a unique scid.
5404 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5405 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5406 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5408 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5409 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5410 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5411 return scid_candidate
5415 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5416 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5417 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5418 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5421 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5424 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5425 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5426 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5427 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5436 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5437 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5438 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5439 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5440 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5445 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5446 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5447 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5451 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5452 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5456 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5457 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5460 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5461 /// using the given event handler.
5463 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5464 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5467 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5468 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5469 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5471 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5473 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5474 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5475 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5476 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5479 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5480 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5481 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5484 for event in pending_events {
5485 handler(event).await;
5488 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5489 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5494 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5496 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5497 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5498 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5499 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5500 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5501 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5505 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5506 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5507 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5508 /// is always placed next to each other.
5510 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5511 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5512 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5513 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5515 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5516 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5517 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5518 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5519 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5520 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5521 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5523 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5524 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5525 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5526 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5529 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5530 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5532 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5533 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5536 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5538 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5539 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5540 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5541 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5542 let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new();
5543 mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5544 pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events);
5548 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5549 events.replace(pending_events);
5558 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5560 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5561 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5562 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5563 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5564 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5565 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5569 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5571 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5572 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5573 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5574 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5575 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5577 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5578 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5579 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5580 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5583 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5584 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5585 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5588 for event in pending_events {
5589 handler.handle_event(event);
5597 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5599 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5600 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5601 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5602 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5603 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5608 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5610 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5611 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5612 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5613 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5614 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5617 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5618 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5621 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5623 let new_height = height - 1;
5625 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5626 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5627 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5628 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5629 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5630 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5633 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), self.default_configuration.clone(), &self.logger));
5637 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5639 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5640 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5641 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5642 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5643 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5644 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5648 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5649 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5650 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5651 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5653 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5654 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5657 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5658 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5660 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5661 if height < last_best_block_height {
5662 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5663 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), self.default_configuration.clone(), &self.logger));
5667 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5668 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5669 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5670 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5672 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5673 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5679 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), self.default_configuration.clone(), &self.logger));
5681 macro_rules! max_time {
5682 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5684 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5685 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5686 // having an explicit local time source.
5687 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5688 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5689 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5690 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5691 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5697 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5698 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5699 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5700 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5704 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5705 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5706 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5707 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5709 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5710 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5711 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
5718 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5720 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5721 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5722 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5723 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5724 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5725 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5730 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5732 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5733 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5734 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5735 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5736 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5737 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5741 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5742 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5744 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5745 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5746 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5747 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5748 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5750 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5751 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5754 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5757 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5758 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5759 let res = f(channel);
5760 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5761 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5762 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5763 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5764 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5766 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5767 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5768 if channel.is_usable() {
5769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5770 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5772 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5781 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5783 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5786 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5787 msg: announcement_sigs,
5789 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5790 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5791 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5793 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5794 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5795 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5800 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5801 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5802 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5803 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5804 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5805 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5806 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5807 // is always consistent.
5808 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5809 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5810 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5811 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5812 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5815 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5816 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5817 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5818 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5819 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5820 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5825 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5826 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5828 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5829 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5830 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5831 data: reason_message,
5841 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5842 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5843 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5844 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5845 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5846 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5847 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5848 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5849 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5850 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5852 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5853 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5854 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5858 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5861 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5862 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5863 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5864 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5865 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5866 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5867 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5868 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5869 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5872 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5873 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5874 _ => unreachable!(),
5876 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5877 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5878 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5885 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5887 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5892 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5893 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5894 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5895 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5897 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5899 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5900 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5901 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5902 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5903 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5904 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5907 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5908 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
5909 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5911 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5912 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5913 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5914 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5917 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5918 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5919 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5920 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5921 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5924 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5925 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5926 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5929 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5930 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5931 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5932 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5935 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5936 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5937 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
5938 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
5941 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5942 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5944 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
5945 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
5946 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
5947 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
5948 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
5951 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5952 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5953 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
5954 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
5957 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5958 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5959 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5960 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
5963 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
5964 /// [`ChannelManager`].
