1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::events;
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl HTLCFailReason {
291 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
292 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
295 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
296 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
300 struct ReceiveError {
306 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
307 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
309 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
314 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
316 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
317 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
318 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
319 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
320 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
322 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
323 err: msgs::LightningError,
324 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
325 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
327 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
329 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 shutdown_finish: None,
345 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
347 err: LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
352 shutdown_finish: None,
356 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
357 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
360 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
372 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
376 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
382 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
386 log_level: Level::Warn,
389 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
391 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
393 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
396 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
404 shutdown_finish: None,
409 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
410 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
411 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
412 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
413 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
415 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
416 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
417 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
418 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
419 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
420 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
421 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
423 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
427 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
428 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
429 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
430 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
431 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
432 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
435 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
436 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
437 /// quite some time lag.
438 enum BackgroundEvent {
439 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
440 /// commitment transaction.
441 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
444 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
445 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
447 latest_features: InitFeatures,
450 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
451 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
453 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
456 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
457 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
458 struct PendingInboundPayment {
459 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
460 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
461 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
462 /// this payment being removed.
464 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
465 user_payment_id: u64,
466 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
467 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
468 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
471 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
472 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
473 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
478 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
481 pending_amt_msat: u64,
482 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
483 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
484 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
486 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
487 starting_block_height: u32,
489 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
490 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
491 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
493 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
494 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
495 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
497 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
498 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
499 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
500 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
501 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
503 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
505 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
506 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
510 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
511 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
517 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
519 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
523 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
530 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
539 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
540 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
541 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
542 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
548 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
549 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
552 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
553 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
554 let our_payment_hash;
555 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
559 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
560 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
561 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
565 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
569 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
570 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
571 let remove_res = match self {
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
576 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
580 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
581 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
582 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
583 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
584 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
585 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
592 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
593 let insert_res = match self {
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
596 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
598 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
599 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
602 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
603 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
604 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
605 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
606 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
613 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
615 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
616 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
617 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
618 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
625 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
626 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
627 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
628 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
629 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
630 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
631 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
633 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
634 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
636 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
637 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
638 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
639 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
640 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
641 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
642 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
643 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
645 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
646 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
648 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
649 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
651 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
652 /// to individual Channels.
654 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
655 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
656 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
657 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
659 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
660 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
661 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
662 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
663 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
664 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
665 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
667 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
668 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
669 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
670 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
673 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
674 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
675 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
676 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
677 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
679 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
680 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
681 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
682 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
683 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
686 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
687 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
688 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
689 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
690 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
694 // `total_consistency_lock`
696 // |__`forward_htlcs`
698 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
700 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
702 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
704 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
706 // | |__`channel_state`
710 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
712 // | |__`per_peer_state`
714 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
718 // | |__`pending_events`
720 // | |__`pending_background_events`
722 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
723 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
724 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
725 K::Target: KeysInterface,
726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
729 default_configuration: UserConfig,
730 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
731 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
739 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
740 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
742 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
743 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
744 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
745 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
746 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
748 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
749 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
750 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
751 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
754 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
756 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
757 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
758 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
759 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
760 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
761 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
762 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
763 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
765 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
770 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
772 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
773 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
774 /// and via the classic SCID.
776 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
777 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
779 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
781 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
783 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
784 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
785 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
787 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
788 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
790 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
791 /// failed/claimed by the user.
793 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
794 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
796 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
797 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
799 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
800 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
801 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
802 /// active channel list on load.
804 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
805 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
807 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
809 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
810 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
811 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
813 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
814 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
815 /// the handling of the events.
818 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
819 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
820 /// would break backwards compatability.
821 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
822 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
823 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
825 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
826 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
828 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
830 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
831 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
832 /// confirmation depth.
834 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
835 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
836 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
838 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
842 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
844 our_network_key: SecretKey,
845 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
847 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
849 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
850 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
851 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
853 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
854 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
856 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
857 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
858 /// keeping additional state.
859 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
861 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
862 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
863 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
864 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
866 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
867 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
868 /// are currently open with that peer.
869 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
870 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
873 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
874 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
876 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
877 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
878 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
879 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
880 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
881 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
882 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
883 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
884 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
885 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
886 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
888 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
895 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
897 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
898 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
899 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
900 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
901 pub struct ChainParameters {
902 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
903 pub network: Network,
905 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
907 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
908 pub best_block: BestBlock,
911 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
917 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
918 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
919 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
920 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
921 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
922 /// updates are ready for persistence).
924 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
925 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
926 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
927 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
928 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
930 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
931 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
934 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
935 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
936 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
939 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
940 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
942 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
943 persistence_notifier: notifier,
944 should_persist: persist_check,
945 _read_guard: read_guard,
950 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
952 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
953 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
958 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
959 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
961 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
963 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
964 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
965 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
966 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
967 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
969 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
970 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
972 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
974 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
975 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
976 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
977 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
978 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
979 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
980 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
981 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
982 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
983 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
984 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
985 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
986 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
988 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
989 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
991 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
992 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
993 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
994 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
996 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
997 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
998 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
999 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1000 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1001 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1004 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1006 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1007 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1010 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1012 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1013 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1015 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1016 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1017 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1018 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1020 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1021 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1022 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1023 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1024 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1025 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1026 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1027 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1028 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1029 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1030 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1033 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1034 /// to better separate parameters.
1035 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1036 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1037 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1038 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1039 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1040 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1041 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1042 pub features: InitFeatures,
1043 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1044 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1045 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1047 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1049 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1050 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1051 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1052 /// payments to us through this channel.
1053 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1054 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1055 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1056 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1057 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1058 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1059 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1062 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1063 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1064 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1065 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1066 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1067 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1068 /// lifetime of the channel.
1069 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1070 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1071 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1072 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1073 /// our counterparty already.
1075 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1076 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1077 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1078 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1080 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1081 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1082 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1083 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1085 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1086 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1088 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1089 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1091 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1092 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1093 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1094 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1096 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1097 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1098 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1099 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1102 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1104 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1105 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1106 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1107 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1108 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1109 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1110 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1112 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1113 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1115 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1116 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1118 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1119 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1120 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1121 /// this value on chain.
1123 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1125 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1127 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1128 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1129 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1130 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1132 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1133 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1134 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1135 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1137 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1138 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1139 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1140 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1142 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1143 pub balance_msat: u64,
1144 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1145 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1146 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1147 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1149 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1151 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1152 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1153 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1154 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1155 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1156 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1157 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1158 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1160 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1161 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1162 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1163 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1164 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1165 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1166 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1168 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1169 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1170 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1171 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1172 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1173 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1174 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1175 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1176 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1178 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1180 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1181 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1183 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1184 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1186 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1187 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1188 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1189 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1190 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1191 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1192 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1194 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1195 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1196 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1197 pub is_outbound: bool,
1198 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1199 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1200 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1201 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1202 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1204 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1205 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1206 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1207 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1209 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1210 pub is_usable: bool,
1211 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1212 pub is_public: bool,
1213 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1214 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1215 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1216 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1217 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1218 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1220 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1221 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1224 impl ChannelDetails {
1225 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1226 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1227 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1229 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1230 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1231 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1232 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1235 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1236 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1237 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1239 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1240 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1241 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1242 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1246 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1247 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1248 /// states for more.
1249 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1250 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1251 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1252 /// send the payment at all.
1254 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1256 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1257 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1258 /// for this payment.
1259 ParameterError(APIError),
1260 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1261 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1263 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1265 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1268 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1269 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1270 /// for this payment.