5965 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
5966 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
5970 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
5971 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5973 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5974 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5975 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5976 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5977 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5978 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5982 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5984 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5987 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5989 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5992 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5994 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5997 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5999 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6002 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6004 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6007 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6009 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6012 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6014 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6017 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6019 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6022 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6024 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6027 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6029 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6032 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6034 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6037 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6039 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6042 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6044 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6047 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6049 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6052 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6054 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6057 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6058 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6059 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6062 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6067 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6069 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6072 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6074 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6075 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6076 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6078 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6079 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6080 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6081 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6082 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6083 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6084 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6085 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6086 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6087 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6088 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6091 no_channels_remain = false;
6095 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6100 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6102 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6103 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6105 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6108 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6109 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6110 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6111 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6112 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6113 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6121 if no_channels_remain {
6122 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6124 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6126 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6127 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6131 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6132 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6133 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6137 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6142 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6143 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6145 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6146 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6147 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6148 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6152 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6159 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6162 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6163 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6164 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6165 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6166 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6167 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6168 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6172 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6173 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6174 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6179 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6180 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6181 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6182 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6183 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6192 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6196 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6199 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6200 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6201 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6202 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6203 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6206 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6208 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6209 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6210 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6214 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6216 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6217 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6220 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6221 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6222 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6223 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6231 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6232 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6236 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6237 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6240 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6241 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6245 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6246 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6247 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6248 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6251 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6252 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6254 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6255 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6256 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6257 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6258 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6261 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6262 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6263 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6264 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6267 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6268 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6269 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6270 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6273 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6274 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6275 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6276 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6277 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6278 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6279 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6280 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6281 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6282 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6283 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6284 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6285 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6286 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6287 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6288 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6289 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6290 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6294 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6295 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6297 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6298 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6299 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6300 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6303 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6304 (2, node_id, required),
6305 (4, features, required),
6306 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6307 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6308 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6309 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6312 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6313 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6314 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6315 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6316 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6317 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6318 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6319 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6320 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6321 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6322 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6323 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6324 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6325 (7, self.config, option),
6326 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6327 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6328 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6329 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6330 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6331 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6332 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6333 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6334 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6335 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6336 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6337 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6338 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6339 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6340 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6341 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6342 (32, self.is_public, required),
6343 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6344 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6345 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6351 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6352 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6353 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6354 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6355 (2, channel_id, required),
6356 (3, channel_type, option),
6357 (4, counterparty, required),
6358 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6359 (6, funding_txo, option),
6360 (7, config, option),
6361 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6362 (9, confirmations, option),
6363 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6364 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6365 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6366 (16, balance_msat, required),
6367 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6368 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6369 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6370 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6371 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6372 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6373 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6374 (26, is_outbound, required),
6375 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6376 (30, is_usable, required),
6377 (32, is_public, required),
6378 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6379 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6380 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6383 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6384 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6385 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6386 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6387 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6391 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6393 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6394 outbound_scid_alias,
6398 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6399 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6401 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6402 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6403 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6404 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6405 confirmations_required,
6407 force_close_spend_delay,
6408 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6409 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6410 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6411 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6412 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6413 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6418 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6419 (2, channels, vec_type),
6420 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6421 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6424 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6426 (0, onion_packet, required),
6427 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6430 (0, payment_data, required),
6431 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6432 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6434 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6435 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6436 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6440 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6441 (0, routing, required),
6442 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6443 (4, payment_hash, required),
6444 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6445 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6446 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6450 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6451 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6453 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6455 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6456 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6457 reason.write(writer)?;
6459 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6460 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6463 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6464 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6465 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6466 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6473 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6474 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6475 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6478 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6479 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6480 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6481 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6485 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6486 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6487 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6488 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6489 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6492 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6493 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6494 // messages contained in the variants.
6495 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6496 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6497 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6499 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6501 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6502 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6503 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6506 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6508 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6509 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6510 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6512 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6517 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6522 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6523 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6524 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6525 (2, outpoint, required),
6526 (4, htlc_id, required),
6527 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6530 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6532 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6533 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6534 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6536 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6537 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6538 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6539 (2, self.value, required),
6540 (4, payment_data, option),
6541 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6542 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6548 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6549 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6550 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6552 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6553 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6554 let mut total_msat = None;
6555 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6556 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6557 (0, prev_hop, required),
6558 (1, total_msat, option),
6559 (2, value, required),
6560 (4, payment_data, option),
6561 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6562 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6564 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6566 if payment_data.is_some() {
6567 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6569 if total_msat.is_none() {
6570 total_msat = Some(value);
6572 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6575 if total_msat.is_none() {
6576 if payment_data.is_none() {
6577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6579 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6581 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6585 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6588 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6595 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6596 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6597 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6600 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6601 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6602 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6603 let mut payment_id = None;
6604 let mut payment_secret = None;
6605 let mut payment_params = None;
6606 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6607 (0, session_priv, required),
6608 (1, payment_id, option),
6609 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6610 (3, payment_secret, option),
6611 (4, path, vec_type),
6612 (5, payment_params, option),
6614 if payment_id.is_none() {
6615 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6617 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6619 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6620 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6621 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6622 path: path.unwrap(),
6623 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6628 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6629 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6634 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6635 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6637 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6639 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6640 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6641 (0, session_priv, required),
6642 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6643 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6644 (3, payment_secret, option),
6645 (4, *path, vec_type),
6646 (5, payment_params, option),
6649 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6651 field.write(writer)?;
6658 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6659 (0, forward_info, required),
6660 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6661 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6662 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6663 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6666 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6668 (0, htlc_id, required),
6669 (2, err_packet, required),
6674 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6675 (0, payment_secret, required),
6676 (2, expiry_time, required),
6677 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6678 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6679 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6682 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6684 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6685 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6686 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6687 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6688 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6689 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6693 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6694 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6696 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6698 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6700 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6701 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6702 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6707 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6708 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6709 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6710 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6712 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6713 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6714 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6715 unfunded_channels += 1;
6720 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6722 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6725 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6726 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6727 channel.write(writer)?;
6734 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6735 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6736 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6737 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6738 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6739 for forward in pending_forwards {
6740 forward.write(writer)?;
6745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6747 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6748 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6749 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6751 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6752 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6753 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6754 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6755 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6756 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6757 htlc.write(writer)?;
6759 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6762 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6763 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6764 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6765 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6766 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6769 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6770 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6771 for event in events.iter() {
6772 event.write(writer)?;
6775 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6776 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6777 for event in background_events.iter() {
6779 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6781 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6782 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6787 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6788 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6789 // likely to be identical.
6790 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6791 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6793 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6794 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6795 hash.write(writer)?;
6796 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6799 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6800 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6801 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6802 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6803 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6806 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6807 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6809 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6810 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6811 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6812 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6815 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6816 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6820 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6821 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6822 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6824 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6825 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6826 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6832 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6833 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6834 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6835 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6838 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6839 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6840 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6841 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6842 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6844 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6847 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6848 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6849 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6850 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6851 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6852 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6853 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6854 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6855 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6862 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6864 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6866 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6867 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6868 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6869 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6870 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6871 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6872 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6873 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6874 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6875 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6876 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6877 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6878 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6880 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6881 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6883 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6884 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6886 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6887 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6888 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6889 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6890 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6891 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6893 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6894 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6896 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6897 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6898 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6899 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6900 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6901 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6905 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
6906 pub entropy_source: ES,
6908 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
6909 pub node_signer: NS,
6911 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6912 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6914 pub signer_provider: SP,
6916 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6918 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6919 pub fee_estimator: F,
6920 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6922 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6923 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6924 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6925 pub chain_monitor: M,
6927 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6928 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6929 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6930 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6931 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
6932 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
6934 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
6936 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6937 /// deserialization.