1271 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1272 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1273 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1274 /// paths than the ones selected).
1276 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1277 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1278 /// for this payment.
1279 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1280 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1281 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1282 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1284 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1286 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1287 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1288 /// in over-/re-payment.
1290 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1291 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1292 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1294 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1295 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1296 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1297 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1299 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1300 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1301 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1302 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1303 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1304 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1305 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1306 payment_id: PaymentId,
1310 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1312 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1314 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1315 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1316 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1317 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1319 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1320 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1321 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1324 macro_rules! handle_error {
1325 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1328 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1329 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1331 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1332 // entering the macro.
1333 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1334 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1337 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1339 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1340 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1341 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1342 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1346 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1347 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1348 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1349 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1354 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1355 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1357 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1358 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1359 action: err.action.clone()
1363 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1364 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1367 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1374 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1375 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1376 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1377 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1378 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1379 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1381 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1382 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1383 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1384 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1385 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1387 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1388 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1390 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1394 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1395 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1398 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1399 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1401 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1402 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1404 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1405 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1406 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1407 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1408 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1409 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1415 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1416 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1420 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1422 $entry.remove_entry();
1430 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1431 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1435 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1437 $entry.remove_entry();
1445 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1446 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1448 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1449 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1455 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1456 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1458 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1459 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1460 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1461 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1462 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1463 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1464 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1465 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1466 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1467 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1468 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1469 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1470 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1471 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1474 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1475 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1476 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1477 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1478 match $action_type {
1479 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1480 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1482 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1483 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1485 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1486 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1487 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1488 if !$resend_commitment {
1489 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1492 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1494 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1495 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1497 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1502 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1503 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1505 $entry.remove_entry();
1509 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1510 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1511 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1514 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1516 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1517 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1519 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1520 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1522 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1523 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1527 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1528 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1529 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1530 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1531 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1533 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1534 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1535 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1536 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1537 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1538 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1539 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1540 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1541 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1542 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1547 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1548 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1549 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1551 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1552 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1553 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1554 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1555 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1556 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1559 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1564 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1565 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1566 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1567 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1568 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1571 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1573 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1574 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1576 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1578 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1579 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1580 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1581 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1582 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1583 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1584 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1585 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1587 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1588 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1589 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1593 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1595 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1596 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1597 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1599 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1600 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1601 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1602 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1603 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1604 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1606 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1608 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1609 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1612 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1613 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1615 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1617 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1619 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1621 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1622 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1623 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1624 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1632 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1633 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1634 &self.default_configuration
1637 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1638 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1639 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1642 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1643 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1645 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1647 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1651 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1656 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1658 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1659 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1660 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1661 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1662 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1664 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1665 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1667 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1668 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1669 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1671 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1672 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1673 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1674 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1675 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1676 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1678 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1679 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1680 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1681 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1682 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1688 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1689 Some(peer_state) => {
1690 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1691 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1692 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1693 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1694 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1695 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1696 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1700 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1705 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1708 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1711 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1712 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1714 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1715 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1721 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1727 node_id: their_network_key,
1730 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1733 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1734 let mut res = Vec::new();
1736 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1738 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1739 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1740 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1741 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1742 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1743 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1744 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1745 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1746 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1747 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1748 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1749 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1750 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1751 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1752 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1753 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1754 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1755 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1756 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1757 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1759 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1760 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1761 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1762 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1763 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1764 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1765 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1766 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1767 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1768 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1769 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1770 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1771 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1772 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1773 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1774 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1775 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1776 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1777 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1778 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1779 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1780 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1781 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1782 config: Some(channel.config()),
1786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1787 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1788 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1789 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1795 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1796 /// more information.
1797 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1798 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1801 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1802 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1804 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1805 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1808 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1809 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1811 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1812 // really wanted anyway.
1813 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1816 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1817 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1818 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1819 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1820 Some(transaction) => {
1821 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1825 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1826 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1827 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1828 reason: closure_reason
1832 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1835 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1836 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1837 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1838 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1839 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1841 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1842 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1844 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1845 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1846 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1847 Some(peer_state) => {
1848 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1849 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1850 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1852 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1855 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1857 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1858 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1859 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1860 let (result, is_permanent) =
1861 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1863 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1869 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1873 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1874 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1875 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1876 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1880 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1888 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1889 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1890 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1891 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1894 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1898 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1899 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1900 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1902 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1903 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1905 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1906 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1907 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1908 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1910 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1912 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1913 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1914 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1915 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1916 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1919 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1920 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1921 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1923 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1924 /// the channel being closed or not:
1925 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1926 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1927 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1928 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1929 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1930 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1931 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1933 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1935 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1936 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1937 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1938 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1939 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1943 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1944 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1945 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1946 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1947 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1948 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1952 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1953 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1954 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1955 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1956 // ignore the result here.
1957 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1961 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1962 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1963 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1964 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1966 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1967 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1968 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1969 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1970 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1972 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1973 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1975 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1977 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1982 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1983 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1984 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1985 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1991 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1994 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1996 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1997 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1998 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1999 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2000 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2001 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2002 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2012 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2013 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2014 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2016 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2017 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2018 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2021 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2022 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2023 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2025 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2026 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2027 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2028 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2029 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2032 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2033 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2034 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2035 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2036 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2040 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2041 /// local transaction(s).
2042 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2043 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2044 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2048 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2049 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2051 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2052 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2053 return Err(ReceiveError {
2054 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2056 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2059 // final_expiry_too_soon
2060 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2061 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2062 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2063 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2064 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2065 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2068 err_data: Vec::new(),
2069 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2072 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2073 return Err(ReceiveError {
2075 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2076 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2080 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2081 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2084 err_data: Vec::new(),
2085 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2088 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2089 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2090 return Err(ReceiveError {
2091 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2092 err_data: Vec::new(),
2093 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2095 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2096 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2098 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2099 phantom_shared_secret,
2101 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2102 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2103 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2104 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2105 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2106 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2107 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2108 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2109 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2111 err_data: Vec::new(),
2112 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2116 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2118 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2121 return Err(ReceiveError {
2122 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2123 err_data: Vec::new(),
2124 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2129 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2132 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2133 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2134 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2135 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2139 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2140 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2141 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2143 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2144 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2145 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2146 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2147 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2148 failure_code: $err_code,
2154 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2155 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2158 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2160 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2161 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2162 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2163 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2164 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2165 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2166 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2167 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2169 macro_rules! return_err {
2170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2173 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2176 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2182 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2184 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2185 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2187 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2188 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2192 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2193 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2195 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2197 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2198 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2199 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2200 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2201 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2203 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2206 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2207 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2208 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2210 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2211 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2212 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2215 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2216 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2217 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2218 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2222 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2223 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2224 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2227 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2228 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2229 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2230 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2231 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2236 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2237 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2238 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2239 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2240 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2241 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2242 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2243 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2244 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2245 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2246 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2247 // phantom or an intercept.
2248 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2249 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2250 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2254 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2257 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2259 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2260 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2262 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2263 // no consistency guarantees.
2264 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2268 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2269 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2270 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2271 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2272 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2274 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2275 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2276 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2277 // we don't have the channel here.
2278 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2280 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2282 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2283 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2284 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2285 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2286 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2287 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2288 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2290 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2291 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2293 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2294 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2298 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2300 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2307 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2308 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2309 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2310 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2311 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2312 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2314 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2315 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2317 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2318 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2319 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2320 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2321 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2322 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2323 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2324 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2325 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2326 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2332 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2333 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2334 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2335 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2337 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2338 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2340 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2341 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2342 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2344 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2345 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2346 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2348 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2353 pending_forward_info
2356 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2357 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2358 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2360 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2361 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2362 if !chan.should_announce() {
2363 return Err(LightningError {
2364 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2368 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2369 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2372 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2375 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2376 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2377 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2378 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2379 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2380 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2382 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2383 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2387 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2389 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2391 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2393 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2394 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2396 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2397 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2398 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2399 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2400 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2401 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2402 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2403 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2406 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2407 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2409 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2415 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2416 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2418 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2419 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2421 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2422 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2423 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2424 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2425 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2427 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2431 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2432 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2433 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2434 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2437 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2438 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2439 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2441 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2442 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2444 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2445 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2447 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2448 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2450 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2451 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2453 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2454 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2455 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2458 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2459 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2460 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2462 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2463 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2465 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2466 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2467 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2468 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2469 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2470 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2471 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2472 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2473 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2474 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2476 _ => unreachable!(),
2479 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2480 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2481 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2482 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2483 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2484 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2485 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2486 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2495 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2496 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2497 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2498 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2503 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2504 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2506 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2511 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2513 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2514 /// fields for more info.
2516 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2517 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2518 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2519 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2522 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2523 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2524 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2525 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2526 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2528 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2529 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2531 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2532 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2533 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2535 /// In general, a path may raise:
2536 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2537 /// node public key) is specified.
2538 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2539 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2541 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2542 /// relevant updates.
2544 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2545 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2546 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2548 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2549 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2550 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2551 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2554 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2555 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2556 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2558 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2559 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2560 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2561 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2562 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2566 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2567 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2570 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2571 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2572 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2573 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2576 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2577 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2580 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2581 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2582 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2583 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2586 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2587 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2590 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2591 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2594 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2599 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2600 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2601 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2603 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2604 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2606 let mut total_value = 0;
2607 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2608 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2609 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2610 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2611 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2612 continue 'path_check;
2614 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2615 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2616 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2617 continue 'path_check;
2620 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2621 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2623 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2624 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2626 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2627 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2628 total_value = amt_msat;
2631 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2632 let mut results = Vec::new();
2633 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2634 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2635 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2638 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2639 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2640 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2641 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2644 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2645 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2646 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2647 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2649 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2650 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2654 results.push(path_res);
2656 let mut has_ok = false;
2657 let mut has_err = false;
2658 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2659 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2660 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2661 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2662 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2663 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2664 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2668 } else if res.is_err() {
2669 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2670 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2673 if has_err && has_ok {
2674 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2677 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2678 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2679 Some(RouteParameters {
2680 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2681 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2682 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2688 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2689 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2690 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2691 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2692 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2698 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2700 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2701 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2702 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2703 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2704 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2706 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2707 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2708 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2709 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2710 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2711 if path.len() == 0 {
2712 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2713 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2718 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2719 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2720 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2723 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2724 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2725 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2727 let res = match payment {
2728 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2729 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2731 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2732 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2733 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2734 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2737 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2739 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2740 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2741 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2744 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2745 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2746 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2749 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2750 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2751 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2755 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2756 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2761 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2762 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2766 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2769 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2771 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2772 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2773 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2774 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2776 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2777 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2778 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2780 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2781 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2782 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2783 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2784 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2786 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2787 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2788 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2789 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2790 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2792 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2800 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2801 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2802 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2803 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2804 /// never reach the recipient.
2806 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2807 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2809 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2810 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2812 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2814 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2815 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2816 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2818 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2820 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2821 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2823 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2824 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2829 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2830 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2831 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2832 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2833 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2835 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2838 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2839 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2843 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2844 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2846 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2847 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2852 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2854 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2855 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2856 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2859 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2860 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2861 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2862 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2863 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2864 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2867 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2868 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2869 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2870 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2871 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2873 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2875 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2877 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2878 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2879 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2880 } else { unreachable!(); })
2883 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2885 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2886 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2889 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2890 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2895 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2896 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2897 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2902 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2905 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2906 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2907 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2916 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2917 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2918 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2922 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2924 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2925 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2927 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2928 /// across the p2p network.
2930 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2931 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2933 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2934 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2935 /// keys per-channel).
2937 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2938 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2939 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2941 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2942 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2943 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2945 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2946 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2947 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2948 /// for more details.
2950 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2951 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2952 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2955 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2956 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2958 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2963 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2964 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2965 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2966 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2967 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2968 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2969 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2973 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2974 let mut output_index = None;
2975 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2976 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2977 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2978 if output_index.is_some() {
2979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2980 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2983 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2984 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2985 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2988 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2991 if output_index.is_none() {
2992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2993 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2996 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3000 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3002 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3003 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3004 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3005 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3007 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3008 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3010 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3011 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3013 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3015 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3016 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3017 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3018 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3019 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3020 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3021 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3022 pub fn update_channel_config(
3023 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3024 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3025 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3026 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3027 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3032 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3035 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3037 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3038 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3039 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3040 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3042 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3043 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3044 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3045 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3049 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3050 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3051 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3054 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3055 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3056 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3057 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3058 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3067 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3068 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3070 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3071 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3073 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3074 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3075 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3076 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3077 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3079 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3080 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3082 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3085 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3086 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3087 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3088 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3089 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3092 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3094 if !chan.is_usable() {
3095 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3096 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3099 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3101 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3102 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3106 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3107 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3108 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3111 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3112 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3113 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3115 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3117 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3118 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3121 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3122 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3123 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3124 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3125 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3127 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3131 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3132 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3134 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3137 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3138 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3141 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3142 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3143 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3146 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3147 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3148 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3149 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3150 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3151 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3152 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3155 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3156 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3157 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3158 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3163 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3165 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3166 /// Will likely generate further events.
3167 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3170 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3171 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3172 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3173 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3175 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3176 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3178 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3179 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3180 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3182 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3183 match forward_info {
3184 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3185 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3186 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3187 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3188 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3191 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3192 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3193 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3195 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3196 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3200 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3203 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3204 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3206 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3209 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3210 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3216 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3217 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3219 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3223 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3224 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3226 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3230 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3231 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3232 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3233 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3234 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3236 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3237 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3238 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3239 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3240 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3242 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3244 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3245 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3249 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3250 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3251 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3252 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3258 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3261 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3264 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3265 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3266 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3267 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3268 // problem, not ours.
3274 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3275 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3277 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3281 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3282 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3283 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3285 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3289 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3290 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3291 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3292 match forward_info {
3293 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3294 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3295 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3296 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3297 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3301 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3302 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3303 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3304 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3305 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3306 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3307 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3309 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3311 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3314 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3316 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3317 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3318 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3319 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3325 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3327 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3328 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3329 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3330 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3331 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3332 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3333 // this channel currently :/.
3339 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3340 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3342 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3344 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3346 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3349 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3351 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3352 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3353 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3356 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3358 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3359 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3360 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3361 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3362 // messages when we can.