6939 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6940 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6941 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6943 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6944 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6946 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6947 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6948 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6949 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6951 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6954 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6955 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
6958 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6959 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6961 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6962 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6963 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6964 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6965 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6966 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6970 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6971 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6972 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6973 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6974 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
6976 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
6977 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6982 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6983 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6984 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6985 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
6987 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6988 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6989 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6990 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6991 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6992 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6996 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6997 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6998 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7002 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7003 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7014 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7015 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7017 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7023 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7024 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7025 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7026 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7027 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7028 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7029 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7030 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height))?;
7031 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7032 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7033 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7034 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7035 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7036 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7037 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7038 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7039 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7040 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7041 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7042 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7043 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7044 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7045 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7047 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7048 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7049 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7050 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7051 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7052 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7053 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7054 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7055 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7056 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7057 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7058 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7059 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7060 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7061 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7062 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7064 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7065 let mut found_htlc = false;
7066 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7067 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7070 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7071 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7072 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7073 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7074 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7075 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7076 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7077 log_info!(args.logger,
7078 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7079 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7080 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7084 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7085 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7086 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7088 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7089 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7091 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7093 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7094 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7097 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7098 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7099 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7103 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7104 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7105 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7106 // safely discard the channel.
7107 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7108 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7109 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7110 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7111 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7114 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7115 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7116 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7117 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7118 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7123 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7124 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7125 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7126 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7130 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7131 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7132 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7133 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7134 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7135 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7137 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7138 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7140 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7143 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7145 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7146 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7148 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7149 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7150 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7152 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7155 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7157 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7158 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let peer_state = PeerState {
7160 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7161 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7162 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7164 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7167 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7168 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7169 for _ in 0..event_count {
7170 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7171 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7176 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7177 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7178 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7179 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7180 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7181 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7185 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7186 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7189 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7190 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7191 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7192 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7196 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7197 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7198 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7199 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7200 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7202 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7204 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7205 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7209 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7210 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7211 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7212 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7213 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7214 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7215 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7216 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7217 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7218 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7219 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7220 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7221 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7222 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7223 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7224 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7225 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7226 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7228 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7229 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7232 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7233 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7236 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7237 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7238 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7239 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7240 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7241 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7243 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7245 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7246 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7247 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7248 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7249 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7250 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7251 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7253 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7254 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7255 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7256 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7257 if path.is_empty() {
7258 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7259 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7261 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7262 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7263 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7264 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7266 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7267 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7268 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7271 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7272 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7273 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7274 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7276 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7277 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7278 total_msat: path_amt,
7279 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7281 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7282 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7287 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7288 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7289 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7290 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7291 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7293 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7294 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7295 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7296 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7297 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7298 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7299 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7300 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7301 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7302 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7303 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7308 !forwards.is_empty()
7310 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7311 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7312 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7313 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7314 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7315 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7316 intercepted_id != ev_id
7328 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7329 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7330 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7331 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7332 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7333 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7334 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7335 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7339 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7340 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7342 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7343 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7344 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7347 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7348 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7351 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7352 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7353 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7354 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7355 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7357 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7358 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7359 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7360 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7361 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7362 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7363 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7364 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7366 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7371 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7373 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7375 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7376 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7378 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7382 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7383 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7385 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7386 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7389 let our_network_key = match args.node_signer.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7391 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7393 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7394 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7395 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7396 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7397 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7401 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7402 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7405 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7406 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7407 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7409 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7410 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7411 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7413 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7414 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7415 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7416 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7417 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7418 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7420 if chan.is_usable() {
7421 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7422 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7423 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7424 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7431 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7433 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7434 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7435 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7436 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7437 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7438 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7439 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7440 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7441 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7442 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7443 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7445 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7446 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7448 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7449 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7450 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7451 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7453 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7454 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7455 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7456 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7458 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7459 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7460 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7461 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7463 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7464 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7465 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7468 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7469 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7472 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7473 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7476 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7479 purpose: payment_purpose,
7480 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7486 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7488 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7489 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7490 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7491 router: args.router,
7493 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7495 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7496 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7497 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7498 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7500 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7501 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7502 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7503 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7504 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7505 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7507 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7513 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7515 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7517 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7518 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7519 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7520 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7522 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7523 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7524 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7526 logger: args.logger,
7527 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7530 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7531 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7532 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7533 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7534 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7537 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7538 //connection or two.