3363 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3364 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3365 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3372 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3373 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3376 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3377 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3378 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3379 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3380 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3381 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3383 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3385 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3386 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3387 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3390 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3394 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3395 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3397 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3401 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3402 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3404 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3405 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3406 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3407 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3408 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3409 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3411 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3418 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3419 match forward_info {
3420 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3421 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3422 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3423 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3426 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3427 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3428 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3429 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3431 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3432 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3434 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3437 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3438 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3439 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3440 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3441 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3442 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3443 phantom_shared_secret,
3445 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3447 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3452 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3453 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3454 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3455 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3456 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3458 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3459 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3460 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3461 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3462 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3463 phantom_shared_secret,
3465 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3466 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3470 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3471 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3472 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3473 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3474 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3477 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3478 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3479 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3481 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3482 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3483 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3486 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3487 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3488 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3489 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3490 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3492 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3496 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3497 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3498 total_value += htlc.value;
3499 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3500 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3501 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3503 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3504 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3506 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3508 _ => unreachable!(),
3511 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3513 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3514 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3515 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3516 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3517 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3518 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3519 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3522 amount_msat: total_value,
3523 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3524 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3526 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3528 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3529 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3531 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3533 payment_claimable_generated
3537 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3538 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3539 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3540 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3541 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3542 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3543 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3544 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3546 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3547 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3548 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3549 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3550 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3556 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3558 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3559 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3561 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3562 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3563 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3564 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3565 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3567 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3569 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3570 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3575 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3582 if payment_data.is_none() {
3583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3584 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3587 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3588 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3590 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3591 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3593 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3594 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3596 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3597 if payment_claimable_generated {
3598 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3604 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3605 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3613 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3614 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3616 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3618 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3619 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3622 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3623 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3624 events.append(&mut new_events);
3627 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3629 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3630 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3632 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3633 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3634 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3635 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3636 if background_events.is_empty() {
3640 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3642 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3643 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3644 // monitor updating completing.
3645 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3652 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3653 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3654 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3655 self.process_background_events();
3658 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3659 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3660 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3661 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3663 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3664 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3666 if !chan.is_live() {
3667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3668 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3669 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3672 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3674 let mut retain_channel = true;
3675 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3678 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3679 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3683 let ret_err = match res {
3684 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3685 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3686 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3687 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3688 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3689 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3690 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3691 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3692 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3693 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3694 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3701 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3702 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3710 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3714 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3715 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3716 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3717 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3718 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3719 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3720 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3722 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3724 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3726 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3727 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3728 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3729 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3730 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3731 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3733 handle_errors.push(err);
3743 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3744 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3745 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3746 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3747 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3748 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3749 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3751 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3752 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3753 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3754 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3755 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3756 if no_remaining_entries {
3757 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3759 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3760 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3761 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3762 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3763 no_remaining_entries = false;
3771 if no_remaining_entries {
3772 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3773 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3775 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3782 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3784 /// This currently includes:
3785 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3786 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3787 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3789 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3790 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3792 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3793 /// estimate fetches.
3794 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3795 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3796 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3797 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3799 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3801 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3802 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3805 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3806 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3807 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3808 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3809 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3810 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3812 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3814 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3816 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3817 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3818 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3819 if needs_close { return false; }
3822 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3823 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3824 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3825 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3826 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3827 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3828 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3833 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3834 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3836 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3837 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3838 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3842 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3843 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3848 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3854 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3855 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3856 // This should be unreachable
3857 debug_assert!(false);
3860 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3861 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3862 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3863 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3865 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3866 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3867 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3869 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3876 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3877 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3878 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3879 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3880 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3883 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3884 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3887 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3893 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3894 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3895 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3897 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3898 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3899 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3900 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3902 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3903 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3904 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3905 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3906 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3909 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3910 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3911 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3912 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3913 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3914 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3915 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3916 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3917 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3922 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3923 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3925 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3927 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3928 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3929 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3930 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3931 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3932 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3933 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3935 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3937 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3938 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3940 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3945 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3946 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3947 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3948 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3949 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3950 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3951 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3952 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3953 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3954 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3956 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3957 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3958 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3959 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3961 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3962 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3963 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3964 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3965 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3969 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3970 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3971 // be surfaced to the user.
3972 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3973 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3974 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3976 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3977 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3979 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3984 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3985 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3986 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3991 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3992 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3993 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3994 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3996 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3997 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3998 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3999 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
4000 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
4003 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4004 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4005 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4008 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4009 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4010 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4012 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4013 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4014 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4015 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4016 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4017 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4018 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4019 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4023 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4027 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4028 all_paths_failed = true;
4029 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4030 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4031 payment_id: *payment_id,
4032 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4038 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4041 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4042 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4043 Some(RouteParameters {
4044 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4045 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4046 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4051 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4052 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4054 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4056 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4058 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4059 if !payment_retryable {
4060 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4061 payment_id: *payment_id,
4062 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4066 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4067 payment_id: *payment_id,
4068 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4074 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4075 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4076 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4077 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4078 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4080 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4081 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4082 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4083 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4090 error_code: onion_error_code,
4092 error_data: onion_error_data
4096 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4102 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4103 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4104 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4105 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4107 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4108 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4109 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4110 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4112 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4113 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4114 payment_id: *payment_id,
4115 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4117 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4120 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4121 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4122 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4123 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4124 network_update: None,
4127 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4130 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4132 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4137 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4138 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4139 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4141 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4142 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4143 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4145 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4146 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4147 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4148 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4150 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4151 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4154 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4156 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4160 let mut forward_event = None;
4161 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4162 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4163 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4165 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4167 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4170 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4173 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4174 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4175 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4176 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4177 time_forwardable: time
4180 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4181 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4182 failed_next_destination: destination,
4188 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4189 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4191 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4192 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4193 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4195 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4196 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4197 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4198 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4200 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4201 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4202 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4203 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4204 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4205 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4206 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4207 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4211 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4212 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4213 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4215 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4216 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4217 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4218 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4220 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4221 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4222 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4223 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4224 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4226 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4227 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4228 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4229 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4230 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4231 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4232 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4233 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4234 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4235 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4236 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4243 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4248 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4249 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4250 debug_assert!(false);
4254 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4255 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4256 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4257 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4258 if sources.len() != 1 {
4259 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4260 debug_assert!(false);
4265 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4266 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4267 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4268 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4269 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4272 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4274 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4275 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4278 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4279 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4280 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4284 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4285 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4286 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4287 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4288 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4289 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4290 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4291 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4292 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4294 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4295 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4296 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4297 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4298 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4299 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4301 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4305 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4307 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4308 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4309 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4310 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4311 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4312 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4313 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4317 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4318 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4321 purpose: payment_purpose,
4322 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4326 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4327 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4328 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4329 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4334 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4335 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4337 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4338 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4339 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4340 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4341 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4342 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4343 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4346 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4347 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4348 payment_preimage, e);
4349 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4350 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4351 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4352 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4356 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4357 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4358 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4360 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4361 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4362 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4363 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4364 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4365 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4371 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4373 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4376 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4377 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4378 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4380 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4381 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4382 payment_preimage, e);
4385 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4386 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4388 chan.remove_entry();
4390 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4393 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4396 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4397 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4398 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4399 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4400 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4401 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4402 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4403 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4404 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4405 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4406 pending_events.push(
4407 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4409 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4419 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4421 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4422 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4423 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4424 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4425 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4426 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4427 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4428 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4429 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4430 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4431 pending_events.push(
4432 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4433 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4439 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4443 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4444 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4445 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4447 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4448 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4449 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4450 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4451 pending_events.push(
4452 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4464 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4465 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4466 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4467 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4468 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4469 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4470 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4473 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4474 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4475 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4476 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4477 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4480 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4481 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4482 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4483 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4484 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4485 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4486 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4487 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4488 // again on restart.
4489 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4490 payment_preimage, update_res);
4492 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4493 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4494 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4495 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4498 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4499 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4500 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4501 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4505 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4506 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4507 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4510 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4511 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4512 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4514 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4516 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4526 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4527 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4528 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4531 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4532 /// update completion.
4533 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4534 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4535 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4536 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4537 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4538 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4539 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4541 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4542 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4543 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4544 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4547 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4548 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4550 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4551 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4552 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4557 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4559 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4560 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4561 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4562 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4567 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4568 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4569 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4570 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4571 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4576 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4580 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4586 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4587 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4588 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4594 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4598 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4599 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4600 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4601 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4605 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4609 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4610 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4611 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4612 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4613 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4614 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4615 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4617 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4618 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4619 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4624 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4625 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4626 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4629 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4631 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4632 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4634 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4635 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4636 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4637 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4641 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4643 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4644 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4647 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4648 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4649 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4651 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4652 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4653 /// used to accept such channels.
4655 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4656 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4657 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4658 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4661 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4662 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4664 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4665 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4666 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4668 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4669 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4671 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4672 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4674 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4675 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4677 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4678 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4679 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4680 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4683 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4684 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4686 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4687 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4688 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4690 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4691 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4693 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4694 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4697 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4698 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4699 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4700 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4701 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4702 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4706 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4707 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4711 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4712 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4716 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4722 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4723 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4727 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4728 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4731 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4732 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4733 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4735 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4736 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4737 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4738 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4741 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4746 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4747 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4750 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4754 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4755 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4756 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4758 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4759 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4760 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4763 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4764 pending_events.push(
4765 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4766 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4767 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4768 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4769 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4770 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4775 entry.insert(channel);
4781 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4782 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4783 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4787 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4790 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4791 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4796 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4797 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4798 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4799 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4800 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4802 user_channel_id: user_id,
4807 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4808 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4809 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4810 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4811 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4812 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4813 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4814 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4815 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4817 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4822 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4823 // lock before watch_channel
4824 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4825 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4826 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4827 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4828 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4829 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4830 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4831 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4832 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4833 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4834 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4835 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4836 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4838 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4839 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4840 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4841 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4842 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4843 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4844 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4847 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4848 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4849 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4854 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4855 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4858 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4859 funding_msg.channel_id))
4861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4862 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4865 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4866 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4869 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4870 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4878 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4880 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4881 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4883 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4885 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4886 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4888 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4889 Ok(update) => update,
4890 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4892 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4893 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4895 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4896 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4897 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4898 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4899 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4900 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4901 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4907 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4908 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4915 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4916 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4920 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4921 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4922 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4923 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4925 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4928 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4929 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4930 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4931 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4932 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4933 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4934 msg: announcement_sigs,
4936 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4937 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4938 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4939 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4940 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4941 // announcement_signatures.
4942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4943 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4944 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4945 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4951 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4959 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4960 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4961 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4967 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4971 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4972 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4973 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4974 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4977 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4978 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4980 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4981 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4982 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4983 let (result, is_permanent) =
4984 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4986 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4991 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4992 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4993 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5003 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5004 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5005 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5006 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5009 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5013 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5014 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5019 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5022 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5023 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5024 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5025 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5030 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5031 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5032 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5033 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5034 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5035 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5036 } else { (tx, None) }
5038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5041 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5042 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5043 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5045 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5046 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5047 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5052 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5057 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5058 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5059 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5060 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5062 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5063 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5064 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5065 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5067 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5068 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5069 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5071 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5073 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5074 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5077 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5078 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5079 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5080 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5081 match pending_forward_info {
5082 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5083 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5084 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5085 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5087 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5089 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5090 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5091 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5094 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5096 _ => pending_forward_info
5099 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5106 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5107 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5108 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5109 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5110 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5112 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5113 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5115 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5120 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5124 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5125 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5127 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5129 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5132 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5139 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5140 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5141 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5142 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5144 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5145 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5147 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5148 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5149 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5151 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5158 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5159 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5160 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5161 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5163 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5164 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5166 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5167 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5168 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5169 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5170 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5171 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5172 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5177 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5178 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5182 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5183 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5184 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5186 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5188 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5189 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5190 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5191 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5192 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5193 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5195 commitment_signed: msg,
5201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5206 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5207 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5208 let mut forward_event = None;
5209 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5210 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5211 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5212 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5213 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5214 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5215 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5216 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5218 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5219 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5221 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5222 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5223 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5225 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5226 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5229 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5230 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5232 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5233 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5234 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5235 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5236 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5237 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5238 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5239 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5240 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5243 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5244 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5247 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5248 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5249 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5250 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5251 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5252 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5253 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5256 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5257 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5258 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5263 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5264 // payments are being processed.
5265 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5266 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5268 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5269 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5276 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5280 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5281 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5282 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5285 match forward_event {
5287 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5288 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5289 time_forwardable: time
5297 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5298 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5300 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5301 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5302 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5304 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5305 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5307 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5308 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5309 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5310 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5311 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5312 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5313 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5314 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5315 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5316 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5317 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5318 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5320 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5321 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5322 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5323 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5324 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5325 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5327 } else { unreachable!(); }
5329 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5330 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5331 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5335 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5336 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5337 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5338 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5339 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5340 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5342 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5345 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5347 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5348 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5350 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5351 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5352 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5354 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5355 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5362 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5363 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5364 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5365 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5367 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5368 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5370 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5377 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5378 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5379 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5381 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5383 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5384 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5386 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5391 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5392 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5393 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5394 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5395 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5403 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5404 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5405 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5406 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5408 // It's not a local channel
5409 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5412 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5413 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5414 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5416 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5417 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5418 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5419 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5420 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5421 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5425 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5426 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5427 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5428 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5430 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5431 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5436 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5439 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5441 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5442 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5443 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5445 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5447 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5450 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5451 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5452 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5453 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5454 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5455 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5456 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5457 let mut channel_update = None;
5458 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5459 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5460 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5463 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5464 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5465 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5466 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5467 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5468 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5469 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5474 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5475 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5476 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5477 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5478 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5487 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5488 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5491 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5492 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5497 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5498 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5499 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5500 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5501 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5502 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5503 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5504 match monitor_event {
5505 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5506 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5508 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5511 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5512 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5513 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5516 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5517 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5518 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5520 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5521 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5522 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5523 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5524 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5525 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5530 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5531 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5533 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5535 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5536 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5537 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5538 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5539 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5544 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5545 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5551 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5552 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5555 has_pending_monitor_events
5558 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5559 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5560 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5562 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5563 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5566 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5567 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5568 /// update was applied.
5570 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5571 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5572 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5573 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5574 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5575 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5576 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5577 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5579 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5580 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5581 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5582 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5584 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5585 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5586 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5587 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5589 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5591 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5594 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5595 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5596 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5597 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5598 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5599 updates: commitment_update,
5603 has_monitor_update = true;
5604 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5605 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5606 if close_channel { return false; }
5613 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5614 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5615 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5622 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5623 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5624 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5627 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5628 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5634 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5635 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5636 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5637 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5638 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5639 let mut has_update = false;
5641 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5642 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5643 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5644 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5646 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5647 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5648 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5649 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5651 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5652 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5655 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5656 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5657 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5658 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5659 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5664 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5666 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5667 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5668 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5674 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5675 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5682 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5683 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5689 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5690 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5692 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5693 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5694 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5695 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5696 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5697 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5698 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5699 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5700 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5701 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5702 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5703 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5704 assert!(should_broadcast);
5705 } else { unreachable!(); }
5706 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5708 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5712 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5713 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5715 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5716 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5719 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5723 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5725 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5726 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5727 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5728 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5729 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5730 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5731 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5732 // never fail a payment too early.