7540 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7546 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7547 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7548 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7549 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7550 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
7551 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7552 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
7554 use core::time::Duration;
7555 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7556 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7557 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7558 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7559 use crate::ln::msgs;
7560 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField};
7561 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7562 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7563 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7564 use crate::util::test_utils;
7565 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7566 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7569 fn test_notify_limits() {
7570 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7571 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7575 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7577 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7578 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7579 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7580 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7581 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7583 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7585 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7586 // to connect messages with new values
7587 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7588 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7589 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7590 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7592 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7593 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7594 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7595 // ... but the last node should not.
7596 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7597 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7598 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7599 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7601 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7602 // about the channel.
7603 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7604 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7605 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7607 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7609 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7610 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7611 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7612 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7613 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7614 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7616 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7617 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7618 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7620 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7621 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7622 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7623 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7624 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7625 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7627 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7628 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7629 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7630 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7631 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7632 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7633 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7634 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7636 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7637 // the channel info has updated.
7638 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7639 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7640 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7641 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7642 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7643 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7647 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7648 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7650 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7651 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7652 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7653 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7654 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7656 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7657 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7658 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7659 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7661 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7662 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7663 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7664 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7665 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7666 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7668 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7670 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7672 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7673 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7675 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7676 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7677 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7678 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7682 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7683 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7685 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7686 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7687 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7688 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7689 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7690 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7691 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7692 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7693 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7695 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7696 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7700 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7702 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7703 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7704 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7705 // lightning messages manually.
7706 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7707 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7710 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7712 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7714 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7715 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7717 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7718 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7720 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7721 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7722 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7724 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7725 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7726 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7728 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7730 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7732 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7733 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7736 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7737 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7739 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7741 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7742 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7743 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7744 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7749 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7750 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7751 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7752 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7757 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7758 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7759 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7760 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7767 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7768 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7769 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7770 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7771 // fails as expected.
7772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7776 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7777 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7778 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7780 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7781 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7782 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7784 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7785 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7786 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7787 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7788 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7790 let route = find_route(
7791 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7792 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7794 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7796 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7798 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7799 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7800 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7802 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7803 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7804 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7805 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7806 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7808 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7809 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7810 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7811 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7812 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7813 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7815 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7816 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7818 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7819 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7821 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7822 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7823 let route = find_route(
7824 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7825 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7827 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7829 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7831 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7832 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7833 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7835 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7836 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7837 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7839 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7841 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7842 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7843 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7845 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7846 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7847 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7849 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7850 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7851 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7852 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7853 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7854 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7855 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7856 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7857 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7859 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7860 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7864 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7865 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7866 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7870 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7872 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7873 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7874 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7875 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7877 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7878 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7879 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7880 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7881 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7883 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7884 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7885 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7886 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7887 let route = find_route(
7888 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7889 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7892 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7893 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7894 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7895 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7898 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7899 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7900 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7901 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7902 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7903 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7904 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7906 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7910 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7911 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7917 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7918 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7919 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7920 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7922 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7923 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7924 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7925 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7926 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7928 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7929 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7930 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7931 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7932 let route = find_route(
7933 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7934 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7937 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7938 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7939 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7940 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7941 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7944 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7945 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7946 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7947 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7948 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7949 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7952 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7956 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7960 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7962 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7963 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7964 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7965 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7967 // Marshall an MPP route.
7968 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7969 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7970 route.paths.push(path);
7971 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7972 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7973 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7974 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7975 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7976 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7978 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7979 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7980 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7981 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7986 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7987 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7991 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7993 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7994 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7996 total_msat: 100_000,
7999 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8000 // payment verification fails as expected.
8001 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8002 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8003 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8004 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8006 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8010 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8011 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8015 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8016 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8017 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8018 // the channel is successfully closed.
8019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8022 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8024 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8025 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8026 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8027 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8028 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8030 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8031 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8033 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8034 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8036 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8039 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8041 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8042 // as it has the funding transaction.
8043 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8044 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8045 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8047 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8050 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8052 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8054 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8055 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8056 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8058 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8059 // as it has the funding transaction.