5733 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5735 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5743 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5746 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5747 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5749 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5750 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5751 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5753 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5755 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5756 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5760 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5761 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5763 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5765 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5766 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5767 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5768 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5769 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5770 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5773 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5774 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5776 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5779 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5781 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5783 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5784 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5785 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5786 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5787 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5790 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5791 /// stored external to LDK.
5793 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5794 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5795 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5797 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5798 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5801 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5802 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5803 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5804 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5806 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5807 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5808 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5809 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5810 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5812 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5813 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5814 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5815 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5816 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5818 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5819 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5821 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5822 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5826 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5827 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5829 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5831 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5832 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5833 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5834 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5837 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5838 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5840 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5843 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5845 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5847 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5848 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5851 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5852 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5854 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5855 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5856 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5859 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5860 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5862 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5863 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5864 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5865 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5867 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5868 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5869 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5870 Some(_) => continue,
5871 None => return scid_candidate
5876 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5878 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5879 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5881 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5882 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5883 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5887 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5888 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5889 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5891 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5892 /// times to get a unique scid.
5893 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5894 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5895 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5897 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5898 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5899 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5900 return scid_candidate
5904 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5905 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5906 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5907 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5909 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5910 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5911 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5912 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5920 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5921 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5922 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5923 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5924 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5929 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5930 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5931 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5935 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5936 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5940 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5941 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5944 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5945 /// using the given event handler.
5947 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5948 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5951 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5952 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5953 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5955 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5957 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5958 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5959 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5960 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5963 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5964 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5965 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5968 for event in pending_events {
5969 handler(event).await;
5972 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5973 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5978 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5979 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5980 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5981 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5982 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5985 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5986 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5987 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5988 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5990 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5991 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5992 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5993 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5996 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5997 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5999 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6000 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6003 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6004 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6005 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
6007 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6008 events.replace(pending_events);
6017 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6019 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6020 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6021 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6022 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6025 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6027 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6028 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6029 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6030 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6031 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6033 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6034 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6035 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6036 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6039 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6040 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6041 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6044 for event in pending_events {
6045 handler.handle_event(event);
6053 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6055 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6056 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6057 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6058 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6061 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6063 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6064 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6065 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6066 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6067 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6070 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6071 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6074 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6075 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6076 let new_height = height - 1;
6078 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6079 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6080 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6081 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6082 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6083 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6086 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6090 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6092 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6094 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6098 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6099 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6100 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6101 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6103 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6104 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6107 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6108 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6110 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6111 if height < last_best_block_height {
6112 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6113 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6117 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6118 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6119 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6120 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6122 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6123 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6127 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6129 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6131 macro_rules! max_time {
6132 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6134 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6135 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6136 // having an explicit local time source.
6137 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6138 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6139 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6140 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6141 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6147 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6148 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6149 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6150 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6154 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6155 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6156 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6157 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6158 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6159 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6165 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6167 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6168 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6169 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6170 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6171 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6172 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6177 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6179 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6180 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6181 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6182 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6185 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6186 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6188 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6189 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6190 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6191 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6192 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6194 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6195 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6197 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6198 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6199 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6200 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6201 let res = f(channel);
6202 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6203 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6204 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6205 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6206 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6208 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6209 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6210 if channel.is_usable() {
6211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6212 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6213 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6214 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6223 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6225 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6227 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6228 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6229 msg: announcement_sigs,
6231 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6232 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6235 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6236 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6237 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6242 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6243 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6244 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6245 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6246 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6247 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6248 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6249 // is always consistent.
6250 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6251 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6252 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6253 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6254 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6257 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6258 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6259 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6260 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6261 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6262 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6263 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6267 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6268 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6270 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6271 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6272 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6273 data: reason_message,
6282 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6283 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6284 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6285 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6286 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6287 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6288 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6289 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6290 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6291 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6293 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6294 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6295 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6299 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6302 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6303 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6304 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6305 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6306 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6307 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6308 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6309 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6310 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6313 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6314 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6315 _ => unreachable!(),
6317 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6318 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6319 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6326 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6328 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6329 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6333 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6334 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6335 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6336 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6338 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6340 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6341 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6342 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6343 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6344 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6345 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6348 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6349 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6350 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6352 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6353 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6354 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6355 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6358 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6359 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6360 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6361 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6362 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6365 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6366 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6367 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6370 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6371 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6372 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6373 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6377 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6378 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6379 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6380 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6381 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6382 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6385 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6387 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6390 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6395 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6400 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6402 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6405 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6406 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6407 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6410 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6415 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6417 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6420 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6422 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6425 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6430 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6432 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6435 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6437 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6440 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6442 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6445 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6447 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6450 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6452 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6455 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6460 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6461 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6462 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6465 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6470 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6472 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6475 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6477 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6478 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6480 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6481 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6482 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6483 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6484 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6485 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6486 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6487 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6488 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6489 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6490 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6493 no_channels_remain = false;
6498 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6501 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6502 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6503 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6504 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6505 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6506 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6507 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6508 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6509 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6510 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6511 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6512 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6513 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6514 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6515 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6516 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6517 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6518 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6519 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6523 if no_channels_remain {
6524 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6527 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6528 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6532 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6533 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6534 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6538 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6543 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6544 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6546 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6547 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6551 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6557 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6558 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6559 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6560 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6561 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6562 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6563 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6564 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6568 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6569 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6570 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6575 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6576 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6577 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6579 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6587 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6591 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6594 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6595 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6596 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6597 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6598 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6603 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6604 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6605 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6606 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6609 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6610 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6611 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6619 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6620 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6624 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6625 provided_node_features()
6628 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6629 provided_init_features()
6633 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6634 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6635 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6636 provided_init_features().to_context()
6639 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6640 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6642 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6643 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6644 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6645 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6646 provided_init_features().to_context()
6649 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6650 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6651 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6652 provided_init_features().to_context()
6655 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6656 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6657 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6658 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6659 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6660 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6661 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6662 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6663 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6664 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6665 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6666 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6667 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6668 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6669 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6670 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6671 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6672 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6676 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6677 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6679 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6680 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6681 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6682 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6686 (2, node_id, required),
6687 (4, features, required),
6688 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6689 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6690 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6691 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6694 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6695 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6696 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6697 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6698 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6699 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6700 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6701 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6702 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6703 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6704 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6705 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6706 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6707 (7, self.config, option),
6708 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6709 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6710 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6711 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6712 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6713 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6714 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6715 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6716 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6717 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6718 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6719 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6720 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6721 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6722 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6723 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6724 (32, self.is_public, required),
6725 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6726 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6727 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6733 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6734 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6735 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6736 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6737 (2, channel_id, required),
6738 (3, channel_type, option),
6739 (4, counterparty, required),
6740 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6741 (6, funding_txo, option),
6742 (7, config, option),
6743 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6744 (9, confirmations, option),
6745 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6746 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6747 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6748 (16, balance_msat, required),
6749 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6750 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6751 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6752 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6753 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6754 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6755 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6756 (26, is_outbound, required),
6757 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6758 (30, is_usable, required),
6759 (32, is_public, required),
6760 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6761 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6762 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6765 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6766 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6767 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6768 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6769 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6773 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6775 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6776 outbound_scid_alias,
6780 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6781 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6783 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6784 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6785 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6786 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6787 confirmations_required,
6789 force_close_spend_delay,
6790 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6791 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6792 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6793 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6794 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6795 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6800 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6801 (2, channels, vec_type),
6802 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6803 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6806 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6808 (0, onion_packet, required),
6809 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6812 (0, payment_data, required),
6813 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6814 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6816 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6817 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6818 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6822 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6823 (0, routing, required),
6824 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6825 (4, payment_hash, required),
6826 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6827 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6828 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6832 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6833 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6835 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6837 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6838 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6839 reason.write(writer)?;
6841 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6842 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6845 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6846 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6847 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6848 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6855 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6856 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6857 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6861 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6862 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6863 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6867 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6868 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6869 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6870 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6871 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6875 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6876 // messages contained in the variants.
6877 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6878 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6879 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6881 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6882 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6883 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6884 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6885 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6888 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6890 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6891 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6892 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6894 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6899 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6904 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6905 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6906 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6907 (2, outpoint, required),
6908 (4, htlc_id, required),
6909 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6912 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6913 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6914 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6915 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6916 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6918 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6919 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6920 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6921 (2, self.value, required),
6922 (4, payment_data, option),
6923 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6924 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6930 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6931 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6932 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6934 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6935 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6936 let mut total_msat = None;
6937 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6938 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6939 (0, prev_hop, required),
6940 (1, total_msat, option),
6941 (2, value, required),
6942 (4, payment_data, option),
6943 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6944 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6946 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6948 if payment_data.is_some() {
6949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6951 if total_msat.is_none() {
6952 total_msat = Some(value);
6954 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6957 if total_msat.is_none() {
6958 if payment_data.is_none() {
6959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6961 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6963 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6967 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6970 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6977 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6978 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6979 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6983 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6984 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6985 let mut payment_id = None;
6986 let mut payment_secret = None;
6987 let mut payment_params = None;
6988 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6989 (0, session_priv, required),
6990 (1, payment_id, option),
6991 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6992 (3, payment_secret, option),
6993 (4, path, vec_type),
6994 (5, payment_params, option),
6996 if payment_id.is_none() {
6997 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6999 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7001 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7002 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7003 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7004 path: path.unwrap(),
7005 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7010 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7011 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7016 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7019 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7021 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7022 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7023 (0, session_priv, required),
7024 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7025 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7026 (3, payment_secret, option),
7027 (4, *path, vec_type),
7028 (5, payment_params, option),
7031 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7033 field.write(writer)?;
7040 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7041 (0, LightningError) => {
7045 (0, failure_code, required),
7046 (2, data, vec_type),
7050 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7051 (0, forward_info, required),
7052 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7053 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7054 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7055 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7058 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7060 (0, htlc_id, required),
7061 (2, err_packet, required),
7066 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7067 (0, payment_secret, required),
7068 (2, expiry_time, required),
7069 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7070 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7071 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7074 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7076 (0, session_privs, required),
7079 (0, session_privs, required),
7080 (1, payment_hash, option),
7081 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7084 (0, session_privs, required),
7085 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7086 (2, payment_hash, required),
7087 (4, payment_secret, option),
7088 (6, total_msat, required),
7089 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7090 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7093 (0, session_privs, required),
7094 (2, payment_hash, required),
7098 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7099 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7100 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7101 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7106 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7108 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7110 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7112 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7113 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7114 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7118 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7119 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7120 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7121 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7122 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7123 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7124 unfunded_channels += 1;
7127 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7128 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7129 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7130 channel.write(writer)?;
7136 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7137 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7138 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7139 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7140 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7141 for forward in pending_forwards {
7142 forward.write(writer)?;
7147 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7148 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7149 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7151 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7152 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7153 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7154 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7155 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7156 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7157 htlc.write(writer)?;
7159 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7163 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7164 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7165 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7166 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7167 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7170 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7171 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7172 for event in events.iter() {
7173 event.write(writer)?;
7176 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7177 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7178 for event in background_events.iter() {
7180 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7182 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7183 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7188 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7189 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7190 // likely to be identical.
7191 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7192 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7194 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7195 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7196 hash.write(writer)?;
7197 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7200 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7201 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7202 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7203 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7204 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7207 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7208 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7210 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7211 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7212 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7213 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7216 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7217 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7221 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7222 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7223 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7225 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7226 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7227 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7233 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7234 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7235 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7236 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7238 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7239 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7240 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7241 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7242 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7243 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7244 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7245 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7252 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7254 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7256 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7257 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7258 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7259 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7260 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7261 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7262 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7263 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7264 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7265 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7266 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7267 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7268 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7270 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7271 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7273 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7274 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7276 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7277 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7278 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7279 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7280 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7281 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7283 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7284 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7285 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7286 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7287 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7291 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7292 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7294 pub keys_manager: K,
7296 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7298 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7299 pub fee_estimator: F,
7300 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7302 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7303 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7304 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7305 pub chain_monitor: M,
7307 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7308 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7309 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7310 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7311 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7312 /// deserialization.
7314 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7315 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7316 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7318 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7319 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7321 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7322 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7323 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7324 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7326 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7329 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7330 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7333 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7334 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7335 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7336 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7337 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7341 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7342 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7343 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7344 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7345 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7347 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7348 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7353 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7354 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7355 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7356 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7357 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7358 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7359 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7360 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7363 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7364 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7365 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7369 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7370 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7371 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7372 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7373 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7374 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7377 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7378 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7380 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7381 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7384 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7386 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7387 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7388 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7389 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7390 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7391 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7392 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7393 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7394 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7395 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7396 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7397 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7398 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7399 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7400 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7401 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7402 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7403 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7404 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7405 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7406 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7407 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7408 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7409 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7410 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7411 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7412 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7413 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7414 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7415 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7416 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7417 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7418 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7419 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7420 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7421 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7422 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7423 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7424 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7425 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7427 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7428 let mut found_htlc = false;
7429 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7430 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7433 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7434 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7435 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7436 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7437 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7438 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7439 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7440 log_info!(args.logger,
7441 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7442 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7443 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7447 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7448 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7449 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7451 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7452 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7454 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7456 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7457 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7458 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7459 // safely discard the channel.