8060 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8061 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8062 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8065 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8066 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8068 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8069 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8070 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8072 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8073 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8074 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8075 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8077 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8078 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8080 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8081 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8082 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8083 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8084 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8085 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8086 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8088 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8089 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8090 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8091 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8092 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8093 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8094 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8097 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8099 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8100 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8101 // closing transaction).
8102 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8103 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8104 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8106 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8107 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8108 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8109 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8110 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8113 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8115 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8117 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8118 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8119 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8121 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8123 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8124 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8127 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8128 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8129 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8132 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8133 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8134 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8137 fn check_api_misuse_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8139 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8140 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8142 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8143 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8148 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8149 // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id`
8150 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8151 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8152 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8153 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8154 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8157 // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than
8158 // creating dummy ones.
8159 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8160 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8162 let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8165 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8166 let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() });
8167 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8168 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8171 let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated {
8172 temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id,
8173 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(),
8174 funding_output_index: 0,
8175 signature: signature,
8178 let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned {
8179 channel_id: channel_id,
8180 signature: signature,
8183 let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady {
8184 channel_id: channel_id,
8185 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8186 short_channel_id_alias: None,
8189 let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
8190 channel_id: channel_id,
8191 short_channel_id: 0,
8192 node_signature: signature,
8193 bitcoin_signature: signature,
8196 let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8197 channel_id: channel_id,
8198 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8199 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8200 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
8203 let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned {
8204 channel_id: channel_id,
8206 signature: signature,
8210 let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown {
8211 channel_id: channel_id,
8212 scriptpubkey: Script::new(),
8215 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
8217 public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key),
8218 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
8222 let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
8223 channel_id: channel_id,
8225 amount_msat: 1000000,
8226 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
8227 cltv_expiry: 821716,
8228 onion_routing_packet
8231 let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
8232 channel_id: channel_id,
8233 signature: signature,
8234 htlc_signatures: Vec::new(),
8237 let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee {
8238 channel_id: channel_id,
8239 feerate_per_kw: 1000,
8242 let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
8243 channel_id: channel_id,
8245 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
8246 failure_code: 0x8000,
8249 let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
8250 channel_id: channel_id,
8252 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
8255 let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
8256 channel_id: channel_id,
8258 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
8261 let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
8262 channel_id: channel_id,
8263 per_commitment_secret: [1; 32],
8264 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8267 // Test the API functions and message handlers.
8268 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8270 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, &open_channel_msg);
8272 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, &accept_channel_msg);
8274 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8276 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg);
8278 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg);
8280 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg);
8282 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg);
8284 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8286 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8288 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8290 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8292 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8294 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &shutdown_msg);
8296 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg);
8298 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg);
8300 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg);
8302 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg);
8304 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg);
8306 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg);
8308 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg);
8310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg);
8312 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg);
8316 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8318 use crate::chain::Listen;
8319 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8320 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8321 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8322 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8323 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8324 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8325 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8326 use crate::util::test_utils;
8327 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8328 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8330 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8331 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8332 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8334 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8338 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8339 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8340 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8341 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8342 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8343 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8344 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8345 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8350 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8351 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8354 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8355 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8356 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8358 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8359 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8361 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8362 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8363 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8364 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8366 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8367 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8369 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8370 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8371 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8372 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8374 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8376 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8378 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8379 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8380 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8381 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8382 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8384 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8386 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8388 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8389 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8390 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8391 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8392 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8395 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8396 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8397 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8399 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8400 } else { panic!(); }
8402 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8403 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8405 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8408 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8411 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8412 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8414 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8415 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8416 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8417 match msg_events[0] {
8418 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8419 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8420 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8424 match msg_events[1] {
8425 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8429 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8430 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8432 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8433 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8438 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8439 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8441 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8442 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8447 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8449 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8450 macro_rules! send_payment {
8451 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8452 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8453 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8454 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8455 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8456 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8457 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8458 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8459 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8460 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8462 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8463 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8465 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8466 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8468 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8469 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8470 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8471 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8472 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8473 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8474 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8475 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8477 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8478 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8479 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8480 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8482 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8483 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8484 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8485 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8486 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8488 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8491 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8492 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8493 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8494 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8496 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8501 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8502 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);