7460 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7461 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7462 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7463 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7464 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7467 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7468 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7469 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7470 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7471 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7472 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7476 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7477 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7478 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7479 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7483 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7484 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7486 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7487 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7490 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7491 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7493 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7496 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7498 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7499 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7501 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7502 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7503 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7505 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7508 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7509 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7510 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7511 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 let peer_state = PeerState {
7513 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7515 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7518 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7519 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7520 for _ in 0..event_count {
7521 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7522 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7527 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7529 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7530 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7531 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7532 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7536 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7537 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7540 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7541 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7542 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7543 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7547 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7548 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7549 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7550 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7551 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7552 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7553 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7555 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7560 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7561 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7562 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7563 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7564 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7565 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7566 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7567 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7568 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7569 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7570 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7571 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7572 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7573 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7574 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7575 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7577 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7578 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7581 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7582 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7585 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7586 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7587 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7588 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7589 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7590 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7592 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7594 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7595 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7596 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7597 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7598 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7599 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7600 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7602 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7603 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7604 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7605 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7606 if path.is_empty() {
7607 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7610 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7611 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7612 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7613 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7615 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7616 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7617 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7620 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7621 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7622 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7623 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7625 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7626 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7627 total_msat: path_amt,
7628 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7630 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7631 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7636 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7637 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7638 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7639 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7640 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
7641 // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
7643 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7644 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7645 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7646 if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
7647 htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7649 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7650 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7655 !forwards.is_empty()
7663 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7664 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7665 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7666 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7667 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7668 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7669 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7670 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7674 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7675 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7677 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7678 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7679 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7682 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7683 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7686 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7687 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7688 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7689 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7690 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7692 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7693 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7694 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7695 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7696 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7697 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7698 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7699 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7701 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7706 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7708 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7710 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7711 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7713 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7717 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7718 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7720 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7721 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7724 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7726 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7728 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7729 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7730 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7731 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7736 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7737 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7738 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7739 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7741 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7742 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7743 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7745 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7746 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7747 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7748 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7749 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7750 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7752 if chan.is_usable() {
7753 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7754 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7755 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7756 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7757 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7762 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7764 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7765 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7766 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7767 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7768 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7769 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7770 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7771 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7772 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7773 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7774 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7776 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7777 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7779 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7780 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7781 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7782 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7784 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7785 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7786 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7787 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7789 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7790 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7791 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7792 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7794 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7795 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7796 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7798 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7799 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7802 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7805 purpose: payment_purpose,
7806 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7812 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7814 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7815 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7816 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7818 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7820 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7822 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7824 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7825 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7826 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7827 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7829 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7830 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7831 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7832 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7833 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7834 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7836 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7842 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7844 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7846 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7847 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7848 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7849 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7851 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7852 logger: args.logger,
7853 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7856 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7857 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7858 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7859 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7860 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7863 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7864 //connection or two.
7866 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7872 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7873 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7874 use core::time::Duration;
7875 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7876 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7877 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7878 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7879 use crate::ln::msgs;
7880 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7881 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7882 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7883 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7884 use crate::util::test_utils;
7885 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7888 fn test_notify_limits() {
7889 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7890 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7891 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7892 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7893 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7894 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7896 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7897 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7898 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7899 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7900 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7902 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7904 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7905 // to connect messages with new values
7906 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7907 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7908 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7909 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7911 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7912 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7913 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7914 // ... but the last node should not.
7915 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7916 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7917 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7918 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7921 // about the channel.
7922 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7923 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7924 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7926 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7928 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7929 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7930 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7931 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7932 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7933 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7935 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7936 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7937 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7939 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7940 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7941 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7942 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7943 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7944 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7946 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7947 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7948 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7949 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7950 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7951 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7952 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7953 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7955 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7956 // the channel info has updated.
7957 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7958 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7959 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7960 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7961 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7962 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7966 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7967 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7969 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7970 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7971 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7972 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7973 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7975 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7976 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7977 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7978 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7980 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7981 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7982 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7983 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7984 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7985 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7987 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7988 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7989 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7991 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7992 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7996 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7997 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7998 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8002 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8004 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8005 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8006 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8007 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8008 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8009 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8010 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8012 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8014 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8015 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8017 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8018 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8019 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8021 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8022 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8023 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8024 // lightning messages manually.
8025 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8026 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8029 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8031 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8033 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8034 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8036 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8037 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8039 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8040 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8041 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8043 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8044 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8045 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8047 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8049 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8051 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8052 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8055 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8056 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8057 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8060 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8061 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8062 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8063 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8068 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8069 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8070 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8071 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8076 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8077 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8078 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8079 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8086 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8087 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8088 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8089 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8090 // fails as expected.
8091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8093 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8094 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8095 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8096 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8097 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8099 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8100 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8101 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8103 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8104 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8105 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8106 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8107 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8109 let route = find_route(
8110 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8111 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8113 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8115 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8117 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8118 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8119 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8122 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8123 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8124 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8125 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8127 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8128 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8129 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8130 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8131 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8132 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8133 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8134 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8135 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8137 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8138 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8140 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8141 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8142 let route = find_route(
8143 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8144 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8146 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8148 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8150 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8151 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8152 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8154 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8155 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8156 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8158 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8160 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8161 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8164 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8168 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8169 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8170 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8171 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8172 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8173 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8174 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8175 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8176 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8178 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8179 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8183 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8184 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8185 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8186 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8187 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8188 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8189 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8191 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8192 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8193 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8194 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8196 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8197 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8198 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8199 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8200 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8202 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8203 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8204 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8205 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8206 let route = find_route(
8207 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8208 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8211 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8212 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8213 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8214 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8217 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8218 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8220 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8225 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8229 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8230 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8234 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8236 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8237 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8238 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8239 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8241 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8242 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8243 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8244 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8245 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8247 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8248 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8249 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8250 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8251 let route = find_route(
8252 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8253 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8256 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8257 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8258 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8259 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8260 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8263 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8264 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8265 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8266 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8267 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8268 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8269 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8271 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8275 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8279 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8281 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8282 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8283 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8284 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8286 // Marshall an MPP route.
8287 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8288 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8289 route.paths.push(path);
8290 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8291 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8292 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8293 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8294 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8295 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8297 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8298 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8299 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8300 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8305 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8306 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8310 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8312 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8313 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8315 total_msat: 100_000,
8318 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8319 // payment verification fails as expected.
8320 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8321 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8322 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8323 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8325 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8329 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8330 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8334 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8335 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8336 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8337 // the channel is successfully closed.
8338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8341 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8343 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8344 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8345 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8346 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8347 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8349 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8350 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8352 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8353 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8354 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8355 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8358 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8360 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8361 // as it has the funding transaction.
8362 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8363 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8364 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8366 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8369 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8371 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8373 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8374 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8375 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8377 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8378 // as it has the funding transaction.
8379 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8380 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8381 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8384 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8385 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8387 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8388 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8389 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8391 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8392 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8393 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8394 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8396 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8397 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8399 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8400 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8401 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8402 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8403 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8404 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8405 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8407 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8408 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8409 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8410 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8411 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8412 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8413 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8416 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8418 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8419 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8420 // closing transaction).
8421 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8422 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8423 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8425 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8426 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8427 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8428 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8429 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8432 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8434 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8436 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8437 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8438 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8440 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8443 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8447 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8449 use crate::chain::Listen;
8450 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8451 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8452 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8453 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8454 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8455 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8456 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8457 use crate::util::test_utils;
8458 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8459 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8461 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8462 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8463 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8465 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8469 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8470 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8471 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8472 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8473 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8474 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8475 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8480 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8481 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8484 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8485 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8486 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8488 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8489 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8491 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8492 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8494 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8495 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8497 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8498 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8499 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8500 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8501 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8503 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8505 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8507 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8508 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8509 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8510 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8511 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8513 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8515 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8517 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8518 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8519 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8520 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8521 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8524 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8525 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8526 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8528 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8529 } else { panic!(); }
8531 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8532 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8534 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8537 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8540 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8541 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8543 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8544 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8545 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8546 match msg_events[0] {
8547 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8548 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8549 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8553 match msg_events[1] {
8554 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8558 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8559 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8561 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8562 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8567 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8568 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8570 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8571 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8573 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8576 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8578 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8579 macro_rules! send_payment {
8580 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8581 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8582 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8583 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8584 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8585 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8586 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8587 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8588 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8589 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8591 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8592 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8594 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8595 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8597 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8598 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8599 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8600 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8601 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8602 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8603 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8604 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8606 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8607 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8608 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8609 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8611 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8612 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8613 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8614 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8615 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8617 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8620 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8621 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8622 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8623 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8625 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8630 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8631 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);